Title: Textile Workers of America Oral History Project: Scott Hoyman Interview
Inclusive Dates: 1985

Creator:

• Hoyman, Scott

Call Number: Tape 1104A

Quantity: 4 tape recordings

Repository:

Wisconsin Historical Society, Division of Library, Archives, and Museum Collections

Archival Locations:

Wisconsin Historical Society (Map)

COLLECTION MAY BE STORED OFF-SITE: see catalog entry to request materials and for additional information.

Abstract:

One of a series of tape-recorded oral interviews conducted with Textile Workers Union of America leaders by James A. Cavanaugh of the Historical Society staff, documenting the origins, growth, and decline of the TWUA, internal disputes, relations with other unions, and organizing drives. The interviews document textile unionism prior to the formation of the TWUA, as well as discussing major strikes and gains made through collective bargaining. Specific references are made to organizing activities in Illinois, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and Wisconsin. The Scott Hoyman interview is part of the Textile Workers Union of America Oral History Project.

Language: English

URL to cite for this finding aid: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/wiarchives.uw-whs-tape01104a

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Scott Hoyman was born in 1920 in Cairo, Egypt, where his parents were United Presbyterian missionaries. He graduated from Monmouth College in 1941 and, after a series of jobs including World War II conscientious objector alternative service, eventually went to work in 1948 for the Textile Workers Union of America as the education director for two joint boards in Maine. He joined the TWUA international staff in 1950 and was transferred to the South in 1952.

Through a series of progressively more responsible positions, Hoyman remained in the South until 1979 when he was appointed Executive Vice President of the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union. He was assistant director of the union's J.P. Stevens Campaign, 1963-1966, and remained closely involved with that effort after he was named Southern Regional Director in January 1967. He was elected to TWUA's Executive Council in 1971. He retired in August 1985.

Interview

The four hours of interview with Scott Hoyman were conducted on May 15, 1985, at the O'Hare Holiday Inn in suburban Chicago. Because of scheduling problems, Hoyman was not interviewed during the earlier part of the TWUA Oral History Project, conducted in 1977-1978.

The interview attempts to cover Hoyman's entire life in four hours because the possibility of a follow-up interview was not good. Because of this, the discussion may seem cursory or rushed at times. The interview did, however, provide useful insights into the TWUA experience in the South during the 1950s-1970s, particularly the union's negotiating and organizing strategies and the J.P. Stevens Campaign.

Abstract

The tapes for this interview have two tracks: a voice track containing the discussion and a time track containing time announcements at intervals of approximately five seconds. The abstract lists, in order of discussion, the topics covered by each tape, and indicates the time-marking at which point the beginning of the particular discussion appears.

Thus, the researcher by using a tape recorder's fast-forward button may find expeditiously and listen to discrete segments without listening to all of the taped discussion. For instance, the user who wishes to listen to the topic on “Influence of Missionary Background on Hoyman” should locate the place on the second track of side one, tape one, where the voice announces the 04:00 time-marking (the voice says at this point, “Four Minutes”), and at this point switch to the first track to hear the discussion. The discussion on “Influence of Missionary Background on Hoyman” continues until approximately 05:15 at which point discussion of the next topic “Education” begins.

Notice that in most cases sentences beneath each headline explain more about the contents of the topic. For example the sentence underneath “Influence of Missionary Background on Hoyman” gives further details on what appears on the tape between 04:00 and 05:15.

The abstract is designed to provide only a brief outline of the content of the tapes and cannot serve as a substitute for listening to them. However the abstract will help the researcher easily locate distinct topics and discussions among the many minutes of commentary.

Index

There is no index to this abstract.

In addition to the processed TWUA collection, the Historical Society received some twenty-six cartons of southern organizing files and J.P. Stevens Campaign files in the summer of 1981. The two shipments were assigned accession numbers M81-295 and M81-406. They bear directly on Scott Hoyman's work for the TWUA.

Processing Information

Finding aid prepared by James A. Cavanaugh, November 21, 1985.

