Introduction

How Swaity Came to TWUA
Scope and Content Note: He was working for the St. Louis Labor Education Project which aimed to place blacks in industrial plants in the St. Louis area. TWUA was one of only a few unions that cooperated with the project. Swaity got to know several TWUA leaders and offered his services to the Union when the project ended; and he was hired.

Blacks and the Northern Textile Industry
Scope and Content Note: Northern employers would play one ethnic group off against another; but Swaity never came into contact with northern employers who used race to prevent organization of their companies. It may have happened occasionally in big cities but not in the small towns where most of the Midwestern textile industry was located, which was where most of Swaity's northern organizing experience took place. He did notice rank and file opposition to bringing blacks into textile mills.

St. Louis Labor Education Project
Scope and Content Note: The project would conduct normal education programs for stewards and then place before them hypothetical situations involving black employees. Using these reactions as a base, the project would then work with employers to bring blacks into departments where it appeared there would be the least opposition.

Causes of the 1950-1952 TWUA Internal Fight
Scope and Content Note: In large part it was a conflict of personalities. The Union was growing fast and had many opportunities for advancement, but there was much competition for high office. This competition produced jealousies and conflicts.

The South as a Cause for the 1952 Fight
Scope and Content Note: Because the South was so difficult to organize, there was a natural inclination to look for a scapegoat. Northerners, who were suffering from the North/South wage differential and from the migration of northern industry to the South, blamed George Baldanzi, who was in charge of TWUA southern operations. On the other hand, southern staff felt the North did not understand the problems they faced.

The 1951 Southern Cotton Strike
Scope and Content Note: A substantial wage increase was negotiated in the North, and the southern mills offered much less, which meant the wage differential would grow even more. A conference of all southern staff and locals was held to decide what to do. The decision by the conference to strike was influenced by political interests. Neither Emil Rieve nor the southerners felt they could afford, politically, to oppose a strike. Swaity was not at the conference, but others reported to him that no one at the conference opposed striking and the southern staff even expressed optimism. The strike turned into a fiasco and attempts to place the blame for it only heated up the conflict and greatly contributed to the internal fight.

Swaity's Position during the Fight
Scope and Content Note: He was new on the staff and found the fight very distasteful. He had heard nothing but good things about the TWUA leadership prior to this. Staff people, however, were drawn into the fight unavoidably, with pressure coming from both sides. Midwest Director Bill Tullar also expressed reservations about supporting one side or the other but finally came to support the Rieve side. Swaity had a good deal of respect for Tullar at the time and viewed Tullar's decision as being fairly impartial; hence, he was influenced to side with Rieve also.

In the Midst of the Internal Fight, Swaity Was Hired into the Education Department
Scope and Content Note: Education Director Larry Rogin told Swaity he needed additional staff, and Swaity had both labor education experience and a familiarity with the Union. Hence, Swaity felt politics played no role in his hiring. The first institutes he was involved in, in early 1951, seemed to be free of Union politics; there were no efforts to influence the workers to take sides. After the southern cotton strike in the spring of 1951, staff people got drawn into the fight much more deeply.

Southern Employers, It Was Rumored, Once Considered Coming to Terms with the Union
Scope and Content Note: Federal mediator Yates Hafner told Swaity, when Swaity was TWUA Southern Director, that during the CIO Southern Drive of the late 194Os, large southern textile employers seriously considered coming to terms with the Union in hopes of either dominating it or at least strongly influencing its direction and militancy. Presumably the 1951 southern cotton strike convinced the employers to pursue a militant anti-unionism instead.

Before the AFL-CIO Merger, Employers Would Sometimes Shop Around for a Union
Scope and Content Note: Some employers, who were being subjected to continuous organizing attempts, would shop around for the least militant or most easily controlled union and then encourage its organizing efforts.

Introduction

Causes of the 1962-1964 Internal Fight - Strained Relations
Scope and Content Note: Strained relations in the Union were encouraged by people with ambition for higher office.

Causes of the 1962-1964 Fight - Wes Cook's Handling of the Synthetic Division
Scope and Content Note: Several synthetic plants were having difficulties, and the local leadership wrote to President Bill Pollock to criticize the service they were getting. Pollock surveyed Synthetic Director Wes Cook's reports and found that he was not visiting the plants often enough. Pollock criticized Cook's methods and told him he could not run the division from an office in Washington and leave all the personal visits to staff. An emotional exchange ensued which influenced Cook to oppose Pollock.

