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Introduction
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Biographical Information
: Rogin was raised in a radical atmosphere on his grandparents' farm in New Jersey. His grandparents were Russian Jews who were Communist sympathizers. His grandparents held fund raisers in their apple orchard for Communist front organizations.
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College Education and Early Political Affiliations
: He attended Columbia beginning in January, 1926, and became active in the Communist movement, though he did not become a Party member. In 1928 he joined the Socialist Party and ran the Norman Thomas-for-President campaign at Columbia. He also did volunteer work for labor unions, distributing leaflets and picketing for the International Ladies' Garment Workers (ILG) and the Associated Silk Workers.
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In 1929 Rogin Went on to Columbia Graduate School
: His major was political science, with a special interest in labor and politics. He did a Master's thesis on the American Labor Party after World War I and completed all requirements for a doctorate except his dissertation, which was on the Pennsylvania labor movement and politics between World War I and the Depression. Rogin had a fellowship and taught at Columbia Extension, but the Columbia faculty would not help him find a teaching job unless he promised to give up his “community activities.” He was a “left-wing socialist” at the time.
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While Still in Graduate School, Rogin Became More Active in the Labor Movement and in an Organization Called the Conference for Progressive Labor Action (CPLA)
: CPLA was an organization of Socialist and other non-Communist radicals in the labor movement.
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Rogen Got into Union Education by Accident
: When A. J. Muste attempted to change Brookwood Labor College into a training school for the American Workers Party in 1933, the Board of the school balked, and Muste, many of the students, and the office staff all left. Rogin's wife, who was substitute teaching in New York City, was asked to fill in as office help. Rogin was unemployed and went to Brookwood to ready the campus for classes. He then went to work for Mark Starr in the Extension Division of Brookwood.
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More Biographical Information
: Rogin's parents, both natives of Russia, were separated. He lived with his mother on her parents' farm. She worked in the garment industry. His father was a druggist. He had two older sisters, one of whom worked in various unions, including the Amalgamated Clothing Workers (ACW). Rogin attended public schools. He married in 1930; his first wife died in 1966; he remarried in 1969; he has three children.
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Emil Rieve
: While traveling in Pennsylvania interviewing for his dissertation, Rogin met Rieve at a Pennsylvania Federation of Labor convention in the early 1930s. Rieve was born in Poland of German parents and was amused that people always took him for a Jew.
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In 1933 Rogin Became Education Director of the Reading (Pennsylvania) Central Labor Union
: Although Rogin refers to this organization as the Central Labor Union throughout this interview, its proper title is the Reading Federated Trades Council.
: He was hired by Jim Maurer, who was on the board of Brookwood, and who was prominent in both the labor movement and the Socialist Party in Reading. The idea was to give rebirth to the Reading Labor College.
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Hosiery Workers in Reading
: Reading was the largest non-union hosiery center through the 1920s and the Depression; but Reading's 20,000 hosiery workers were organized and militant and were the biggest group in the Central Labor Union. Many of them were Rogin's students.
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Socialists Had Controlled Reading since 1927, and Socialism Reflected on the Upstanding Character of the Labor Movement in That City
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The Hosiery Union in Reading Was Socialist Because Its Workforce Was Comprised of Immigrants Who Were Already Socialist When They Came to the United States
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The Hosiery Industry Always Paid High Wages, and in Philadelphia at Least, a High School Education Was Required for Employment in a Hosiery Mill
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Introduction
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American Workers in Hosiery Mills Became Socialists Because They Worked with Socialist Immigrants and Learned the Trade from Them
: Socialists were scattered throughout the industry. William Smith, American Federation of Hosiery Workers' (AFHW) Secretary-Treasurer, said in Philadelphia one would get a hosiery job, go join the Union, and then go join the Socialist Party. There were many Polish Socialist workers in the hosiery industry.
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Why It Was So Difficult to Organize Hosiery Workers in Reading
: Despite the strong Socialist orientation of the city, the employers were mostly German and strongly anti-union. Rieve, for instance, was fired from his hosiery job at the age of 13, when he joined a committee which approached his Reading boss for a wage increase.
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In Philadelphia the Hosiery Union Was Formed Early
: In 1919 an effort was made to break the Union when the employers announced a wage cut, which the Union rejected. The ensuing strike lasted 22 months and the Union won. The strikers were members of the United Textile Workers (UTW), having split from the AFHW. However, the AFHW did give them financial support, and this led to a reuniting of the hosiery factions in the UTW.
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High Dues and High Wages in the AFHW
: When Rogin went to work for the AFHW, members were paying 2 percent of their wages as dues and 3 percent into an organizing fund. Knitters were earning $100-$125 a week, and toppers, footers, and seamers were earning about $80 a week.
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Unorganized Companies Were Very Selective in Their Hiring and Thus Were Successful in Keeping the Union Out, Although There Were Many Strikes
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The Long Strike in Kenosha, Wisconsin, Was Financed by the Milwaukee Local
: Twenty-five percent of the salaries of the knitters in the Milwaukee local were paid to the Kenosha strikers the full length of the strike. This had been arranged by Rieve.
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More on Emil Rieve
: An ardent Socialist, a great trade unionist. He organized many locals.
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The Hosiery Industry in Philadelphia Required a High School Education Because the Jobs Were Highly Skilled, Which Called for More Intelligence
: Full-fashioned hosiery machines were very complicated, and knitting required a four-year apprenticeship. The high school diploma was not necessary to do the work, but it was used for selection purposes.
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Why the AFHW Was Able to Maintain Such High Dues
: It was in part a reflection of the socialist tradition, but even more so because it was a highly democratic organization made up mainly of high school graduates who were paid very high wages. Another factor was that high dues were necessary to maintain an active organizing campaign which was vital to maintaining the Union and the high wages it brought during the Depression.
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John Edelman
: The AFHW's socialist leadership was not afraid of intellectuals. Edelman, a Reading newspaperman, was hired in the 1920s and became the Union's idea man. He later became regional director for the CIO in Philadelphia and then went to work for TWUA.
