Introduction

Trade Union Background
Scope and Content Note: Organized the Louisville metal fabricating plant he was working in at the time the National Industrial Recovery Act was passed. Was fired; won back pay, but not reinstatement. After that, spent all his spare time organizing. Worked part time for the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC) and later for the Textile Workers Organizing Committee. Became a full-time representative for the Tobacco Workers International Union about 1941. Then to St. Louis with the Retail, Wholesale and Department Store workers for five years; involved in the big Montgomery Wards campaign in Kansas City for a year. Then worked for a time with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers of America in Kentucky.

Went to Work for the Textile Workers Union of America (TWUA) in 1947
Scope and Content Note: Stationed in St. Louis and covered a large area with mainly bag factories. In late 1948 was asked to replace Lew Conn as Director of the Pittsylvania County Joint Board in Danville, Virginia. Dan River Mills, with 11,500 workers, was the largest textile union situation in the country. Continued with Dan River Mills' unions until 1957. Later associated with the International Association of Machinists and then labor on the international scene.

Appointment as Pittsylvania County Joint Board Director
Scope and Content Note: Usually joint board directors were elected from the membership, but Danville was such an important situation, the TWUA felt an experienced person was necessary.

Biographical Background
Scope and Content Note: Father a civil engineer and a “Kentucky Mountaineer.” A left wing Democrat who read a lot of socialist literature, his father was therefore sympathetic to labor although he was not himself a union member. Boggs knew nothing of the labor movement until he went to work in a factory and witnessed the conditions.

Work for SWOC
Scope and Content Note: At first he was the only SWOC employee in Louisville; wrote and distributed his own handbills and made his own contacts. Had no help, but much encouragement from SWOC's Indianapolis office, headed by James Robb.

Tobacco Workers
Scope and Content Note: Was working full time for SWOC on a part-time salary and needed more income. His wife was attending college at the time. So, went to work for the Hod Carriers and Building Laborers. Then got a job in a Brown and Williamson. Tobacco Company factory and became active in the Tobacco Workers Union. The Tobacco Workers had an internal fight “where the old bureaucracy was expelled and a new leadership took over, and I was active in that revolt also....This one was successful.”

Organizing of Dan River Mills, 1943-1944
Scope and Content Note: George Baldanzi, in charge of TWUA southern organizing, assigned Joe Pedigo to head the Dan River Mills campaign. After the successful organization of Dan River Mills, there was so much animosity by the employers toward Pedigo that he could not stay on to do administrative work. Thus Lew Conn came in to head the Joint Board. When Lew Conn moved up to North Carolina State Director, he recommended Boggs as his replacement.

Seeds of the Emil Rieve-George Baldanzi Split
Scope and Content Note: Boggs feels TWUA was able to organize Dan River Mills because of Baldanzi's skills. Also feels this success was the beginning of Emil Rieve's animosity toward Baldanzi. When Boggs arrived in Danville, people were already pro-Baldanzi or pro-Rieve. “And Baldanzi always said, 'All I want is for the bastards to leave me alone. I have no ambitions to do anything except what I am doing.'” Rieve was never able to communicate effectively with southern workers because of his thick accent and brusque personality. Baldanzi, on the other hand, had a sensitivity that permitted him to relate to people wherever he went. That was the basis for the split in the union and also for the 1951 Southern Cotton Strike, which almost destroyed the union in the South. “It was not a matter of principle; it was a matter of a clash of personalities....Except for this internal difference within the union, there never would have been a strike.”

Joe Pedigo
Scope and Content Note: A southerner from Roanoke, Virginia, who came out of a textile mill.

