September 25, 1978 Session

Introduction

Biographical Background
Scope and Content Note: Born in New York City, November, 1919. Grew up in New York. Received a B.A. from Brooklyn College and an M.A. in economics from New York University. Worked for the U.S. Department of Commerce, for the War Labor Board, and for a private company before joining TWUA as a senior economist in 1947. Married, two children.

Duties When He First Joined TWUA
Scope and Content Note: Under Director Sol Barkin, he was responsible for supervising the work of the economists and statisticians in the Research Department and for preparing reports and analyses. The Department had at the time, in addition to Barkin and Perkel, two economists and two industrial engineers.

Working for Sol Barkin
Scope and Content Note: Initially Barkin was “quite troublesome” to work for because his speech was not as communicative as it should have been, and he usually wanted his staff to do more than he actually asked them to do. He was impatient. After a month or two, however, Barkin came to show Perkel a lot of respect, and they actually progressed to a friendly basis; at least they were friendlier than Barkin was with most people who worked for him. Barkin's vanity and volubility at times created problems.

Barkin's Image as a Maverick Economist
Scope and Content Note: “He liked to push the frontiers.” He was always looking for fresh viewpoints, and to that extent he was a maverick. He impressed people with his freshness and his articulateness, being much more articulate in public speaking than in private conversation.

The Role of the Research Department
Scope and Content Note: Perkel and Barkin had similar views of the role of the Department, but Barkin was affected by his experience in an administrative capacity during TWOC. “He never got over that experience.” Perkel, on the other hand, never had any experience with, or desire for, a top administrative position in the Union. Both conceived their mission as trying to think about the Union and its problems with more depth, more complex analysis, and more intellectual vigor than the officers and to come up with analyses and recommendations to meet the Union's problems. Both viewed the Research Department more as a think tank than a service department.

The Import Problem
Scope and Content Note: TWUA identified this problem long before other unions. The industry usually cooperated with the Union in government presentations, etc. The United Textile Workers (UTW), however, did not have a research department and did not have the resources to make any economic analyses that would help the industry's case; hence, it did not participate much in the effort to put controls on textile imports. The UTW did have representatives in the 1960s on the Labor-Management Textile Advisory Committee which dealt with imports.

Perception of the Import Problem by Other Unions
Scope and Content Note: Other soft-goods unions began to see the problem in the early 1960s and became active with TWUA in trying to do something about it. Today, of course, even heavy industries are affected. The reason why other unions did not support TWUA's concern over imports was because heavy industry was experiencing full employment, more or less, and they simply did not perceive the problem as being real. Only when it affected them personally did they react.

Relief from Textile Imports
Scope and Content Note: The International Cotton Textile Agreement - part of President Kennedy's seven-point program for textiles - was helpful, but only for cotton; and cotton was becoming a less and less important part of the textile picture with the rapid growth of synthetics. Relief for synthetics and wool was not forthcoming from the government until about 1974, when those fabrics were added to the International Trade Control Program. It took this long for synthetics to be added to the Trade Control list because the market for synthetics was expanding so rapidly that American production of synthetics was growing continuously, albeit at a slower rate than imports. Hence, while the Union and the industry could show a loss in the proportion of the market, they could not demonstrate injury; they could not demonstrate a decline in production in absolute terms. Wool was not added to the list until 1974 because the wool industry was not influential in government and because Japan was the major supplier of imported wool; and “relations with Japan were such that it was difficult to impose additional restraints on trade with Japan.”

Perkel's Involvement with the Kennedy Seven-Point Program for Textiles
Scope and Content Note: Barkin was Research Director until the end of 1962, and the import agreement was negotiated in 1962; hence, Perkel was not very involved with it until after 1962. He was quite involved in its evolution after that and with its extension to synthetics and wool.

Frustration in Dealing with the Government
Scope and Content Note: Both in regards to imports and in his current efforts on behalf of occupational safety and health, Perkel finds dealing with the government very frustrating. “Many government people don't really get involved in trying to see the true nature of problems. They just want to dispose of issues as painlessly as possible to them. They want to do things the easy way; they don't want to offend influential people. And so, progress is very slow in getting them to do what they should do.”

The Trade Adjustment Assistance Provision of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act
Scope and Content Note: This provision was supposed to provide relief to workers who lost jobs due to imports. The provision was thrown in as a sop to labor; trade adjustment assistance, not import limitation, was the official policy of the AFL-CIO at the time. The Union until the early 1970s was never able to use this provision of the act because the legislation was written in such a way that the burden of proof was excessive. In order to fulfill all the requirements for getting trade adjustment assistance, one had to prove what was virtually impossible. Perkel can recall no relief coming from this provision of the act from 1962 to 1970, even though several petitions for assistance were filed in that period, including many by the TWUA; all were rejected. Finally, due to the efforts of the Steel Workers, a change in the interpretation of the provision came about in 1970. Thereafter TWUA was able to get some assistance for members thrown out of work because of imports.

