1977 April 18

Introduction

Background of Joseph Hueter and His Parents
Scope and Content Note: Born June 1, 1907 in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Parents born in Germany, came to the United States on their wedding trip, and never returned to Germany. Father had been a paperhanger in Germany; in the United States he became a butcher in a slaughterhouse.

Anecdote about His Father's Arrest for Passing Out Union Literature

Education, Marriage, Children
Scope and Content Note: Eighth grade education at Catholic school in Philadelphia. Married first time in 1928; two sons.

Jobs Held
Scope and Content Note: Delivery boy for butcher shop; soda jerk; baker; stock room at large Philadelphia department store.

First Job in Textile Industry - Collins and Aikman Company
Scope and Content Note: At age 20, mid-1926, went to work as apprentice weaver making pile fabric. Piece work. 11½ hours a night, 5 nights a week. Second week already on his own loom; made $57. Soon was averaging about $100 per week.

Rivalry Between Loom Fixers and Weavers

Lack of Unionization Amongst Weavers
Scope and Content Note: No union; no seniority. High earnings made unionizing infeasible. Those with high earning ability, like Hueter, able to remain working in midst of layoffs during slack periods. Discontent did not develop until technological changes brought increased workloads and employee layoffs. Slack period in 1933 brought “wage cut” so that weavers were making only $16 per week.

Hueter and Two Others Call Meeting to Organize Union
Scope and Content Note: Only 35 out of more than 1,000 attended; officers elected. One officer fired; entire plant walked out. Strike lasted from May to October 1933; was very successful.

Hueter Elected Business Agent of Newly-Formed Union
Scope and Content Note: Included other shops of the pile fabric division organized during the strike. No knowledge of union work at that time. All affiliated themselves with the United Textile Workers (UTW) to form Local 1741 (later Local 33 - TWUA).

Dispute over Granting of UTW Charter to Local 1741
Scope and Content Note: William Pollock, business agent for Local 25 (Upholsterers), challenged Local 1741's right to a UTW charter. Dispute settled and Local 1741 rented office space from Local 25.

Textile Strike of 1934 as It Affected Philadelphia
Scope and Content Note: Both union and nonunion workers walked off their jobs; many appeared at Hueter's office asking to be organized.

Introduction

Anecdotes Relating to 1933 Collins and Aikman Strike
Scope and Content Note: Local 1741 leadership duped into holding mass meeting at Communist hall. Gimmick to avoid ruling against mass picketing. Picket line incident - Collins and Aikman's Chairman of the Board got an umbrella in his face.

Textile Strike of 1934
Scope and Content Note: Very effective in Philadelphia; Philadelphia business agents attempted to persuade UTW Executive Council not to call off the strike. Many nonunion employers refused to rehire striking employees after the strike. (See 17:55 of this Tape 1, Side 2; strike did not have adverse effect on organized plants.) Organizing severely affected for many years as a result.

Very Few Textile Locals Had Written Contracts in 1930s

Role of Hosiery Workers and Dyers in 1934 Strike

1934 Convention Decision to Strike
Scope and Content Note: Emil Rieve opposed strike in woolen-worsted industry because of financial condition of UTW.

Hueter's Opinion of 1934 Strike
Scope and Content Note: Being new to union activities, felt strike could be run effectively without finances, both on local and international level.

Strike Vote at the Convention
Scope and Content Note: Very few people against going on strike, despite finances.

Dues-Paying Procedures within the Local
Scope and Content Note: No checkoff systems. Dues not paid regularly.

First Written Contract in Local 1741 Won by Chance
Scope and Content Note: With LaFrance Industries, 1936-37. Dues not being paid by LaFrance union members; local threatened to strike for a checkoff system. Internal problems of LaFrance Industries left it in no position to suffer a strike, so company gave in and granted written contract with ten percent wage increase, closed shop, and the checkoff. Others soon fell in line.

Collins and Aikman's Association with the Union
Scope and Content Note: By matching wages and conditions of union shops as well as setting up internal grievance procedure, Collins and Aikman able to eliminate the union. Strike of 1934 served to again unionize Collins and Aikman; but Collins and Aikman again matched the union shops and employees once again dropped from the union.

1936 UTW Convention
Scope and Content Note: UTW officers ineffective; opposition controlled the convention. Federations spearheaded drive to join with CIO.

Francis Gorman
Scope and Content Note: Most effective officer in UTW; had ability and was respected by membership.

James Starr
Scope and Content Note: Active only in role as Secretary-Treasurer.

1977 April 19

Introduction

1933 Collins and Aikman Strike, Personal Standpoint
Scope and Content Note: International union had no strike fund; did not provide any money or food for strikers. Appeal to farmers very successful; they furnished enough food to feed 1,000 people every morning, for duration of strike. Appeal to organized plants in Philadelphia brought in some funds.

Existing without Money to Pay Necessities
Scope and Content Note: Real estate agents contacted to permit strikers to remain in their quarters until strike settled and repayment could be made; no evictions. Doctors willing to wait for payment; service continued.

Hueter's Personal Situation
Scope and Content Note: Second son born during strike; wife sickly and was in hospital for one year after this birth. Aunt cared for children. No money saved. Brother-in-law lent money. Landlord very sympathetic, to Hueter's surprise. Family very supportive.