Causes of the 1962-1964 Fight - Ambition
Scope and Content Note: Several people thought they could do a better job than Pollock was doing. Bill Belanger thought he had the ability to be president and felt he could do a better job than either Pollock or the people who were in line to succeed Pollock.

Causes of the 1962-1964 Fight - An Accumulation of Little Incidents
Scope and Content Note: At least two people, who were later to hold very high office, seriously discussed with Swaity whether they should oppose Pollock. This was due to the accumulation of many small incidents which made people generally dissatisfied. “There was no question that Bill Pollock, as President, was not going to tolerate, if you want to call it, disloyalty. It was very obvious that Belanger, Wes Cook, and (Victor) Canzano were equally vehement about wanting either to set Pollock back or...take over leadership....”

Emil Rieve's Role in the 1962-1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: He did not feel the Union was growing and doing the kind of job he hoped it would do after his retirement. So, he encouraged the divisive influences.

Swaity Felt Rieve Was Wrong in Blaming Pollock for the Union's Decline
Scope and Content Note: Many external factors, over which the leadership had no control, were causing the Union's decline - southern migration, the decline of the woolen industry because of the growing importance of synthetic blends, the decline of the carpet industry in the North because of the switch from woven to tufted manufacturing processes, the extreme opposition of southern employers, etc. The decline of the Union actually began in the early 1950s, but it was not really felt until after Rieve's retirement. This made Pollock look responsible; it also made other people think they could do a better job, and that led to conflicts over the distribution of organizing staff and other conflicts that led to the internal fight.

Causes of the 1962-1964 Fight - Personalities
Scope and Content Note: The personalities on both sides were not the type to compromise. Also, there was no strong personality available to take charge and warn everyone of the potentially disastrous results of another fight, based on the 1952 experience.

The 1964 Fight Was Not as Disastrous for the Union as the 1952 Fight
Scope and Content Note: Only Belanger and Cook were fired, and there were only a few other separations and no secession.

Basically, the Fight Stemmed from People Feeling They Could Do a Better Job Than Pollock, Coupled with Personal Strains That Developed from Pollock's Actions

The Firing of Cook and Belanger after the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Swaity agreed with Pollock's position in this matter. Pollock reasoned that he had no other office in the Union to which he could go if he were defeated in the convention; he would be out of the Union. For that reason, he felt Belanger and Cook should be treated the same way; he felt they vacated their positions as directors by running for higher office. The same did not apply to his other opponents.

More on Rieve's Role in the 1962-1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: Emotionally, Rieve was deeply involved in the direction the Union took after he left office, and his feelings were influenced by some of the people who later joined the Executive Council Majority in opposition to Pollock.

Reba Canzano's Role in the 1962-1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: She served as Rieve's Administrative Assistant when he was President. She used to listen in on every phone conversation Rieve had so that she would be thoroughly informed of a situation when he finished talking and instructed her to act on the conversation. In most cases, anyone who wanted to see Rieve had to go through Reba. When Pollock became President, he felt that she would not be able to give him the same loyalty she had given Rieve; so, he hired someone else to fill her position and gave her a position of lesser responsibility. She resented this, became more and more bitter, and tried to influence people to get her a more influential role; but “Pollock put her down pretty heavily.” Her treatment helped to influence both Victor Canzano and Rieve in their opposition to Pollock by adding an emotional issue.

Rieve's Speech at the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: He had been counting heavily on a change in leadership. When it did not take place, he lashed out in frustration in his convention speech.

Swaity's Election to the Executive Council in 1964
Scope and Content Note: Although he was identified with the Education Department and no department director had previously been permitted to take a seat on the Executive Council, he actually started out as an organizer, worked in Canada during the secession movement, did organizing in the South after the 1952 fight, served for a time as Canadian Director when Harold Daoust took leave from that post to serve as director of organizing, then became director of the Education Department, and was serving as Pollock's assistant at the time of the 1964 convention.