The Nature of Perkel's Work Before Becoming Director
Scope and Content Note: He spent 60-70 percent of his time supervising and working on the service aspects of the Department - answering requests from the field, preparing routine financial, wage, and benefits analyses, etc. The remainder of his time was spent assisting the Director on more profound studies of what the Union's problems were and how to deal with them.

How the Research Department Became Involved in the Occupational Safety and Health Issue
Scope and Content Note: The immediate cause was the organizing of a plant in Philadelphia that processed asbestos. The plant had previously had an independent union which addressed in its contract the concerns of the workers about exposure to asbestos. This was the first time TWUA had ever encountered such a concern in any of its plants, and it therefore became necessary to learn about the problem. Concurrently, scientific research was beginning to disclose the problem of byssinosis amongst American cotton mill workers. Perkel saw it as his job, as Research Director, to learn about industrial disease in the textile industry; and the officers approved his devoting considerable time to this.

Introduction

Research Department Reaction to This New Concern
Scope and Content Note: The Department was able to hire its first expert in safety and health in early 1972. Perkel actually welcomed this new concern; it was like starting a new career that was both gratifying and interesting.

Why It Took So Long for TWUA to Recognize This Issue
Scope and Content Note: The Union and the general public was simply unaware of occupational health problems. In 1968 Dr. Irving J. Selikoff published an article in The New Yorker about the health dangers of exposure to asbestos dust. This was the first time the popular press had carried anything on industrial disease. There had been simply no awareness previous to this, amongst unions or the public, that such things represented serious health hazards to workers. The Union, once made aware of the problems of industrial disease in textile employment, was quick to respond. At about the same time a mine disaster helped spark the beginnings of occupational safety and health legislation, which helped make the Union and the public aware that occupational health was a real problem. The reason the independent local in Philadelphia had been addressing occupational health in its contracts and the TWUA was unaware of the problem was because TWUA did not have textile asbestos plants. TWUA had locals where asbestos was used peripherally, but none where asbestos was actually manufactured and thus where asbestos dust was significant. People at the Philadelphia local were losing their ability to breathe and were dying early; these same problems were not noticeable in any TWUA local.

TWUA'S Role in Passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
Scope and Content Note: TWUA was very active testifying before the committees of both houses of Congress. The Union brought members to hearings to testify on brown lung (byssinosis), excessive noise levels, etc. The testimony must have been effective because the report of the committee used asbestos and cotton dust as prominent examples of industrial disease that should be addressed in legislation.

Frustration in Attempting to Get the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) to Issue a Cotton Dust Standard
Scope and Content Note: The TWUA experience in attempting to get a decent cotton dust standard issued was “an important experience in that it reflects...the kinds of pressures and the kinds of results that occur when a trade union tries to deal with a serious problem through a government administrative agency; and the kinds of pressures that are brought to bear on (the government agency) and affect the results.” It was very frustrating trying to get OSHA and the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) to move, despite the Union's application of political pressure and factual data to support that pressure.

TWUA Went to Court to Force the Government to Move on Cotton Dust
Scope and Content Note: In late 1975 the Union filed suit against the Secretary of Labor, after waiting nearly a year for him to propose a new cotton dust standard. The Department of Labor reacted by proposing a new standard, which was merely the first step. This proposal formed the basis for a rule-making proceeding, which involved hearings, briefs, testimony, etc. The Union made a major effort in this proceeding, doing a lot of work and spending a lot of money for independent experts and worker testimony, in order to demonstrate the need for, and feasibility of, an effective standard.

Government Inflation-Control Agencies Attempted to Stall Issuance of the Standard
Scope and Content Note: The Council of Economic Advisors and the Council on Wage and Price Stability tried to prevent issuing the standard OSHA had prepared. OSHA, however, had heard testimony from the Council on Wage and Price Stability and had rejected its arguments. The Council's position was that, when setting standards under OSHA, the main thrust should be to find the most cost-effective way of regulating the problem. In this case, it meant having workers wear masks and respirators and having them examined periodically by company doctors who would, when deemed necessary, have the employees transferred to healthier departments of the plant. The theory was that this would be cheaper than forcing the mills to clean up the air. In the short run this would be true, but in the long run it would wind up costing more to take care of cotton dust victims who would not really be adequately protected by this system. Masks are impractical for use over extended periods. Company doctors are pro-company and not all plants have healthy departments to which affected employees can be transferred. Because the Union's suit against the Secretary of Labor was held in abeyance rather than withdrawn, the Council was unable to keep OSHA from issuing the standard.