Pittsylvania County Joint Board and Race Relations
Scope and Content Note: There were three locals in Dan River Mills - Riverside, Schoolfield, and a black local. Because of southern prejudice, “it was impossible for black workers to have anything approaching equality within the union unless they had their own structure within that union.” At one TWUA convention, there were more black delegates from Danville than from all the rest of the country. This separate local and separate leadership gave the blacks a forum from which to demonstrate their equal abilities. In many cases, white workers would take their grievances to the black steward because he was more capable than the white steward. By the time Boggs left Danville, “relations had developed to the point where they could all belong to the same local union, and the blacks would have equal recognition, or nearly equal recognition, at least to the extent of the percentage of blacks there were in the plant.” Before Boggs left Danville, there were two efforts to amalgamate all three locals into one. The white locals voted for it, and the black local voted against it. The merger of the locals was brought about after Boggs left. Blacks in the early 1950s were still pretty much relegated to certain jobs in the plant, although some had been upgraded to semi-skilled jobs during World War II because of labor shortages. Thus, some blacks in semi-skilled jobs might be working right alongside whites who were in a different local union.

Introduction

Structure of the Pittsylvania County Joint Board
Scope and Content Note: In addition to the three locals at Dan River Mills, there was a local at Danville Knitting Mills and also, the city bus drivers had a TWUA local. The bus drivers asked TWUA to organize them, and Lew Conn suggested they contact the Transport Workers, but they said, “We want to belong to the same union as everybody else in town.” The Dan River locals each had their own officers and stewards. The black local had members in both the Riverside and the Schoolfield divisions of the plant. Schoolfield, which was much larger than the other locals, had two business representatives, and the other two each had one. Each of these four business agents was also assigned to service either the knitting mill or the bus drivers. Each local elected delegates to the Joint Board. All three had a voluntary checkoff. It was never a closed shop, but about 85 percent to 90 percent were on checkoff because of active stewards. “Anyone who refused to join the union wasn't very popular with his fellow workers.”

Pittsylvania County Joint Board as a Showcase
Scope and Content Note: In addition to having an education director and an active community relations program, the Joint Board had an industrial engineer of its own, which no other TWUA joint board had. The industrial engineer was sometimes used outside Danville in negotiations where companies had incentive systems. “This was another means of showing what the union could do to help workers if they didn't belong to the union....It was very much a part of the program of the national office to try to use Danville as a showcase, but this also was a part of the irritation that was evident in the organization because Rieve wanted very much to be in constant contact with the Danville situation.” Virginia State Director Boyd Payton complained that Boggs had a direct pipeline to New York.

Relations Between Dan River Mills and the Union
Scope and Content Note: Cool, but polite. The top officers in the mill considered themselves southern gentlemen; they did not go in for table-pounding. The terms of the contract were carried out “reasonably well.” There were many arbitrations, but not too many in comparison to other southern situations. Tried to avoid arbitrations. A skilled staff which had a pretty good working relationship with its management counterpart. Discharge and discipline cases made up about three-quarters of the arbitrations. Workload and incentive cases were much more difficult, although the decision to take these to arbitration was easier. The company was a strict disciplinarian and would apply discipline even when it knew it would lose the grievance “because it felt this was necessary to keep the workers in line, and it probably was effective from the company's point of view.” Had a permanent arbitrator until termination of the contract after the 1951 strike.

Background to the 1951 Strike - the 1950 Contract
Scope and Content Note: The negotiations previous to the strike “resulted in the first really open break between the Baldanzi forces and the Rieve forces.” Incentive workloads were the big issue for Dan River workers in those negotiations. As a result, they settled for the first TWUA contract that provided “a degree of control over the assignment of workloads” but did not get a wage increase, just a wage reopener. Baldanzi sat in on the end of negotiations, as did Payton. “Immediately, the contract was attacked.” The biggest textile situation in the South had signed a contract without a wage increase. The textile industry was depressed at the time of the signing, but the Korean War spurred the industry shortly thereafter. The contract gave the individual worker some say-so as regards the pace of his work. This resulted in some increased employment, as some workers were able to choose to tend fewer machines than previously. Also, the contract reduced, in many cases, the base rate of productivity required on particular jobs. The negotiations were quite protracted and complicated because this involved time studies of various machines, materials and tasks.

