Subseries: Jim Doyle

1985 January 15
Note: Access online.

INTRODUCTION

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
Scope and Content Note: Born in Oshkosh, parochial grammar school; public high school. Father had a paint store; manufactured the paint on the third floor of the building. Also had a filling station. Mother a housewife. Neither graduated from high school, but both knowledgeable. Four older sisters. Irish, Catholic on both sides of the family. Parents not active politically. Father very conservative politically; very anti-La Follette.

POLITICAL ACTIVITIES AT UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN-MADISON
Scope and Content Note: Developed his political leanings at the University. Attended UW 1933-1937. By second year of college was very involved in campus politics. Memorial Union Student Board roughly equivalent then to the current Student Association, except that it was all male, as was the Memorial Union. As a junior, managed Carl Thompson's campaign for senior class president. He lost to Carol Morse, Senator Wayne Morse's younger sister. Political ferment on campus. Young Communist League and some front groups. Intellectual antagonism between Selig Perlman and the communists. Doyle was not a Young Progressive and was not attracted to them. The New Deal “was too tame for me. I didn't think that it was a powerful enough change from the strictly free enterprise system.” Considerably left of center politically, but not affiliated with any party. Most distinct political lines on campus were between the fraternities and sororities on the one hand and the independents on the other; roughly equivalent to conservatives and liberals.

DOYLE ELECTED SENIOR CLASS PRESIDENT
Scope and Content Note: Marvin Laird's older brother, Dick, was the fraternities' candidate against Doyle. The vote was probably 225-150 out of 1500 to 2000 students. At his class' forty-fifth reunion a few years ago no one had the slightest recollection of the election, even though he thought it was very important at the time.

COSMOPOLITAN ATMOSPHERE ON CAMPUS WAS BIGGEST FACTOR IN SHAPING HIS POLITICAL VIEWS
Scope and Content Note: Influenced by several teachers, but his political views developed independently of the classroom. Majored in history. Influenced by English constitutional historian Bob Reynolds and by William Hesseltine, American history professor. Also influenced by the “continuing debate” in philosophy between Max Otto, a pragmatist, and Alexander Meiklejohn, an idealist.

IN 1936, HIS FIRST ELECTION, VOTED FOR FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT FOR PRESIDENT AND FOR PROGRESSIVES ON THE STATE LEVEL

DOYLE AND HIS FUTURE WIFE (RUTH BACHHUBER) WENT TO COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY AFTER THE UW
Scope and Content Note: He went to Columbia law school in 1937 and she came to graduate school there a year later. Active in student politics at Columbia also, Moot courts on campus similar to fraternities except that they were the structure around which the mock trial aspect of one's legal education were organized. Teams from the various moot courts would compete against each other arguing cases. Moot courts had sharp discrimination against Jews; “so we had a big rhubarb almost the whole time I was there.” Issue eventually resolved favorably. At Columbia his politics remained to the left of the Democrats. As at the UW, he was a “peacenik” when he started at Columbia, but eventually became more anti-Hitler than pro-peace. The Spanish Civil War diluted his pacifism.

“I NEVER, NEVER IMAGINED THAT THERE WAS ANY OTHER WAY TO GO AT IT THAN TO ATTEMPT TO GET CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT AND TO WIN THE OPPORTUNITY TO USE THE POWER OF GOVERNMENT IN THE DIRECTION THAT I THOUGHT THINGS SHOULD GO.”
Scope and Content Note: Never any doubt about the efficacy of government. Never had the alienation from government or the lack of confidence in government as a means for solving problems which later characterized many students in the 1960s.

GOT A JOB WITH THE U.S. JUSTICE DEPARTMENT RIGHT AFTER GRADUATION FROM COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL, 1940
Scope and Content Note: Professor Herbert Wechsler at Columbia was invited by Solicitor General Francis Biddle to take a sabbatical to work for a year representing the United States in criminal cases before the Supreme Court at the time Doyle graduated. Wechsler was invited to bring along a law clerk. Doyle was quick to accept the offer.

ANECDOTE ABOUT HOW HE BECAME LAW CLERK TO SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JAMES F. BYRNES, 1941-1942
Scope and Content Note: Byrnes never finished high school; admitted to the bar by studying in a law office while working as a court reporter. A key figure in the U.S. Senate during the New Deal years. Appointed to the Supreme Court in 1941. Byrnes did not know how Supreme Court Justices selected their law clerks, so he asked Justice Hugo Black to pick two law clerks for the year, one for Black and one for Byrnes. Doyle and another fellow showed up at Black's outer office one day. Black and Byrnes came out for a short interview, then returned to Black's office and flipped a coin. “I always felt that I got the better of that flip....”

END OF TAPE 36, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON BEING LAW CLERK FOR JUSTICE BYRNES AND ITS EFFECT ON DOYLE
Scope and Content Note: “A very important time in my life politically as well as otherwise.” Close association. Only Byrnes, his secretary (also from South Carolina), and Doyle were in the office. “I just began to get ideas about how it really is in American politics and American institutions in a way that I had never really glimpsed before.” Admired Byrnes greatly. “A glimpse of an extremely able and very pragmatic person, a principled person according to his lights with a totally different orientation than mine.” What the South looked like through the eyes of a white southern politician. Becoming a Democrat at this time, although the transition began as soon as he came to Washington, D.C. The difficulties of conceiving of social and economic programs, shaping them into legislation, and then shaping them into administrative application. “The total effect of it was conservative in that it was to conservatise me in the sense that my ideas about great radical transformations in the society in the right direction.... My notions about that were undercut considerably.” Herbert Wechsler was the person who paved the way for his getting the clerkship with Byrnes. A network by which young attorneys got clerkships with Supreme Court Justices.

ENTERED THE NAVY IN 1942
Scope and Content Note: A supply corps officer. Could not be a line officer because of his color blindness. Anecdote about how he and UW political science professor Leon Epstein experimented with their diet to try to remedy their color blindness. Went to supply corps school at Harvard Business School, then to Norfolk where he was in “an advance base unit” which organised naval bases overseas. Eventually wound up as supply officer on a Navy cargo ship in the Pacific Ocean. “Not a fighting ship. Around the backwaters, on the edges of the fighting, but close enough.”

OFFICE OF WAR MOBILIZATION AND RECONVERSION, 1945
Scope and Content Note: At Roosevelt's request, Byrnes left the Court in Summer of 1942 to become the United States' “Economic Czar” for the War. Small staff of people; office in the White House. In January 1945 Byrnes located Doyle and had him transferred back to Washington to work on Byrnes' staff. Byrnes resigned on April 1, 1945.

THE STATE DEPARTMENT, 1945-1946
Scope and Content Note: Right after Harry Truman became president, Truman asked Byrnes to return to Washington as Secretary of State, which he did as of July 1, 1945. Doyle then joined Byrnes in the State Department. “When I said earlier that I thought that I got the better of that toss of the coin, I meant that, having been Byrnes' law clerk rather than Black's meant that I had the chance to be with Byrnes briefly while he was War Mobiliser and then for a year while he was in the State Department.” “I had no background to bring to either of these assignments.” In the State Department Doyle served as an assistant to the Counselor (advisor) of the State Department, Benjamin Cohen.