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The Influence of Rieve and the Hosiery Workers on TWUA
: Rieve, with his AFHW background, was “a master at letting people talk themselves out and come to the right conclusion.” Rieve faced a much harder task in textile than others faced in other mass-production industries because the militancy of the textile workers had been expended by the textile strike of 1934. At least 25,000 textile workers were fired as a result of the 1934 strike. Rieve came into the leadership position in TWOC after Sidney Hillman became convinced the campaign in textiles would not be a success, and at the time, Sol Barkin was in charge of a job he was not cut out for. Rieve had brought the Hosiery Workers through a difficult period, and his staff understood what unionism was about. Another thing Rieve brought out of the Hosiery Workers was his bitter experience with the Communists, who were scattered throughout the industry. Hence, unlike other CIO Organizing Committees, he did not invite the assistance of Communists and thus did not have to face that problem later on.
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Introduction
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More About the Influence of Rieve and the Hosiery Workers on TWUA
: Rieve also understood the importance of dealing with the industry in sections. Hosiery workers had an understanding of bargaining, which was often lacking in other UTW divisions and leaders, like Frank Gorman. Although the textile workers were the lowest-paid mass-production workers in the CIO, they were the first to raise dues above a dollar a month. This was possible because Rieve understood that the membership would make a wise decision if they were given the necessary information.
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Rieve Was Able to Work with Many Different Kinds of People
: Shortly after taking over TWOC, Rieve had a conference with his AFHW staff to determine if he could keep Barkin as Research Director after he had been running the Union for Hillman. The decision was made to keep Barkin, despite the recognition that he would be interfering in the Union; this was a decision only a strong man could make. Also, Rieve never tried to make Rogin, a Socialist Party member, do political things which would be unsavory for him. He also worked well with people like John Chupka, Mariano Bishop, and Sam Baron, who came out of the mills, came from varying political backgrounds, and went into leadership positions in the Union. Rieve's preference would have been to have Socialist trade unionists, as exhibited by the people he brought in from outside the industry.
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TWUA Education Department and Rogin's Philosophy of Labor Education
: Rogin wanted his Department to be as functional to the Union as possible, so that his people could provide services other than just education. Labor education had a rebirth in the CIO, although much of it was merely circuses. Rogin felt a good labor educator was a group worker, not a teacher. Rogin felt his staff was the best prepared to keep morale up in strike situations. He also involved his staff in political work and organizing. All this fit into Rieve's philosophy of the uses of the Education Department. All these activities helped get the Department acceptance within the Union. Rogin claims there is a difference of opinion over this philosophy between the TWUA and ACW Education Departments today, with the ACW being more of a “circuses” operation. Rogin often sent his new employees to Brookwood College for training. Training of organizers by the Education Department was also innovative.
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Democracy in TWUA
: Given the history of splits in the UTW, it would have been difficult not to have a democratic organization.
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If the Great Textile Strike of 1934 Had Been Postponed until the CIO Was Functioning, It Might Have Been Successful
: Also, however, TWUA might have been a less democratic organization, more like the Steel Workers.
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By the Time TWOC Was Formed, the Hosiery Industry Was Almost Completely Organized, Except for the South
: This was due to NRA and NLRB, but the important thing was that the Union had money for organizing. 1933 was a big organizing year for the AFHW.
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1936 Strike at the Berkshire Knitting Mill in Reading
: This was a long strike against the primary manufacturer of knitting machinery in the United States. The strike was lost.
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There Was Some Success in Organizing the Hosiery Industry in the South in the 1930s
: The AFHW learned in the 1920s that the southern hosiery industry, due to its comparatively high wages, could not be organized until the southern cotton industry was organized. The AFHW did, however, do some southern organizing as part of the organizing drive that began in 1933.
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Introduction
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AFHW National Wage Structure
: Because the South could not be organized if AFHW insisted on a nationally-uniform wage structure, this policy was changed at the 1939 convention, which lasted two weeks.
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AFHW Efforts in the South
: AFHW hoped to beat the industry to the South - to organize the workers concurrently with the establishment of the industry so as to unionize the workers at an early stage, as had been done in Philadelphia. The big centers of the seamless hosiery industry in the South, like Chattanooga, Tennessee, went on strike during the 1934 Textile Strike. They stayed out longer than the cotton workers, but lost.
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Impact of the AFHW'S Southern Experience on TWUA
: Rieve felt that it was Southern workers who would have to organize the South. Hillman felt the same, and this accounted for the presence of Steve Nance as TWOC's Southern Director.
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Roy Lawrence, Southern Director
: He was not the right man for the job in those times. Also, he interfered with the Education Department's work in the South. His printer's mentality was not militant enough. Although Rieve did not like Lawrence's intransigence in his treatment of staff, Rieve would not replace him. The fight against George Baldanzi might not have happened if Rieve had acted as his instincts directed and removed Lawrence.
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Baldanzi's Attempt to Dump Lawrence in 1948
: Most of the Southern staff supported Baldanzi's attempt.
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Lawrence's Interference with the Education Department
: He tried to prevent Rogin from hiring Pat Knight, the Southern Education staff person.
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Rieve Always Felt Insecure about the South
: Hence, he tended to leave the job of organizing the South to Southerners, who were often less competent and less experienced than other staff people. This grew out of the experience the AFHW had in the South - if an employer was determined to get rid of the Union there, he could do it.
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Only in the United States Will One Worker Take Another Worker's Job Away from Him During a Strike
: In other countries an employer would not think of hiring a worker during a strike who had not worked for him before the strike.
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Pattern of Strikebreaking in Textiles Began in the Hosiery Industry
: The employers would find an issue which would force a strike, keep the plant closed for three months, and then begin to recruit strikebreakers. Meanwhile, the employer would have his orders filled by other mills.
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Why Strikebreakers Are Available in the United States
: Basically it is due to a lack of class feeling. It is also partly due to the fact that certain immigrant groups were excluded from certain skilled jobs and were, therefore, eager to move into those jobs during a strike. Rogin gives some examples illustrative of these phenomena. In the South there were no immigrant strikebreakers; there the main factor was this lack of class feeling.
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Hosiery Federation Influence on TWUA Structure
: The influence was negative. That is, Rieve was not going to permit the development of industrial federations within the TWUA. One of the Union's first tests came on this issue when some New Englanders wanted to form a Woolen and Worsted Federation.