Tape/Side   1/1 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   00:30	Biographical Background Scope and Content Note: Born in Egypt. Parents Presbyterian missionaries. Sabbatical in the United States every 7 years. Returned to United States for good at age 16 in 1936 in order to finish school. Went to Monmouth College in Monmouth, Illinois.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   04:00	Influence of Missionary Background on Hoyman Scope and Content Note: “The missionary zeal may have made me interested in looking around for socially significant activities, where people might be helped in one way or another.”
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   05:15	Education Scope and Content Note: Father and his two older sisters had gone to Monmouth College, which was church related. Many of the students spent missionary time in Egypt. Had attended a prep school, called Stonybrook, on Long Island. Parents stayed in Egypt. Two sisters were in the United States. In college, was involved in debate and edited the school's weekly newspaper. Took a lot of social science courses. Involved in campus politics, supporting non-fraternity candidates. Debate topics were often political.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   08:40	World War II Scope and Content Note: Applied for and received conscientious objector status. Active in anti-war activities. Did alternative service with the Friends' Service Committee, working first in a CCC camp in New Hampshire and later in a mental hospital in Philadelphia. Large hospital with 3000 males and 3000 females. Involved in lice experiment in New Hampshire.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   14:05	Worked in Factories During Summer in College and Belonged to the Packinghouse Workers Organizing Committee Scope and Content Note: Worked two summers, one in an unorganized plant and one in a Swift plant, packing lard for shipment to England under Lend-Lease.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   16:35	Internship at the National Institute of Public Affairs Scope and Content Note: The National Institute sponsored about forty internships for recent college graduates. Received room, board, and tuition for graduate courses at Washington, D.C. colleges. “I was very much interested in that because it represented the New Deal.” Worked for the Office of Land Use Coordination in the Department of Agriculture.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   19:15	More on Education Scope and Content Note: College major was political science; minor was in philosophy. Did some graduate work, including economics courses at the Wharton School while in Philadelphia working at the mental hospital, which he felt would be useful because of a growing interest in and involvement with cooperatives. Began a thesis on the relationship of cooperatives and organized labor.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   21:50	Taught Some Labor Education Courses in the Philadelphia Area and Went to Work for Shops Organized by the Steelworkers in Order to Get Practical Experience Scope and Content Note: Applied to various unions for work in labor education.
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   25:10	Hired by Larry Rogin to Be Education Director of Two TWUA Joint Boards in Maine - Biddeford and Lewiston
Tape/Side   1/1 Time   27:20	More on Being Education Director of Biddeford and Lewiston Joint Boards Scope and Content Note: Was paid by the national office, but the joint boards reimbursed the national office for his salary and expenses.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   00:30	TWUA in Maine in 1948 Scope and Content Note: Hired in 1948, the high point of the TWUA. Each joint board had about 5000 members. Most of the Lewiston plants were owned by Bates Manufacturing Co. Biddeford included a large textile machinery manufacturing plant. The joint boards were important organizations in Maine, because the state had only about a million people. Plants in 1948 were strong. There was a wage differential for Maine, like for the south. Mostly cotton; some synthetics.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   05:20	Duties as Education Director for the Joint Boards in Maine Scope and Content Note: Shop newspapers; steward classes. Immediately got involved in working against two right-to-work referenda. Hoyman served as executive secretary of the statewide committee against the referenda. Big campaign; spent much money; defeated the referenda.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   07:10	Initial Impressions of the TWUA Scope and Content Note: In Maine TWUA was very important, largest union. Very impressed by the 1948 convention. Rieve, in terms of stature, was among the top four or five people in the CIO.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   13:15	Hoyman Became an International Representative in 1950; Did Political Action Work in Northern New England Scope and Content Note: The move was probably part of the Rieve-Baldanzi fight, since Hoyman was presumed to be pro-administration.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   16:05	By 1952 Convention, There Were No Neutrals in the Rieve-Baldanzi Fight Scope and Content Note: “The most tightly aligned convention I've ever been at.” Most of the Education Department staff was sympathetic to Baldanzi, despite Education Director Larry Rogin's insistence on neutrality.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   18:45	Hoyman's Perspective on the Rieve-Baldanzi Fight Scope and Content Note: Was not at a level to really see what was going on, but it appeared that the whole thing started amongst two groups on the Executive Council, one of which “appeared to distrust Baldanzi as a potential president, future president of the union.”