RETURNED TO WISCONSIN IN 1946
Scope and Content Note: “Ruth and I really never imagined anything other than that we would...come back to Wisconsin, and we were just carrying that out. It was a big change and kind of a deflationary change, I must say, for me, in terms of just the sense of being in on big doings....” In Washington, those who are not elected and who do not have their power base back home are dependent on elected officials for their positions. That would have bothered him after a while.

ASSISTANT U.S. ATTORNEY, MADISON, WISCONSIN, 1946-1948
Scope and Content Note: Was looking for a position in Wisconsin, noticed this opening, applied, and got it. Much later he came to think that the U.S. Attorney at the time “thought that he was supposed to appoint me,” given the State Department, James Byrnes, etc. connections.

1946 SENATE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: Ambivalent, but voted in the Democratic primary since he was a Democrat by this time.

DOYLE WAS UNDER THE PROVISIONS OF THE HATCH ACT “FOR TWO IMPORTANT YEARS IN THERE,” 1946-1948
Scope and Content Note: Hatch Act was relatively new at the time and Doyle took it seriously. His wife and all his friends, however, were getting more and more involved in politics and he obviously engaged in many informal discussions and “was waiting anxiously for the time when I could get into it.”

BY THE SUMMER OF 1948, ALMOST ALL HIS FRIENDS HAD DECIDED TO JOIN THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY

END OF TAPE 36, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

AMERICAN VETERANS COMMITTEE (AVC)
Scope and Content Note: “Citizens First, Veterans Second.” An alternative to the American Legion and the Veterans of Foreign Wars. Consciously not to be a lobbying group for veterans interests, “but to be the veterans organization that would carry through on the purpose of World War II and to establish freedom and equality here in the United States and peace in the world; it was to have marked the whole turning point in the whole history of warfare and the aftermath of warfare in that this veterans group would be different....” Strongly liberal; organized and developed by independent minded people. “Extremely important organization in terms of the general theme of our conversations about what was to happen later in Wisconsin in the Democratic Party.” Through the AVC, all the people who were trying to decide where to go politically, in the wake of the 1946 elections, “could start doing their thing”--organising, finding one another, developing platforms, etc. “In that context a whole lot of us really came to know and see one another a lot.” “Petered out” about 1950. Nationally may have had about 20,000 members; maybe 1000-1500 at its peak in Wisconsin. “We got to know the labor people, the young labor people, in that context.” Horace Wilkie was very prominent in AVC. Red Newton and Elmer Beck were labor people in AVC. AVC differed from AmVets in that AmVets was similar to the American Legion, except designed for World War II veterans.

JOINED THE LA FOLLETTE, SINYKIN AND DOYLE LAW FIRM, 1948; THE GLENN FRANK AFFAIR
Scope and Content Note: Phil La Follette and Doyle had known each other a little during Doyle's college days. A fortunate thing for Doyle, largely because of his treasured association with Gordon Sinykin. La Follette was aware of Doyle during his college days because he was “around” with many of the Young Progressives, but perhaps most because of the Glenn Frank episode on campus, in which Doyle testified, as senior class president, that it was difficult to judge student opinion in regards to Frank. It was important for La Follette to have someone say that the student body was not necessarily one hundred percent in favor of Glenn Frank. Horace Wilkie's father was chairman of the Board of Regents at this time. Joined the La Follette firm as a partner; there was only the three of them. Phil La Follette was interested in having his own law firm, “but he really wasn't too interested in getting into heavy day by day law practice, and he never really did.” Phil was active in many corporations outside the law firm. Sinykin was a “hardcore La Follette progressive,” and never became active in the Democratic Party.

PHIL LA FOLLETTE'S POLITICAL ORIENTATION AFTER 1946
Scope and Content Note: Very conservative and grew steadily more conservative. A right-wing Republican. However, he supported Earl Warren for president; probably thought Warren was more conservative than he turned out to be. Phil was “very kind and warm and friendly to me.” Doyle did not focus on La Follette and his political opinions because he was so wrapped up in his own political activities. A militarist. Devoted to Douglas MacArthur. Very anti-Soviet. Isolationism had changed to internationalism. Believed in world leadership for America, through the exercise of its industrial and military power.

DOYLE TOTALLY INVOLVED IN THE 1948 CAMPAIGN AFTER BEING RELEASED FROM THE HATCH ACT

END OF TAPE 37, SIDE 1
Note: Tape 37, Side 2 is blank.

1985 January 23
Note: Access online.

INTRODUCTION

RECRUITMENT OF TOM FAIRCHILD AS ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE 1948 TICKET
Scope and Content Note: Carl Thompson, as candidate for governor, seemed a foregone conclusion, given his good showing in the 1947 special congressional election. Tom Fairchild's father was a Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice. “It was a marvelous name and a marvelous family, and reeked of respectability.” Fairchild was very interested in the DOC, but was less active than those of the “inner circle.” At the time no one expected him to win. The Republican primary was won by Donald Martin, who “did not have a very good reputation. The Republicans were dismayed with the fact that he had won the primary and that he was the candidate.” Fairchild received the endorsement then of many moderates and some identifiable Republicans. There was no serious talk about anyone except Fairchild for the Democratic ticket.

LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR, SECRETARY OF STATE, AND STATE TREASURER CANDIDACIES IN 1948
Scope and Content Note: “Something of a flap” developed on the question of a lieutenant governor candidate. Henry Reuss was “interested in his own future, I would say, just a little bit more immediately than many of the rest of us. I don't mean to say he was any more ambitious for himself than any of the rest of us, but he was thinking about things.” Reuss was hesitant to run for lieutenant governor and suffer a smashing defeat which might injure his political career. For a time it appeared that Miles McMillin might run, but he decided not to, a decision he was later very happy about. Henry Reuss moved back into the picture, and, when he did, McMillin moved out; no one was making a formal announcement. Tony Gawronski, a member of the old guard, finally was the candidate. Earl Stoneman, who had farm co-op and Rural Electrification Administration (REA) connections, ran for Secretary of State; he was very reluctant to be a candidate because of his age and position. Miles McNally, an old-line, conservative banker, ran for state treasurer; “and he too was prevailed upon to do it for the good of the cause.”

BOB TEHAN
Scope and Content Note: He was in charge. He “was not only opening the door to us, but encouraging us very, very actively to move in aggressively and actively and to do things, like putting this slate together.... We were always reporting back in to Bob and accepting his guidance and his suggestions about the whole thing.” The Gawronski and McNally candidacies were “undoubtedly” the result of Tehan's counsel.

JEROME FOX
Scope and Content Note: Not far behind Tehan in his importance at this time. Much less involved on a daily basis than Tehan, but “perceptive about what was going on and about the potential for a big change and a big surge in Democratic strength right then.” In his own way was as helpful as Tehan.

MORE ON BOB TEHAN
Scope and Content Note: Tehan was a liberal, “a remarkable man; a very, very bright man.” Looked like the prototype of the Irish Catholic city politician. “Right at the core of Milwaukee politicians, Democratic politicians.” Tehan “generally shared the attitudes that were expressed by” the New Republic.