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Rogin Became Education Director for the Hosiery Workers in 1937
: In 1934 he was working for the Reading Central Labor Union and also as a newspaper reporter. By 1935 the Central Labor Union could no longer support him so he took a job at Brookwood. In 1937 Brookwood sent Rogin to the Hosiery convention to work with the Education Committee and to cultivate more money and students for the College. The Education Committee asked Rogin to draft a resolution mandating the hiring of a full-time Education Director. The resolution was adopted, Brookwood was closing, and Rieve obeyed the convention mandate by hiring Rogin on Labor Day, 1937.
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Rogin as Education Director of the Hosiery Workers
: He held one-week institutes, utilized Works Progress Administration teachers, and conducted annual institute tours of the Midwest and the South.
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Introduction
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Rogin Geared His AFHW Summer Schools to Be Functional
: Everything had to be related to the needs of the Union. Anecdote concerning a Wisconsin School for Workers economics teacher who was too theoretical in his teaching at one of Rogin's institutes. Rogin often taught six hours a day himself, even when the institutes were held at the University of Wisconsin and experts were abundant. The most important thing about the institutes were the spirit they built; education was almost secondary.
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There Were Fewer Communists in TWOC Than in Other Organizing Committees
: Rieve got rid of whatever Communists Hillman had permitted.
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Rieve Did Not Really Take Over TWOC until a Few Months Prior to the TWUA Founding Convention
: By 1938, however, he was spending more time in New York.
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Rogin Knew Sidney Hillman Long Before TWOC
: Rogin's family had shared a summer cottage with Hillman, and Rogin's aunt had helped raise the Hillman children.
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TWUA Was Not Begun Too Soon
: Since Rieve was able to focus the Union on organizing and there was no problem with raising money for organizing, Rogin does not believe that TWOC was ended prematurely.
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Politics at the Founding Convention of TWUA
: Selection of William Pollock as Secretary-Treasurer was a mistake because he represented the old UTW; that is, he did not have the understanding of modern unionism that many new people had. Rieve favored Carl Holderman for the position of Secretary-Treasurer. That also was a mistake because Holderman was a Hosiery Worker. Rogin disagrees with those who think Rieve did not want Holderman because Holderman was too independent. Rieve did not want Pollock.
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More on the Beginning of TWUA
: Rogin feels that TWUA was formed even though TWOC was not economically self-supporting because the organizing drive was not successful and, in order to hold the Union together, a democratic structure was necessary. Organizing Committees can only exist under that structure for as long as they remain successful. The members become restless when things begin to go bad. Unlike the Steel Workers Organizing Committee (SWOC), TWOC did not have a “Big Steel” organized which could have sustained it as an Organizing Committee. Furthermore, there was a tradition of independence in textile unionism.
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Full Organization of the Textile Industry
: Rieve was very realistic; he knew that the South would be difficult to organize. When Rogin joined the TWUA staff (in 1941), it did not yet have many major northern textile mills. Rogin estimates that TWUA had fewer than 150,000 dues-paying members at that time.
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Why Sander Genis and Joe Salerno Were on the First TWUA Executive Council
: They were from the ACW and were on that payroll. However, they were putting much of their time into textiles, and there were no obvious candidates for the Executive Council from their regions. Ultimately, when those circumstances changed, both men returned to the ACW.
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Hillman Saw TWOC as a Failure
: It was a success only in that the textile industry for the first time had a viable union.
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The Merger of the ACW and TWUA in 1976
: Sol Stetin saw that the Union was a failure. For recognizing this and doing something about it, he is a great man.
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The Constitutional Organization of TWUA Was Patterned after the UTW
: Unlike the usual CIO structure, which was patterned after the United Mine Workers (UMW) structure, TWUA did not have its vice presidents elected by their regions. The structure was more akin to AFL unions than to CIO unions.
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In Late 1941 Rogin Became Education Director of TWUA
: Rieve had asked Rogin twice, in 1939 right after the convention and again one year later, if he wanted the position; but Rogin rejected the offer, saying that TWUA was not yet ready for an education director. Rogin argued that he would get trapped into administration if he came at that time. By late 1941, when Rieve talked with him for the third time, Rogin told him that TWUA was now ready for an education director. For Rogin, joining the TWUA staff was like going home.
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One of the Many Reasons Rogin Joined TWUA Was Baldanzi
: Rogin originally was very impressed with Baldanzi and looked forward to working with him. Baldanzi in his prime was probably, with the exception of John L. Lewis, as good a speaker as the labor movement ever had. Rogin later came to the conclusion that his initial impression of Baldanzi was wrong; Baldanzi did not have depth.
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Introduction
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Relationship of TWUA Locals to the International Union
: The International Union was viewed as being very helpful to even the most independent locals, and this inspired their loyalty to the TWUA leadership. Locals did not use the threat of bolting to the UTW as a means of getting their own way.
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Autonomy Was Sought by and Divisiveness Came About in TWUA Locals and Joint Boards for Various Reasons
: Often it was found in areas where the Union had weak or incompetent staff. Jim Kelly in Pennsylvania was an example; he was a very dedicated trade unionist, but he just did not perform his job very well. Unrest was also caused in certain areas where the staff was too domineering - for example, Roy Lawrence in the South. If there was a mixture of different kinds of locals within the same joint board, a certain amount of unrest developed. One of the reasons Baldanzi was successfully re-elected in 1950 was a lack of respect on the part of the rank and file leadership for the International staff in their area.
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Before the War Labor Board (WLB) Helped Institute the Checkoff, There Was a Tendency Toward Nonpayment of Dues Once the Contract Had Been Negotiated
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UTW Versus TWUA
: TWUA's first real success against UTW was in Fall River.
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John L. Lewis and the Formation of the CIO
: Lewis could not afford having the steel industry unorganized because it owned too many soft coal mines, and he could not organize steel without organizing other heavy, mass-production industries. Lewis did not care about textiles. Once steel was organized, he could walk out of the CIO. What Lewis did not understand was that his main backers at the 1940 CIO convention were Communists, and that the Party line changed during 1941, leaving him at the 1941 convention with only UMW support. He was then left on a limb and would obviously not again be a leader in the CIO.
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Rogin's Goals and Philosophy When He Became TWUA Education Director
: He wanted to build the labor movement and to make it a progressive social force.
