Subseries: Philleo Nash, 1986 September 10
Note: Access online.

INTRODUCTION

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND--GENEALOGY
Scope and Content Note: Nash born in Wisconsin Rapids. Grandparents were pioneers. Maternal grandfather was an editor and an abolitionist. Paternal grandfather was an early cranberry grower and a member of the Wisconsin legislature; an associate of William Vilas and went to Washington, D.C., with him when he was named postmaster general. First president of Nekoosa Paper Company; early conservationist. A conservative Democrat.

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND--YOUTH
Scope and Content Note: Interested in music. Spent a year at Curtis Institute in Philadelphia. Attended the University's Experimental College for two years and got fed up with unstructured education. Got interested in anthropology. Went to graduate school at the University of Chicago.

MORE ON PATERNAL GRANDFATHER
Scope and Content Note: Vilas and Nash's grandfather were seatmates in the legislature and were largely responsible for getting sufficient money from the legislature to improve the standing of the University.

PARENTS' POLITICS
Scope and Content Note: Minimal. Mother's people were non-political. Father's people became disillusioned after William Jennings Bryan was nominated for the presidency in 1896. They became Roosevelt Republicans; liberals only in their support for conservation. Father, Guy Nash, was an independent Republican, who supported Roosevelt's Progressive Party. Uncle Roy Nash was a well known forester. “...It is a fact that politically I was brought up to think that the Republicans were running a pretty nasty machine, that is the La Follette Republicans.”

NASH'S POLITICS IN COLLEGE WERE “INNOCENT”
Scope and Content Note: Not interested in student political organizations. Supported Herbert Hoover for president in 1928. Supported Philip La Follette in 1932.

NOT VERY POLITICAL THROUGHOUT THE 1930s
Scope and Content Note: Very involved in his studies at the University of Chicago. Ran into some New Deal programs while doing his doctoral research on an Indian reservation. Was not an enthusiast of either the Indian Bureau or the New Deal programs he saw. “My political attitudes, I think, were pretty much those of young anthropologists of that era, namely, 'don't trust the government.'” Did not vote until 1944, except once when his father was being recalled from the local school board.

FINALLY GOT POLITICAL WHEN HE WAS IN CANADA
Scope and Content Note: Canada entered World War II and imposed strict security measures. A close friend was arrested under the Defense of Canada Regulations and Nash became very involved in seeking his release. This was during the Nazi-Soviet Pact and his friend was accused of being a Communist. He was released without fanfare when Germany invaded Russia.

RETURNED TO WISCONSIN RAPIDS FOR A YEAR AND BEGAN TO LEARN THE CRANBERRY BUSINESS

WHEN THE UNITED STATES ENTERED THE WAR, NASH WENT TO WASHINGTON TO WORK FOR THE OFFICE OF WAR INFORMATION
Scope and Content Note: Was doing applied anthropology in the Office of War Information. Became aware in the course of his work of very acute racial tensions. Began to report on it, but found there was no one to talk to about it. Found a sympathetic ear in Jonathan Daniels in the White House. Mishandling of the 1943 Detroit race riot.

END OF TAPE 76, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

CONTINUATION OF DISCUSSION OF NASH'S WORK IN WASHINGTON DURING WORLD WAR II
Scope and Content Note: Daniels charged with keeping track of race relations in the interest of avoiding disruptions in war production. Nash was made his assistant, but also had to continue to do his work in the Office of War Information. “And I would say it was at this point that I really became political.”

THE POLITICIZATION OF PHILLEO NASH
Scope and Content Note: “So let's say I was radicalized by my experiences in Canada and by the Depression. And politicized by discovering the nature and source of political power in Washington in an area that I cared a great deal--namely civil rights.”

MORE ON NASH'S WORK ON CIVIL RIGHTS DURING THE WAR
Scope and Content Note: Daniels was a liberal Southerner and thus had middle-of-the-road views. Avoided further riots, though sometimes did call out troops or go to court. “We had the full power of the presidency, and we used it.”

TOOK AN ACTIVE ROLE IN THE 1944 ELECTION
Scope and Content Note: Concerned because the only previous election held during a war was in 1864 and there were riots in the streets. Roosevelt determined not to campaign in the usual sense. Part of the campaign strategy was to provide the press with “instant replies” rather than to make speeches. As soon as Republican presidential candidate Thomas Dewey made a speech, the speech was sifted for errors and a reply drafted and issued by the White House press office. Daniels was a member of the Instant Reply Committee and asked Nash to figure out a way to speed up the replies to the point where they would be ready virtually by the time Dewey had completed his major evening speech so that the reply could appear in the morning newspapers. Advance copies of Dewey's speeches were received by teletype in the afternoon and analysis of them began immediately. The reply was ready before the speech was even given; only had to listen for any changes in the actual speech. Also worked with Ted Posten, head of the Negro News Desk, to write headlines for the Negro weeklies during the campaign. “News manipulation.”