MORE ON JERRY FOX
Scope and Content Note: Considerably less ideological than Tehan. Sardonic; good-natured. “I kind of think he never shared our firm belief that we were actually going to change mankind.” Skillful in cajoling the more active of the older Democrats “to be patient with us and to go along with us.” “What pains-in-the-neck we must have been when we emerged on the scene and encountered these people and started explaining things to them that they'd known for thirty or forty or fifty years.”

TEHAN WOULD HAVE SUPPORTED REUSS OR McMILLIN FOR LIEUTENANT GOVERNOR IF THEY HAD DECIDED TO RUN IN 1948

WILLIAM CARROLL WAS THE ONLY CONSERVATIVE TO CHALLENGE A LIBERAL IN THE 1948 DEMOCRATIC PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: This showed the weakness of the conservatives. “I never was aware of any considerable resistance among the older, and perhaps more conservative, Democrats about that whole effort in there in 1948 and on into 1950 and '52 about just having the place sort of flooded with these younger people running for this, that, and the other.” Carroll was the only one Doyle can remember “who seemed to feel rather strongly at the time that we would take the party in directions that were too liberal.” A faint conservative candidacy; little support.

GREENE-TEHAN FIGHT
Scope and Content Note: “We were all Tehanites.” “None of us outside Milwaukee had the faintest idea what was really behind the difficulties that had arisen between him and Greene, which seemed to be just a collection of incidents that had no ideological content...” The Fond du Lac meeting (which founded the DOC) “was a Tehan move, undertaken to counter Charlie Greene's initiatives....” “So I think that historic occasion was really prompted by rather mundane considerations.”

END OF TAPE 38, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

DOYLE'S CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE DOC, 1949
Scope and Content Note: Cannot remember when he assumed this title and when it was turned over to Gaylord Nelson. Because Jerry Fox was up in Chilton and was not interested in “pouring hours and hours into all the nitty-gritty of it...it was agreed early in the game that somebody in Madison would be a co-chair and would really look after things at a headquarters office.”

DECISIONS ON WHOM TO INVITE TO DOC MEETINGS PRIOR TO THE GREEN BAY CONVENTION
Scope and Content Note: Always trying to broaden the base. “We had a bunch of meetings during those years halfway between Madison and Milwaukee.” Must have gone to at least one meeting a month. “The group that would meet would change from time to time.” Horace Wilkie was very prominent in the work of the DOC. Others who would regularly attend these meetings were Carl Thompson, Miles McMillin, Bob Tehan, Andy Biemiller, Henry Maier, Wendelin Kraft, and others. Would discuss how to fit Milwaukee's organization into a statewide effort, personalities as potential candidates and party officers, etc. At these meetings, the group might decide it would be important to invite someone from the CIO or a farm co-op to the next meeting.

MEETINGS DEALT WITH ORGANIZATION, NOT ISSUES
Scope and Content Note: An implicit assumption that everyone shared the same point of view on issues. “I really don't think that it ever occurred to us that any differences of opinion that we might have about some specific issue that had to do with government rather than with politics would divide us, even though we might have some variations in our views about those things.”

CREATION OF THE DOC CONSTITUTION
Scope and Content Note: The task of drafting the constitution was divided up to some extent, “but I did most of the drafting for all parts of it, I would say.” Wide participation, but everything was funneled to Doyle who would do the actual drafting. “We were all caught up with the idea...that we were developing an organisational structure that would fill a huge gap that was left by the statutes of the state on the subject of political organizations.” Statutes provided for the election of precinct committeemen who would elect a county chair; but no real statewide organization grew out of this set up. The only statewide organisation was “the so-called platform committee” which met after the September primary and consisted of the legislative and state officer candidates who had won the primary. No cohesion and not a membership organisation. Intention of DOC was to provide a broad-based membership organization. Republican Voluntary Committee was not very broadly based; was mainly to avoid statutory limitations on fundraising, which was also one of the reasons for the formation of the DOC. Anecdote about Doyle's drafting of the preamble to the DOC constitution and how Carl Boegholt, a University philosophy professor who was a pragmatist, loved the part about how “Means shape ends. To be a force for democracy a political party must be a democracy.”

PRE-PRIMARY ENDORSEMENTS
Scope and Content Note: The endorsement policy was unquestioned at the beginning. Tom Coleman, boss of the Republican Party, thought endorsements were a very important part of the party function. Democrats thought “that was an awful thing.” This view especially prevalent amongst former Progressives; felt pre-primary endorsements violated everything old Bob La Follette stood for on openness in government. Doyle was not particularly interested in this issue at that time. Felt this would be “one of our talking points”--no bosses in the Democratic Party. In later years he became the leading proponent of endorsements.

END OF TAPE 38, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON PRE-PRIMARY ENDORSEMENTS
Scope and Content Note: Probably as early as 1950 he began to see the problems of not endorsing prior to the primary. Came to feel that the DOC was “sort of a peer democracy,” which had developed and grew in membership, but “when the time came to run people for office and get them elected, the DOC and all of its members, as an institution, as an organization, just retired from the field and let nature take its course in the primaries.” The Capital Times made endorsements and labor made endorsements, and by so doing they had more influence in the outcome of elections than the party did. Never felt DOC endorsements would “determine” the outcome of primaries, since Capital Times and labor endorsements would still be made and would have at least as much influence. Doyle's position was the party should leave itself free to endorse, if the party decided it wanted to endorse and if it was practical to do so. “That really never got anywhere.” “The La Follette Progressive mythology...was much too potent.” In the Progressive Party, however, Phil and Bob La Follette “would pass the word and that was it. We didn't have a counterpart for that.” Even though there were contests for offices in the Democratic primary, “I didn't envisage very well then, and I don't think any of us did, how fragile the party was, how relatively weak the party was and how weak it would be proven to be as time went on, particularly when some of us won office, like the governorship, the senatorship, or something.” By the 1950s political parties were beginning to fade in importance as compared to the personal organisations of candidates, “and by now the transformation is almost total, almost everywhere.”

PROXMIRE'S REJECTION OF ROBERT LA FOLLETTE SUCHER, THE DEMOCRATIC ATTORNEY GENERAL PRIMARY WINNER IN 1956
Scope and Content Note: Not enough to change-the policy on endorsements. Proxmire, Doyle, and others encouraged Frank Nikolay's independent candidacy for attorney general against Sucher; the encouragement was not necessarily in personal terms, but they were glad he ran.

ORGANIZING COUNTY DOC UNITS
Scope and Content Note: Doyle, Carl Thompson, and Horace Wilkie did the most in this effort. About a dozen people in Madison, but especially Horace Wilkie, would pool what information they had on a particular county. The efforts were often feeble. “Very often we were reduced to getting in touch with the postmasters in the county, who would be Democratic appointees, or with the rural mail-carrier.” Their response was often very guarded, since “very often we would find that the postmaster was really a Republican in sheep's clothing and that there hadn't been any Democrat, logical Democratic candidate for the postmaster at the time that that appointment occurred; and these people might just be totally unsympathetic, even antagonistic; but more often than not, we would find a Democratic sympathizer.” Postmasters would rarely ever be willing to help out themselves, but would provide names of Democrats in their towns. Started from scratch in many counties. Would finally find someone willing to hold an initial organizational meeting of three or four people, and then one of the DOC leaders would attend the meeting. Sometimes would travel two hundred or two hundred fifty miles and find only the contact and his wife at the meeting. Initial meetings were always small. “So, we'd give'm the whole spiel about this new membership kind of an organization and what it was all about. They'd listen impassively and finally we'd browbeat somebody into agreeing to report back to us in a week or so, all looking toward a public meeting, at which we would have somebody come to speak and try to get a crowd. That was it. Just a one by one by one thing.” Eventually would come across people who were very interested in politics, but had never had the opportunity to get involved. “It was a demonstration of the virtues of a membership organization.” “I'm describing the bleakest of settings. Of course, there were many, many others where there was no party organization but there” was a nucleus ready to get to work on building a party. Got list of contacts from farm and labor organisations.