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Southern Education Director
: As with other aspects of the Union's work, special attention in this area was required if the South was ever to be organized.
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Rogin Wanted Education Directors on Joint Board Payrolls
: The bulk of the Education staff was on joint board payrolls. The South was not strong enough to support joint board education directors; hence, it got a Southern Education Director. In order to overcome the suspicion of education amongst the workers, the joint boards were allowed to select their own education directors; outsiders would not have been accepted.
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The Impact of World War II on TWUA
: In the North, the Union was accepted and solidified its base during the war. The war had this same effect for other unions. For TWUA it had the additional impact of having the Union accepted in the “backwoods” areas of Maine, New Hampshire, and Vermont where other unions did not exist and where resistance previously had been as strong as in the South. In the South, what unionism exists today is largely attributable to the war. Also, the war made existing unionism in the South viable. Employers in the South who chose to fight the Union did so by delays. The Baltimore and Atlanta offices of the NLRB never were any good. Franklin Roosevelt had made political deals with the South, which permitted Southern conservative politicians to control these offices of the NLRB. It was in the South and in the textile industry where employers learned to use the NLRB to their advantage, largely through the method of delays.
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The Only Reason TWUA Was Able to Organize Danville Was Because the Workers Could Be Assured There Would Be No Strike, Because the WLB Would Not Permit It
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Examples of the Lingering, Detrimental Effects of the 1934 Strike
: TWUA continually ran into textile workers throughout the country who had been blacklisted in the South in 1934. This strike has been largely ignored by labor historians.
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Introduction
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The 1934 Strike Had More Impact on Organizing Textile Workers Than Any Action TWUA Took Throughout Its History
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The WLB and Manpower Shortages of World War II Were Helpful to TWUA, But the Little Steel Formula Was Less Helpful
: Although the Little Steel Formula exempted low-wage industries, TWUA had a difficult time overcoming the Formula because of the political influence of the southern textile industry. This influence was exhibited most clearly in James F. Byrnes, the “assistant President,” who was Chairman of the Economic Stabilization Board. Byrnes “was always the attorney for the southern textile industry, whatever job he had.”
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The Most Important Contributions to the Growth of TWUA During the War Were the WLB's Maintenance of Membership and the Checkoff
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TWUA'S No-Strike Pledge
: There were several strikes, however, to force the government to take over plants - Gaffney, South Carolina, Deering Milliken in Huntsville, Alabama, etc. These strikes were needed because the companies were refusing to sign contracts ordered by the WLB.
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The International's Control of Local Strikes
: Even if the International felt a strike was not in the local's best interest, it would not veto the strike if local sentiment was strongly in favor of striking.
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The Cotton Case and the No-Strike Pledge
: Rescinding the no-strike pledge was not a bluff. Rieve did not know the order would be released when it was; the Union was ready to strike.
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Effects of the War on TWUA
: WLB, though it did make things easier for the Union, did not dull its fighting edge because the will to fight had been lost in 1934, especially in the South, where it mattered most. Many potential local Union leaders and many good staff people were lost both to heavy industry and to the draft. Common labor in the Maine shipyards paid more than the job of a skilled loom fixer.
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Rieve Was on the WLB, Spending about Half of His Time in Washington
: He remained in control of the Union, however.
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11:10
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Canada and TWUA
: In 1945 the Canadian Congress of Labor was attempting to form an opposition union to the Communist-dominated UTW in Canada and requested help from TWUA to accomplish this. Rieve was very doubtful about pursuing it but did so under pressure from the Canadian Congress of Labor and the CIO. This was an opportunity for Sam Baron, who was very competent, to get back into the Union; he had left the Union rather than support the American Labor Party. For a long time Canada cost more than it brought in.
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14:20
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Background of the Hosiery Federation Leaving TWUA
: The Hosiery Federation almost disappeared during the war because silk and nylon were not available for full-fashioned hosiery; therefore, hosiery was no longer a powerful force within the Union. When the Hosiery Federation refused to accept the second per capita increase, both Rieve and TWUA felt that this refusal would set a bad precedent and thus should not be allowed; there was also a feeling that the entire concept of the federation system was an anachronism.
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17:50
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Southern Hosiery Industry
: Before World War II, there were two separate hosiery industries in the South: full fashion and seamless. With wartime developments that made nylon practical for the seamless industry, and thus made seamless hosiery attractive and fashionable, the full-fashion industry disappeared. This disappearance was the basic reason for the demise of the Hosiery Federation.
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19:00
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More on the Hosiery Federation Leaving TWUA
: The Federation had two percent dues and could have afforded the higher per caps. AFHW leaders felt theirs was a viable organization, and that they could make it on their own. Also, some people in the Federation wanted to demonstrate that they could run a union. At the Executive Council meeting which voted on expulsion, both Bill Gordon and Herb Payne, a former hosiery worker himself, abstained. Payne's vote was for sentimental reasons. The AFHW did not consider joining the UTW. Afterwards, there was no competition between TWUA and hosiery on who would organize hosiery workers.
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23:35
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The Dyers Were Very Happy with Their Status as a Federation, But They Were Not in a Position to Pull Out as the Hosiery Federation Did
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00:00
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Introduction
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01:25
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TWUA Leadership Viewed Non-Communist Radicals More Tolerantly Than Communists
: Radicals like the Trotskyites were accepted because they worked for what they thought would be best for their brand of revolution. Communists, on the other hand, worked for what was best for the Soviet Union; and this made them difficult to deal with.
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03:25
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TWUA and the Workers Defense League (WDL)
: TWUA's mixed record of financial support for the WDL reflected the Union's financial condition and other factors, not ideological differences. The WDL was a Socialist group, and Rogin served on its Board.
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05:50
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TWUA Support of the CIO'S Communist Purge
: Rieve's experience with Communists in the AFHW led to his opposition to Communists in the CIO. Baldanzi was not an ideologue, but his experiences with Communists in the TWUA and in the World Federation of Trade Unions, plus their opposition to the Marshall Plan, led him to oppose them in the CIO. Also, the young radicals on the TWUA staff, who were later to support Baldanzi in the internal fight, were all strongly anti-Communist.