Introduction

The North-South Wage Differential
Scope and Content Note: Pay in the New England textile industry was simpler. It was based on hourly rates and piece rates rather than the more complex incentive system of Dan River Mills, which was based on work units rather than pieces. The base pay in the incentive system was determined by the “walking pace” and required time studies. Because of the greatly different systems for paying workers, “there was no accurate measure for determining what was equal.” Actually, the average pay at Dan River Mills was at or above the average pay in the North, but the productivity was above that of the North. Because of the greater productivity in the South, even hourly rates were not comparable. Because of different plant layout, etc., the greater productivity did not mean the southern workers were necessarily working harder. The North-South wage comparisons were based on average earnings, but these comparisons meant little because of the different kinds of plants, materials, etc. This supposed North-South wage differential, however, “was the most important basis of contention.” This was the official reason for the strike, although the real reason was politics.

1951 TWUA Cotton Negotiations
Scope and Content Note: A national committee of vice-presidents, North and South, was formed. After the first contract was signed, this committee was to pass on whether subsequent agreements were up to par. Although not a member of the committee, Boggs sat in on all its meetings. At Dan River Mills, it was determined that a 2 percent raise satisfied the Wage Stabilization Board's formula. The company agreed to a 2 percent raise and an additional 4 percent pending the Board's approval. The northern members of the committee claimed they had negotiated 7 percent to 8 percent raises in the North and thus, the Dan River offer was not up to par. Dan River Mills would have to agree unequivocally to a 6 percent raise or more, or else there would have to be a strike vote. The southern locals voted to strike.

Strike Issues
Scope and Content Note: “Actually, what they were striking for was rather nebulous, because nobody knew what they were going to wind up with.” At best, they would be striking for 1 percent or 2 percent if the offered 6 percent were approved. “It was really a senseless strike.” Dan River Mills would not put in writing the 2 percent, plus 4 percent, offer. It would only promise the 2 percent, plus anything up to 4 percent more which the Wage Stabilization Board would approve. Thus, the strike was for the “4 percent or more.”

Bargaining/Strike Strategy
Scope and Content Note: Boggs felt the unions locally should have worked out the best possible agreement with the company and then put it to a vote of the membership, rather than having the national committee determine whether it should or should not be accepted. “I considered it undemocratic...and impractical....” Boggs went along with the decision of the committee and urged a strike vote. At the eleventh hour, Rieve came into negotiations, the only time he had ever done so at Dan River Mills. “He was going to come in and demonstrate how a good negotiator could perform.” He shouted and pounded the table, and management, maintaining its “southern gentleman” profile, walked out. Since the local leadership favored a strike, Boggs' decision to ask for a strike was simplified. Some of the southern representatives had doubts about the wisdom of a strike, but, because of the union's “political atmosphere,” they felt they had no choice but to go along with a strike. “So actually, it was a political decision. If there had not been this internal strife within the union, which resulted in the formation of this committee, then negotiations would have been handled as they'd been handled in the past. and in my opinion, people would have reached an agreement in most of the situations....This general strike in the South would never have occurred except for this political situation....” Politically, the South was backed into a corner.

Rank and File Attitudes about Striking
Scope and Content Note: Because the southern rank and file believed it was being paid less than the North, even if all the southern leadership recommended against striking, local level leadership would have been, at best, mixed. “Then you'd have division within each local situation....Actually, there was no way except to give it a try. We tried and lost.” The strike vote was by secret ballot, but many undecided people did not vote. The more militant workers voted, and they voted overwhelmingly for a strike. “It was really a very difficult situation.”

Worker Preparation for a Strike
Scope and Content Note: Financially, the workers were not very well prepared. There was no strike fund locally or nationally. They were not prepared for a long strike. Psychological preparation of the workers varied from place to place. Psychological reactions varied somewhat depending on whether management attempted to operate during the strike. “In Dan River Mills, they made an all out effort....They brought in people who had never been inside of a textile mill.”