DOC FINANCES
Scope and Content Note: Almost never stayed over night when organizing local units. If did stay over night, stayed in a private home. Gasoline was reimbursed from the party treasury. Doyle has check stubs from first DOC check book. First check was for something like $2.58 to Pat Lucey for auto reimbursement. This kind of expense was paid largely from membership fees. A few contributions outside dues. Total receipts for 1949 were a little over $4500; $1100 from the state share of county unit dues (30 of each dues dollar). Ben Saltzstein apparently was chair of a Democratic finance committee and apparently raised money in Milwaukee, about $2400 in 1949.

END OF TAPE 39, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON DOC FINANCES
Scope and Content Note: No money from the Democratic National Committee. Probably the first national money did not come until 1951, as the beginning of “a very, very feeble interest of the National Democratic Party in trying to beat McCarthy in 1952.” Some small amounts from national Democratic sources did come in 1950 senate and probably congressional campaigns, going directly into the campaign funds, not through the state party. Jim Corcoran, was “a kind of a mystical figure that Bob Tehan would get in touch with every once in a while when some sum...was desparately needed.”

1949 FOUNDING CONVENTION OF THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Held in Green Bay, probably as an effort to extend the presence of the DOC outside Milwaukee and Dane County. “I don't remember any opposition. I remember just tremendous exhilaration.” Other than the successes of the 1948 elections, it was the most exhilarating event of the first few years of DOC's existence. “We could see the people there that we had been searching out for that preceding year here, there, and elsewhere. And damned if they didn't show up.” Truman had won when no one thought he would. “It was all a very yeasty thing. And, gee, I mean we were all so virtuous, you know; it was kind like a Pat Boone convention.” The business was to adopt the constitution, which was a democratic instrument. Discussion of the constitution lasted from 10:30am to 1:20pm.

END OF TAPE 39, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

INTEREST GROUP ADVISORY COMMITTEES TO THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Recurring argument that the economic groups from which the party sought support should have “some institutional status within the party framework” and a regularity of consultation. Never took hold, but the party did constantly reach out to labor and farm groups.

ROLE OF LABOR IN THE EARLY GOING (1948-1952)
Scope and Content Note: Labor more important than farm groups in terms of money, personnel for campaigns, and numbers. Wisconsin State Federation of Labor (WSFL) leadership cool toward identifying itself too closely with the Democratic Party in Wisconsin. George Haberman, president of the WSFL, “I think was really a Republican, and certainly not a Democrat, and certainly not an enthusiast for the efforts that were being made to change the direction and increase the power of the Democrats in Wisconsin.” There were working relationships with leaders of various WSFL-affiliated groups--Jake Friedrick, for example. “The real active association between the Democratic Party and the labor movement was on the CIO side, and specifically and particularly the UAW (United Auto Workers) but also to some extent the Steelworkers.” Some Machinist leadership (WSFL) was helpful. “There was just no such thing as a Democratic-Farmer-Labor coalition that was in place....” “Labor people just did not decide during those years that their interests lay in a close, active commitment and working relationship with the Democrats as contrasted with the Republicans. They kept their distance and they bargained politically with the people who were in power, whoever they were, Republicans or Democrats.” In Kenosha and Racine, however, it seemed that at least half of the DOC activists were labor people. Harvey Kitzman, UAW regional director, “was an all-out Democrat and a very, very able, good person.”

ROLE OF FARMER GROUPS IN THE EARLY DOC (1948-1952)
Scope and Content Note: Bob Lewis “was the key to it. He was the key to educating somebody like me about the farm organizations and who was who.” Carl Thompson, Miles McMillin, and Gaylord Nelson had wide acquaintanceships with “the farm people and the co-op people.” Floyd Wheeler was an important link with the REA. Many farm co-op leaders had Progressive backgrounds, thus providing a natural link to Carl Thompson.

1950s EFFORTS TO RECAST THE WISCONSIN DEMOCRATIC PARTY ALONG THE LINES OF MINNESOTA'S DEMOCRATIC-FARMER-LABOR PARTY
Scope and Content Note: Philleo Nash (party chair 1955-1957) “did have that kind of a vision.” Nash was close to labor people; had worked at it. Nothing came of it.

DEMOCRATIC VICTORY IN 1958 CHANGED THE PARTY'S RELATIONSHIP TO LABOR, FARM AND CO-OP GROUPS
Scope and Content Note: “Definitely changed it in terms of the status of the Democratic Party in Wisconsin in the eyes of labor groups, farm groups, and co-op groups and so forth. We were no longer viewed as some people who were struggling to go somewhere in a general direction that coincided with labor's goals or the farm co-ops' goals. We, that is the Democratic Party in Wisconsin, was a power.” Gaylord Nelson, elected governor in 1958, had had close ties to labor, having been a law partner with well-known labor lawyer John Lawton.

SELECTION OF THE DOC'S NAME
Scope and Content Note: Some concern in 1949 at the first convention whether the word “Organizing” implied that this organization was transitory, that it was a prelude to something else. However, since organizing was the number one priority, it was decided to leave the name as it was originally conceived at the May 1948 Fond du Lac meeting and change it to a more permanent sounding name sometime later. No one entertained the notion that the “OC” of DOC would have some appeal within the labor movement because of the “OC” used by the CIO when it was first getting going. Also, “we newcomers felt that we had to be very respectful of the statutory organization and not come charging in and taking a title like 'the Democratic Party of Wisconsin.'”

CO-EXISTENCE OF THE STATUTORY ORGANIZATION AND THE DOC CAUSED SOME PROBLEMS
Scope and Content Note: DOC had no recognition at all from the national party at the time of the 1952 Democratic National Convention. Credentials and everything went to the statutory organisation. “We newcomers showed some admirable restraint.” Sometime in the mid-1950s the Democratic National Committee came to recognize the DOC as the Democratic Party in Wisconsin. “The transition occurred naturally then.”

END OF TAPE 40, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

DOC ROLE IN SELECTION OF NATIONAL COMMITTEEMAN AND NATIONAL COMMITTEEWOMAN
Scope and Content Note: Doyle cannot remember how it worked, but expects the statutory committee had the authority to make these selections in the late 1940s and early 1950s. “As early as November of 1949, there were no differences of opinion, no differences in view between the people who occupied the significant offices in the statutory party and the people who were in the DOC.”