Running the Strike
Scope and Content Note: Maintained picket line 24 hours a day; asked International Union to send organizers to give advice; resolved incidents that could weaken the strike. First attempt of loom fixers to go back to work repelled. By October 1933 when strike ended, only about 400 left, as other strikers had found jobs elsewhere in the city.

Effect of Strike on Collins and Aikman
Scope and Content Note: Plant brought to standstill. Strikers had consistently requested meetings with company from beginning of strike; no negotiation until company contacted strikers in October.

Publicity of the Strike
Scope and Content Note: Pennsylvania Governor Pinchot's wife and Eleanor Roosevelt spoke with the pickets; Philadelphia's mayor and several councilmen also visited the line.

Paying Wife's Hospital Bill
Scope and Content Note: Unable to pay the bill, she was in charity ward; she received excellent care though they could not pay.

Philadelphia Textile Workers, the CIO, and the Textile Workers Organizing Committee (TWOC)
Scope and Content Note: Officers of unions, as well as rank and file, very interested in improving image of labor unions. CIO viewed as way of advancing interest of workers. Amalgamated Clothing Workers' (ACW) Charles Weinstein led very effective TWOC organizing drive in Philadelphia: up to 10,000 people organized within about two years. New organizing techniques.

The Philadelphia Joint Board Formed in 1938
Scope and Content Note: Resulted from influence of ACW, which had experienced success with the joint board structure. United Textile Workers' (UTW) locals and newly-organized, unaffiliated groups placed in seven locals, which were then combined to form the Joint Board. Hosiery Workers, as a federation, not required or encouraged to affiliate with Joint Board. Concluded that five business agents could handle work of the seven local unions.

Introduction

Discussion of the Philadelphia Business Agents
Scope and Content Note: George Powell from Dyeing and Finishing Division; William Pollock from Upholstery Division became the Manager and so was replaced with another business agent, also from the Upholstery Division; William Batty from Woolen-Worsted Division; Hueter from Pile Fabric Division; Rolla Wallace from Carpet Division.

Pollock Became Manager of Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: During TWOC organizing drive, Pollock was assistant to Weinstein, director of the drive in Philadelphia. TWOC officials then supported Pollock as Manager of the planned Joint Board; he was the most experienced of the five business agents.

Foundation and Structure of the Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: Took several months to write up by-laws because locals wanted to maintain autonomy. Pollock elected by the delegates to the Joint Board as Manager; no opposition. John Millar elected President (from Carpet Division); Estelle Rowe elected Secretary (from Woolen-Worsted Division).

More on Structure of Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: Based on U.S. Congress; locals assigned delegates according to membership strength, but Board of Directors representation like U.S. Senate - one vote for each local. Local membership meetings usually considered important issues before Joint Board delegates decided issue, in order to instruct delegates and Directors. Business agents elected by locals; neither they nor Manager could be members of Board of Directors. Variations in subsequent TWUA Joint Boards from this model; many not self-supporting.

Joint Board Improved Effectiveness and Strength of Textile Workers in Philadelphia

Financial Structure of Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: All money from dues and initiation fees went to Joint Board; money, office space, and services available to every local union. Percentage returned to local union, to shops within local union, and to the International Union.

Effect of Joint Board on Textile Industry in Philadelphia
Scope and Content Note: Recognition from employers and politicians; expedited negotiations favorable to union.

1977 July 20

Introduction

TWOC Philadelphia Area Leaders
Scope and Content Note: Weinstein, Pollock, George Baldanzi.

William Pollock's Interest in a Top Position with International Union
Scope and Content Note: Made his intentions known by calling together the five business agents from Philadelphia and polling them on their opinion; three favored. Hueter and George Powell opposed; did not want Pollock to leave the Joint Board “experiment” so soon.

Committee Formed to Get Support for Pollock's Bid for Secretary-Treasurer
Scope and Content Note: Committee consisted of Hueter and Powell. In two separate meetings, Rieve cool to idea; no decision made; several other people interested in the position. Pollock believed his bid successful and began grooming Rolla Wallace, one of the newest business agents, for position of Manager, causing some resentment.

Hueter on Entertainment Committee Formed for First TWUA Convention in Philadelphia

Support for Pollock as Secretary-Treasurer Finally Arranged
Scope and Content Note: Two days before convening, still no decision on position of Secretary-Treasurer. Hueter inquired; Pollock summoned. Outcome: Pollock won support for position of Secretary-Treasurer with the condition that Hueter become Manager of Philadelphia Joint Board; this a surprise to Hueter.

Anecdote about Pollock's Nomination as Secretary-Treasurer at the Convention
Scope and Content Note: Hadn't asked anyone to nominate him; therefore, no one did for a few moments. Bill Gordon stopped embarrassing pause by taking the floor and making the nomination.

Did Not Know Why He and Powell Were Selected to Plead Pollock's Case to Rieve

Other Potential Candidates for Position of Secretary-Treasurer

Pollock as Part of 1936 UTW Convention Opposition Slate with Rieve
Scope and Content Note: Hueter feels this did not have too much to do with his decision to run for Secretary-Treasurer in 1939. As representative of the third largest group in the organization (the Philadelphia Joint Board), Pollock felt he should become Secretary-Treasurer.