Introduction

Swaity's Role in the 1962-1964 Internal Fight
Scope and Content Note: As Pollock's assistant, he was working closely with Pollock during that period and became convinced that Pollock was taking the right position in most instances. Swaity was deeply involved in preparation for the convention. He served as part of a small group that helped organize support amongst delegates.

Swaity Became Southern Director
Scope and Content Note: After the 1964 convention Herb Williams and Boyd Payton, who had been members of the Executive Council Majority faction and who had been directors of several southern states each, left the Union. This created a vacuum. Pollock decided to combine the South into one region with Swaity as its director. Mike Botelho, who was also part of the Majority and had been director of the Southeast region, was made Swaity's assistant. Swaity felt bad that Botelho had been displaced as a regional director, so he gave Botelho responsibility for the administrative/servicing functions and devoted his own energies almost entirely to organizing.

The Local 1790 Issue in the 1962-1964 Internal Fight
Scope and Content Note: In a political fight, one looks for weaknesses on the other side. Once an issue is made of something, it tends to grow. “What may be worked out through some kind of compromise or assignment to take care of a thing, when you're in an internal fight, and people are opposed to you, you don't do it.” Hence, the situation would not have developed into a full investigation if Local 1790's manager, Johnny Miraglia, had not been on the Majority side.

TWUA Efforts to Raid the United Textile Workers (UTW) Had Relaxed by the Mid-1950s
Scope and Content Note: There has been practically no effort to raid one another since the AFL-CIO merger. Prior to that, the TWUA relaxed its raiding in the hopes of bringing the two unions together. In at least one instance, TWUA even helped the UTW win an election. In 1949-1950, TWUA had a bloody strike at the American Enka plant in Morristown, Tennessee, and lost the local. Several times during the following years, both the UTW and the TWUA made attempts to organize the plant again. Finally, TWUA agreed to assist the UTW, rather than splitting the union vote in the NLRB election. The TWUA assigned Joe Pedigo, who had seceded to the UTW in 1952 and then returned to the TWUA, to help the UTW; and the UTW won the election. This was sometime shortly before the AFL-CIO merger and is indicative of the efforts that were made to stop the conflict between the two unions.

The Failure of UTW/TWUA Merger Efforts
Scope and Content Note: The TWUA, at least from the mid-1950s on, had a strong desire to merge the two unions and made genuine efforts in that direction. The UTW, however, either felt uncomfortable with the TWUA, or feared it would be swallowed up by the larger union, or would lose prominent offices. While Swaity was assistant to Pollock, he felt the TWUA was ready to go to great extremes to effect merger if there had been any encouragement from the UTW.

Many UTW/TWUA Raids Reflected Not the Attitudes of Top Leadership, But the Rivalries of Local Staff People from the Two Unions

Baldanzi, the UTW, and the TWUA
Scope and Content Note: From the time Baldanzi seceded to the UTW until he left the UTW to work for the Teamsters, there was extreme conflict between the two unions. After that, feelings abated and the TWUA began to think in terms not just of getting its seceded locals back but of bringing the whole UTW into the TWUA. When Baldanzi returned to the UTW as its President, the enmity did not return. Pollock had tried to avoid the 1952 fight, and he did not feel as bitter toward Baldanzi as other TWUA leaders did. Hence, they lunched, held meetings, talked merger, and finally set up a joint committee on merger; but Baldanzi would not bend at all.

UTW Merger Demands
Scope and Content Note: The UTW wanted equal representation on the Executive Council; but the TWUA, because of its vastly greater membership and financial strength, felt this was not equitable. Also, because “we'd had some internal conflicts in the past that indicate an Executive Council can go many ways, the feeling was that that was too much...” The TWUA, however, was willing to create positions for all UTW leaders. The fact that the UTW took such an extreme position indicated that Baldanzi did not really desire a merger. When the TWUA merged with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW), it also demanded that its entire Executive Council become part of the new Executive Board, but it did not demand equal representation on the Board.

TWUA's Lack of Organizing Success in the 1970s Compared to the 1960s
Scope and Content Note: This must be discussed on a regional basis because, except for the year prior to Pollock's retirement when organizing was placed under the direction of Swaity as Organizing Director, TWUA organizing was always managed by regional directors.