HANDLING OF PATRONAGE IN THE EARLY YEARS OF THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Bob Tehan handled patronage “right up to the moment that he could no longer do so.” National Committeeman and Committeewoman “would have continued to administer that.” The new people had a consensus that patronage would not be used “as an instrument for developing party strength.” There were negative aspects of involving the DOC too heavily in the patronage business, which consisted mainly of rural mailcarrier positions, because selection of one person for the post would no doubt result in the bad feelings of all the other job aspirants. Doyle does not recall the DOC's patronage committee set up in late 1951. Suspects such a committee might have been formed to make sure patronage jobs were not “dissipated on non-Democrats.”

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MILWAUKEE COUNTY DOC AND THE STATE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Milwaukee was different in that there had been a Democratic Party in existence there for years. There was in existence a network of people. “Among those people who had been active in that kind of a relatively loose organizational kind of a thing among the Democrats in Milwaukee, among those people I remember that I had the sense that they considered that it was sort of a big bore, all this cheerleading and pep rally stuff and all that that we were injecting into this to have this big mass organization.” Adding membership seemed unimportant to them. “The whole membership thing never really took hold, except in the silkstocking districts where, lets say along the north shore and so on, where active units got organized.” In those areas, there was a feeling that they were part of a big, statewide push to develop the party.

AFTER SUCCESSFULLY DEVELOPING THE DOC, DOYLE QUESTIONED WHAT IT WAS
Scope and Content Note: There came a point where the DOC had been successful in building membership, bringing forth good leaders, “and all in all it was something very much to be admired, but what was it? It was kind of like a lodge, like the Eagles or the Elks or the Moose or something. It had its internal life...but connecting it to getting more votes than the Republicans in the elections...that connection was not very clear.” Even before electoral success, when candidates began to build their own organizations and people came to look to those organisations rather than the party, “it would be very difficult to say that the DOC...had any direct impact on anything.”

WITH ELECTORAL SUCCESS THE PARTY BECAME LESS IMPORTANT
Scope and Content Note: “The organization of a group of people in Wisconsin after the War within the Democratic Party to try to make it go; I think it was a short-term phenomenon and that's probably the way it was destined to be and there's nothing wrong with it.”

THE DEMOCRACY OF THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: “Process, fairness in process, fairness in the way in which decisions are made and the participation in decisions and so on, is not only almost as important as the subsequent decisions that emerge from it, but probably does shape the decisions.”

WHY THE FOUNDERS OF THE DOC OPTED FOR A MASS MEMBERSHIP ORGANIZATION
Scope and Content Note: It just seemed to be a logical way to generate interest in the party and to capture former Progressives.

END OF TAPE 40, SIDE 2

1985 January 30
Note: Access online.

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON THE DEMOCRACY OF THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: The model of a membership organization down to the county level naturally led to a participatory organization. Amongst the Madison activists “it was pretty much a consensus thing all along.” There was a group of people who were in continual touch with one another and no one tried to take over. This served as a model that was reflected throughout the organization.

1950 DEMOCRATIC SENATE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: Surprising that four people would be interested in the office so soon in the DOC's life. “The biggest thing, I think, to explain that was Truman's victory. It's really difficult to exaggerate the impact of the 1948 victory of Truman's.” Also, Fairchild's election and Thompson's good showing in 1948. There was a feeling that one might actually win. Also, “Wiley was a kind of an inviting target. In our eyes at least he was kind of a bumbling guy and looked as though he might be vulnerable. We under-estimated him considerably both in terms of his political strength and in terms of his political savvy.”

DAN HOAN AND THE 1950 SENATE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: A special case. “From about 1940 or so on, as I recall it, Dan was doing what we were later doing in trying to develop the Democratic Party.” Ambitious and had previously been very successful.

WILLIAM SANDERSON AND THE 1950 SENATE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: “An interesting manifestation of the developing activism on the farm side and on the co-op side.”

TOM FAIRCHILD AND THE 1950 SENATE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: Ambitious. Incumbent attorney general, which “looked like a good springing off place. You know, it was a time when just about anybody could just up and run for governor. I did in 1954.”

MORE ON WILLIAM SANDERSON
Scope and Content Note: Merlin Hull was the tolerant one in this setting, since Hull, a progressive Republican, allowed his secretary to run on the Democratic ticket. Hull “I am sure...was sympathetic to what we were doing. And he probably figured that we didn't represent a real threat to him.”

DOYLE'S ELECTION AS CHAIR OF THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Was opposed by George Molinaro, who had labor support. “It wasn't a real big deal.” Doyle decided to run, only shortly before the convention, “for reasons that had to do with the McCarthy election, and the fact that I was not going to be a candidate in '52.” Molinaro probably decided to run only a week before the convention. “So I don't think it would do to read too much into that competition, the fact that that competition occurred, although it did represent some kind of an assertion by labor it wanted one of its own, it wanted a big voice in the party, bigger voice than it had.” “I never was a guy that the labor people went for in a big way. I was too much of an egghead or something.” Probably won by a two to one margin, which reflected the fact that Doyle probably knew everyone at the convention while Molinaro had a much narrower base.

DOYLE'S GOALS AS CHAIR OF DOC
Scope and Content Note: Wanted to accomplish “more of the same. We had the sense that we were really getting somewhere.” Also wanted a voice in the 1952 McCarthy campaign.

JOE McCARTHY'S IMPACT ON THE WISCONSIN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Scope and Content Note: His defeat in 1952 became an obsession with Wisconsin Democrats.

JOCKEYING FOR THE 1952 DEMOCRATIC SENATORIAL NOMINATION
Scope and Content Note: Doyle and many others were ambitious and wanted to be the candidate to defeat McCarthy. “In any kind of a developed political setting, such as Wisconsin today, that would have been just ludicrous that I would think that I might be the person who would run and be elected to the Senate. But in those days, anybody who wanted to, would just pop in and do it. But we were mindful that it should be done right, that we should have a strong candidate, that we should try to get some unity early and start developing some unknown person over a long period of time so that by the fall of 1952 there'd be some well-recognized person there opposing McCarthy.” In addition to Doyle, Gaylord Nelson, Henry Reuss, Tom Fairchild and others were interested in being that person. Doyle and Nelson were close friends and decided not to run against each other in the primary. They decided in the summer of 1951 on arbitration as a means of deciding which one was to be the candidate. Doyle picked Morris Rubin as his “champion,” Nelson picked Miles McMillin, and those two picked Bob Lewis as the third party. “And the answer was Gaylord.” Henry Reuss had been privately indicating he would probably be a candidate. Doyle and Nelson thought Reuss should subject himself to the same type of arbitration procedure that they had engaged in. Meanwhile, Fairchild, who some thought would be the most attractive candidate, was leaning toward not running. The Reuss-Nelson arbitration was set up to a point, then Reuss backed out of the arbitration and announced his candidacy. Nelson then dropped his interest, not wanting to run against Reuss in the primary. “It was strictly a unilateral thing. Reuss just decided to do it and he did it. The rest of us, including me and including Gaylord who had all thought we were being just princes about the whole thing, were ticked off about that and weren't at all sure that Henry was the best candidate.” Very resistant to the idea that the whole thing should be settled “just by Henry's assertion of his candidacy.” Reuss started campaigning, but people around the state were reluctant to announce support for him. No one wanted to commit themselves in case a stronger candidate should appear.