Choosing the Executive Council Slate
Scope and Content Note: Slate picked primarily by Rieve, Baldanzi, and Hillman to give recognition to certain factors - region, industry, large groups within the organization.

Introduction

Responsibilities as Philadelphia Joint Board Manager
Scope and Content Note: Supervision of business agents, employment of Board employees, cooperation between unions, negotiation of contracts, supervision of shop problems, and general overseeing.

Operating Differences Between Philadelphia and Other Areas
Scope and Content Note: Philadelphia rarely called upon International representatives for assistance because local people had good experience and generally good relationships with employers and within the Joint Board.

Absence of Ethnic Problems in Philadelphia

Anecdote about Ethnic Origins Which Occurred Shortly after Hueter Became Business Agent
Scope and Content Note: Hueter made strong point that a person's ability to speak English well had no bearing on his right to be heard at meetings. Incident grew out of criticism of Polish speaker.

Effects of World War II on Philadelphia Textile Workers
Scope and Content Note: More women in positions previously held by men; argument developed over equal pay for equal work; employers often proved the work not equal.

Hueter Member of War Labor Board
Scope and Content Note: Did not find it difficult negotiating contracts; framing demands within limits of rules and regulations which were widely known; no strikes.

New Building for Philadelphia Joint Board in 1945
Scope and Content Note: Pollock opposed Hueter's efforts to get loan from International Union; Rieve approved loan, as did Executive Council.

Pollock Continuously Blocked Hueter's Efforts and Supported Wallace
Scope and Content Note: Claimed he did not want to appear to favor Philadelphia endeavors.

Wallace's Position on Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Useless as far as representing Philadelphia Joint Board on Executive Council; maintained authority as business agent over his own local union in Philadelphia, to Hueter's exclusion. Wallace not particularly able, wanted to avoid controversy, and personally opposed to Hueter.

From the Beginning Rieve Urged Hueter to Run for Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Hueter stuck to promise to Pollock that he would not run. Began to have second thoughts when he saw Wallace's ineffectiveness.

Introduction

Hueter Finally Decided to Run for Executive Council in 1948
Scope and Content Note: Had been asked by Rieve prior to each convention if he would be interested in the position. Joint Board delegates and Philadelphia delegates to 1948 convention asked Hueter to run for Vice President (i.e., Executive Council member). Wallace was not nominated and did not run.

Relationship Between Hueter and Wallace Deteriorated
Scope and Content Note: Bad relationship lasted until Wallace's death.

Why Philadelphia Delegates Urged Hueter to Run for Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Within first two years after Wallace on Council, he stopped attending Joint Board meetings or reporting International Union events to the Joint Board; membership therefore not informed of Council business and even many members of Wallace's own local finally urged Hueter's candidacy.

Wallace Claimed Hueter Violated 1939 Agreement by Running for Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Hueter maintained agreement applied only to 1939, was not perpetual. Pollock agreed with Hueter's interpretation.

Hueter's Position on Special Assessment for Strike Fund Brought before Executive Council in November 1948
Scope and Content Note: Felt decision should be postponed pending clarification of where money would go and how it would be spent. Represented Philadelphia Joint Board's views on this subject, as it had always paid its own way without financial help from the International.

Letter from Philadelphia Joint Board Introduced at November 1948 Executive Council Meeting Advocating Creation of Labor Party
Scope and Content Note: President of Joint Board, John Millar, worked for many years in textile industry in England and advocated to Joint Board that a political party similar to Britain's Labour Party be set up in the United States. Lack of recognition of labor in the United States somewhat justified Millar's position. Hueter took no position; Rieve felt labor would progress further, faster working within existing political framework.

Discussion on Potential of Labor Party in Light of Political Situation in 1948
Scope and Content Note: If Truman defeated, opportunities would have been good for formation of a labor party; but no top union officials ever supported possibility of a labor party.

1977 July 22

Introduction

Beginnings of the Baldanzi-Rieve Split within the TWUA
Scope and Content Note: Hueter unaware of any differences prior to his joining Executive Council in 1948. Not until 1949 did differences become apparent to Hueter; by 1950 sides were drawn in Executive Council. Hueter supported Baldanzi. Claims Baldanzi supporters forced into position to oppose many issues because the other side arranged to give political implications to the issues.

Hueter's Interpretation of the Causes for Split
Scope and Content Note: When Hosiery Federation left TWUA, Rieve took membership in a New England local and made this his base of support; this biased him in favor of the New England representatives. New England representatives on Executive Council had prior knowledge of issues up for discussion at Council meetings; Rieve always had their support in advance. New Englanders then used influence over Rieve to advance their own political ambitions, which meant opening up Baldanzi's position for a New Englander. These plans may have been laid without Rieve's knowledge at first.

Main Figure in New England Group
Scope and Content Note: Most ambitious and forceful was Mariano Bishop; had support of New Englanders and acquired support of others who were ambitious.

Introduction

Why Hueter Chose to Side with Baldanzi
Scope and Content Note: Rieve unable to give satisfactory explanation of why Baldanzi should be eliminated.