New England Organizing
Scope and Content Note: By the 1970s the Union had lost what little influence it had been able to retain in the 1960s. It no longer had any major chain organized that it could use to set wage patterns. Employers pointed to the large number of organized mills that were liquidating, and the workers became fearful.

Midwest Organizing
Scope and Content Note: The Midwest never had much staff; perhaps three organizers. Its greater success in the 1960s would have to be attributed simply to getting the breaks.

New York Organizing
Scope and Content Note: Director Jack Rubenstein worked as diligently in the 1970s as the 1960s, but the number of potentially organizable workers was decreasing, and the difficulty of organizing was increasing. The New York staff only numbered two or three.

Upper South Organizing
Scope and Content Note: There never was much large-scale organizing done there, but the Union did pick up the Narrows, Virginia, Celanese plant with 2,000 workers in 1970.

Quin State Organizing
Scope and Content Note: Most of the organizing staff members were concentrated in the Quin State and the Southern regions in the 1960s and 1970s. Quin State Director Sam Frost was very able, and his death had an impact on organizing success in that area.

Southern Organizing - Anecdote about Organizing Canton Cotton Mills
Scope and Content Note: Prior to 1963, there was virtually no organizing success in the South. In 1963, the Union, almost by accident, picked up the Canton (Georgia) Cotton Mills. An organizer was passing through Canton and decided to drop off some leaflets at the mill there. By luck, he happened to run into a situation where there was a tremendous amount of discontent. Because of the internal fight in the Union at the time, a great effort was put on in this situation. Botelho and Canzano became involved personally.

Introduction

Swaity's Organizing Approach in the South in the 1960s
Scope and Content Note: When Swaity was appointed Southern Director in 1964, he thought this new position would provide him with an opportunity to experiment with some of the ideas he had previously tried to convince others to try when he was Education Director and when he was Pollock's assistant. Two or three of these ideas worked well. The main, new approach he brought to the South was a massive survey approach. Previously, contact with unorganized plants was done mainly by the staff. Swaity instituted a method whereby college students and wives of staff would leaflet plants at a low cost. The leaflets had coupons that people could detach and send to the Union if they were interested. This permitted the Union to cover many more plants and to discover more plants that were primed for organizing. Some plants had coupon returns as high as ten percent. If a plant showed a return as high as five percent, an organizer was sent in and a campaign started. Nearly all of the large plants organized in the South while Swaity was director were first approached through this method.

Discontent Was the Crucial Factor in Organizing Southern Plants in the 1960s
Scope and Content Note: The whole survey approach was geared to discovering what plants had the most discontent. One of the roles of a union is to correct injustices, and this approach lent itself to discovering injustices. Usually workers resent injustices that are closest to them. Thus, they would be more concerned about the favoritism and other attitudes of their immediate departmental supervisors than they would about making less money than the plant down the road. Workloads were a factor in almost every plant that was organized. In some places production had been speeded up to the point where workers did not have time to go to the bathroom or to eat.

Swaity Placed Heavy Emphasis on House Calls and Formation of Committees in Organizing
Scope and Content Note: He wanted to make sure that the committees were representative of all departments and shifts. He also wanted his organizers to seek out plant leaders and win them over to the union cause rather than just accepting as leaders anyone who showed an interest in the Union.

Organizing Campaigns Require More Supervision Than Regional Directors Can Give Them
Scope and Content Note: Because Swaity had placed himself in charge of organizing and left the administrative/servicing aspects of the South to Botelho, he was able to maintain closer supervision of each situation and to run more effective campaigns. He would visit each organizing situation almost every week. Placing organizing under the direction of regional directors had always been one of TWUA's weaknesses. Since regional directors also have to direct the servicing aspects of union work, they do not have enough time to properly oversee the organizing aspect. Furthermore, regional directors, because they want to maintain good relations with the members, tend to emphasize service to existing membership rather than organizing new members. TWUA organizing successes have usually come where the organizers had full-time supervision.

Swaity as TWUA Director of Organizing
Scope and Content Note: For the one year before Pollock's retirement, Swaity was in charge of all TWUA organizing. He attempted to find the best person in each region and place him in charge of all organizing in that region. It was very difficult to find competent organizing directors for each region.