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10:00
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The TWUA in New England Was Anti-Communist Because the United Electrical Workers (UE) Had Installed Incentive Plans in Their Shops with No Protection to the Workers
: Many textile workers worked on incentive plans, and the UE model set a bad precedent.
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11:15
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Rogin Feels That the CIO Communist Purge Was Not a Mistake
: Unlike in England, where the Communists were an open faction that everyone recognized, in the CIO the Communists, like Lee Pressman, were often a secret influence. In Communist-controlled unions, the Communists did not permit the kind of democracy that would allow the issues to be fought out. The purge did not weaken the labor movement, since the people who were purged were not tied to the American labor movement, but to the Soviet Union. The only detrimental effect of the purge was that, once the Communists were gone, there was no longer any debate on issues in the CIO. But even this was not so bad since the debate prior to expulsion had been on a false basis because of the secrecy of the Communists.
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15:20
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There Was Nothing Wrong in and of Itself with Being a Communist First and a Trade Unionist Second
: To greater or lesser degrees the leaders of the Fur Workers, the Electrical Workers and other Communist unions were Communists first and trade unionists second. If there had been a strong Socialist movement in the United States, the same might have been true of the Socialists. This would have been acceptable if the Communists had not had their policies determined by what was best for the Soviet Union rather than what was best for American workers.
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16:25
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Communists and Secrecy
: Their secrecy built a feeling of conspiracy. Rogin feels there was a conspiracy. Several examples of Communists Rogin knew whose Communism was either kept secret later or exposed later, including two who worked as Socialists with Rogin. Senator Joseph McCarthy would have made considerably less headway if the Communists had been open. Uncovering a secret Communist merely spurred on the witch-hunt.
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21:30
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CIO Headquarters Communists Hurt the CIO in the Early Years by Seeing to It That Communist Splinter Groups of AFL Unions Came into the CIO, Rather Than the Parent Unions
: This was true in the case of the Shoe Workers, the Upholsterers (admitted to the CIO as the United Furniture Workers), and the Longshoremen. These headquarters Communists also forced competent anti-Communists off the CIO staff. Although they were able people who often did good work for the CIO, in many cases their actions were not governed by what was best for the CIO.
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25:00
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Anti-Communist Leaders in the CIO and in TWUA Welcomed the Anti-Communist Provisions of the Taft-Hartley Act Because It Would Make Organizing Easier, Particularly in the South
: The TWUA could not take the principled stand that Lewis took and refuse to sign the affidavits, because the TWUA could not afford to be without the protections of the NLRB.
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Box
5/1
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00:00
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Introduction
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Box
5/1
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00:30
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TWUA and the Highlander Folk School
: Rogin had used Highlander and felt that money should be appropriated by TWUA toward support of the school. Requests for support, however, were rejected because of Communists at the school. Roy Lawrence, “a blind anti-Communist,” led the opposition to the appropriation.
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02:10
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Charges Brought Against Two Communists from Paterson, New Jersey, at the 1948 TWUA Convention
: The TWUA had known of their Communism for some time. The charges were brought at this time as part of the general CIO purge.
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Box
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03:10
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Impact of Taft-Hartley on TWUA
: Over the long haul the Act just solidified the general public's attitudes toward unionism. The attitudes it reflected were more detrimental than its actual provisions. The administration of the law, more than its language, affected the Textile Workers. The employers had already learned to use the Wagner Act against unions. Employers were once again heroes for having won the war.
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Box
5/1
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05:25
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The First TWUA Attempt to Build a Strike Fund Was Made in 1948
: The assessment followed a strike against Erwin Mills. When more money is needed and the membership will not permit increased dues to build the general fund, they will often permit payments into a strike fund.
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Box
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07:35
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Pattern of Wage Movements in the South after World War II
: Wage movements in the North would be followed by an extensive leafleting campaign in the South and then pressure on the organized Southern mills. In 1951 this pattern did not work; the Southern mills did not respond to the leafleting pressure; and that is what caused the Southern Strike. Southern textile wages remained closely tied to the minimum wages, but not as closely as a few other industries.
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Box
5/1
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10:45
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Position of TWUA within the CIO by the Late 1940s
: TWUA itself was viewed as a poor cousin because the industry was not organized; but TWUA staff, and Rieve, were respected. Baldanzi was respected for his speechmaking abilities. When the Southern Drive failed, everyone knew the industry was not organized, and the large membership in some New England states no longer looked so impressive.
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Box
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13:05
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Concentration of Power at the Top of the International Union in the Late 1940s Was in Part Necessitated by Taft-Hartley and in Part Simply the Tendency of National-Market Unions
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15:00
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By the Late 1940s TWUA Was Losing Big NLRB Elections and Winning Small Ones
: Large companies were able to carry out sophisticated campaigns against the Union; also, it was easier for organizers to deal with smaller numbers.
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Box
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15:50
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After the War, TWUA Staff Was Aware That the Future of the Union Lay in Organizing the South
: The 1951 southern strike occurred because the Union realized that a wage movement had to originate amongst organized plants in the South. While Operation Dixie was not a success, some plants were organized, and there remained hope for success in the South. The Union, however, came out of the 1951 strike weaker; and that was the signal that things were going to get worse.
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18:45
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The Education Department Grew Steadily Through the 1940s
: Rieve believed in education, and Rogin tried to make the Department functional to the Union. Therefore, the Department was not an expense without tangible results. Some people, who were originally resistant to education, like Bishop, came to see its value to the Union.
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21:10
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Political Institutes Were Begun as a Followup to Similar Institutes That Had Been Held in the South by the Southern School for Workers
: Rogin's southern staff urged him to pursue this idea, and Rieve agreed. Baldanzi opposed them because Rogin insisted that they be run as integrated institutes, which was a very difficult undertaking in terms of where the participants could stay and where they could eat. Baldanzi feared that integrated institutes would hurt the Southern Drive.
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Box
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22:45
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TWUA Staff Who Believed in Civil Rights Always Had Ambivalent Feelings in the South
: Locals were usually segregated, but blacks generally favored this because they would have more of an opportunity for representation.
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25:05
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There Was Much Opposition to the First Integrated Institute in the South, Which Was Run Just after the War at the University of North Carolina
: Whites were housed in university dormitories, and blacks were housed in the homes of faculty members.