Unsatisfactory Standard Finally Issued
Scope and Content Note: The Carter administration, because of its concern over inflation, did several flip-flops on issuance of the standard before finally coming out with a standard that Perkel viewed as entirely unsatisfactory. The basic problem with the standard, as issued, is that it delays by four years the amount of time given to the companies to implement engineering control of cotton dust. In the meantime, the mask system will be in effect. If ordered to do so, the companies could clean up the air within a year. The Union has appealed to the Court of Appeals to correct the deficiencies in the standard.

The Delays Were Caused by Company Influence with Various Governmental Agencies, Not by OSHA
Scope and Content Note: Even when a good government agency head wants to do his job correctly, the employers have political influence with other sectors of the Administration which “are more attuned to them.” This influence was used to try to prevent OSHA from issuing the standard. The employers are now going to court to try to get the standard set aside and are trying to use Congress to amend the appropriations bill to impede OSHA's implementation of the standard.

Other Ways to Induce Management to Cooperate
Scope and Content Note: The use of tax incentives to make it attractive to management to implement effective cotton dust standards has possibilities, but this approach has not been adequately explored.

Creation of the TWUA Industrial Engineering Department in 1970
Scope and Content Note: The Union almost always had at least two industrial engineers in the Research Department. Perkel decided he could no longer devote the required time to the economic aspects of his work, where his expertise lay, and still supervise the industrial engineers, who perform a very specialized function. Hence, he decided it would be best for both himself and the Union if Industrial Engineering was made a separate department.

Introduction

How Changing Lifestyles in the 1950s Affected the Textile Industry
Scope and Content Note: It was a question of intensity. While people were buying more cars and homes which have upholstery, drapes, carpets, etc., they were buying less and different types of clothes, and apparel has always been the major user of textile products. Hence, total textile demand declined; and this decline affected mostly the older, less competitive industry in the North.

Northern Pockets Never Organized by TWUA
Scope and Content Note: At its peak, TWUA had about three-fourths of the North organized. as the northern industry declined, organized plants declined more sharply than unorganized plants. This was due in part to the fact that organization was concentrated in large units making staple products - American Woolen Company, the large carpet companies, etc. These large plants took a greater beating by the decline in demand for textiles than did many smaller plants. The unorganized pockets were in synthetic yarn weaving and processing in Pennsylvania; the woolen industry in Maine and Massachusetts; and the narrow fabric industry in Rhode Island. These smaller plant industries showed a greater ability to survive in the 1950s. By the late 1950s, or certainly by the 1960s, this residue of unorganized northern textile mills, often widely dispersed, accounted for close to half of northern textile employment. “The fact that there was such a large sector of unorganized workers in the North reflected a failure of the Union to organize in the North as well as in the South.”

Why These Pockets Were Not Organized
Scope and Content Note: Initially they were not organized because they were harder to organize. They were more geographically dispersed, smaller in size, and not located in the major textile centers that were organized on a mass basis in the 1940s. They were in the hinterlands. Later, in the 1950s and 1960s, they were not organized because the Union was concentrating its efforts in the South. The idea that organization of a large southern chain was the essential step needed before the industry could be organized, “dominated the thinking of the leadership....” a minority felt more effort should be applied to the North where, if an election were won, there would be a greater chance of getting a contract.

Attempts to Organize the North Did Continue, But They Were Largely Unsuccessful
Scope and Content Note: The reasons for this were twofold: 1) By the 1950s more and more workers, especially in non-metropolitan areas, were becoming skeptical of the value of unions and were much less aware of unionism as a force than were workers in heavily populated areas. 2) To organize these small, dispersed, hinterlands plants required exceptionally competent people who could discover the needs of these workers, ways to appeal to them, and ways to carry out an effective campaign. “And I think we had a scarcity of skilled people to do that.” There appeared to be a scarcity of skilled organizers throughout the labor movement in the 1950s and 1960s. The quality of the TWUA organizing staff probably did not differ much from other unions at the time.

The Sizeable Unorganized Northern Pockets
Scope and Content Note: There were thousands of unorganized textile workers in the Pennsylvania synthetic yarn processing, weaving, and knitting industry. In Rhode Island there were many unorganized workers in the narrow fabric industry and in Maine and Massachusetts the unorganized were concentrated in the woolen industry. All together, there were (and still are) probably 70,000 to 90,000 unorganized textile workers in these four states.