Organizing in ACTWU Today
Scope and Content Note: ACTWU joint board managers do not want Swaity, as Organizing Director, to run their campaigns; they want him to find them competent assistants to oversee organizing in their areas. Such people are not easy to find, and the Union is currently trying to take the best staff and train and develop them so as to come up with a group of people who can fill this role as localized organizing directors.

TWUA Has Always Had a Difference of Opinion on How Best to Organize
Scope and Content Note: When Swaity became Organizing Director, he called in the major regional directors to discuss the best approaches. Each had his own approaches and did not want to have anything to do with new methods. The meeting lasted for several days; and, after time spent on general discussion, the meeting, in an attempt to uncover weaknesses, turned to an analysis of TWUA organizing experiences: time put into campaigns, type of plants picked for organizing, whether contracts resulted, and the success rate of various individual organizers. This resulted, finally, in agreement amongst the regional directors. Out of this developed staff training institutes. Hence, a consensus was reached, but still the directors did not want someone else (i.e., an organizing director) running campaigns in their regions.

Organizing Differences Are More in the Degree of Refinement Than in the Basic Approach
Scope and Content Note: “It's the intensity rather than the approach.” All regional directors agree that in-plant committees must be formed, but there is a difference in how it is done - the kind of people selected for committees, the degree of development of their abilities, etc. Similarly, all agree that house calls are needed, but some do it with much more intensity than others. Also, with surveys, some pick different plants than others, and some survey more widely than others.

A Major Organizing Weakness
Scope and Content Note: There is a tendency to return to the same unorganized plants time and again because there is always some interest and leadership remaining there from the last approach. Swaity's broad survey turned up several plants that had never been visited or had not been visited for many years which showed a good deal of organizing interest, largely because they had not been approached for some time and management had become careless.

Summary Statement of the Differences in Organizing Success in the 1960s and 1970s
Scope and Content Note: The differences “relate largely to some of the intensity with which organizing is pursued, along with the breaks that come.” In regard to the latter, all unions won a higher percentage of NLRB elections in the 1960s than in the 1970s.

The Landrum-Griffin Act Hurt Organizing
Scope and Content Note: An emboldened opposition developed after passage of the Landrum-Griffin Act. It was not so much that the act changed labor law as it was that employers became more confident that, psychologically, they had won another victory over unionism. A very, very sophisticated anti-unionism developed during the 1960s. Today, companies employ anti-union experts. The Whiteford Blakeney law firm is no longer an exception; many people are building careers on union-busting today.

Some Unions Have Had More Success Organizing in the South Than TWUA Has Had
Scope and Content Note: Paper mills in the South are very well organized because the Paper Workers had the northern and Canadian industry well organized, and, because of the nature of the industry, skilled workers from the North were needed when the paper companies opened southern mills. These workers took the union south with them. The International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, while having difficulties organizing General Electric and Westinghouse, have had no trouble organizing southern utilities, in large part because the southern utilities had a monopoly and did not care if they were organized.

Hosiery, Textile, Apparel, and Furniture, on the Other Hand, Have Experienced Tremendous Management Opposition and Little Success
Scope and Content Note: The key to organizing in these industries is the selection of the most organizable targets; and that is something that can best be done by a central organizing operation.

Introduction

The Industrial Union Department's (IUD) Decision to Target a Major Textile Chain for Organizing
Scope and Content Note: When Nick Zonarich became the IUD's Organizing Director, he was interested in making organizational inroads in the South, particularly in the Carolinas. He wanted to concentrate on a particular area, and the Greenville-Spartanburg, South Carolina, area was selected because of the large number of unorganized mills. It was also the most anti-union area in the South. This concentrated drive kept running up against mills in the area that were part of larger chains. The IUD then realized that it could not organize in this locality as long as other mills in a chain were unorganized, because the companies would not grant contracts, even if elections were won. Hence, the concept of organizing on a chain basis arose.

