INTRODUCTION

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
Scope and Content Note: Born in Knoxville, Tennessee. Went to Oakland, California, after finishing high school. Attended University of California. Father was a retailer.

JOINED RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION (RCIA) IN 1934
Scope and Content Note: Was managing a food store. A truckdriver told him there was to be an organizing meeting for clerks that night. Suffridge and a few others went to the meeting and joined the union. The local union that was formed, Local 870, (covering Alameda and Contra Costa counties) was actually organized by store managers. The managers were doing fairly well, but their clerks “worked for almost nothing.”

HIRED AS SECRETARY-TREASURER OF LOCAL 870
Scope and Content Note: For little over a year, several managers worked nights and weekends for free, organizing the local. When the local decided to hire full-time staff, a committee of five approached Suffridge and asked him to run for the job. Mainly out of a desire to experiment, he reluctantly accepted their offer. When the election was held, three of the five who asked him to run ran against him. Suffridge won the post and remained in that job until 1944 when he was elected President of RCIA.

LOCAL 870 WAS BORN DURING THE OAKLAND GENERAL STRIKE AND FACED CONSIDERABLE OPPOSITION FROM MANAGEMENT
Scope and Content Note: When a store was organized, the union signed a “blank check agreement,” which is unlawful today, that stated the union would not attempt to enforce any hours or wages it could not enforce in Safeway, the major chain in the area.

OTHER LABOR JOBS HELD BY SUFFRIDGE DURING HIS OAKLAND PERIOD
Scope and Content Note: For several years, he was Secretary-Treasurer of the Oakland Central Labor Council. He gave his pay for this position to his secretaries in return for their keeping the Council's books. Also, for the last four or five years before becoming President of the RCIA, he served as President of the California State Council of Clerks, which was built to a membership of about 40,000 before he left.

WHY STORE MANAGERS AND HIGHER PAID PERSONNEL TOOK THE LEAD IN ORGANIZING LOCALS
Scope and Content Note: They never really stopped to analyze why they were organizing a union to improve conditions of their employees. Like the clerks, the managers had to work late at night bagging beans, cutting cheese, etc. after store closing. “Even the manager's job was not a bed of roses. It was just a little bit better than the clerk's job when you come right down to it.” Basically, it was the middle of the Great Depression, and “there was a lot of...care about one another at that time....” Even in department stores, the higher paid people were often the first to sign union cards because “they have something to accomplish besides earnings.” They are concerned about the commission structure, a guaranteed weekly draw on the commission, a “wipe off” at least monthly, and enough floor time. Also, turnover amongst managers and higher salaried employees is much lower than amongst the lower paid people.

THE 1934 OAKLAND GENERAL STRIKE AND THE RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Local 870 was just getting started, and the old department store local, Local 47, was pretty inactive, so RCIA really played no role in the general strike.

ORGANIZING LOCAL 870
Scope and Content Note: At the time Suffridge was elected Secretary-Treasurer, the local had probably fewer than 100 members. Rare was the month when Suffridge received his full salary; he was driven largely by a desire not to fail. By 1937, the local had organized all the major food chains in its jurisdiction. Organized and initiated over 1,260 Safeway employees in one night in the Oakland Auditorium Theater. Safeway was the last of the major chains to be organized, and it refused to recognize the union despite a heavy sign-up of employees. Anecdote about one Safeway attorney being fired for signing a recognition agreement under an implied strike threat. Eventually, recognition was wrung from Safeway, and the big initiation meeting was held.

PROBLEMS WITH THE TEAMSTERS
Scope and Content Note: Some Teamsters were being compensated very well for supporting management. They even started getting physical with the Clerks. Finally, the Clerks had to tell them that their violence would henceforth result in a one-for-one retaliation. That cleared up the situation, and the relationship between the two unions in Oakland was very good thereafter.