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Box
5/2
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00:00
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Introduction
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Box
5/2
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00:30
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Merger of the Education and Publicity Departments in 1947
: They were merged because Ken Fiester, as editor of the paper, had not been with TWUA long enough to become Publicity Department Director when E. M. Schoffstall resigned that position. Rieve did not think Fiester knew the Union well enough to run the Publicity Department on his own, since Rieve always gave a considerable amount of freedom to all departments, and no officer saw the paper before it was printed. Rogin gave nominal supervision to the Publicity Department and was responsible to Rieve; but Fiester ran the Department pretty much on his own.
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05:35
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The Internal Fight Interfered with the Separation of the Education and Publicity Departments
: Many young people on the staff sided with Baldanzi, especially those amongst Political Action field staff headed by Al Barkan and those on Rogin's Education staff. Barkan ordered his staff to support the administration slate, but most of them refused and worked actively for Baldanzi. Rogin did not order his staff to support Rieve, but rather requested that they keep out of the fight, because being in education was a favored position, and the membership would tend to follow the advice of Education staff. Thus, Rogin was not trusted by the administration supporters, though he strongly supported Rieve. Although Rieve agreed with the position Rogin had taken with his staff, he decided not to separate the Education and Publicity Departments because it would look as though Rogin was being punished for not pressuring his staff to support the administration. The actual separation of the two Departments came after the 1952 convention.
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10:20
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Though the Education Staff Did Not Remain Neutral, They Did Restrict Their Political Activities
: Though many sympathized with Baldanzi, they were far less active than the Political Action people.
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12:05
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After the 1952 Convention and the Separation of the Education and Publicity Departments, Rogin Had No Staff in the Education Department
: Most left for better opportunities. The Baldanzi supporters would have been uncomfortable staying anyway.
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Box
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14:30
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Almost All Educational Activities Stopped During the Period of the Internal Fight, Except for the Washington Institutes
: One of the joint board managers came to the institute to protect his delegates from Rogin; he, however, was surprised that there was no politicking at the institute.
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Box
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16:00
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By the Time of the Internal Fight, Rogin's Interest Was Changing from Education to Organizing
: The Union had a much greater need for organizing than for education. He had done organizing work with the Hosiery Workers and also as Publicity Director. Tom Cosgrove pretty much began to direct the Union's education activities. Rogin, in effect, became an assistant to the President for organizing, while maintaining the title of Director of Education. He was offered the title of Assistant to the President in Charge of Organizing but rejected it because he realized regional directors would be jealous of this.
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Box
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21:35
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The Basic Cause of the Internal Split Was Rieve's Heart Attack
: For many reasons Baldanzi was not trusted to take over the leadership of the Union in the event of Rieve's death. He played favorites without regard to ability; that is, he liked people who flattered him. He lacked depth. Also, he lacked guts in a difficult situation as evidenced by his failure to make a speech for a per capita increase. He was unable to handle more than one negotiation or situation at a time. He was untrustworthy, which became evident at the 1948 convention when he tried to undermine Lawrence.
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Box
6/1
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00:00
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Introduction
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Box
6/1
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00:30
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More on the Cause of the 1950-52 Internal Split
: Baldanzi's attempt to defeat Lawrence at the 1948 convention was the factor that sparked Rieve's supporters to try to oust Baldanzi. They did not realize how difficult it would be to do this because of Baldanzi's popularity with the rank and file. Also, they did not realize that their own sources of information were not respected by the membership.
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Box
6/1
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02:00
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Why Bishop Was Chosen to Run Against Baldanzi in 1950
: Bishop's personal ambition would not have been that influential had there not been a general consensus of agreement concerning Baldanzi. Of all Rieve's supporters, he was the most able and competent. Although he was a narrow trade unionist along AFL lines, he had the potential for developing into a trade unionist like Rieve. He had the ability to rise above personal feelings, as evidenced by his support of Walter Reuther for CIO president even though the United Auto Workers (UAW), especially Victor Reuther, had actively supported Baldanzi in the TWUA internal fight.
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Box
6/1
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05:00
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Rieve Was Not Committed to the Fight Against Baldanzi and Should Not Have Allowed Himself to Be Talked into It
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Box
6/1
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05:35
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Victor Reuther's Intervention in the Internal Split
: He tried to get the UAW to take sides and support Baldanzi; but Stetin was able to exert influence on Martin Gerber, UAW New Jersey regional director. Gerber convinced the UAW that this was merely a power struggle, not a case of a good liberal labor leader against a conservative one.
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Box
6/1
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07:05
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The Difference Between Rieve and Baldanzi Was One of Style
: Baldanzi was never actually second in command because Rieve never gave him responsibility in overall Union activities. This could be due in part to the nature of the executive vice presidency. Baldanzi catered to his audience. One of the things he enjoyed doing was to make fun of Rieve in front of the young intellectuals, even though Rieve was a self-taught intellectual and was always trying out new ideas, which Baldanzi was not. Baldanzi tried to build personal loyalty among selected staff. Anecdote concerning Rogin saying the wrong thing about Baldanzi to a Baldanzi confidant shortly after joining the TWUA staff. Baldanzi did not pick loyalists for the Southern Drive, but he developed their loyalty after hiring them.
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Box
6/1
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14:40
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Lew Conn Would Not Have Supported Baldanzi in 1950 if Rieve Had Removed Lawrence from the Slate
: Others felt the same way.
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Box
6/1
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16:55
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Rieve Did Not Have Much of a Following Amongst the Union's Rank and File
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Box
6/1
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17:15
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Baldanzi Supporters
: Baron supported Baldanzi on principle - the fight against Baldanzi was unfair; Charlie Serraino, out of personal loyalty; Charlie Hughes, because he was a maverick; and Charlie Lazzio, because he was a dyer.
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Box
6/1
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18:40
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Isadore Katz
: He supported Baldanzi while outwardly working for the Administration. Katz wanted to have his own law firm in addition to being general counsel to TWUA, but Rieve would not allow it.
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Box
6/1
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21:35
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Of All the Issues Raised During the Internal Fight, the Only One Which Had Any Validity Was the Issue of Democracy in the Union
: Rank and file wanted more of a voice in the selection of their immediate representatives. Lawrence, for example, could never have been elected by Southern votes.