POLITICAL EDUCATION DURING THE TRUMAN YEARS
Scope and Content Note: Became David Niles' assistant in the White House shortly before Roosevelt's death. Niles had been in the upper eschelons of the 1924 La Follette-Wheeler campaign and was Roosevelt's “point man” on third party movements. When Niles got sick, Nash succeeded him during the last two years of the Truman administration. “...I learned something about politics there.... I learned practical politics. I learned timing. And I learned something about what power could do if you knew how to use it and if you were a lot more interested in the outcome than you were in what happened to yourself. I was always rather reckless.”

1948 ELECTION
Scope and Content Note: Nash's job was to try to get the black vote as close to one hundred percent for Truman as possible. “And it was pretty close. So after we picked that one up off the floor, I became a little arrogant about my knowledge of practical politics.”

CONTACT WITH WOOD COUNTY DURING THE TRUMAN YEARS
Scope and Content Note: His father died in 1946 and Nash thought he would have to return to Wisconsin Rapids to run the family cranberry business. Truman did not want him to leave and told him to take whatever leave was necessary, but to stay on the White House staff. Did spend several months off and on in Wisconsin Rapids and kept close contact with his sister, Jean, who ran the business on a day to day basis. On one of his visits home, Milt Schneider and Warren Sawall enlisted his support for the DOC.

CONDITION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN DURING THE TRUMAN YEARS
Scope and Content Note: The defeat of Bob La Follette “caused great consternation in Washington...and a good deal of contempt for the political organization in Wisconsin that would let that happen.” Proxmire came in and bumped “a perfectly good assemblyman.” In general, the party was not getting very far. Most of the new leaders of the party in Wisconsin would visit Nash in Washington, at least once, since he was their best White House contact. “I had no great reason to have a lot of respect for what the DOC was doing in Wisconsin.”

AFTER TRUMAN LEFT THE WHITE HOUSE, NASH REMAINED IN WASHINGTON AND SET UP AN UNSUCCESSFUL CONSULTING BUSINESS IN THE AREA OF RACE RELATIONS
Scope and Content Note: “I lacked both clients and influence.” Returned to Wisconsin in August 1954.

NASH'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DOC IN 1954
Scope and Content Note: He was anxious “to settle my score with Joe McCarthy.” See Milton and Gloria Schneider interview, Tape 72, Side 2, 24. The DOC had not made the necessary alliances to defeat McCarthy. Someone needed to bridge the three-way gap between Dane County, the southeastern part of the state, and the north. Needed someone to organize the party, not organize for his own candidacy.

INVOLVEMENT IN WOOD COUNTY DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Scope and Content Note: Ran for county chairman and was elected. Organized meetings “that were of a new style.” Used the rural telephone lines and mailboxes, invited whole families, “and you use the real social centers which are the country bars.” Concentrate meetings in the winter when farmers are less busy. Refreshments and entertainment. Membership grew. Bridged the gap between labor and farmers.

DOC CHAIRMAN ELLIOT WALSTEAD ASKED NASH TO DO SOME FUNDRAISING FOR THE PARTY
Scope and Content Note: The party was spending three dollars to raise five dollars. Beefed up the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinners with big name politicians from outside the state. Party was not making effective enough use of radio and television.

END OF TAPE 76, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON NASH'S STATE LEVEL PARTY ACTIVITIES PRIOR TO BECOMING PARTY CHAIRMAN
Scope and Content Note: He did not initiate the Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinners, but be brought in celebrities and raised the price of tickets.

DECISION TO RUN FOR STATE CHAIRMANSHIP
Scope and Content Note: A delegation, including Henry Maier, came and asked him to run. Nash insisted that his support come from all parts of the state. Jerry Blaska was one of the few Dane County leaders who supported him. Nash agreed to run and “this greatly upset the Dane County Democrats.”

MILTON SCHNEIDER
Scope and Content Note: “Milt and I came apart at that point.” Milt was very opinionated and abrupt and was given the task of convincing Nash not to run; offered him the alternative of becoming national committeeman, which Nash refused.