Hueter's Report to Philadelphia Joint Board on His Meeting with Rieve
Scope and Content Note: Almost unanimous support for Hueter's position in siding with Baldanzi; some objections came from Carpet Division (Local 80), through the influence of Rolla Wallace.

Issues That Caused the Split
Scope and Content Note: Democracy (Rieve assumed more authority than Baldanzi people thought was constitutionally legitimate and Executive Council majority ruled the Union), geography (New England received unequal share of International Union services and financial help), personalities.

Degree of Ambition Often Determined Which Side People Chose

As 1950 Convention Approached Rieve Gave More and More Authority to His Supporters
Scope and Content Note: Rieve spoke of his possible retirement.

Reasons for Failure to Oust Baldanzi at 1950 Convention
Note: Though Hueter refers to this as the 1952 convention, it was the 1950 convention.

Scope and Content Note: Rieve left political preparations pretty much to his followers, and they were not up to the task. Attempt to make Baldanzi's ambition for the presidency the main issue was a strategic mistake. Many delegates switched allegiance to Baldanzi because he did not exhibit this ambition.

Following 1950 Convention - Rieve Group
Scope and Content Note: Situation deteriorated; Baldanzi given no assignments. Rieve again assumed leadership role and began planning for next convention. Pro-Rieve shops in one local given separate charters to increase delegate strength; staffers given delegate proxies of locals that never sent delegates.

Following 1950 Convention - Baldanzi Group
Scope and Content Note: Hueter confined to Philadelphia area whereas previously he had done organizing, etc. in a much broader area. Sam Baron discharged as Canadian Director; Charles Serraino confined to New Jersey. Baldanzi given no important assignments. Union did nothing to heal the wounds; made no progress for the members. Everybody politicking.

Situation Prior to 1952 Convention
Scope and Content Note: With Rieve's position strengthened and with Baldanzi being restricted, positions of strength reversed from that of 1950 convention. Both sides meeting and developing propaganda, pamphlets being distributed, letters going out.

Decision Reached that Baldanzi Should Run for President
Scope and Content Note: Belief by Baldanzi group that they were committed, there was no turning back, and therefore he should run with a complete slate. Hueter did not agree, but was outvoted. Propaganda changed when this decision made - Baldanzi group went on the attack.

1952 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Baldanzi side miscalculated Rieve's ability to create delegate strength; went into convention expecting defeat.

Anecdote Concerning Voting at 1952 Convention - Politicking Right Up to the Voting Booths

Following 1952 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Hueter holds that Baldanzi and most of his followers did not secede, but were driven from the Union.

Baldanzi, after Leaving TWUA
Scope and Content Note: Helped organize New York City taxi drivers; ultimately elected president of UTW.

Charles Hughes
Scope and Content Note: Elected to Executive Council in 1950 as independent; broke the slate. Chose to support Baldanzi.

Introduction

Charles Hughes (Continued)
Scope and Content Note: As representative of Carpet Division, decided to organize those locals on Baldanzi's behalf. (Rolla Wallace's Local 80 split over this issue.) Simultaneously Hughes was politicking to make himself Carpet Director. Turned out Hughes playing both sides, as evidenced by his post-convention nomination by Rieve to be Carpet Director. Hughes had made a deal with Bishop. Hughes unacceptable to Carpet Division; job with State of New York obtained for him as consolation.

Subsequent Careers of Baldanzi Supporters - Baron, Serraino, Lew Conn

Why Hueter Ran for Executive Vice President
Scope and Content Note: Had previously promised Pollock he'd never run for any office against him. Accepted Executive Vice President candidacy only with approval of Philadelphia Joint Board.

Hueter the Only Leader from Baldanzi Group Who Continued Working for TWUA
Scope and Content Note: Returned to Philadelphia as Joint Board Manager. Rolla Wallace took Hueter's place on Executive Council, which he held until his death.

Philadelphia Joint Board Seat on Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Not immediately filled after Wallace's death (August 1952); difficulty in finding an acceptable replacement - only remaining Rieve supporter there was older and unreliable; this man was finally elected in 1954.

With 1956 Convention, Philadelphia Business Agents Insist that Manager of Philadelphia Joint Board Be Returned to Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Much dissatisfaction with representation. Rieve did not object, but said it must be cleared with incoming president - William Pollock. Pollock attempted to attach conditions to his support for Hueter, but ultimately accepted him without strings.

Hueter Received Full Cooperation of Executive Council Upon His Return as Vice President

Hueter's Relationship with Pollock Remained Cool

Hueter Did Not Recommend Secession to Joint Board Following 1952 Convention
Note: See Tape 6, Side 1, 10:30, where Hueter appears to contradict this discussion.

Scope and Content Note: Wrote letter to UTW stating under what conditions Philadelphia Joint Board would join that organization - purposely listed demands that would not be acceptable to UTW. Did not want to split the Union.

Hueter Questioned about Secession by Rieve
Scope and Content Note: Rieve suggested Hueter draw up list of requirements for assurances of no repercussions against Joint Board. Committee of Executive Council formed to discuss items on the list. (Pollock one of eight on this Committee.) Unanimous approval of all 18 items. One additional item added at Rieve's suggestion: Dropping of charges against Hueter for advocating secession. (Committee accepted dropping the charges against Hueter without much discussion. One of the 18 items was to use Charles Weinstein as an arbitrator to settle differences between Philadelphia Joint Board and the International; such arbitration was never needed.)