Unorganized Synthetics
Scope and Content Note: TWUA had good organization in plants that used chemicals to make synthetic yarn. The unorganized synthetic plants were those that took this product, put a twist in it, rewound it, wove it and knitted it; that is, these plants took the yarn product of Viscose and Celanese and made it into bolts of cloth. In earlier days, the Union did have sizeable numbers of these workers organized in the Allentown, Pennsylvania, and the Paterson, New Jersey, areas, but those areas have dwindled appreciably while the lower-wage areas - small towns in the Pennsylvania coal region, like Scranton and Wilkes-Barre - were able to maintain themselves through the 1950s textile recession.

The Economics of Organizing Were Rarely a Consideration
Scope and Content Note: While smaller, dispersed plants are more expensive to organize and service, this expense rarely affected determinations of what should be an organizing target. TWUA has never made an economic analysis to determine if there is a break-even point in organizing. The Union has tried to get around the problem of the expense of servicing small, dispersed plants by “setting up joint boards which weren't joint boards in the sense that they're a center of a mill area; they're joint boards in that they centralize the administration over a wide radius of small towns.” “We've tried to organize wherever we could find unorganized workers, and we've simply found it difficult, if not impossible, to win elections among these 80 or 90,000 workers. We've won some, but we lose more than we win in the North.”

More on the Difficulty of Organizing These Northern Pockets
Scope and Content Note: It is difficult “to convince them that you're powerful enough to get them what they want and to overcome the employers' opposition.” Although Scranton and Wilkes-Barre are in the center of the old Appalachian coal fields where there is a strong union tradition, many of the textile workers there are women, and they are harder to organize. However, it appears that garment shops in the area are better organized than textile.

The Key Factor in Successful Organizing in the 1950s
Scope and Content Note: Usually organizing successes in the 1950s came when the workers in a mill were angry about something the boss or foreman had done.

The Basic Problem in Organizing the South
Scope and Content Note: “Southern workers believe that their bosses are more powerful than unions are; and many, if not most, are afraid...that they would suffer...primarily through loss of their jobs.” “The basic problem...[is] that people are afraid, and the dominance of the employer in the community is such that people don't see the potential for exercising the necessary power to equalize their position or improve their position on the job.” It is true that where workers have organized in the South, they have not shifted the balance of power tremendously or improved their standard of living appreciably; but organization has given working people a greater sense of their own dignity, a greater reliance on themselves to correct wrongs. They do feel they have more right to their own opinions and control of their lives.

What the Union Can Offer the Southern Worker
Scope and Content Note: Where workers sense they are not in command of their lives, “the Union gives them an opportunity for redress of a sort” through the grievance procedure. The Union cannot offer substantial wage increases, but can offer improvement in job rights and the long-range promise that wide-scale organization will bring wages up.

The Changing South
Scope and Content Note: “The changing nature of industry in the South and culture in the South are important influences that will affect the future of organizing in the South.” It was once impossible to organize in the South; it is easier now; organizing conditions should continue to improve.

The “Southern Conspiracy”
Scope and Content Note: It is questionable whether there is a conspiracy in the usual sense, but southern employers do get together to discuss common concerns, including the union problem. Also, the pattern of activities of certain southern legal firms, like Whiteford Blakeney's, do imply a conspiracy.

Introduction

The Mentality of the Southern Employer
Scope and Content Note: There is a new generation of southern textile management, but many employers retain the old notions of dominance that were common in the era of Charles Cannon. They still largely retain “the sense that workers aren't really adults; they're kinda children; they have to be told what to do.” This paternalism is changing to some extent as new people, who have had experience in other industries and with unions, are being brought into textile management. They have more sophisticated attitudes, but they still feel the union gets in the way when management wants to make changes. So whatever the motive, “you have a very strong anti-union animus pervading the...top management in the southern textile industry.”

Differences Between Southern and Northern Textile Workers Today
Scope and Content Note: The South has a larger proportion of younger workers and black workers and, therefore, would appear to have more workers who are susceptible to organization.