Why TWUA Welcomed the IUD'S Decision to Target a Major Textile Chain for Organizing
Scope and Content Note: Bill Pollock kept thinking there must be answers that the TWUA did not have. He sent Swaity to visit the organizing directors of several other unions to study their approaches and methods. He began to think that if the TWUA could not do the job, maybe some other organization could. Hence, he was quite willing to let the IUD take on a major segment of the southern textile industry. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the TWUA had organized some southern textile mills, but it could not get any signed contracts. The reason for this was that the northern industry had declined to the point where only marginal mills were left. The Union could not push too hard on wages in these northern mills because that would force them out of business. That, coupled with the southern agitational wage drives, had combined to narrow the North-South wage gap significantly. That permitted southern employers to point to organized plants and say that organized workers were doing no better than unorganized workers. Thus, the Union saw the need for organizing a major southern company in order to have an example in the South; in order to have a contract pattern-setter in the South like it once had in New England. The Executive Council at this time was devoting considerable amounts of time at each meeting to discussion of organizing tactics and approaches. Thinking, therefore, was developing more and more along the lines of attacking a major southern chain.

Why J.P. Stevens Was Selected
Scope and Content Note: John Chupka, who was friendly with Zonarich and who had been involved in the unsuccessful Greenville-Spartanburg campaign, chaired the TWUA committee which made a study of the various chains and selected Stevens. Stevens was selected for the following reasons: 1) It was a northern company, financed by Boston money; therefore, it had had experiences with unionism. 2) Bob Stevens had been Secretary of the Army. 3) Its mills were concentrated largely in the Carolinas. 4) It was a major company which could set a pattern if organized. 5) The largest company, Burlington Mills, had provided TWUA with nothing but bad experiences; it closed every plant TWUA organized. “The feeling was Burlington was too vicious and too tough.” 6) the Union had left Stevens alone for some time, and Stevens' workers were expressing considerable interest in the Union.

The Executive Council Decision to Accept Stevens as the Target
Scope and Content Note: Pollock had reservations about Stevens. In later years he expressed the feeling that he thought Burlington should have been selected, or perhaps the fourth or fifth largest chain rather than Stevens which was the second largest. Several Council members advised against another major southern campaign and suggested the Union put its money into the North where it had some members and an established joint board system. This was a constant debate in the Council. A study had shown that the ratio of staff to organizing successes was lower in the South than elsewhere. The Council finally decided, however, that, since the IUD was going to foot half the bill, the effort would be worth it. Jim Pierce of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE), was selected to direct the campaign.

Cannon Mills
Scope and Content Note: Cannon Mills was not picked as the target because of the Union's long record of failure with this company. The Union had conducted long drives in Cannon in the early 1950s, but Charles Cannon's paternalism was so strong in Kannapolis (North Carolina) that no drive even reached the election stage. Today the Cannon situation shows more promise because Charles Cannon is dead, and the business people, churches, etc. in Kannapolis are beginning to react against the town's long history of feudalism. Anecdote about one of TWUA's southern agitational wage drives in about 1960: three or four out of every five workers would take the leaflets and throw them back in the face of the Union organizer.

The Stevens Campaign Strategy, 1963-1974
Scope and Content Note: It was planned from the beginning as a long-range drive, but no one anticipated the kind of opposition that was to develop from the company. Originally about half of the 40 Stevens mills were selected as prime targets, and a smaller group from that half was chosen as most organizable. The original idea was not to hold any elections until all were ready. It soon became obvious that it would be impossible to bring all the mills to election stage at once. So, the original strategy was abandoned, and, about 1965, elections were held in a few mills with the hope that victories in those would have a snowballing effect. Every election was lost. Then frustration, bitching, and blame-placing set in. It was decided then to ease off the campaign until the NLRB cases were processed, and people fired for union activity were restored to their jobs. Meanwhile, it was hoped, the staff could be improved and prepared for another offensive. Most of the original staff was either returned to their former jobs with the TWUA or the IUD or were laid off. About 1968 the organizing campaign was virtually abandoned, although elections and NLRB cases were still processed. The organizing drive did not become intensive again until after the NLRB election victory at Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, in 1974. Today the staff is all employed by ACTWU, and the IUD merely contributes funds. One of the staff problems earlier was that those employed by the IUD were paid much more than those employed by TWUA.