IMMEDIATE UPSHOT OF NASH'S VICTORY
Scope and Content Note: Remained friends with his opponent, Horace Wilkie. Madison people feared Nash would close the Madison headquarters and move it to Milwaukee. “I intended to heal, not to wound.... I didn't do any of the things that the power hungry wanted me to do and thought I would do.” Henry Maier would have wanted the office moved to Milwaukee. Permitted people to buy Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner tickets on the installment plan and raised a good deal of money.

THE ROBERT LA FOLLETTE SUCHER INCIDENT
Scope and Content Note: Anti-Sucher people used the Madison party office to attempt to defeat one of the party's dully nominated candidates.

NASH'S DEFEAT AS CHAIRMAN IN 1957
Scope and Content Note: Knew he would be challenged in the convention and was not terribly disturbed by the prospect of defeat. “If I couldn't preside over a united party, I didn't want to preside at all. In other words, I didn't want to go into the 1958 election with one hand tied behind me.” Nash chose two convention lieutenants who were not good choices--Chris Seraphim, “a wild man if ever there was one,” and another man. They permitted many of Nash's supporters to go off for a drink before voting and several of them did not return in time to vote. They got in line after the polls had officially closed. They wanted to challenge their right to vote, but Nash refused. As a result, he lost by five votes.

MORE ON NASH'S DECISION TO RUN FOR THE CHAIRMANSHIP IN 1955
Scope and Content Note: Henry Maier and the others knew about his activities in Wood County because he had invited them to speak at the meetings he was holding around the county. There might have been a little mystique about the 1948 Truman election and Nash's role in that.

NASH FELT HE DID SUCCESSFULLY UNITE THE PARTY LONG ENOUGH TO WIN THE 1957 AND 1958 ELECTIONS

REASONS FOR HIS FAILURE TO WIN REELECTION TO THE PARTY CHAIRMANSHIP
Scope and Content Note: The indifference of Henry Maier. By 1957 Maier had determined that his political future was in the city of Milwaukee, not statewide. “I was substantially without a manager in '57.... The second thing is, I think, I probably too didn't care as much as I should have.” Did not organize well enough and did not campaign hard enough. Gave a poor speech at the convention.

END OF TAPE 77, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON THE PROBLEMS OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN IN THE MID-1950s
Scope and Content Note: “The DOC was put together by a combination of disillusioned Progressives and dissatisfied Democrats, I'd say.” There also were some top flight people. No better public servants in Wisconsin history than Henry Reuss, Tom Fairchild, Pat Lucey, and Jim Doyle. “But it takes more than being right to win.” It takes lots of hard work. The DOC leaders had an attitude that all it took to win elections was to nominate the best available people. “Something had to be done to overcome the mistrust of the oldtime Progressives for organized labor.” Mistrust between the Progressives whose roots were in Scandinavian socialism and the Milwaukee labor people whose roots were in nineteenth century German socialism.

PAT LUCEY WAS LINING UP PEOPLE FOR JOHN KENNEDY LONG BEFORE 1960

GROWTH OF THE PARTY DURING NASH'S CHAIRMANSHIP
Scope and Content Note: Lucey claimed the party did not grow in membership during Nash's term. “It grew in interest; it grew in visibility; it grew in strength; and it grew in finance.” If it lost membership, “I'm not aware of it.”

SPECIAL ELECTION OF 1957 TO FILL JOE McCATHY'S SENATE SEAT
Scope and Content Note: Had a radio-TV fund which had a lot of money; principle source of money was the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee. Nash organized pressure on Governor Vernon Thomson to call a special election after the death of McCarthy. The administrative committee of the Democratic Party did not want Proxmire to run. He was a three time loser; they feared the carpetbagger issue; and they did not like him personally. “That's easy, not to like him.” Nash wanted to win and felt Proxmire could win. Nash organized an unscientific poll, using Young Democrats as workers. The poll cost only two hundred dollars and its results were very close to the actual primary results. The party had no campaign fund. Nash took his poll results to Washington and used it to get money from the Senate Campaign Committee. Lyndon Johnson raised $65,000. A party worker in Janesville, who later became important in the John Kennedy campaign for president Paul Corbin; see Gerald Flynn interview, Tape 81, Side 1, 19 to end of interview, is probably responsible for starting a rumor that $10,000 in COPE money was missing from the campaign fund, “and Proxmire fell for it.” Nash had labor leaders try to convince Proxmire that there never was any money, but he would not believe them. “It suited Prox's purposes to believe what he'd heard from this guy from Janesville.” The theory of the rumor was that Nash was holding back the money for his own campaign to challenge Proxmire in 1958.