A & P REFUSED TO ESTABLISH STORES IN THE OAKLAND AREA BECAUSE OF THE EXISTENCE OF THE UNION

GOOD RELATIONSHIP WITH THE AMALGAMATED MEAT COTTERS AND BUTCHER WORKMEN (AMC&BW) IN THE OAKLAND AREA

ORGANIZING AND SERVICING ORIENTAL STORES IN THE AREA
Scope and Content Note: The Secretary-Treasurer of the Oakland Central Labor Council thought it impossible, but the local succeeded. Suffridge told the AMC&BW local union that if it did not take in the Oriental butchers, his local would. Despite considerable internal opposition, the AMC&BW local did accept Oriental butchers. A major problem with Japanese clerks was that they would kick back part of their pay to management. The local would close down the offending store and get the back pay, but the clerks would kick it back a second time. The local then started taking the back pay and donating it to the Oakland Naval Hospital, as it was doing with all its fines. The management of the Oriental stores then decided it would be better to stop the kickback arrangement.

BEGINNING OF AN INFORMAL CHAIN STORE COMMITTEE
Scope and Content Note: The committee would select one target, and each local would then go after that chain, each in its own way.

LOCAL 870s STRENGTH IN SAFEWAY
Scope and Content Note: At one time closed down the chain for 40 days without use of a picket. Teamster leader Dave Beck ordered bakery truck drivers to cross RCIA picket lines, and the local Teamster official responded there were no picket lines.

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

RESOLUTION OF 40-DAY SAFEWAY STRIKE
Scope and Content Note: The local decided to leave Safeway out of negotiations and settled with the other stores. The other major chains wrote a letter saying it was a good, fair agreement, and the union published this letter in the newspapers, leaving Safeway no alternative but to sign the same agreement.

WHY CALIFORNIA LED THE WAY IN ORGANIZING CLERKS
Scope and Content Note: Difficult to say, but it might have something to do with the kind of people employed in California stores, most of whom may have been bolder individuals, since most had emigrated from other states. One big factor was getting organized workers to help organize the unorganized.

ORGANIZING OAKLAND DRUG STORE RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Secretary-Treasurer C.C. Coulter gave Local 870 Jurisdiction over drug stores. Suffridge held a big meeting in the 0akland Auditorium of his organized grocery clerks, “got a little Billy Sunday going,” and the members went out and signed up Walgreens in four days.

A DISCIPLINED RANK AND FILE MOVEMENT
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge always told the membership that raises came from profits and productivity and encouraged the membership to increase productivity, short of speed up, so that the stores could afford a raise the following year also. The membership had a lot of pride. The local pioneered health and welfare plans, which gave the members a close tie with the union

IN THE 1930s, OVER 30 PERCENT OF LOCAL 870 MEMBERS HAD COLLEGE DEGREES
Scope and Content Note: Since most did not intend to make a career of retailing, perhaps they had less fear of losing their jobs. There was a pride of ownership by the members in their local.

LOCAL 870's HIRING HALL
Scope and Content Note: Previously unheard of in retailing. The local could provide stores with clerks who could speak various languages. The local ran ads for people interested in getting into the trade. Even Safeway called the local first, when it wanted a clerk. The local also trained clerks. These various unique services were not planned; they just happened because we didn't know any better.”

“A WELL-INDOCTRINATED WHITE COLLAR WORKER IS ACTUALLY, HONESTLY, AS TOUGH AS A BLUE COLLAR....”
Scope and Content Note: Candy store girls were “as militant as stevedores.”

CALIFORNIA STATE COUNCIL OF RETAIL CLERKS
Scope and Content Note: A merger of District Council 2, (San Francisco area) with the Los Angeles area District Council. The purpose was to assist local unions with negotiations and to coordinate bargaining. Ben Crossler in the late 1930s became the first full-time employee of the Council. He did a good job, concentrating on negotiations. Through the years, the Council acquired a near uniformity in contracts throughout the state, although it took the War Labor Board to bring about uniformity of wages.

LOCAL 770, LOS ANGELES
Scope and Content Note: Local got off the ground when Suffridge, some of his organizers, and some organizers from other California locals went to Los Angeles. It then developed its own leadership and got heavily into health and welfare programs. Its big problem has always been hundreds of small, unorganized independents.