1978 July 23

Introduction

Disposition of the Fund Gathered by the Baldanzi Forces During the 1950-1952 Internal Dispute
Scope and Content Note: Individuals, locals, and joint boards who supported Baldanzi had contributed to this fund. After the 1952 convention, the Baldanzi leadership (the Committee for a Democratic TWUA) determined that the money remaining in the fund be returned proportionately to all who had made a contribution. Forty-two hundred of the ten thousand dollars donated by the Philadelphia Joint Board was returned. Rieve questioned this and asked for the books, which he was given, but only after the distribution. No further action was taken by the Union.

Hueter's Position During the Internal Dispute Was Always Approved in Writing by All of the Locals - Including Pollock's and Wallace's - Within the Philadelphia Joint Board

The Secession Movement within the Philadelphia Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: Several shops in Rolla Wallace's Local 80 seceded. (Hueter refers to this as Local 83, but he means Local 80.) Immediately after the fight, the entire Joint Board had voted to secede, but this decision was overturned after a meeting with Rieve at which certain assurances and agreements were settled upon.

Philadelphia's Seat on the Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: Wallace was elected on the Administration slate in 1952. When he died, Albert Tompkins, the only other Philadelphia business agent who supported Rieve, replaced him. Hueter was elected in 1956 and re-elected at every convention until his retirement in 1972.

For about Four Years after His Return to the Executive Council, Hueter Was Treated Like an Outsider
Scope and Content Note: There were two reasons for this. First, he had sided with Baldanzi and at one point had advocated secession. (Hueter here contradicts his earlier statements regarding his role in secession - see Tape 5, Side 2, 21:00. The version given here is corroborated elsewhere - see Sol Stetin interview, Tape 6, Side 2, 01:40). Second, he was localized in Philadelphia, while most other vice presidents operated on a more national level. Hence, when he attended a Council meeting, he was far less prepared on the issues than were other Council members.

The Beginnings of the 1962-1964 Internal Dispute
Note: Throughout his discussion of this fight, Hueter usually refers to the two factions as the “Majority” and the “Minority.” in order to be consistent with other interviews in the TWUA Project, this abstract uses the terms “Majority” and “Administration” to identify the two factions.

Scope and Content Note: Hueter remained an outsider on the Executive Council until 1960, when he began to realize that something was happening between members of the Executive Council and the officers of the Union. He questioned Council members about why they were taking positions on certain issues that were contrary to the wishes of the officers.

By 1962, There Was Almost an Open Fight in Every Executive Council Meeting
Scope and Content Note: Hueter was still uncertain why this was happening.

Finally One Council Meeting Deteriorated Badly Enough for Pollock to Call a Recess
Scope and Content Note: Each faction went into a different office. Hueter, “since [he] didn't have any representation in either side,” sat in the hall until Bill DuChessi invited him into the caucus of Pollock supporters.

It Appeared to Hueter That the Circumstances Surrounding This Dispute Were Very Similar to Those of the 1952 Dispute
Scope and Content Note: A particular group on the Executive Council felt first, they could no longer work with one of the officers of the Union - in this case Pollock; and second, they were interested in advancing their own ambitions within TWUA.

For Several Months Hueter Attempted, Unsuccessfully, to Reason with Both Sides in the Dispute
Scope and Content Note: He argued that no matter who won, the Union would suffer.

Hueter Sided with the Administration
Scope and Content Note: Although Pollock had his faults, he was a good President and should not have been removed just because someone else wanted to advance.

One of the Issues Which Contributed to the Split Was the Discharge of Ben Wyle, TWUA General Counsel
Scope and Content Note: Wyle was actively supporting the Majority; Pollock discharged him; and the Majority attempted, unsuccessfully, to override Pollock's decision.

More on the Beginnings of the 1962-1964 Internal Dispute
Scope and Content Note: Until 1960, the Executive Council consistently was in agreement with the recommendations made by the officers. However, in 1960, certain members of the Council began opposing the officers' recommendations; and this opposition continued to grow until the fight broke into the open. The vote in the Council was consistently 12-10.

The Twelve Vice Presidents Constituting the Majority All Had Basically the Same Motives
Scope and Content Note: They were all dissatisfied with the quality of Pollock's leadership. A few were interested in personal advancement; and others resented the way Pollock treated them. Hueter argued with the Majority that, at best, only two of them would be able to advance; but the feelings against Pollock were so strong that this argument could not sway any of the Majority.

Another Issue Contributing to the Split Was Wage Increases for Directors
Scope and Content Note: Pollock did not believe in equal pay for equal work, and, often, directors with similar responsibilities would be paid different salaries.

The New England Clique Supported the Majority
Scope and Content Note: Many joint board managers and staff from New England sided with the Majority. Ultimately, the New England leaders felt the entire New England area would support their position, but that did not happen.