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   19:40	1950 Convention Scope and Content Note: The move to unseat Baldanzi caught the delegates by surprise.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   21:55	Cause of the Rieve-Baldanzi Fight Scope and Content Note: Has only impressions. Baldanzi's flamboyance made Executive Council members uncomfortable. In the 1948-1950 period, one-third of the union's membership was in New England and Baldanzi was not a New England person. Chupka, Canzano, and Bishop were all heavyweights in New England “and it might have been that those guys felt...that New England may have deserved more of the future of the union than it would have under Baldanzi.” Baldanzi was dynamic and had a lot of support amongst staff people in the South.
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   25:10	Hoyman's Decision to Support Rieve Scope and Content Note: The joint board and regional directors in his area - New England - all supported Rieve “and I didn't have any reason to disagree with that.” “There wasn't any conscious decision-making; just grew into a political position, I guess.”
Tape/Side   1/2 Time   26:55	Chartering of Locals for Political Purposes in Preparation for the 1952 Convention Scope and Content Note: Hoyman does not recall being involved in any of that work.
Tape/Side   2/1 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   2/1 Time   00:30	Staff Appointments in 1950-1952 “Were Screened on Political Considerations as Well as Other Considerations”
Tape/Side   2/1 Time   02:15	Post-Convention Secession Movement Had to Have Been Planned Well in Advance of the Convention Scope and Content Note: Because of the margin of the election, Baldanzi probably did not expect to win.
Tape/Side   2/1 Time   05:00	Hoyman Assigned to Fight Secession Scope and Content Note: “It was an exciting series of events.” Before the convention adjourned some of the southern locals were already moving their treasuries. Hoyman worked with the Philadelphia Joint Board for two weeks, until it decided not to secede; then went to North Carolina. In North Carolina, only Wayne Dernoncourt, amongst all the staff people and business agents, opposed secession. Procedure of the secessionists was to move the local treasuries into private accounts and then adopt motions to affiliate with the UTW. If a contract was in place, they would have to sign UTW cards and petition the NLRB for an election. Battles over the physical possession of union halls. Appointment of international administrators over locals. In many instances the companies took the position that they were unsure which organization was the real representative, and placed dues in escrow. TWUA proponents' arguments were mainly along the lines of TWUA's militancy and the inferior UTW contracts. UTW proponents claimed the TWUA leadership discriminated against the South. “It was amazing what a small number of local unions actually jumped the fence.” The Cone plants went UTW; two of three Erwin mills went UTW, but not the one Hoyman was in charge of. Dan River plants left and so did the joint board in Rockingham, North Carolina. In all, about 10,000 members in the Carolinas left the TWUA in the fall of 1952, but many returned. UTW paid former TWUA staff people every other week.
Tape/Side   2/1 Time   18:55	Cone Mills' Return to TWUA Scope and Content Note: Luke Carroll, former manager of the Greensboro Joint Board, bolted to the UTW, but came to regret it and wound up helping the TWUA get many of its members back to the Cone chain. In November 1954, about 5,000 Cone workers voted for the TWUA. Hoyman headed the TWUA staff during this campaign. Anecdote about holding an integrated meeting at the University in Greensboro, at which Walter Reuther spoke during the Cone election campaign. Unfortunately, the UTW, in order to get a contract with Cone Mills, had given up the dues checkoff. After TWUA got these plants back, it bargained from late 1954 on through 1955 without being able to get the checkoff. From 1955 to 1960, Hoyman was the manager of the joint board that included these plants and dues had to be collected by hand. The most people who paid dues in any one month during this time was 700 out of 5000. Constantly agitated the company in various ways to get the checkoff. Frustrating.
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   00:30	More on the Cone Mills after Their Return to the TWUA Scope and Content Note: Eventually some Communists were able to infiltrate and get elected as leaders of these locals. Attractive targets because they were small locals in large plants. This caused problems for management and finally in 1981 the TWUA was able to secure the dues checkoff.