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Box
6/1
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23:35
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Frustration Over the Union's Limited Success in 1950-1952 Played No Part in the Fight
: Membership peaked in 1950, and only the more astute leaders realized the Union was “up against a real crunch.”
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Box
6/2
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00:00
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Introduction
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Box
6/2
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01:45
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Anecdote Concerning the Pool in the Press Room at the 1950 Convention
: The pool was for how many votes Baldanzi would receive. Rogin inserted a figure but then removed it because the figure he used meant Baldanzi would win. Had he left that figure in the pool, he would have won it.
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Box
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02:25
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Where the Rieve Forces Went Wrong in 1950
: They were poor politicians in that they believed what they were told and did not realize the amount of resentment some rank and file members had against their immediate representatives - mainly joint board managers. On the issues alone, they could not defeat Baldanzi unless people like Lew Conn and Sam Baron, who had significant followings, switched sides.
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Box
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03:35
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Rogin Had Certain Advantages in Knowing How Delegates Felt
: For one thing, Rogin resembled Baldanzi a great deal, and at the 1950 convention, drunk delegates would come up to Rogin and, mistaking him for Baldanzi, would tell him that they backed him, no matter what their s.o.b. joint board manager said. Another advantage was being in education; Union members attending institutes would talk about their problems with the Union and their dissatisfactions. Rieve was not close to the situation because he relied on his industry directors.
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Box
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05:25
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The Point of No Return for Baldanzi Was the 1950 Convention
: Baldanzi could not have kept his supporters if he merely ran for Executive Vice President again in 1952.
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Box
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07:20
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The June, 1951, Staff Purge Was a Mistake
: Rogin fired one of his staff, and Joe Hueter hired him as Education Director for the Philadelphia Joint Board.
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Box
6/2
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08:35
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Baldanzi Mistakes During the Fight
: He permitted newspapermen in his caucuses. Workers generally hate the local press because it usually sides with the bosses. The Administration forces then made a big issue of how Baldanzi permitted these “stooges for your bosses” in his meetings while keeping honest Union members out. Also, Baldanzi was caught on the defensive when the Rieve forces distributed a Baldanzi paper at an industry conference. Baldanzi was not an astute politician.
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Box
6/2
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12:10
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Mistakes by the Rieve Forces Were Less Severe
: The attempt to get rid of secret ballot elections at the 1952 convention was stupid.
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Box
6/2
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13:10
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Aftermath of the 1952 Convention
: Baldanzi could have, and should have, stayed with TWUA - he could have gone to the Passaic Joint Board. The staff purge was not entirely unexpected but it was unnecessary; part of the responsibility for it lay with Reba Gilpin Canzano. People were purged before it was thought through. Even if people were fired, they could have gotten positions as locally-hired business agents in Baldanzi strongholds and provided a base for another presidential attempt in 1954.
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Box
6/2
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14:30
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The Secession Movement
: Baron made a deal with the UTW - if the UTW ridded themselves of Communists in Canada, he would bring the TWUA in Canada into the UTW. One reason Baldanzi could bolt to the UTW with a clear conscience was that there were no longer such great differences between the AFL and the CIO; the Steel Workers were the most obvious example of this.
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Box
6/2
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16:35
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Baldanzi Had Plans to Remake the UTW
: He took a number of young radicals with him from TWUA, but they stayed with UTW only a short time because the UTW could not afford to pay them. The reason for this was because the UTW did not want them and had separated their treasury so that Baldanzi could not get at it.
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Box
6/2
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17:35
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Impact of Secession on TWUA
: The fight to prevent secession raised the morale of the Union. It did not have a particularly detrimental effect on organizing in the South. The Union's figures on the number who actually seceded were somewhat deceiving because the checkoff had been lost in Danville and Cone Mills in 1951.
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Box
6/2
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19:45
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The 1951 Southern Strike
: The checkoff in Danville probably would have been lost even without the strike. The basic question was whether or not the Union could create a wage movement in the South, and in order to ascertain this a strike of the organized sectors of the industry in the South was necessary. Had there been no internal fight, the decision may well have been made not to strike. Slim Boggs, in Danville, was realistic; he said Union members and a few more there could be counted on to stay out for only a week. Bill Billingsley, in Greensboro, however, said the non-Union Cone Mills workers would follow the Union on strike; he claimed the workers there were more militant than the Union. Baldanzi's attitude reflected Billingsley's Danville and Cone Mills were basically defeats waiting to happen.
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Box
6/2
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24:40
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The Southern Worker
: Southern workers were not willing to strike long enough to win because they had no other job alternatives, and they had seen what had happened to other Southern textile strikers. At Gadsden, Alabama, the TWUA was able to keep a Deering Milliken Mill closed for a year, and then the company shut it down rather than open with a Union contract. Also, there was the heritage of the 1934 Strike.
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Box
7/1
Folder
00:00
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Introduction
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Box
7/1
Folder
00:30
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More on the 1951 Southern Strike
: A strike in the South “was almost like a revolution.” There simply was not enough Union strength there. The organized sections of the industry could be pulled out on strike, but it would have no impact at all on the overall operation of the industry.
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Box
7/1
Folder
01:15
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Aftermath of the Southern Strike
: Rieve's charge that modern unionism, especially at Danville, lost the strike was somewhat justified. Public relations in a southern community disappears during a strike. There must be a strong union first. Rogin would gladly trade a national right-to-work law for a law forbidding employers to hire outside workers during a strike. He thinks the industry could have been organized with such a law. The CIO Southern Drive might have been successful under such a law; instead, many mills organized during that drive had to be struck to get a contract, and the employers simply hired outside workers and broke the strikes.
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Box
7/1
Folder
05:40
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Victory Could Not Have Been Purchased at Danville
: Victory had never been purchased by the Hosiery Workers, whose strikers sometimes lived as well as employed workers.
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Box
7/1
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06:10
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Other CIO Unions Did Not Readily Aid TWUA with the Southern Strike Because the CIO Was Becoming More Like the AFL and Less of a Movement
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Box
7/1
Folder
06:55
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Impact of the 1951 Southern Strike on TWUA
: The Union could no longer promise northern employers that if they gave a wage increase, one would follow in the South. It also had the effect of making the South look more appealing to northern employers who were contemplating a move.