Introduction

New Englander John Chupka Did Not Join the New England Clique in Its Opposition to Pollock
Scope and Content Note: The New Englanders thought that if they were united, Chupka would join with them. Because of statements Chupka had made about his difficulties with Pollock, the Majority assumed he would support their position. “Chupka was a man who wasn't quick making a decision”; when he did make his decision to back the Administration, it was a severe blow to the Majority.

The Administration Established a Committee of Three to Plan Strategy
Scope and Content Note: It consisted of Pollock, Chupka, and Hueter. This surprised Hueter because he “was only a joint board manager.” They would meet prior to Council meetings to decide the positions to be taken by the Administration faction.

Rieve's Role in the 1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: At first it was only a rumor that Rieve was becoming involved; but it soon became evident, from certain statements made by Majority members of the Executive Council, that he was taking a position in favor of the Majority. The Administration attempted to nullify Rieve's position by threatening to revoke his salary if he came to the 1964 convention and spoke on behalf of the Majority. Rieve was angered by the Administration's plan; and thereafter there was no question that he would be attending the convention and voicing his opinion. At that point, he was trying to protect himself.

Rieve's Speech at the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Hueter was convinced that no action would be taken against Rieve if he did not speak for the Majority. “...[T]he speech he made at that convention was definitely wrong from the standpoint of the future of the Union”; but Rieve was so angry with Pollock over the proposed income reduction, he no longer cared about the Majority; it had become a question of a personal attack on him. The resolution to end Rieve's salary and place him on pension was introduced by the Administration, and it passed. Hueter tried to get Rieve to play the role of peacemaker, but he would have no part of that.

More on Rieve's Role in the 1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: Certain statements the Majority let slip, concerning policy matters that only Rieve would have known anything about, indicated that he was advising them.

The Local 1790 Issue
Scope and Content Note: Hueter was not close to this situation. Like most of the Administration group, he merely went along with Jack Rubenstein's recommendations.

Federation of Textile Representatives (FTR) During the Fight
Scope and Content Note: There was never any indication that the formation of this internal union of organizers in 1962 had anything to do with the political fight. There was no organized attempt by the FTR to take one side or the other.

1962 Turnover in Executive Council Members
Scope and Content Note: There were no political overtones; the Executive Council met and agreed on who should be slated to replace the four who resigned.

It Became Very Difficult for the Administration to Slate Twelve Replacements for the Executive Council Before the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: It was difficult from the standpoint of which ones were most able. Also, there were a number of possible choices, but only twelve positions available, so some were bound to be offended; and the Administration did not wish to lose any of its supporters. There was quite a battle within the Administration group over the slating of these twelve. One fellow insisted on having two people from his jurisdiction slated and walked out when the others refused to agree to this. Hueter spoke with him for an hour and finally got him to agree to go along with the decision of the others.

In Both the 1950-1952 Internal Dispute and the 1962-1964 Internal Dispute, There Were High-Level Informants on Both Sides
Scope and Content Note: Both sides knew in both fights exactly what the opposing faction was going to do.

If the Majority Had Had the Support of the Membership of the Areas They Represented, They Would Have Won in the 1964 Convention

Why the Majority Opposed Calling a Special Convention to Settle the Internal Dispute
Scope and Content Note: The Majority was not yet ready and felt that more time would solidify their position with the membership. However, the Administration used this time to secure its own position, charging that the Majority was preventing the Union's advancement.

The 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: On the first morning, the Majority forces were so noisy during demonstrations that delegates began demanding that the galleries be kept quiet.

Introduction

More on the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: The Majority forces that were being so rowdy were mainly from Joseph J. (Johnny) Miraglia's Local 1790. They were deliberately attempting to disrupt the convention, and delegates began resenting this attempt. Before the start of the convention, the Administration forces were still uncertain of victory - they had counted votes in advance, and the tally was almost even - but as that first day progressed, it became more and more evident that the Administration could win. The Majority took a negative, opposition tact, while the Administration took a positive approach, explaining as they went along their course of action. This negativism, plus the rowdiness of the Local 1790 people, turned many delegates to the Administration.

More on the Special Convention
Scope and Content Note: Although the idea of a special convention was a “maneuver” on the part of the Administration, they were willing to follow through with it. However, they were fairly certain that the Majority was not ready at that point.

Until Their Nomination at the Convention, the Administration Did Not Know Who from the Majority Would Be Running for the Major Offices of the Union
Scope and Content Note: The Administration was aware of a certain amount of dissension among the Majority as to who would run. They were “not necessarily” surprised that Wesley Cook and William Belanger were nominated.

Hueter Does Not Believe That the Reason Cook and Belanger Were Slated for the Major Offices Was Because the Majority Knew They Could Not Win
Scope and Content Note: Instead, he believes “that up until the first day of the convention, they were convinced that they would win the convention.”

Cook and Belanger as Potential Officers of the Union
Scope and Content Note: Though each were strong individuals, they worked well together in the Executive Council.

Speculation Would Have It That Either Industry or Regional Directors Would Be Most Apt to Run for the Major Offices
Scope and Content Note: People at this level would have ambitions that joint board managers and people at lower levels would not entertain.

Committee Assignments at the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: These assignments were discussed by the entire Executive Council, and the attempt was made to balance them so that there would be no charges made against the Administration of trying to control committees. People from each faction, plus neutral people, were put on each committee. The Administration saw to it that some of these “neutral” people were leaning toward the Administration. In the 1952 fight, Rieve and his supporters had stacked the committees heavily in their own favor.