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   03:25	More on the Aftermath of the Rieve-Baldanzi Fight Scope and Content Note: Lew Conn and others at that level really had no choice; they had to leave the TWUA. Philadelphia probably remained in TWUA because Joint Board Manager Joe Hueter and the local leaders thought the situation through and realized what was best for their members. Hueter bargained over the conditions under which he would remain in the TWUA. Hoyman's first five years in the South were spent largely in repairing the damage of the Rieve-Baldanzi fight, trying to keep locals from leaving and trying to get locals back. “A terrible diversion, possibly at a period of time when the union, had it not been diverted, might have broken through to another level...of penetration into the industry.” Hoyman remained in the South from 1952 to 1979.
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   09:00	1951 Southern Cotton Strike Scope and Content Note: A result of the political conflict within the union; neither side could afford not to be militant. “The result being that we had a strike which we probably shouldn't have had.” Also, TWUA had never before had a major strike in the South. Probably also, it was the wrong time to try to link northern and southern wages. “Strike started at the top, not the bottom.” “That's all right in an atmosphere where union discipline and union status has become such a tradition if someone is told, 'this is a bad contract, we have to strike,' you know, there's no big deal; you just do it. Apparently that wasn't the case in those plants; they didn't have that kind of a trade union base.” Many southern locals were creatures of the War Labor Board; they had not had a strike for recognition or the initial contract.
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   15:20	Burlington Organizing Campaign, 1956, and After Scope and Content Note: Hoyman was not involved in this drive. He was preoccupied with Cone Mills. Company's response to the campaign was “ruthless.” Ironically, Burlington bought out the Erwin Mills in the early 1960s and dealt with the existing unions. TWUA had to strike to prevent a contract concession; Burlington could have held fast and maintained the battle for years, but it backed off. “It represented an entirely different reaction by a major southern textile company to the process of dealing with a collective bargaining problem.” Someone in the company had become sophisticated enough to determine that Burlington should not have a national reputation for being anti-union. In the last four years, Burlington has invested 55 million dollars in the denim plant which is organized by TWUA.
Tape/Side   2/2 Time   25:15	Rock Hill, South Carolina Scope and Content Note: Largest printing and finishing plant in the United States; TWUA had over 3000 members there. Mostly male jobs. Unpleasant working conditions, which leads to a more militant workforce. The other big plant in Rock Hill was a Celanese plant. Synthetics had higher wages and generally a higher percentage of membership in the union.
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   00:30	More on Rock Hill, South Carolina Scope and Content Note: Other situations in Rock Hill not as positive. Lost a weaving plant as the result of a strike in the late 1940s. Never able to organize several others.
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   01:25	Effect of the Closing of the Darlington Mill after It Was Organized in 1956 Scope and Content Note: “A burden that the union had to carry in all the other organizing campaigns...for a long period of time.”
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   04:00	Anecdote about a Hoyman Leaflet Which Tried to Use One of the Positive Darlington Decisions to the Union's Advantage with J.P. Stevens in Roanoke Rapids Scope and Content Note: Offered a 25,000 dollar reward to anyone who could get a J.P. Stevens supervisor to say they would close the mill if it were organized, since the Darlington decision had said such a threat was illegal. President Bill Pollock rebuked Hoyman's efforts.
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   05:25	Harriet-Henderson Strike Scope and Content Note: Hoyman was involved from time to time. Julius Fry serviced those two locals. He was very keen on contract language items. The company tried to modify the arbitration clause. The union erred by not scrupulously insisting on forcing the company to continue to bargain and thereby getting the NLRB to declare the strike an unfair labor practice strike, which would have at least preserved the union there. Hoyman learned from this; always insisted that the company fulfill its legal obligation to bargain. As an example, the J.P. Stevens negotiations at Roanoke Rapids continued from the fall of 1974 until the fall of 1980 without reaching impasse and “without the company being able to say, 'our hands are clean at the bargaining table.'”
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   16:45	Hoyman, as Southern Director, Used Attorneys Quite Often Scope and Content Note: Used unfair labor practice charges often.