USE OF THE BOYCOTT WAS AN ORGANIZING TECHNIQUE
Scope and Content Note: Was not used much until the late 1940s. An ordinary strike of a store, however, implied a boycott because of the presence of the public. The boycott really had nothing to do with organizing Los Angeles. San Pedro, however, was organized long before Los Angeles simply because it was a strong union town.

LOCAL 870 NEVER HAD A WAGE DIFFERENTIAL BASED ON SEX
Scope and Content Note: Sex was never mentioned in any contract. Wages were keyed entirely to jobs, and jobs were carefully defined. Local 870 pioneered this, and food locals formed later followed the pattern.

RETAIL, WHOLESALE AND DEPARTMENT STORE UNION (RWDSU) SPLIT FROM RCIA
Scope and Content Note: The West Coast was so insulated from this split that Suffridge did not really know the issues involved. The dissident locals did send literature, complaining, in part, about the fact that there had been no convention for several years. This issue, however, did not concern California, since it constituted about 65 percent to 70 percent of the membership of the International Union.

THE 1939 RCIA CONVENTION
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge and other delegates had no complaints about the new constitution but did object to the way it was passed without discussion. That was Suffridge's first real experience on the International level.

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

SUFFRIDGE WAS OFFERED THE PRESIDENCY OF RCIA IN 1940
Scope and Content Note: President W.G. Desepte and Secretary-Treasurer Coulter told Suffridge Desepte would retire, and the Executive Board would appoint Suffridge president if he wanted the job. Suffridge refused the offer, but Coulter continued to pressure him. Suffridge at the time had no aspirations for International office; had a good job with Local 870, and his family was settled in the Oakland area.

SUFFRIDGE FINALLY RAN FOR PRESIDENT IN 1944
Scope and Content Note: During the call for nominations in early 1944, Coulter again pressed Suffridge to run for president. Suffridge finally agreed, provided Coulter would take responsibility for securing the proper nominations (from 15 locals).Turned out to be a rough campaign because Desepte was talked into running for re-election. Suffridge won by a seven to one margin.

FROM THE BEGINNING OF HIS TERM, SUFFRIDGE PERFORMED THE DUTIES OF BOTH PRESIDENT AND SECRETARY-TREASURER
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge was scheduled to assume the presidency on September 1, 1944, but Coulter suffered a heart attack shortly before that date and never recovered sufficiently to carry, out his duties. The Executive Board appointed Suffridge Acting Secretary-Treasurer.

SELECTION OF VERNON HOUSEWRIGIT AS PRESIDENT
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge scheduled a convention for 1947. Officers were not elected at convention, and Suffridge felt there should be two officers present for the convention. He recommended Vernon Housewright be named president by the Executive Board because he felt an Easterner was needed to balance the offices, and because Housewright was one of the few Easterners he knew.

MORE ON SUFFRIDGE'S ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge found no hard feelings, amongst Desepte's supporters after the election. When Suffridge discussed running for president with Joe DeSilva, leader of Local 770, DeSilva said he would support Suffridge, but if Suffridge did not run, “my fedora's in the ring.” “Joe was a typical Rudolph Valentino Italian.”

THE 1968 CAMPAIGN FOR RCIA PRESIDENT
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge had always intended to retire at age 55. When he submitted his resignation to the executive Board, however, it prevailed upon him to finish his term of office. He agreed, and that “was my biggest mistake.” The referendum vote in 1968 was “a real dirty, mudslinging campaign.”

MORE ON SUFFRIDGE'S ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY, 1944
Scope and Content Note: The California State Council ran his campaign and put out considerable literature. Suffridge traveled back East to campaign a little. John Philpott did a lot of work on literature. Suffridge was able to defeat incumbent Desepte rather handily because Desepte stayed at home in San Francisco, and “he never ever functioned as a president.” “They would have chosen most any younger fellow.” Coulter probably selected Suffridge to run for president because of the strength of the California Clerks, because Suffridge did not really want the job, because Suffridge was a team player and a loyal guy who would not have challenged Coulter's leadership role had Coulter not taken ill, and because Suffridge was honest and the same could not be said of many Eastern leaders. “Coulter was an honest, inactive leader....”