The 1964 Convention Was Much More Democratic Than the 1952 Convention
Scope and Content Note: The Administration tried to be democratic in its positions, thereby robbing the Majority of an issue. “All they could do was oppose,” and this negativism had an effect on the delegates.

Why the TWUA Trustees Sided with the Majority
Scope and Content Note: One of the three trustees, Mary Vaz, was from New England, was very involved with that group, and owed her job to Majority leaders. (Hueter says that Mary Vaz was also a trustee in the 1952 fight, but she was not. In 1952 Elizabeth Nord was the woman trustee, and she was the only trustee that year to support the Rieve side.) Another was William Ewing, who was from the Synthetic-Yarn Division of western Pennsylvania, and who, therefore, was probably under Cook's influence.

The TWUA Constitution Forbids the Use of Union Funds for Internal Disputes
Scope and Content Note: The Administration solicited funds from individuals, locals, and joint boards which backed the Administration position. Careful records were kept; and, after the 1964 convention, the remaining funds were returned to the contributors on a proportionate basis.

No Effort Was Made to Check the Source of Funds Used by the Majority
Scope and Content Note: This may have been because of the Landrum-Griffin Act.

From a Personal Standpoint, the 1952 Fight Was Much More Bitter Than the 1964 Fight
Scope and Content Note: The 1964 fight, however, was more detrimental to the Union because of the loss of capable Union leaders.

It Is Doubtful That Either Cook or Belanger Could Have Remained within TWUA after the 1964 Internal Dispute
Scope and Content Note: Since the opposition was based on such a wide variety of issues, it would have been extremely difficult for them to accept these things overnight. If they had remained in TWUA, the dispute would have continued until another open break developed.

It Was Suggested to Baldanzi That He Could Remain with the Union after His Defeat in 1952
Scope and Content Note: However, those making this suggestion knew that Baldanzi would not accept; that he simply could no longer have worked with Rieve.

Because the Majority Did Not Have the Support of the Membership, There Was No Question of a Secession Movement after the 1964 Convention
Scope and Content Note: The Administration did not realize the Majority had so little membership support until the convention had actually begun.

The Fate of the Losers in 1964
Scope and Content Note: Hueter feels that all of the Majority members were embarrassed by the positions they had taken and knew they could not work in harmony with the winners. So they looked for a way out. Many took retirement. There was no real discussion about getting rid of Majority leaders who did not leave of their own volition. The fight was so bitter both sides assumed that defeat would mean they were through.

Introduction

More on William Belanger and Wesley Cook
Scope and Content Note: Belanger had another job lined up which paid more than he had been making as a division director; and Cook was ready to leave the Union anyway.

Harold Daoust Became New England Director after Belanger Left TWUA
Scope and Content Note: Even before the 1964 internal dispute, Daoust had wished to return from Canada. Since he was from New England, the decision to make him Director in that area, where he was well known, was an appropriate one.

Bill Tullar
Scope and Content Note: Tullar was Midwest Director. He resigned from the Union in 1966 because of illness, though he had been ill prior to his retirement and took another job with the government after his retirement.

Aftermath of the 1964 Internal Dispute
Scope and Content Note: Between the time of the 1964 fight and Hueter's retirement in 1972, TWUA did not progress as much as it would have liked, especially in the area of organizing. This was due to the fact that times were not good, and the Executive Council was composed of a number of newer, inexperienced members.

The Difficulties of Being a TWUA Organizer
Scope and Content Note: TWUA usually sent organizers outside their native areas, perhaps assuming that they would be more productive away from home. Often they would be separated from their families for long periods. Examples of the demeaning things organizers had to put up with, including an anecdote about women at a Philadelphia plant pouring water on Hueter and other organizers. Also, there was always the pressure to produce in order to move up or even to avoid being replaced.

One of TWUA'S Long-Time Problems Was the Lack of Advancement Opportunities
Scope and Content Note: The lack of advancement possibilities within TWUA was the main reason why the Union experienced two internal fights. No one can remain an organizer for thirty years. Hueter saw this problem and, as Chairman of the Constitutional Review Committee in the early 1970s, he recommended retirement of officers and employees at age 65 in order to open up advancement opportunities for younger people. The membership overwhelmingly supported this change.

Imbalance on the Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: This was one of the reasons the 1970 convention mandated the formation of a committee to review the constitution. Hueter was named to the committee and became its chairman. Hueter thought the original theory in TWUA was to have a Council with more or less equal representation from industry directors, regional directors, joint boards, and locals. At first it worked this way, but pressure came from high-level directors who were not on the Council, and, by the 1970s, the Council began to become imbalanced, particularly geographically. Furthermore, by the time Hueter retired, there was no longer a balance of half the vice presidents being paid by the International and half locally. A problem involved in this was that often, qualified people were kept off the Council in order to maintain balance.

Hueter and His Constitutional Review Committee Visited Different Areas of the Country to Get the Views and Suggestions of the Membership
Scope and Content Note: The meetings were not always well attended because of the distance that would often have to be travelled to attend. There was, however, always a good representation of locals at the meetings. People at the meetings asked good questions and were generally satisfied that the Committee was sincerely trying to improve the organization.