FUNDRAISING FOR THE SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN, 1952
Scope and Content Note: Doyle had connections in the East “with potential contributors to the anti-McCarthy campaign. That became pretty much my specialty during that whole period up to November.” Reuss, meanwhile, was going East to raise money, presenting himself as the candidate. People would then check back with Doyle, as party chair.

END OF TAPE 41, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON FUNDRAISING IN THE EAST FOR THE 1952 SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN AGAINST McCARTHY
Scope and Content Note: “It was a very delicate time” because it was possible that Reuss would be the candidate, yet Doyle did not want to shut out other potential candidates by telling contributors that Reuss was the only candidate.

LEN SCHMITT'S CANDIDACY IN THE REPUBLICAN PRIMARY AGAINST McCARTHY
Scope and Content Note: Former Progressive; Merrill lawyer. “That introduced a whole new dimension to the problems about organizing to beat McCarthy.”

TOM FAIRCHILD'S VACILLATION ON HIS CANDIDACY
Scope and Content Note: Decided about June that he would not run. This left little time for any other candidate to arise. Doyle and everyone else pretty much decided that “Henry should be it.” Doyle was on a trip East when someone called to say Fairchild would run. This made it awkward for Doyle who was trying to convince people in the East that the proper way to defeat McCarthy was in the Democratic party, not the Republican primary, and that the party had settled on Henry Reuss. Doyle returned to Wisconsin, landing in Milwaukee where Fairchild met his plane. “He was chagrined about the fact that he had thought and spoken one way and then changed his mind. But people had been after him and after him. They really had.” “It was a terrific scramble to get enough signatures for Tom to get him on the ballot,” his decision came so close to the filing deadline.

REUSS-FAIRCHILD PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: “A very, very stout contest.”

PROPONENTS OF THE FAIRCHILD CANDIDACY
Scope and Content Note: “A whole lot of us had thought for quite a while that if it was just a question 'would Tom or Henry be the stronger candidate,' it would be Tom because of his statewide stature.” Many people around the state had that view. Doyle does not know what or who finally caused Fairchild to run.

THE POTENTIAL OF WALTER KOHLER RUNNING AGAINST McCARTHY IN THE PRIMARY
Scope and Content Note: The Milwaukee Journal claimed that Doyle supported this as the best means of defeating McCarthy. Doyle does not recall this, but suspects he would never have endorsed Kohler because “I was one of those who thought that developing the Democratic Party in Wisconsin over a period of years, of which 1952 was just one, was an objective and a focus that should not be dissipated in an effort to beat McCarthy.”

THE POTENTIAL OF BOB LA FOLLETTE RUNNING AGAINST MCCARTHY
Scope and Content Note: On that point Doyle deviated somewhat from his thoughts about not sacrificing the party in an effort to defeat McCarthy. “We all thought the best way to beat McCarthy would be for Bob to run against McCarthy in the Republican primary. And if Bob would do that, we would just lay off. It would be an interruption in our effort to build the Democratic Party.” Doyle and others approached Bob La Follette to run as a Democrat against McCarthy, but they did not feel he actually would run as a Democrat. “He was friendly, but he was cool to the idea right from the word 'go.' As I recall, he told us very promptly--it would be within a couple of days or so--'absolutely not.'”

DOYLE'S EASTERN FUNDRAISING EFFORTS
Scope and Content Note: Two principle avenues--Americans for Democratic Action and Maurice Rosenblatt's National Committee for an Effective Congress. People Doyle knew in these organisations would connect him with wealthy liberals. “Of course one thing would lead to another and I'd be given leads by one person to another person. So I corresponded, I telephoned, I went around to see people.” There was a pretty good willingness to contribute significant amounts of money--$500 or $1000--and no resentment to speak off amongst eastern Democratic candidates from whom this anti-McCarthy campaign might be taking money. “But they were all hung up by two things: One, despair; nobody could beat McCarthy.... And the other one was that we were in such disarray, we in Wisconsin.” Despite all this, the fundraising went well, especially in comparison to the 1948 and 1950 Democratic campaigns in Wisconsin.

ROLE OF THE MILWAUKEE JOURNAL IN THE ANTI-McCARTHY CAMPAIGN
Scope and Content Note: Ed Bayley, a political reporter for the Journal at the time and now Dean of the School of Journalism at the University of California-Berkeley, “knew us real well, and so we would talk with him a lot. And he was terrifically anti-McCarthy. But the Journal, at a certain point, decided that it was really going to go after McCarthy. And they did. I mean, you wouldn't believe it as you read the staid Journal in recent years. It was a Cap Times type of campaign against McCarthy, and I'm sure far more influential.” When people contacted Doyle with campaign ammunition to use against McCarthy, he would simply refer them to the Journal.

CAMPAIGN STRATEGY IN THE 1952 SENATORIAL CAMPAIGN
Scope and Content Note: “I'm afraid it never really settled down very clearly. Tom Fairchild would have been just incapable of having one of these slashing personal anti-McCarthy campaigns, and he didn't. So, to the extent that he set the tone of his own campaign, it would have been one where he just let the anti-McCarthyism just develop in the national news context and so on, but locally just do his thing and try to build on the strength that we'd been developing on these party efforts. And that was my view also about how the campaign should go.” Would not have been useful to spend what little time and money was available to tell people McCarthy was bad on civil liberties. “It would be about like letting people know that Jessie Helms is an extreme rightwinger.”

“WAR TO THE DEATH,” 1952 ELECTION POST-MORTEM
Scope and Content Note: Doyle's widely quoted reaction to McCarthy's victory. “I certainly was giving expression to the great bulk of the anti-McCarthy voters in Wisconsin, not just the people in the Democratic Party.... It was an accurate statement of the way I felt about it.”

DISCUSSION ABOUT MAKING DOYLE CHAIR OF THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE AFTER ADLAI STEVENSON'S NOMINATION IN 1952
Scope and Content Note: Stevenson wanted to offer Doyle the chairmanship, but Doyle was off fishing with his family and could not be found. “And I guess Stevenson's enthusiasm for me was not so intense that he wanted to wait very long. I'm happy I never received that call; by the way.”

END OF TAPE 41, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

DOC HIRING OF PAT LUCEY AS AN ORGANIZER IN 1951
Scope and Content Note: Was to be paid by funds raised outside the state because the party was so poor. Especially interested in developing county and legislative slates. “As for the selection of Pat, as best I can recall, there was no disagreement about choosing him. It was just a great stroke of good luck from the party's point of view that Pat was willing.” Lucey had already demonstrated his effectiveness in organization and administration. “Undoubtedly we were looking ahead to the fact that it was the McCarthy year, the McCarthy election year, and that there would be nationwide interest in the election and that there was a very real potential for a fair amount of money to be raised around the country outside Wisconsin for the campaign.”

DOC FINANCES VIS-A-VIS THE DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL COMMITTEE (DNC)
Scope and Content Note: Doyle does not recall, but suspects fundraising events with speakers produced by the DNC probably included arrangements whereby the DNC would get part of the proceeds. DNC would contribute to senate and congressional campaigns. State organizations always try to “sell” the national organization on the importance of particular election contests in the hopes of receiving campaign money from the national organization. “We tried to sell the Democratic National Committee on the whole idea that the Democratic Party in Wisconsin could become as effective and as successful at the polls in the same way that the Democratic Party in Minnesota had become successful...and that it was important to the national party that the two states be successful Democratic states.”