MORE ON 1939 CONVENTION
Scope and Content Note: No one objected to the substance of the constitutional amendments which added considerable power to the office of Secretary-Treasurer.

RCIA HISTORY PRIOR TO 1939
Scope and Content Note: For prestige and public relations purposes, the RCIA in the early 1900s paid per capita tax to the American Federation of Labor (AFL) on about 50,000 members when it really had only about 5,000 15,000 members. In the early 1930s, with membership of 5,000, the organization “was just breathing.” Because of the growth in California, the percentage increase in membership between the late 1920s and 1939 was quite large. This spurt in membership was due more to the “Roosevelt atmosphere” than to the National Recovery Act or the Wagner Act.

SUFFRIDGE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH COULTER AFTER ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY
Scope and Content Note: Coulter was incapacitated the whole time, but Suffridge kept him informed. Suffridge gave Coulter a direct blood transfusion once, and Coulter had a seizure in the midst of it; “scared the heck out of me.” “I had a very fine relationship with him right on up until he died.” Coulter was informed of the major changes Suffridge instituted--creation of the divisional structure, the first organizing conference, etc.--but he was really in no condition to participate in those decisions, Suffridge never had the benefit of a training period, was never on the Executive Board and never really served as second in command. Yet, “It never occurred to me to not go ahead and do whatever needed to be done.” The Executive Board, from 1944 through 1968, never refused to give Suffridge unanimous support.

CONDITION OF THE RCIA WHEN SUFFRIDGE T00K OFFICE
Scope and Content Note: He was surprised to see the membership was only 60,800, since the union had been paying AFL per capita on 100,000. He cut back on per capita payments a little each month in order to reach a point where payment was actual. He was also surprised to see his local union was in better financial condition than the International. The International had only three organizers on the staff. He added organizers as the budget permitted and began a program with locals of half-and-half support of organizers. He worked with what he had. One important job to do was inspiring the locals.

CREATION OF THREE REGIONAL DIVISIONS WITHIN RCIA
Scope and Content Note: This was not a radical change but rather a logical change since the chain stores had similar regional structures. His intention was to further subdivide the structure but, at first, there was only enough money and manpower for three regions.

EARLY EDUCATIONAL WORK IN RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge and the rest of the international staff lived out of suitcases. Local meetings were held to inspire interest. One important message was that the members' paychecks were divisible by the extent of organization in a given area. Pretty soon pressure from the bottom activated local leadership.

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

NATIONAL ORGANIZING CONFERENCE, 1946
Scope and Content Note: Officers of other international unions advised against holding the conference because bringing people together like that provided them with an opportunity to engage in internal union politics. The conference was very successful and was a forerunner of annual seminars later held at various universities.

SUFFRIDGE'S INEXPERIENCE AS AN INTERNATIONAL UNION OFFICER WAS AN ADVANTAGE
Scope and Content Note: “Anyone that doesn't know that anything can't be done stands a fairly good chance of doing it.”

COULTER'S UNION PHILOSOPHY
Scope and Content Note: Like the leaders of many unions and other organizations, he was not interested in having the union grow beyond his capabilities. He did not seem to be jealous of the strength and success of the organization in California, even though, “the International was almost the tail of the dog at that particular point.” California, despite its strength, had no one interested in taking over the International. Coulter “was just a good, honest trade unionist that didn't have any particular desire or vision to want to plow back the earnings into growth....” Also, he was probably cautious because of the hard times the union had experienced during his administration. Those who came later were less satisfied with the status quo.

GREATEST CHALLENGE TO RCIA LEADERSHIP DURING THE 1940s
Scope and Content Note: To familiarize itself with the peculiarities of each particular area..The influence of outside forces in some, areas and the corruption of RCIA leadership in some areas were major problems. It was a question of organizing new members, and improving contracts, while accepting the quality and conditions of each locality.

CLEANING UP CORRUPT SECTORS OF THE RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Priorities and timing. The International did not have the strength, the money or the manpower to clean up all areas at once.