The Regional Representation Recommendation Was Rejected by the Executive Council

Hueter and His Committee Analyzed the Results of Their Area Tours and Reported to the Executive Council
Scope and Content Note: The Council then discussed each suggestion and either supported or rejected it, with the supported suggestions being recommended to the convention.

More on Compulsory Retirement at Age 65
Scope and Content Note: Hueter was very strongly in favor of this, even though he would be affected by it at the next convention. Jack Rubenstein, however, strongly opposed it and felt that “people were after him personally.” He failed to realize the importance of advancing people within the organization.

The Administration Was Not Too Happy with the Change That Permitted Delegates to Vote for Only Fifteen Vice Presidents to Fill the Twenty Executive Council Seats
Scope and Content Note: This was a compromise because there was so much opposition to the past practice of forcing delegates to vote for twenty vice presidents. The administration continued to present slates of twenty.

In 1972, Pennsylvania Was Not Represented at Either the Woolen-Worsted Conference or the Northern Cotton-Rayon Conference

Introduction

The Philadelphia Joint Board Was Always Represented at the Woolen-Worsted Conferences; Hueter Cannot Speak for the Rest of Pennsylvania
Scope and Content Note: Hueter, as Manager, was a member of the Advisory Council of the Woolen-Worsted Division of the Union, even after the American Woolen Company, the pattern setter, had gone out of business.

Hueter Attended Almost All Cotton Division Meetings until Philadelphia No Longer Had Any Basic Cotton Industry Left
Scope and Content Note: Then the plush and upholstery cotton locals became a section within the Cotton Division and met separately.

J.P. Stevens
Scope and Content Note: The decision was unanimous in the Executive Council to target Stevens, even though it came in the midst of the 1964 internal dispute. Selection of such targets was rarely subject to politicking. The Union decided to concentrate on a large chain of the industry; the idea being that if they were successful, there would be a real impact on the industry. Up until that time, TWUA had attempted to organize smaller units of the industry with no apparent effect.

Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, J.P. Stevens Mills
Scope and Content Note: In 1974, after an election had been won by the Union, Hueter offered his assistance in the subsequent negotiations, with the understanding that he not become involved for too long a period of time. However, in his first and only meeting with the company, it was immediately “obvious that the company had no intention of coming to any agreement on anything,” so Hueter withdrew. Also, Hueter felt he would have to hold many meetings with the local people to get a feeling for their desires. All of this would have amounted to a full-time job in Roanoke Rapids, which was a commitment he could not make.

Hueter's Opinion of Southern Workers
Scope and Content Note: He had never negotiated for southern workers, but he did not feel they were any different in their negotiating desires. All workers ask for the sky but are willing to settle for less, and it takes a lot of meeting with groups and individuals to determine what they will settle for.

The Decline of the Textile Industry in Philadelphia
Scope and Content Note: The Joint Board at its peak had about 12,000 members, and today it is down to about 2,000-3,000. The majority of textile workers in Philadelphia are still organized. Many factors contributed to this decline. The decline in textile employees has been general; indeed, in Philadelphia, more non-union shops have failed than union shops. Family-owned companies, which dominated the industry in Philadelphia, closed down because the children of the original owners neither needed nor cared to continue running the business. There was actually very little migration. Many mills had antiquated machinery, and rather than invest the money necessary to update this machinery, the company chose to close down. Imports were a factor. Also, in plants where the employer was willing to install new machinery, this often meant a reduction in the work force of as much as 50 percent, with the alternative being plant liquidation.

Collins and Aikman's Association with the Union over the Years
Scope and Content Note: The company continued to match wages and conditions of union shops and eventually set up its own company union. This lasted until the company moved South, leaving its former employees behind. These people then asked the Philadelphia Joint Board for assistance in locating work, and the Joint Board complied. The company continued its policy of matching union benefits in the South. The Union signed up a majority there, but the company refused to negotiate a contract; the Union eventually lost its majority.

Fringe Benefits in Philadelphia
Scope and Content Note: Paid holidays were originally bargained in lieu of part of a wage increase. In most cases, Philadelphia was a pioneer in fringe benefits in the textile industry. One advantage was that the Joint Board represented nine different branches of the industry but insisted on getting the same benefits for the weaker divisions as for the strong. Other areas could then use Philadelphia as an example to match these benefits in the weaker branches of the industry.

In the Early Going It Was Difficult to Get Information on Contracts in Other Parts of the Country
Scope and Content Note: The Research Department eventually was able to overcome the hesitancy of local unions to reveal the conditions of their contracts. Wage information then became readily available, but work load information remained difficult to obtain. This was due in part to the variety of machines and conditions in the various mills. Because it was not a wealthy industry, the Union never thought it could obtain uniform working conditions throughout the industry.

Pension Benefits in the Philadelphia Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: Pensions were not achieved until toward the end of Hueter's tenure as Joint Board Manager. Uniformity of plans was never achieved.

Imports Were the Main Factor in the Decline of the Textile Industry in Philadelphia
Scope and Content Note: Imports have wiped out the yarn spinning branch of the industry.