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   18:10	More on Harriet-Henderson Scope and Content Note: Perhaps the negotiators felt the contract would be settled, but in retrospect it was a mistake not to arrange it so that the strike was an unfair labor practice strike. The bombing, or attempted bombing, did not have a bad effect on the strikers, but it put a lot of pressure on the union. Made the union very careful to regulate strikers 'conduct in future strikes.
Tape/Side   3/1 Time   22:45	The Difference Between the Ability to Strike at Harriet-Henderson While Unable to Even Organize Most Mills Scope and Content Note: Workers were fighting to keep something they already had. People will defend what they already have much longer than they will fight to get something they do not already have. Luther Jackson, president of one of the two locals, later went on to become president of a local in a different union and would call on Hoyman for advice prior to negotiations.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   00:30	IUD'S Organizing Pilot Project in the Greenville-Spartanburg Area in 1960 Scope and Content Note: Not much staff involved. A couple election victories. Sort of a pilot project for what became J.P. Stevens campaign.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   02:50	Agitational Wage Drives Scope and Content Note: Idea developed by department heads and industry directors. Used issues, like wages, in order to develop interest in organizing. Served the dual purpose of identifying interest in organizing and of getting employers to make wage increases. A good example of a successful organizing effort which grew out of the wage agitation drives was Canton, Georgia.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   08:10	Hoyman Headed Organizing Campaign Amongst Tufted Carpet Mills in Northern Georgia in 1962 Scope and Content Note: Won a local of 500 out of the perhaps 10,000 tufted carpet workers in the area.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   12:20	Southern Organizing Scope and Content Note: Many factors bear on whether the organizing attempt will be a success or a failure. More blacks in the textile industry today and they are more ready to act collectively.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   17:30	1962-1964 Internal Fight - Causes Scope and Content Note: Rieve cronies, perhaps with his encouragement, were skeptical of Pollock. No specific differences of union policy; simply rested on whether Pollock was a good president or not. “In a period in which the union was undergoing terrific contraction.”
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   20:40	Why Insurgents Were Not Successful in 1964 Scope and Content Note: “There were some qualities that Pollock had which I think were very appealing to rank and file leadership.” Plain-spoken, down to earth, effective in terms of human relations with local officers, straight-forward. His opponents did not have much in the way of an alternative program. Advantage of being the incumbent.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   23:15	Rieve's Role in the 1964 Fight Scope and Content Note: “An unfortunate thing.” Surprising that someone of Rieve's stature would criticize his successor the way he did at the 1964 convention.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   24:40	Hoyman During the 1964 Fight Scope and Content Note: Hoyman at this time was assistant director of the Stevens Campaign and had recently headed up the founding of the staff union. The staff union maintained official neutrality. Hoyman's sympathies were with Pollock. Did not think criticism of Pollock was helpful to the union.
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   26:10	Boyd Payton During the 1964 Fight Scope and Content Note: The majority called themselves the “baddies” and those who stuck with Pollock the “goodies.” Payton was a “baddy.”
Tape/Side   3/2 Time   27:30	Federation of Textile Representatives Scope and Content Note: This staff union started in the South. “There were some difficulties in the union's personnel policy at that time in terms of how they handled staff.”
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   00:30	More on the Creation of the Federation of Textile Representatives Scope and Content Note: Probably was easier to get an initial contract because of the fight within the leadership of the union.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   01:15	Effect of the 1964 Internal Fight Scope and Content Note: Not as bad as the 1952 fight. A big hindrance, however, since the union was facing so many problems. Lost some capable people. Substantially less bitter than the 1952 fight.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   03:15	Going into the 1964 Convention It Appeared Pollock Had a Majority and Would Maintain It