CLEANING UP OHIO
Scope and Content Note: The International did its homework and knew it could “make a holy war out of it.” Suffridge called in key local officers and International staff from all over the country. A day or two later, Suffridge put all Ohio locals under trusteeship and put one of these key men in charge of each local. “We straightened out 0hio from stem to stern; removed a vice-president that had gotten involved with the criminal element....” Removed all local officers and returned those who were clean. This occurred shortly before the 1951 convention, to which the vice-president, Peter Formica, appealed, losing on all counts.

CLEANING UP NEW YORK
Scope and Content Note: Put 27 locals under trusteeship. The United States District Attorney did not have the courage to take the case. The local District Attorney, however, did cooperate, sending one of his men into each local with the International's representatives. Consolidated the locals into 22 locals, dropped a vice-president (Paul Lafayette) and ended up with a good, clean operation.

CLEANING UP DETROIT
Scope and Content Note: Detroit RCIA was under Teamster leader Jimmy Hoffa's influence. The Detroit Clerks were not repenting their full membership to the International and were not enforcing their contracts. There were also some financial irregularities. The RCIA cooperated with Attorney General Robert Kennedy to clean up the situation. After the cleansing, a very strong 1ocal was quickly built up.

CONSIDERABLE HOMEWORK WAS REQUIRED BEFORE CLEANING UP AN AREA
Scope and Content Note: A cleanup was usually sparked by complaints from local people.

IT TOOK QUITE A BIT OF TIME TO BUILD THE CASE AGAINST THE NEW YORK LEADERSHIP

SETTING UP NEW LOCALS AND CLEAING UP OLD ONES
Scope and Content Note: RCIA usually placed an experienced person in charge, until good indigenous leadership surfaced. International organizers were equally competent at organizing and administering.

ORGANIZING AND RCIA GROWTH
Scope and Content Note: Organizing gains were recorded by both International and local union staff. The International did not really mushroom in size but rather showed a steady net gain in membership every year from 1940 through Suffridge's retirement. The theory behind RCIA's half-and-half share-an-organizer program was that the locals would have more at stake in organizing if they had a financial investment in it. Later, the International annually presented a one thousand dollar bill to each division director who could show a 10 percent net gain in membership over the previous year. The division director showing the largest overall net gain would receive a second one thousand dollar bill.

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

DEVELOPMENT OF RCIA STRUCTURE
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge did not follow any model, but rather added departments as the need arose and the finances allowed.

DESCRIPTION OF RCIA MEMBERSHIP
Scope and Content Note: Somewhere between blue collar and white collar. Slightly different in background from blue collar, fairly well educated, middle class. Clerks from blue collar families are slightly harder to organize than those from the middle, class because they have made a jump in status and are a little leery of not acting the way they perceive white collar workers should act.

RCIA PUBLIC RELATIONS RADIO AND TELEVISION
Scope and Content Note: One of the major tasks of the RCIA was convincing the membership and potential membership that belonging to a union was acceptable. To that end, the union bought ad space, with commercials similar to those industry had, on Dave Garroway's Today Show. It cost seven hundred thousand to nine hundred thousand dollars a year, and “it was actually the best spent organizing money we ever had” because people were proud to belong to the union they saw on the Today Show. Such advertising seemed to make the union more acceptable. The same kind of ads were run on the weekend Monitor radio program. This exposure also helped with management because management would be less likely to take on this union than it would a union it had never heard of. Also, this advertising provided a certain recognition value when an organizer first approached a group of unorganized employees. For over five years, “Celebrity Parade,” which never had an RCIA person, on it, was sponsored by the union. It usually featured politicians and was pitched at Congress to help with RCIA lobbying. The idea for sponsoring these shows was Suffridge's.

MORE ON THE GROWTH 0F RCIA'S STRUCTURE - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING DEPARTMENT
Scope and Content Note: There was no model. It was mainly a case by case situation recognizing a need and figuring out the best way to satisfy that need. For example, locals were sending in contracts which the International thought to be inferior. So, the Collective Bargaining Department was set up. It eventually became inadequate; so a collective bargaining department was set up in each division.