The Campaign Was Almost Abandoned in the Early 1970s
Scope and Content Note: “There was no question that in the early '70s, because there had been no results, the opposition to continue with Stevens was strong within the TWUA.” There was considerable talk about putting the Union's organizing money into areas that had existing joint boards. Swaity was about the only person on the Executive Council who strongly recommended continuing with the Stevens campaign. He argued that selecting another company to concentrate on would only result in going through the same procedure again and ending up in the same position. He argued that with Stevens, at least, the Union had a base of unfair labor practices to work from, and that it would all pay off in the long run. “I felt that way about it because I had experienced the thing; and some of the other southern guys were no longer there....The Paytons were not there, the Botelhos were not there, and so on, who have held the same position.” Pollock was ready to abandon the whole thing.

The Victory at Roanoke Rapids
Scope and Content Note: The Roanoke Rapids victory saved the Stevens drive. An election was held there in 1965 because it was considered to be one of the most likely places for victory. There had been a union in a couple of the mills there before they were purchased by Stevens. Like Kannapolis, there were several plants clustered in a small area. There was virtually no other industry in town; just two paper mills, and they were both organized. Because of these favorable circumstances, another election was held in 1974, and the Union won.

Introduction

More on the Victory at Roanoke Rapids
Scope and Content Note: A major factor was the high percentage of black workers in these mills. Also, a number of workers who had been fired during the election drive in 1965 had been reinstated by the Supreme Court, and thus the Union could point to success in protecting its supporters. The 1965 campaign had been a secret campaign. It was clear that this second campaign would have to be an open campaign in order to be successful. At first, when the Union asked its supporters to come out into the open, only blacks came out. Indeed, the first meetings were held in a black church with only a couple whites, in addition to the organizers, present. The Union then moved to a storefront in town in order to attract more whites. The election campaign was a very effective one; it was very well planned and very intensive; the Union drew upon all it had learned from its experiences with the company the ten years previous. Furthermore, there was additional incentive: “Everybody knew, if Roanoke Rapids went down, that's the end.”

The Campaign at the Wallace, North Carolina, Stevens Plant
Scope and Content Note: This campaign was not as well planned in its early stages, and the intensive efforts of the final weeks came too late. Not enough time was spent preparing the workers for the tactics they would be confronted with, and, as a result, the workers did not have the same kind of maturity as the Roanoke Rapids people.

The Wallace, South Carolina, Campaign
Scope and Content Note: Like Roanoke Rapids, this one was well planned. The Union had learned a good deal in the elections it held in 1965 and in subsequent elections. The company used the same tactics in each campaign, and the Union was able to prepare the people for what to expect. Also, like Roanoke Rapids, the plants here had a high percentage of black workers, probably 50 percent. The day before the election, however, the company held a meeting; and, when 22 workers attempted to question the company, they were fired. Without that, the Union would have won the election. With that, “We didn't go through with an election at that point because hysteria had set in.”

More on the Roanoke Rapids Victory
Scope and Content Note: Because a large number of workers were involved in the election, many people, like Swaity, felt they could come in and spend time on it. Swaity still uses the number of workers involved to determine whether he will make a personal visit to an election site.

The Union's Strength in Roanoke Rapids Today
Scope and Content Note: It is difficult to give an accurate answer. The staff reports 70 to 80 percent of the workers are for the Union, but attendance at meetings would not indicate such a high percentage. On the other hand, a strong effort was made by the anti-union group, and it was able to attract only 30 percent support at most. Thus, Swaity would guess that 50 to 70 percent of the workers are, to greater or lesser extents, in favor of the Union.

Reasons for Workers' Support of the Union in Roanoke Rapids
Scope and Content Note: The support has improved over the years because the company's predictions of strikes and plant closings never materialized. Meanwhile, the Union's mere presence has had an impact on company behavior. Furthermore, the Union knew from the start that it would have a hard time and determined to develop programs involving the workers, handling grievances, etc. “We have had a major influence on tempering the company's activities, normal activities.” The Union has always had a policy of not collecting dues until a contract is bargained. This policy has been maintained at Roanoke Rapids; otherwise the company would charge that the Union was only interested in the workers' dues. Thus, the workers are receiving some of the advantages of the Union and do not have to pay for these advantages; so their attitude toward the Union has improved over time.