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   04:55	Selection of J.P. Stevens as the Union's Main Organizing Objective Scope and Content Note: A TWUA committee was formed to select a target to make use of Reuther's new organizing assistance from the AFL-CIO's Industrial Union Department (IUD). Stevens company had some characteristics which it was thought lent them to this type of organizing. 1) Plants for the most part were larger. 2) Relatively small number of plant locations. 3) Stevens' predecessor firms had bargained with TWUA in the north. 4) Robert Stevens had been Eisenhower's Secretary of War and it was felt that his having been a public figure might make the company sophisticated in its view of labor relations.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   08:55	At the Outset, the Stevens Campaign Was Directed by Jimmy Pierce, from the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) Scope and Content Note: Half of the organizing staff was from TWUA and half from various IUD affiliates. Chupka was the closest to the campaign of top TWUA leadership. IUD-directed at the onset. Pollock thought it would be useful to see how others would handle textile organizing drives, “and I don't go with that at all.” Pierce remained in charge of the campaign for several years; was followed by Harold McIver, from the Steelworkers.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   12:05	Theory of the Stevens Campaign at the Outset Scope and Content Note: Twenty-six organizers in about a dozen places. The idea was to assault the company simultaneously in many different locations. Impossible, however, to move the campaign along at the same pace at all locations.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   14:45	Stevens Opposition to the Campaign Scope and Content Note: Whiteford Blakeney, a Charlotte attorney, was the number one anti-union labor relations counsel in the South. Stevens retained him. Blakeney's policy was that he would not keep as a client any textile company that was organized and decided to deal with the union. The “Blakeney formula” in bargaining included the following: 1) never agree to arbitration; 2) never agree to a checkoff; 3) meet with the union as long as the union wants to meet, but never agree to arbitration or the checkoff. Stevens' first action was to discharge many union sympathizers. The union had difficulty proving to the NLRB that these people were known union sympathizers; so the union started sending the company lists of members. In Great Falls, the company posted the union's letter on the bulletin board and crossed off the names as each one was fired.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   18:20	Stevens I Scope and Content Note: This was what the NLRB called the first round of hearings on charges filed by the union against Stevens. Twenty-three plants with violations. Administrative law judge moved from one town to the next with the hearings. Sixty-five days of hearings. First people were fired in the spring of 1963; took the NLRB until late 1966 or early 1967 to hand down its decision. People put back to work in 1967. By then, however, the union had lost elections at Roanoke Rapids and Greenville.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   21:00	Hoyman's Role as Assistant Director of the Stevens Campaign Scope and Content Note: At first, had a common set of leaflets for all the different plants. Hoyman prepared leaflets. Tried to coordinate things, so that all important judgments and decisions were made centrally in order to maintain consistency. Also, NLRB charges were filed through the central office of the campaign.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   22:55	A Lot of Turnover of Staff Scope and Content Note: The theory of coordinated organizing is good, “but in practice when you start deciding who you are going to assign to another union's campaign, you don't tend to give your best hitters to hit on somebody else's ball team; and we had a lot of turnover in the first year or two of the Stevens drive.” Ultimately, the campaign would up with mainly TWUA people, people hired specifically for the Stevens campaign, and a few people from the IUD.
Tape/Side   4/1 Time   24:25	Despite Preponderance of TWUA Staff, Stevens Campaign Remained an IUD-Directed Effort Because of the Presence of Harold McIver Scope and Content Note: After the Roanoke Rapids election was lost, Hoyman began to do more and more non-Stevens work. The Stevens campaign was pared down considerably in terms of staffing. “The fundamental conclusion of the union was that until the Labor Board and the courts could mount an effective response to show that there was a Labor Act and it had to be observed, the amount of activity on the campaign should be reduced.” From 1967 on, Hoyman was no longer directly involved in the Stevens campaign, although, as Southern Director, some of his staff was assigned to the campaign.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   00:00	Introduction
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   00:30	Despite Low Periods the Union Never Seriously Considered Total Abandonment of the Stevens Campaign Scope and Content Note: “It became such a spectacle, such a challenge, that there was just no way that you could get off the tiger's back.”