END OF TAPE 77, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

DECISION TO RUN FOR LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR IN 1958
Scope and Content Note: “The political bug had bit me.” Considered running for Congress in the Seventh District, but a poll indicated he would not win. Lucey asked him to run for lieutenant governor for the sake of party unity. Since party unity had been his objective from the start, he felt an obligation to run. Talked it over with Harry Truman before deciding. Did not expect to win, but did win in a very close race. “So, then I had a very happy two years....”

DEFEAT IN 1960
Scope and Content Note: Two Young Democrats produced a million pink flyers alleging Nash had been a Communist. Distribution of the pink sheets was concentrated in McCarthy strongholds. Religion was an issue in the election that year because of John Kennedy. Lutheran ministers wrote letters to their parishioners warning of a Democratic victory. Kennedy campaigners used Catholic parish halls for political meetings. Nash's election analysis showed that the pink sheets were not very effective. Lost by about the same amount that Kennedy lost by. Despite his incumbency, “you could say that I failed to take hold in my two years as lieutenant governor.” His strong civil rights stand cost him, particularly on the south side of Milwaukee.

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR PRIMARY IN 1960
Scope and Content Note: Jerome Grant ran against Nash and did well. Ran well on the south side of Milwaukee.

MORE ON THE PINK SHEET IN THE 1960 ELECTION
Scope and Content Note: Nash tried to turn the issue around by reprinting the pink sheets, but using both sides. He used it to raise campaign funds, showing people what he was up against. The two fellows who initiated the pink sheet campaign identified themselves as disillusioned Young Democrats.

THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AND THE LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR CAMPAIGN IN 1960
Scope and Content Note: Nash had campaigned hard for Hubert Humphrey. Nash would have switched to Kennedy after the Wisconsin primary if Humphrey had pulled out. Nash was asked to campaign for Humphrey in West Virginia, but refused because his own campaign for reelection needed attention. “I put everything into personal appearances in the '60 campaign.” Hired a small airplane and flew around the state trying to make news. Went to the convention as a Humphrey delegate and eventually urged other Humphrey delegates to switch to Kennedy when it became clear he would win. Feared a Kennedy-Johnson ticket. “I think it was a disaster.”

KENNEDY APPOINTED NASH COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS EVEN THOUGH NASH HAD NOT SUPPORTED HIM IN THE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: John was less vindictive than Bobby. Bobby Kennedy never forgave Nash and, as Attorney General, would not provide Nash the Justice Department assistance he sometimes required. Because of promises made to people active in Indian causes, Kennedy needed someone knowledgeable about Indian affairs. Nash went to see Stuart Udall, recently nominated Secretary of Interior, who told him the administration was committed to appointing an Indian to the position of Commissioner.

END OF TAPE 78, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON NASH'S APPOINTMENT AS COMMISSIONER OF INDIAN AFFAIRS
Scope and Content Note: An Indian was appointed on an interim basis and then Nash was nominated for the post. The two men who had initiated the pink sheet campaign in 1960 appeared at Nash's confirmation hearing to testify against his appointment. He was appointed nevertheless.

THE MADISON-MILWAUKEE-OUTSTATE DIVISIONS WITHIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN
Scope and Content Note: Actually quite common; exists in most states. Dealing with such divisions should be one of the principle jobs of the party chairman.

ELECTION OF JOE McCARTHY IN 1946
Scope and Content Note: A crucial factor was a heavy turnout for McCarthy in West Allis where the Communist-led union at Allis Chalmers wanted to prevent Bob La Follette, Jr., from investigating it.

MORE ON PAT LUCEY
Scope and Content Note: “Sure he built up the party; anybody could after I worked for it between 1955 and 1957.” “The desire for public office is really incompatible with being a good party manager.” “Pat was a very, very good governor, and I certainly can't find fault with him as a party manager.” However, Nash does find fault with him for running for vice president on a third party ticket in 1980.

MORE ON THE MADISON-MILWAUKEE-OUTSTATE DIVISIONS
Scope and Content Note: The outstaters did not really constitute a group by themselves but rather chose sides between Madison and Milwaukee. For instance, northern mining counties were heavily Democratic because of the union connections with Milwaukee and usually would line up with Milwaukee.

ASSESSMENT OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY OF WISCONSIN TODAY
Scope and Content Note: “Not too good.” Not particularly strong candidates for some of the major offices, like U.S. Senator in 1986. Postmaster appointments have taken away many of the local party leadership. “The ones that really showed us how to campaign in this state were the Kennedy's. They put together the party that Pat Lucey led.”

END OF INTERVIEW