Initial Reactions to the Roanoke Rapids Victory
Scope and Content Note: A post-election meeting was held with the IUD in Washington, D.C. Because the company did not wait the legally-allowed, seven-day period before opening negotiations and because it did not file objections to the election, the IUD people felt a contract would be bargained. The TWUA people, however, were skeptical; Swaity was very skeptical. “I just couldn't see that company, with its whole history, giving us a contract and paving the way for us to organize other plants.” A contract would have meant giving the Union the whole chain.

TWUA Bargaining Strategy at Roanoke Rapids
Scope and Content Note: The feeling was that competent negotiators would be needed. Joe Hueter was called out of retirement to help with negotiations. People like Swaity, however, who had had experience in the South were convinced the Union would face a decertification election a year later. Firemen from Atlanta, Georgia, advised the Union how to avoid a decertification: develop as many unfair labor practices against the company as possible so it could not come back with a decertification election. In order to develop the unfair practices, the usual procedure of setting up a steward system had to be abandoned in favor of a more centralized system whereby staff people would handle all grievances. If the company was dealing with stewards, there would be no way to record what it did or did not do; but, if it was dealing with Union representatives, everything would have to be in writing. Thus, if the Union asked for information and the company refused to provide it, a record of this unfair labor practice would be available in writing. It is very difficult to develop unfair labor practices by claiming the company is not bargaining in good faith; but they can be developed on the basis that the company refused to give information vital to bargaining, and bargaining includes much more than simply negotiating a contract. It includes every incident that happens in the plant, every production and work load change the company contemplates. The Union was able, through this method, to develop many unfair labor practice charges. Shortly after the election victory, a meeting was held in Chicago to discuss this whole strategy, and a heated conflict arose between those who wanted to pursue the traditional approach, and those who favored the unfair labor practices approach. Joe Hueter resigned from the negotiating team shortly after this meeting, either because he did not agree with the approach or because he saw the situation would be a long, drawn-out affair, and he could not devote that much time to it.

Union Service at Roanoke Rapids
Scope and Content Note: The Union handles many grievances. Even without a contract and a written grievance procedure, all plant changes are subject to bargaining. The Union, however, should be getting more workers involved in grievance meetings. The company's approach is to listen to the grievance, look into it, and make changes without announcing that the changes are taking place, or that the Union is responsible for them.

The Stevens Boycott
Scope and Content Note: Even before the Roanoke Rapids victory, because of the mounting unfair labor practices, the Union realized it would have to pressure the company through means other than legal procedures and organizing. The Union tried a boycott on a small scale in the early 1970s. When no progress was made in negotiations at Roanoke Rapids, the Union decided it had to hit the company from as many sides as possible in order to keep management off balance. Hence, there developed the boycott, the community action approach, etc. “The philosophy behind it was that, unless you can hurt their pocket book, you aren't going to bring this company down.”

The Legal Aspect of the Stevens Campaign
Scope and Content Note: The long history of legal cases won had really accomplished nothing. Recently, however, the Union has received some advantages from the law. These are due in large measure to the efforts of ACTWU General Counsel Arthur M. Goldberg. Prior to merger, the TWUA had not had the insight to push the cases in the directions Goldberg has pushed them. Prior to merger, the Union had been thinking only in terms of job reinstatement and back pay for workers fired for union activity. The idea of seeking an injunction against the company was ruled out by TWUA legal staff who felt there would be no chance of success. Goldberg, however, picked up on the injunction approach and has been successful with it.

More on the Boycott
Scope and Content Note: The TWUA had many illusions about how to carry on a boycott and was unaware of the limitations on secondary boycotts. It was assumed that merger with the Clothing Workers would lead to a boycott by clothing workers of Stevens cloth, but that, it turns out, would have been an illegal secondary boycott.

Contradictions of the Boycott
Scope and Content Note: If the boycott is successful, Stevens will have to cut back production and lay off workers. This, of course, poses the contradiction of the Union asking for the workers' support, on the one hand, while working in a direction, on the other hand, that would cost the workers their jobs. Swaity views this as similar to a long strike in which the Union takes the chance of losing workers' support. “You hope that people would understand that. And there are a lot of people in Stevens who understand it that way, who say, 'There is no future for me or for us as textile workers, and the only way we are ever going to be successful is if we win this fight; and, therefore, we're willing to make the sacrifices.' That's the kind of thing we've got to convince a lot of people on. I think we've convinced a small minority; we have not convinced the large majority.”