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   01:35	When Stevens Continued the Same Violations after the NLRB and Court Decision, the Union Successfully Sought Contempt Charges and Reinforced the Campaign Scope and Content Note: Thus, despite losing the election, the union was certified as the bargaining agent at Stevens' Statesboro, Georgia, mill. Eventually the contempt of court by Stevens got it into such a bind, it had to change its course of conduct. Stevens dropped Blakeney, and hired a new firm which claimed it could oppose the union without breaking the law.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   05:05	Victory at Roanoke Rapids Scope and Content Note: The union reinforced the organizing effort and won the election at Roanoke Rapids in 1974, the first election victory since the campaign had begun in 1963. Technically, the union did not even have to sign up any new members in order to hold the Roanoke Rapids election because the previous election there (1965) had been set aside and the union could have merely asked for a rerun of that election. The union did sign up people in order to test whether people were ready for another election. Blakeney was still Stevens' attorney at this time and he agreed to start negotiations almost immediately. Many TWUA heavyweights were sent in to help with negotiations, but gradually Hoyman became involved and everyone else left. “And we started this marathon thing.”
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   08:50	Hoyman Involved in Many Negotiations Between 1965 and 1975, Preparing Him Well for the Long Stevens Negotiations at Roanoke Rapids Scope and Content Note: Bargained many initial contracts. “I decided that the ultimate strategy was never to disappear. If you couldn't be destroyed, no matter how feeble a flame might be burning, you had in essence defeated the company up to that point because the essence of a company's strategy toward a union is 'make 'm go away.'” A strike runs the risk of losing it all. “So we would develop and accentuate and expose the company's unwillingness to bargain responsibly.” By the time Hoyman started bargaining at Roanoke Rapids, it was about the eighth situation where he was bargaining against a company which was being advised by Blakeney. Two levels of negotiations: one at the table and one on day-to-day problems. The union in effect had a grievance procedure for six years before it had a contract because the company was under so much pressure due to its labor law violations that it would scrupulously respond to any union request for information. After three years of negotiations, the company finally agreed to arbitrate discharges, but nothing else. “That was a big day.”
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   16:10	Boycott, Corporate Campaign, and National Publicity Scope and Content Note: “...Really began to change the size of the union versus the size of the company.” This all came after the merger of TWUA with the Amalgamated Clothing Workers. Clothing workers brought a very sophisticated legal department into the merger, as well as all the boycott apparatus used in the Farah campaign. TWUA brought a large defense fund, which was spent on the Stevens campaign.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   17:25	Settlement with Stevens, October 1980 Scope and Content Note: Relations with the Stevens company at the top are better than with other major southern companies because settlement of the whole thing required many meetings of the top leadership of the union and the company.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   18:35	More on the 1974 Victory at Roanoke Rapids Scope and Content Note: The company's profit sharing (retirement) plan was in bad shape, having suffered a loss shortly before the election, while the company's separate pension plan for salaried personnel did not suffer a loss. Another reason for victory was that there had been several elections in Roanoke Rapids, some even before these mills were purchased by Stevens. “There was a live paper local union in Roanoke Rapids, very good local. There were two locals. And I think that those people were probably more exposed to effective unionism.” Also, younger people and blacks were coming into the mills. Plus a lot of hard work by the organizing staff.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   21:35	Innovative Techniques Used by TWUA Versus Stevens Scope and Content Note: Use of college students in the boycott and in protests. Clothing Workers had used these techniques. Involvement of churches. Moral issues sprang out of the situation.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   24:40	Reason for Stevens Finally Settling Scope and Content Note: New management decided their energy should be directed to running a major textile company and not to fighting the union.
Tape/Side   4/2 Time   25:30	Status within the Stevens Chain Today Scope and Content Note: Union has not been able to organize any additional units. Did get an NLRB order of representation for the Wallace, North Carolina, plant. Some plants where the union had gotten contracts have since been closed or sold. Where sold the new owners did sign contracts with the union. The company has made substantial investments in the Roanoke Rapids physical plant however. Stevens total employment is down and the company is spending tremendous amounts of money on new equipment in order to remain competitive.