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Box
7/1
Folder
08:40
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Causes of the Decline of TWUA after 1950
: Profitable northern mills were bought out by speculators and conglomerates for their war profits. The choice was then whether or not to reinvest these profits in the textile industry or in industries which were less subject to depression and cycles. If investment was made in textiles, the question was whether to invest in the North where land was expensive and the textile job was the worst job in town and attracted the worst workers; or in the South where one could get tax breaks, cheap land, modern plants, and workers who saw textile jobs as the best jobs in town because the plants were newer and cleaner than most other southern industries. It was, therefore, inevitable that the industry would become southern, and in the South any employer who wanted to could defeat the Union.
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Box
7/1
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12:35
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Barkin Predicted There Would Be a Lengthy Depression in the Textile Industry, But There Was Nothing the Union Could Do
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Box
7/1
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13:05
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More on the Decline of TWUA
: The split in the Union and the 1951 southern strike may have accelerated the Union's decline, but they were not among its causes. The causes were basically outside the Union's control. The tragedy of Rieve was that he became President of TWUA, because he would have been known as a great union leader if he had been in most any other industry.
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Box
7/1
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15:45
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Banks Contributed to the Decline of the Northern Textile Industry
: Credit would only be extended for modernization if it was done in the South. This was only good business, for all the reasons mentioned above (Tape #7, Side 1, 08:40). J.P. Stevens dealt with the Union in the North; but it moved South.
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Box
7/1
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17:00
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As TWUA Locals Became Defunct, Their Resources Reverted to the International
: The locals and the International worked it out so that there were no hard feelings on this issue.
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Box
7/1
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17:40
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The Tariff Issue
: It had always been a problem with the textile industry. TWUA, and particularly Barkin, had proposed various means of keeping the issue under control. However, when the northern mills began closing, it became a much more dominant issue. Eventually, the Union gave up on schemes to control the problem and opted for a high-tariff policy.
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Box
7/1
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18:50
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Organizing in the 1950s
: Success usually came in smaller, older mills that did not wish to spend the money necessary to fight the Union. American Thread in Chattanooga, Tennessee, was a case in point.
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Box
7/1
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21:00
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Education Department in the 1950s
: At the headquarters level, the Education Department remained a one-man operation after the 1952 fight; on the local and joint board level, there was some cutting back of education staff for economic reasons. However, local institutes continued to be held and were always well attended.
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Box
7/1
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23:55
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The Burlington Drive
: It was begun as a pretense for organizing in order to move wages. It was conducted contrary to all the usual methods of organizing. They did not build in-plant committees, but rather carried on a public campaign with mail-back cards. They were surprised at the response they got to the cards from some mills. The campaign was broad, in 34 mills, with concentration on woolen mills and rayon-weaving. The campaign then became one designed as a constant pressure on wages.
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Box
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00:00
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Introduction
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00:30
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More on the Burlington Drive
: William DuChessi headed the campaign until his duties as carpet director called him away. Rogin took over the campaign, with the help of the AFL-CIO, which was persuaded to commit organizers to the drive. TWUA and the AFL-CIO each put about 20 people into the drive. It was Rogin's idea to proceed slowly with the campaign so that after a period of about five years, enough progress would be made to hold elections. The assumption was that the company would pull all its tricks early in the campaign. However, Rogin left TWUA before his idea could be brought to fruition. One reason Rogin left was because he was away from home too much. Those who followed Rogin in the drive held elections too soon. Rogin did not intend to hold elections in all 34 mills at once. The aim was to get majorities in enough of the same kinds of mills to make an NLRB election victory meaningful. He felt Peerless Woolen (a division of Burlington) could have been won in another year.
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07:05
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Some Employees Were Fired During the Burlington Drive
: Although they were technically fired for other reasons - lack of attendance or poor work, for example - they were actually fired for Union activities but chose not to file NLRB charges because future employment would have been very difficult. Supervisory personnel were also fired because they were not aggressive enough against the Union. Rogin interviewed one such person who gave the Union enough information to build a very strong case against the company, but he would not testify because too many of his relatives still worked in the mill. The firings did not chill the drive because technically they were not done for union activity; and, because there were no in-plant committees, the workers did not know that those fired were active in the Union.
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09:55
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More on the Organizers from the AFL-CIO Who Participated in the Burlington Drive
: Many of these organizers had been on the CIO staff before the merger. The CIO used to loan them out to member unions, but that policy stopped after the merger. Hence, people were available. AFL-CIO had a policy that it would offer no organizers if more than one member union was interested in the same company. The UTW was not interested, but it would not say so. TWUA, therefore, had to force a policy change through the AFL-CIO Executive Council before it could get the organizers. The AFL-CIO then assigned the organizers to the campaign without asking them their wishes in the matter. The AFL-CIO was really trying to get rid of these people. Only those who could not get other jobs actually joined the drive. Most were not very good.
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12:40
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Rogin's Idea about Long-Range Organizing Was Not Carried Out Because Those Who Came after Him Wanted Quicker Results
: Pollock supported Rogin in his position though he did not understand what Rogin was trying to accomplish. Most everyone else still saw it simply as a wage-pressure drive, not an organizing drive.
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14:10
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Rock Hill, South Carolina
: A good, strong dye local there had a successful strike (in 1956). It also was successful in the 1951 strike.
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16:10
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After the 1951 Southern Strike, the South Began to Dominate the Industry
: The Union could no longer force wage movements in the North.
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18:10
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Rieve Retired in 1956 for Reasons of Health and the Fact That the Union Was in a Decline
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19:05
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Why Rogin Left TWUA
: Partially as a result of Rieve's retirement, but mainly because his interest was in organizing; however, he did not wish to move his family to the South and was reluctant to be away from them too long.
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20:45
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How Pollock Became Executive Vice President
: After Bishop died, the natural man to replace him was Chupka, but for various reasons he chose not to run. Rieve should not have called the Executive Council meeting to make a decision about Bishop's successor immediately after Bishop's funeral because everyone was operating under an emotional strain. Therefore, with Chupka unwilling to run, Pollock won the position by default.
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