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE PARTY AND DEMOCRATIC LEGISLATORS IN THE 1950s
Scope and Content Note: “There was a mixed relationship.” The new legislators were “very much at the forefront of the party's affairs.” Those in the traditional and secure Democratic seats along the lake shore “went their own way;” accepted the party platform only to the extent that they agreed with it. Only way around this is a parliamentary system, “an idea that appeals to me more and more as time passes.”

DISCUSSION OF LETTER DOYLE WROTE LELAND McPARLAND IN LATE 1952
Scope and Content Note: Letter shows that there existed a tension between Democratic legislators and the party. One issue involved in the letter may have dealt with concerns over accepting dinners and other things from lobbyists. [The original of the letter under discussion is in the State Historical Society's Democratic Party of Wisconsin collection.]

“JOE MUST GO” MOVEMENT
Scope and Content Note: A big bone of contention. Doyle opposed the effort because it could not succeed; the number of signatures required in the limited time allowed made success virtually impossible. To try and fail “was ill-advised.” The effort, to Doyle's surprise, was “spectacularly successful” in terms of the number of people who got involved in it and the number of signatures obtained, but the real number of signatures is unknown because the petitions were never filed and were never opened to any objective outsider. “I was pretty much a Democratic Party organization type vis-a-vis that whole effort.” The party kept its distance from the “Joe Must Go” movement, but some party leaders did get involved. Some felt so strongly, they got involved; some thought it was politic to get involved. Even some, who felt it was not a good idea, felt the party should get involved and help make it successful rather than to sit on the sidelines with the appearance of being unsympathetic. “I think that my position wasn't of tremendous significance in the whole thing; but, to the extent it had a significance, I think I probably suffered a little from the position I took because it was kind of a...grudging party line, party boss kind of attitude.”

DOC FACTIONALISM
Scope and Content Note: “It was real.” “Quite a bit of that is just built into any kind of a political organization.” An outgrowth of ambition. “I think it is healthy.” Regretted the Madison-Milwaukee split at the time. Many Milwaukee activists, however, had no feeling that the Madison people were discriminating against them.

END OF TAPE 42, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON DOC FACTIONALISM: MILWAUKEE vs. MADISON
Scope and Content Note: Milwaukee antagonism toward Madison was partly a product of the fact that there had been successful Democratic activity in Milwaukee for several years “and I think there was a feeling that that wasn't sufficiently recognised by the newcomers on the scene. And I think it is probably accurate to say that it wasn't sufficiently recognised by the newcomers.” Also, a feeling that there was not sufficient recognition of the importance of Milwaukee and the lake shore in general in getting out votes on election day. The current antagonism between Milwaukee Mayor Henry Maier and Democratic Governor Tony Earl is not a new phenomenon. Doyle does not see the Reuss-Fairchild primary in 1952 as a Milwaukee-Madison split. “I don't think Henry was ever of a mind that the Madison ring in some way or the other was doing him dirt.” Madison people were more favorable to Fairchild's candidacy. Central city and southside Democrats in Milwaukee were a little more conservative than most Wisconsin Democrats; northsiders tended not to feel antagonisms against outstate or Madison and tended to be more liberal than those in the city.

ABSENCE OF ISSUES, 1948-1958, BY WHICH TO JUDGE POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES
Scope and Content Note: The environment was not an important issue, nor was consumerism. Everyone favored a strong military presence.

DOYLE'S 1954 GUBERNATORIAL CANDIDACY
Scope and Content Note: “I was ambitious. I wanted to be governor.” “It appeared to be a possibility in 1954.” Aware of the prodigious amount of campaigning Bill Proxmire had done in 1952, but Doyle discounted it because he had been defeated so badly. In 1952 Proxmire was not just filling out the ticket, as Bob Kastenmeier was in 1958. Proxmire wanted to run; may have made the decision as early as 1950. Doyle thought he would win the primary almost right up to the day of the election. “It was not wildly irrational. I had considerably more party people supporting me than Bill.” Also thought his Irish Catholic background would help him in Milwaukee. Did well in Madison and some places outstate, “but, I really, as I recall, lost all over the place.”

CO-CHAIRMANSHIP OF THE AMERICANS FOR DEMOCRATIC ACTION (ADA), 1953-1954
Scope and Content Note: The other co-chair was Arthur Schlesinger Jr. Not much work involved. Required some public statements and public appearances on behalf of the ADA's positions. Doyle was very close to ADA's most active founders--Jimmy Wexler, Joe Rauh, Jim Loeb, Arthur Schlesinger. The McCarthy election focused attention on Wisconsin and McCarthy's victory “had something to do with the idea that I should have a prominent--and I mean prominent superficially--prominent role in the organization.” Schelsinger did not want to be chair alone; if he had that would have been satisfactory to everyone. ADA was largely an eastern organization at this time. Co-chair was an elective position, but the kind where things are all arranged in advance.

DOYLE BIOGRAPHY, 1954-1960
Scope and Content Note: Concentrated on building his law practice, although he did keep politically active. Ran for circuit court judge and was defeated by former Progressive Norris Maloney. “I thought I was going to win that one too.” Except for that contest, was much less involved in DOC organizational work, although he was fairly active in campaign fundraising.

WISCONSIN SALES TAX ISSUE
Scope and Content Note: Doyle was a vice-chair of Governor Nelson's Blue Ribbon Tax Committee, which was chaired by Miller Upton, president of Beloit College. “A very significant interlude.” “I was becoming more conservative.... It was beginning to sink in to me...that ...when liberals won public office, particularly...the governorship...the more real and earnest life became about dealing with the real world, and dealing with money, both revenue and so on.” “The sales tax was possibly the biggest boogie man that you could imagine among the progressives and among liberal Democrats and with labor and so on, as well it might be just sitting there all by itself. It's a regressive, tough, rough tax. It's a huge yielding tax....”

END OF TAPE 42, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON THE SALES TAX
Scope and Content Note: The sales tax is a bad tax and the progressive income tax is a good tax. “But the problem of how a state is to be governed in terms of its revenue structure in a federal system in competition with other states for business and industry and so on is a real problem. The business people of the state have been saying that for years. The Republicans have been saying it for years.” As state government grew, with local aids and the like, it was hitting a point where the income tax, as the main source of revenue, was getting overloaded, especially in comparison to other states which were competing with Wisconsin for business and industry. Since Nelson had been in the legislature for ten years before his election as governor, probably this reality was developing within his mind slowly over that time. Thus, he was prepared to take some risk in moving toward a sales tax. By the time Doyle was appointed to the Blue Ribbon committee, he had come to the conclusion that “the idea of some kind of a sales tax should be entertained.” While Gaylord Nelson and Doyle pretty much shared the same view, Doyle, as a mamber of the committee, was in a better position to voice his opinion. The closer Nelson's 1960 re-election bid got, the riskier the whole situation became. Meanwhile, conservatives were pushing to have the committee openly declare in favor of a sales tax. Doyle felt the committee, which had a broad mandate, should finish its work before making any recommendations. Doyle's argument was upheld and the committee did not take a position on the sales tax prior to the 1960 election. After his reelection, Nelson felt much freer to take an open position in favor of a small sales tax, and eventually the sales tax was instituted. In 1962 John Reynolds ran for governor on an anti-sales tax platform. While often proposed in the legislature during the 1950s, the sales tax never got anywhere then because the Republicans and everyone else were afraid of the issue.