Organizing Approaches Today
Scope and Content Note: By and large, organizing is carried on today the same way it was 20 or 30 years ago. That is one of the problems. There is very little innovation; very little geared to the younger worker who grew up in a different climate. TWUA has, to a very limited extent, experimented with new techniques like TV and opinion surveys. “These are things that require money and they require a willingness to experiment and an openness to the possibilities of doing things a lot differently than they have been done. And those attitudes are rather uncommon in our Union and generally among unions.” While there has been talk of changing these attitudes, when it comes down to putting up the money to invest in new techniques, the money is not there. The AFL-CIO has given no indication of advancing new techniques. “The AFL-CIO, the Industrial Union Department, and the unions are dominated in the organizing department by people who feel that organizing is a process which they know because they've been in it and nobody else knows. And anything new is a gimmick.”

Perkel's Opinion of the TWUA Merger with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW)
Scope and Content Note: It is too early to say much about it. The Textile Division is still in a separate building. The merger has had certain clear benefits in regard to the J.P. Stevens campaign. The consumer boycott is more effective than it would have been had TWUA tried it alone, and the merged organization is able to do a bigger and better job in the legal aspects and in the launching of the corporate campaign against Stevens. It is too early to tell, however, if these benefits will make any significant difference because the Union has not won against Stevens yet, and there is no way of telling if it will win. The negative aspects of the merger are that it is now more difficult to get things done; actions have to be cleared with more people; there is a longer chain of command and a slower process of decision making. It is too difficult to balance the pluses and minuses at this point. ACTWU will take a few years to become more efficient. “It's impossible for me to say whether the merged organization is a much more potent force than the separate organizations were.”

Professional Staff Freedom after Emil Rieve's Retirement
Scope and Content Note: Rieve permitted professional staff a good deal of freedom to pursue those things which they thought were best for the Union. This did not change appreciably under William Pollock or Sol Stetin. “Stetin was more free in letting people develop ideas and try to carry them out than Pollock was.” Since the merger, however, “it's less of a free organization from that point of view. You can't move very far without getting the okay of all four general officers.”

Divided Opinion in the Executive Council on Organizing Priorities
Scope and Content Note: By the early 1970s, after several years of the Stevens campaign without any successes to show for it, a handful of Council members began to question whether maybe the Union should be concentrating its organizing efforts in the North. “There started to be serious concern that we were barking up the wrong tree; (that) it was a no-win situation.” Jack Rubenstein was the most voluble one expressing these views, and from time to time two or three others would express similar views. Rubenstein expressed them most strongly, and he had expressed them for several years. “...But it was not a popular view.”

Consideration about Dropping the Stevens Campaign
Scope and Content Note: Sol Stetin, a few months before the election at Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina, told the Council that if the Union did not win that election, it should consider whether to continue with the Stevens campaign. Southern Director Scott Hoyman maintained at the time that the Union was not winning the battle against Stevens and that perhaps the Union should reassess its strategy. The inference was not to withdraw from the South and concentrate on the North, but perhaps to select a smaller target in the South because the big ones appeared to be too much of a burden.

TWUA'S Near Victory at Cannon Mills and the Campaign That Followed
Scope and Content Note: In 1974 TWUA polled 45 percent of the vote in an NLRB election at Cannon mills. It is hard to judge how that near victory came about. The Union then decided to pursue a second major campaign in Cannon mills. It used an opinion polling firm “to get more understanding of the Cannon worker's mentality.” The poll indicated a sharp division amongst the workers, and an election outcome was hard to predict. Many older workers were pro-management, and many others regarded Cannon management as at least neutral. There was, however, substantial dissatisfaction amongst younger and black workers. The Union then launched a campaign there similar to previous campaigns, but after six months the response was not encouraging. Not enough workers were signing cards, and the organizer in charge decided to withdraw from the situation. Cannon management did not fire anyone for union activity during the campaign. If the Union had won by a narrow margin and was not able to bargain a contract, it might have been able to strike because of the concentration of Cannon mills in one geographic area and one bargaining unit.

Availability of Strikebreakers in the South Today
Scope and Content Note: They are still pretty easy to come by, but recent TWUA strikes have seen management forego this route and attempt to continue operations with their regular employees.

Perkel's Assessment of William Pollock as President of TWUA
Scope and Content Note: He had a great stubbornness of will; he faced difficult problems and refused to retreat in the face of adverse conditions; he tried to maintain the organization but resisted spending money for innovation in organizing. Perkel was not close enough to the decision-making process to attempt to grade Pollock as a leader. “To me his outstanding quality was a determination to maintain the strength of the organization, a resistance to retreat....He was aggressive about winning wage increases at a time when it was difficult to do so. On the other hand, in the organizing field, he was limited in his willingness to experiment in response to the difficult problems we faced.” “I won't say I felt comfortable working for him....Trying to get him to change his mind was an onerous thing. I felt that I had two-and-a-half strikes against me when I went in to try to get him to change his mind.”