RCIA REACTION TO THE APPEARANCE OF CHAIN F00D STORES
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge's local took no position on the Chain store tax in California; he felt organizing the employees and getting them good wages and conditions would be enough of a tax. In the late 1930s when a national chain store tax was being discussed, the RCIA, along with the AHC&BW and other unions in the field, encouraged passage of the tax at first. Suffridge does not know the details, but, from conversations, he discovered that the AMC&BW and the RCIA apparently reached an understanding with A & P which provided for union opposition to the tax in exchange for “certain deliveries” from A & P. A & P, however, did not keep its word.

ORGANIZING SAN DIEGO FOOD STORES; OPPOSITION BY AMC&BW'S MAX OSSLO
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge does not recall the California State Council's threat to close Safeway throughout the state if it did not recognize the union in San Diego. However, if this did occur, it would not have been unusual. The big problem in San Diego was the opposition of Max Osslo and his cooperation with Safeway against the RCIA. Later on, Osslo's resort to violence against an RCIA organizer resulted in his incarceration. Suffridge and California Governor Goodland Knight were long time friends, and one of Knight's last acts in office was to pardon Osslo at Suffridge's request.

PRESSURING CHAINS WHICH WERE ORGANIZED IN SOME PLACES AND UNORGANIZED IN OTHERS
Scope and Content Note: This was a common tactic. Its legality today depends upon the jurisdiction and the methods used. A leaflet merely stating the facts would not result in an injunction if the wording were correct. Picketting of Sears in the United States because of its activities in Lima, Peru--The RCIA would never strike a store if such a strike would violate a contract. A boycott, merely stating the facts, however, is a different matter.

DISCOUNT STORES
Scope and Content Note: RCIA had considerable success organizing discount stores, at least up to the time of Suffridge's retirement. The workers in these stores are closer to blue collar and thus more susceptible to organization. Some large chains resisted quite a bit. Although the 1955 convention passed a resolution which was negative towards discount stores, there was never any policy put into effect which would have followed the resolution. Suffridge's personal initial reaction to discount stores was to organize them. At first, many discount stores were started by people who had no real professional retail experience and, in some cases, involved “funny money.” Sweetheart, top-down contracts with unions other than the RCIA were fairly prevalent at first. Not many sweetheart agreements lasted very long.

END OF TAPE 3, SIDE 1
Note: Tape 3, Side 2 is blank.

INTRODUCTION

RCIA GROWTH DURING THE 1950s AND 1960s
Scope and Content Note: Growth due to several factors public relations work; top-notch, highly trained and highly motivated staff (“second to none anywhere in the labor movement or, in management”); hard work.

MONTGOMERY WARDS
Scope and Content Note: Scattered boycotts by RCIA and RWDSU. RWDSU made a mistake at one point of announcing to the press that on a certain date, there would be a work stoppage in all Wards' stores, and that RCIA would also pull its people; RWDSU, however, had not even discussed this with RCIA. RCIA got an agreement from Wards that it would go along with the pattern in a given city, especially in southern Illinois, which was highly organized, and also that Wards would cease its program of fighting the union. Basically, it was just an agreement by both parties to operate on a higher plane. This agreement did not spur any greater organizing push by the union. Wards was more likely to be organized in areas where RCIA was strong; but usually their organization “just happened,” usually from inside.

SEARS, ROEBUCK AND COMPANY
Scope and Content Note: Nathan Shefferman, a close associate of Teamster Dave Beck, ran an agency in Chicago which showed employers how to avoid unionization. Wherever RCIA experienced opposition from Sears, Shefferman was usually in the picture. Sears in San Francisco was organized in the 1940s and also in other cities. In Boston, it was a jurisdictional dispute with an independent union and the Teamsters. The Sears' boycott in the 1960s was caused principally because of Sears' use of Shefferman. The AFL-CIO “finally grew up on this particular subject and recognized the boycott in many of the industries as a far better weapon than the strike.” The Sears' boycott was not a phenomenal success, but it did soften up several areas.

MEASURING THE SUCCESS OF A BOYCOTT
Scope and Content Note: RCIA does not always “have access to the cash register, but we are fairly good judges of traffic going in” a store. Another measure of the success of a boycott is a slight softening up of the attitude of management.