DOYLE'S ROLE AS NATIONAL DIRECTOR OF ADLAI STEVENSON'S 1960 PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
Scope and Content Note: “I was nutty about Stevenson right from the word 'go' and remain so today.” It seemed after his big defeats in 1952 and 1956 that he was through. Stevenson was drafted in 1952 and really did not want to run. He saw that 1952 would be a defeat. He really wanted to run in 1956 and then be the logical candidate in 1960, not having two defeats under his belt. Going into 1959, no Democrat had emerged to become the dominant candidate. It began to look as though the Democrats might go all the way to the convention without a dominant candidate. Doyle and others began to think it would be good to float the idea of Stevenson and to develop that idea. Doyle did not think Stevenson should seek the nomination; he would probably lose in the primaries. Doyle found that there was a lot of good feeling and almost no ill feeling toward Stevenson. Stevenson, himself, would never, even in very private conversations, commit toward an open candidacy, no matter what developed. Doyle and a few others throughout the country started initiating things, writing letters, and the like. Senator Mike Monroney of Oklahoma, Senator John Carroll of Colorado, Eleanor Roosevelt, Herbert Lehman, George Ball and a few others of stature came out for Stevenson. Petitions for Stevenson were signed throughout the country. In the midst of this these people decided, around early May 1960, that some kind of “draft Stevenson” organization should be formed and Doyle was named executive secretary of that organization. Stevenson continued to be very evasive. Doyle had no regular contact with Stevenson, but it became clear that Stevenson was “willing.” He would make public statements and show up in needed places, but he would not announce; “thus creating very, very grave tensions between himself and Kennedy.”

1960 DEMOCRATIC NATIONAL CONVENTION
Scope and Content Note: Kennedy people wanted to come out of the convention with the nomination but also with the good will of as many major politicians as possible. Hence, their strategy was to not get the nomination on the first ballot, but rather let each delegation vote on the first ballot the way it was committed, leaning, etc., thus keeping everyone happy; and then win on the second ballot. The orchestrated Stevenson demonstrations and the seeming groundswell for Stevenson forced the Kennedy people to change their strategy and win on the first ballot, since the Stevenson momentum might overtake them on the second ballot. “The Kennedy people decided they better get it fast and they shifted gears not long before the convention. When they shifted gears and they went back to these people that they were going to indulge and started putting the heat on them, there was trouble and that added to the dislike--that's a mild word for it--that the Kennedy people began to entertain toward the Stevenson people....” Doyle and the Stevenson people felt if Kennedy could not win on the first ballot, Stevenson had a good chance; at least if Kennedy could not win the nomination, Stevenson would be the logical draftee.

END OF TAPE 43, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

KENNEDY-HUMPHREY PRIMARY BATTLE IN 1960 “WAS A BIG, BIG BLOODLETTING, TERRIBLY DIFFICULT THING FOR WISCONSIN DEMOCRATS”
Scope and Content Note: If neither had been elected president, it would have been a bad split and that would have been the end of it. However, because Kennedy won, the split between those who were pro-Kennedy and those who were anti-Kennedy during the primary, persisted through his presidency.

POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF DOYLE'S APPOINTMENT AS FEDERAL JUDGE
Scope and Content Note: Incumbent U.S. District Judge, Patrick Stone, died in January 1963. Many people, including Doyle, were interested in replacing Stone. The Kennedy brothers made it clear that they would not favor Doyle's appointment. In the fall of 1963 President Kennedy appointed David Rabinovitz, a Kennedy supporter in 1960. Congress adjourned before confirming the Rabinovitz appointment. Kennedy was assassinated, but President Lyndon Johnson reappointed Rabinovitz on an interim basis, pending reconvening of Congress. The Senate, however, reconvened and adjourned without confirming Rabinovitz, thereby ending Rabinovitz's appointment. This was about the same time as John Reynolds' unsuccessful effort to win re-election as Wisconsin governor; after his defeat, he expressed interest in the judgeship. It became a question of either Doyle or Reynolds. Doyle was appointed in May 1965 and Reynolds was appointed to a judgeship in Milwaukee in the fall of 1965.

RETROSPECTIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE WISCONSIN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
Scope and Content Note: Has “very well” lived up to Doyle's expectations. “What we hoped to achieve, we did achieve.” The Democratic Party, as a liberal party, did become the alternative to the Republican Party in Wisconsin.

PARTY LEADERS WHO WERE NOT AROUND IN 1948 SHOULD ALSO BE GIVEN CREDIT
Scope and Content Note: “I treasure that time and I treasure the associations of that time..., but I think it is kind of a curious thing on the part of all of us that there's a fairly intense interest about the beginnings of things and about the ends of things, but there's a great big long middle in there that just doesn't quite have the sex appeal that beginnings and ends do. And I think...it results in a little distortion.” Those who have done their share for the party in the intervening years should be admired as much as those who happened to have been in on the beginning. “I'm afraid that perhaps some of us who were involved in this particular effort at the time right after World War II in Wisconsin, I'm afraid that some of us, including me, sometimes succumb to the idea that we created something and that we have some kind of entitlement to sit in judgement about Tony Earl or Tom Loftus, a legislative leader, or somebody else who is struggling with today; and I try hard to guard against that.”

ROLE OF WOMEN IN THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: “By comparison with my own attitudes today and the attitudes of many, many people today, the way in which that whole things was done in 1948 to '57 was pretty awful. The men just asserted themselves, took it on themselves to be the bosses of the whole operation.... Generally speaking it was all just kind of taken for granted that the women would be doing the hard work and the men would be the ones who would be putting themselves forward. That was absolutely unconscious and therefore, I think, a very striking demonstration of how pervasive and deep sexism is in our society, and causes me to doubt very much whether, with respect to sexism or racism or many other things, I can have any confidence in my attitudes today when I realize how much they have changed on that subject.”

DOC FOUNDERS NEVER HAD ANY DOUBT BUT WHAT GOVERNMENT WAS THE ANSWER
Scope and Content Note: Today, almost no one, even Democrats, will stand up and say government is the solution to the country's problems. “Not that we should have an all-pervasive government, but that the way in which to address social and economic problems was through the instrument of government and that, if people of our point of view won control of legislatures, congresses, executive offices in the state and nation and so on, we would simply figure out what's the best thing to do about this, that, and the other thing.” Doyle has modified, but not abandoned that point of view. Realizes there are limits to what can be accomplished, at least in the short run, through governmental action.

CONCERNED THAT HE MAY NOT HAVE MENTIONED EVERYONE IN THIS INTERVIEW WHO PLAYED A SIGNIFICANT ROLE, ALTHOUGH HE THINKS HE HAS MENTIONED ALL THOSE WHO WERE THE MOST INSTRUMENTAL IN ORGANIZING THE DOC
Scope and Content Note: Carl Thompson and Horace Wilkie, perhaps most important in the very beginning. “Pat Lucey...right from the day that he walked on the scene in terms of the state effort was the person who really had the biggest impact, lasting impact....”

END OF INTERVIEW