Introduction

The Company Would Have Preferred to Avoid a Strike
Scope and Content Note: Management, however, was determined to operate the mills if there was a strike. Management made an effort just before the strike vote to convince Boggs and his negotiating committee to make an exception and exempt Dan River from the strike.

Why the Strike Was Lost
Scope and Content Note: So many people went back to work the company was operating at about 75 percent. The union had a choice of going back to work under the existing contract or holding out until the contract expired, at which time it would have been impossible to negotiate another. The company maintained its 2 percent and 4 percent offer throughout the strike, implemented the 2 percent during the strike, and implemented the 4 percent after Wage Stabilization Board approval.

Effect of the Strike at Dan River
Scope and Content Note: When the contract expired, the company refused to continue the check-off, thus greatly weakening the union.

At Danville, the Strike Could Not Have Been Won
Scope and Content Note: The strike might have been successful in some situations where management was less adamant to break it. The only way to have won in Danville was to have enough money that the workers could have met their normal obligations. There simply was not that much money available, from any source. If all the workers had stayed out, the mill could not have recruited enough workers to operate at anything near normal. Snowball effect of workers returning to work. The workers needed pay-checks and did not have the long tradition of unionism that existed in the North. “And the company was aware of this.” One of the company's labor relations men told Boggs before the strike that the vast majority of Dan River Mills' workers were “not trade unionists in the true sense of the word....Of course, I disagreed with him...but...I felt that he was right.”

More on Preparation of the Workers for a Strike
Scope and Content Note: There had been a build-up from the start of the criticism of the 1950 contract. For the first time in TWUA's history, the official organ, Textile Labor, came out with attacks against Baldanzi and the Danville leadership. “That's practically unheard of in house organs.” It “really angered all of us.” The Korean War, which led many non-union plants to implement wage increases, plus the agitation for equalization of the North and South wages, made it look to the workers like this was their opportunity, and strike sentiment became greater than it would otherwise have been.

Northern Representatives in Danville during the Strike
Scope and Content Note: Boggs was in charge of the strike in Danville. “There were a number of people sent in from the North. They didn't help at all. It would have been much better if they had stayed away.” They did not behave the way southern workers expect their leaders to behave. They checked into the best hotel in town, and the strikers heard stories about their steak dinners, trips to the liquor store, etc. All of this later helped the members make up their minds when the split came. Baldanzi and Payton spent more time in Danville during the strike than anywhere else.

The Strike Outside Danville
Scope and Content Note: It was successful wherever the companies did not try to operate. Cone Mills' situation was just about as bad as Danville. All locals, however, followed the Danville pattern and returned to work under the same conditions.

The Strike Settlement
Scope and Content Note: Rieve, prior to the strike, claimed his membership on the Wage Stabilization Board would influence the strike outcome. He promised that the Board would grant the southern workers the same increase as the North if they struck. So actually, the strike was a means of pressuring the Board. As a member of the Board, Rieve should have known better. When the Board did not move after a strike of several weeks, Rieve claimed he had been doublecrossed. “But I don't know whether he had any agreement from anybody or any indication from anybody else on the Board that this would be the case. I question if it was anything other than just propaganda on his part.”

A Big Southern Strike Was Not Inevitable
Scope and Content Note: Strikes eventually, even at Dan River Mills, might have been necessary; but the idea of a big strike being inevitable, “'So let's get it over with,' I couldn't subscribe to that.” Up to this time, there had been no negotiations except on a plant-wide basis. Cone Mills, for instance, insisted that each of its plants negotiate separately, even though they always ended up with the same contract everywhere. Boggs felt the TWUA was making pretty good organizing progress in the South prior to the strike, and the strike ended it.