WHY THEY SEARS' BOYCOTT WAS CALLED OFF
Scope and Content Note: It had run its course. There was no particular victory, but it kept up the interest of the membership. In some areas, the boycott was quite successful, but in others it probably had no effect. The union did not use its TV commercials to advertise the boycott. In fact, when RCIA signed to do the TV commercials, NBC required the signatures of General Sarnoff and seven vice-presidents so there would be no one fall guy “when it blew up.” Hence, RCIA used the ads strictly as commercials; an attempt to inject the boycott would probably have led to non-renewal.

RCIA'S SUCCESS ORGANIZING IN THE SOUTH
Scope and Content Note: “We ran into a gold mine of leadership in several southern cities, like Atlanta.”

RCIA PHILOSOPHY OF MERGING LOCAL UNIONS
Scope and Content Note: In the 1940s, the RCIA began encouraging locals to merge in order to achieve self sufficiency with paid officers, etc. New locals were created with jurisdictions following the trade centers of major chain stores, and the sap thing was attempted when merging locals. This also would result in locals in large cities having jurisdictions which included many small towns, which otherwise would not be able to support their own locals. Similarly, when the union filed for an election, it would ask for a unit which would include a good many stores in small towns in addition to the large city in an area. The idea was to “have some local, with jurisdiction over every foot of soil in our country.”

ONE REASON FOR RCIA ORGANIZING SUCCESS WAS GOOD CONTRACTS
Scope and Content Note: Organizing was not an end in itself; “we were a failure” if a good contract did not follow organization. This made for an evangelistic rank and file with much voluntary organizing.

MORE ON MERGING LOCALS
Scope and Content Note: No locals were merged by force. A sales job was done to convince the smaller locals that merger brought strength by providing for full-time representatives, etc.

CANADA
Scope and Content Note: One reason for the big jump in Canadian membership in the mid-1960s was affiliation of many independent unions, especially a large one in Montreal. RCIA had no real problems with Canadian nationalism. The union anticipated language problems Montreal and approached that large local in a bilingual manner from the start.

END OF TAPE 4, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

RENEWED INTEREST IN THE STORE CARD IN THE 1950s
Scope and Content Note: Advertised on TV. The store card used to be more symbolic than it is today. At one time, if a union representative came in and picked up the store card, all the employees would leave. Now its display is more of a problem.

EMPLOYER RESISTANCE HAS ALWAYS BEEN THE MAIN OBSTACLE TO ORGANIZING

EFFECT OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT ON RCIA
Scope and Content Note: The law caused RCIA to perfect its methods. It had a holding action effect because the union had to go to elections for union shops in stores that had been union shops for years, but it had no real adverse effect on RCIA.

ORGANIZING IN THE LATE 1950s
Scope and Content Note: RCIA usually tried to avoid elections unless it had over 50percent signed up. Most recognition was won by card check. The reason for more election losses in the late 1950s was that the union was getting into the “hard core” of anti-union stores. Access to shopping centers became a problem at this time; such access is easier today. Also at that time, an employee could legally be fired for talking to an organizer inside a store.

DURING SUFFRIDGE'S ADMINISTRATION, THE UNION'S GOAL WAS TO SHOW A NET GAIN IN MEMBERSHIP EACH MONTH
Scope and Content Note: “And we put our money back in the business....”

BY SUFFRIDGE'S RETIREMENT, MOST OF THE MAJOR'CHAINS HAD BEEN ORGANIZED
Scope and Content Note: The remaining weak spot was the Winn Dixie chain and some viciously anti-union privately owned chains in the South.