Effect of Losing the Strike
Scope and Content Note: Not only stopped TWUA southern organizing progress, but also that of other unions. Prior to the strike, Boggs was optimistic. Where contractual relations had existed for several years, as in Dan River Mills, the companies seemed to be willing to live with the union. “There was a beginning of an acceptance of unions as a fact of life in industry....The strike is still affecting management attitudes in the South. This brought about a hardening of attitudes on the part of management throughout the South....Once management realized that they could break a strike, then they were much less inclined to make any concessions to a union.”

Introduction

Black Workers during the Strike
Scope and Content Note: No more militant than the whites. In fact, some of the black leaders, to everyone's surprise, went back to work. There were two brothers who were leaders in the black local. One went back to work, and the other said, “I don't know if I'll ever speak to my brother again.”

Effect of the Strike on Boggs Personally
Scope and Content Note: The worst tragedy of his working life.

The Main Obstacles to Organizing in the South
Scope and Content Note: Industry new to the region. Movement from North to South by industry was not motivated, as the labor movement claims, to get away from unions; but this was “in the back of their minds.” Anti-union psychology of southern employers. Unfamiliarity of southern workers with both industry and unions. “You had to educate before you could organize.” Workers had to be educated first as to what a union was and then as to its necessity. This was never really understood by TWUA's northern leadership “whose attitude, it seemed to me, was, 'Well, we've got our unions here, why can't they organize in the South. A worker's a worker.'” Northern leadership never “fully appreciated the problems that were inevitable in the newly industrialized South....I doubt the attitudes have changed a great deal on the part of many of the northern leaders yet.”

The Situation in Southern Textiles Today
Scope and Content Note: There is still a union, “not a very effective union,” in Dan River Mills. There is still a union in Cone Mills. Recent change in attitude in Cone Mills' White Oak Mill, Greensboro, North Carolina, where the company agreed to a checkoff. In areas where the unions have remained strong and effective, the unions are pretty much accepted, and management would have a difficult time trying to break those unions. “We didn't have that long tradition in Danville.”

Boggs' Introduction to the Rieve-Baldanzi Split
Scope and Content Note: Boggs became aware of the Rieve-Baldanzi animosity as soon as he was hired by TWUA. Midwest Director Bill Tullar cautioned him to stay away from the conflict. Tullar explained it as being largely a misunderstanding, claiming that Baldanzi was stubborn and wanted to run things his own way. When Boggs arrived in Danville, Lew Conn explained his version - that Rieve was jealous of Baldanzi and wanted to undercut his power in the union. “And this became pretty obvious as time went on.”

Capsule Sketch of the Events of the Internal Fight
Scope and Content Note: In 1950, when Mariano Bishop ran against him, Baldanzi defeated the challenge by a two-thirds majority. Between the 1950 and 1952 conventions, there was a constant effort to build an organization to get rid of Baldanzi. Having the power of the purse and “the power to hire and fire,” the Rieve forces were successful. Baldanzi was forced, “against his will,” to run for president in 1952.

Why Baldanzi Ran Against Rieve in 1952
Scope and Content Note: It took a great deal of persuasion to get him to run. “I was never sure whether we were right or wrong, but it was obvious that we couldn't continue with a couple strong-willed characters unwilling to...work out their differences.” The fight was “tearing the union apart.” Baldanzi, it seemed, either had to resign or to run against Rieve for the presidency. It took hours of argument to convince him to run. He maintained to the end that he had no desire to be president. Boggs felt he would lose, and Baldanzi probably also thought he would lose, but he came to see there was no other way out of the situation.

Depth of the Split
Scope and Content Note: “There was so much discontent in the South when Baldanzi lost that it would have been impossible for any of the Rieve followers to work effectively in the South.” Most Baldanzi followers were so emotionally involved they could not take orders from Rieve, and they got out as soon as they could, “including me.”

The Point of No Return in the Internal Fight
Scope and Content Note: Between the 1950 and 1952 conventions, “the union wasn't doing anything.” Every move was interpreted as political.

Differences Between Baldanzi and Rieve - Organizing
Scope and Content Note: “I don't think Rieve had any concept of how to go about organizing in the South. And George did.” Organizing in the South can be done only by a southerner or someone who understands southern psychology.

No Basic Differences Between Rieve and Baldanzi; Mainly a Personality Conflict

Baldanzi's Supporters
Scope and Content Note: People supported Baldanzi because he was a very warm person (“when he made a friend, he had a friend”) and because of his effectiveness in the South. They blamed Rieve “for meddling when he shouldn't have.” Rieve was not “a big enough person” to accept Baldanzi's popularity, and he saw the South would probably become the majority area in the TWUA, which, because of Baldanzi's popularity there, became a threat to him.

Introduction

Mariano Bishop
Scope and Content Note: Of Rieve-supported people, he was the most likely to defeat Baldanzi. He was very likeable and was able to communicate with southern workers.

1950 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Until people arrived at the convention, it was not general knowledge that a candidate would be run against Baldanzi.

Why So Much of the Executive Board Supported Rieve
Scope and Content Note: They had jobs which either Rieve controlled or which were in the North where he was dominant. Some were ambitious. Boggs questions, however, whether there was an organized clique which was pushing Rieve.

Individual Baldanzi Supporters within TWUA Leadership
Scope and Content Note: It was not a matter of personality with them. They simply felt they were supporting the philosophy which was necessary to build the union, to organize the South. “This was the opinion that was expressed amongst all of us whenever we discussed the internal situation.”

More on the 1950 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Decision to run someone against Baldanzi was probably made shortly before the convention. There was not enough time to organize a campaign against Baldanzi, and it might not have been possible to do at that time anyway.

Secession after the 1952 Convention
Scope and Content Note: Negotiations between the secessionists and the United Textile Workers of America (UTW) were held after the convention and resulted in an agreement that the former TWUA unions would be permitted to run their own affairs without interference. There had been no discussions whatever prior to the convention. During their convention post-mortem, the secessionists agreed it would be impossible to stay within the TWUA. The options were independence or a home elsewhere. Boggs thinks the initial approach was made by the UTW leaders. Some CIO leaders tried to convince Baldanzi to remain within the CIO somewhere, but that was impractical.

UTW Corruption
Scope and Content Note: At the time Boggs switched to UTW, he was aware of the leadership's incompetence, but not its corruption. Discovery of the corruption caused many, like Lew Conn, to get out of the UTW. “We can't possibly work with these guys. And every time another one of our group would leave, that made it more difficult for those of us who were still there; and just about everybody among the top group got out, one by one.”

George Baldanzi and the UTW
Scope and Content Note: During the McClellan Committee investigations, UTW Secretary-Treasurer Lloyd Klenert testified that he had given people a lot of money in Danville in order to get them to vote for UTW. Boggs testified that Klenert had never even come to Danville until after the election for UTW, and that he had never offered any money to anyone within the Danville textile unions. Shortly after Boggs left Danville, several UTW southern locals approached him to see if he would run for president of the union. Boggs did not feel he could win, even if he wanted “to step into that situation.” Meanwhile, Francis Schaufenbil and other UTW leaders approached Baldanzi about the position, and that convinced Boggs not to run. Some former TWUA people felt Baldanzi had deserted them when he left UTW for a job with the Teamsters. Actually, he had had no choice but to leave UTW because the leadership had been chipping away at the autonomy agreement and had made Baldanzi Southern Director but without enough funds to operate effectively. Boggs, who was out of the UTW by then, attended the convention and congratulated it on being able to get such a good man for president. Schaufenbil sought out Baldanzi for the presidency rather than run himself because he knew the former TWUA people would never have accepted him because he was too closely identified with the corrupt leaders. No one within the former TWUA locals had either the stature or the ambition to become UTW president, but these locals had enough influence to determine who would be president.