RCIA RELATIONSHIP WITH LARGE CHAINS
Scope and Content Note: The union opposed national agreements with the chains but cultivated good relations with the heads of chains. National agreements would have resulted in a situation where the best the union could get would be somewhere between the existing top and the existing bottom. Cultivation of good relations with the leadership of chains was exemplified by the appearance of Kroger's president on RCIA's TV show. Negotiations in later years operated on a regional or divisional basis. If a big strike was imminent, the Director of the International Collective Bargaining Department would step into negotiations and sometimes Suffridge would call the head of the chain involved to see if something could be done to break the logjam. Sometimes the heads of chains would call Suffridge; it was basically an attempt to keep each other informed and to be sure both sides of a particular story were heard. Anecdote about a call in the middle of the night from the top man in Food Fair about a big strike in Florida. Once he heard the union side, he got the strike settled by 11 o'clock the next morning. “Most of top management is really more enlightened than we think.” “It's difficult to strike the right balance, to have a good relationship without having a buddy-buddy relationship.” Anecdote about meeting with top management in a small Oakland chain prior to a strike; the strike came off, but it was short and paved the way for settling with the rest of the industry, including Safeway, the largest. A general rule of RCIA was never to call a strike without first giving top management an opportunity to prevent it.

THE “CLERKS' WORK” CLAUSE AND JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTES WITH THE AMC&BW
Scope and Content Note: An outgrowth of automation, particularly in regard to packaged meats. When the stores started displaying Pre-packaged meat outside the butcher area, the butchers tried to follow their work, and jurisdictional problems developed. If the AMC&BW had cooperated, the situation could have been resolved, because the Clerks did not want the meat displayed away from the butcher area either. AFL-CIO President George Meany arbitrated in favor of the Clerks. Agreement after agreement with the AMC&BW, however, failed to work. RCIA had a centralized structure and could enforce such an agreement, but the AMC&BW had too many independent baronies which AMC&BW Secretary-Treasurer Pat Gorman could not discipline.

ALTHOUGH NATIONAL CHAINS OFTEN SUGGESTED IT, RCIA ALWAYS REJECTED THE CONCEPT OF NATIONAL AGREEMENTS

END OF TAPE 4, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

RCIA AND THE TEAMSTERS
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge had a good relationship with local Teamsters on the West Coast. Dave Beck, however, always tried to interfere on the side of management whenever the Clerks had a dispute with Safeway. The Clerks were always able to beat back his efforts. There never was an RCIA Teamsters “strategic alliance” on the International level. Suffridge personally had a very good relationship with Teamster President Tobin and many of his vice-presidents. Suffridge also had a good trade unionist relationship with Jimmy Hoffa. Shefferman wrote Beck's speeches.

WEAKNESS OF LOCAL RCIA LEADERS LED TO STRATEGIC ALLIANCES

BECK'S INTERFERENCE WITH RCIA ORGANIZING AND LOCALS
Scope and Content Note: He had no designs on RCIA membership. His motives were not clear, but everyone believed his interference, “was not for free.”

BECK'S INTERFERENCE IN THE 1946 OAKLAND GENERAL STRIKE
Scope and Content Note: Beck tried to break the strike while all the local Teamster truck drivers supported it. One of the possible reasons why Beck could get away with this was that he was after Tobin's job, and Tobin was probably content to leave Beck alone as long as he stayed west of the Rockies.

SHEFFERMAN'S BRIBE OFFER
Scope and Content Note: In the early 1950s, Shefferman, on behalf of the Teamsters, offered Suffridge two million dollars if he would prevent the RCIA from fighting back against Teamster incursions. Since Shefferman made a similar offer with the same dollar figure on behalf of another union on another occasion, Suffridge did not take it very seriously.

RCIA FAVORED EXPULSION OF THE TEAMSTERS FROM THE AFL-CIO

CLEVELAND AND PETER FORMICA
Scope and Content Note: The Teamsters were not a visible factor in the situation until the RCIA International entered the picture. Then the Teamsters attempted to raid some RCIA stores. Formica's letter of confession was intended to save him from prosecution. If Formica had been successful and had affiliated his locals with another AFL union, the RCIA would have had no effective recourse within the AFL structure. Suffridge did not know of Formica's political ambitions within the RCIA until after the clean up was completed.

1959 CONSTITUTIONAL ANENDMENTS T0 MAKE SECESSION MORE DIFFICULT
Scope and Content Note: These were enforceable because Standard Oil had a similar policy of preventing employees from working for competitors for a period of years after resignation, which was upheld in court.

RCIA AND AMC&BW SAN DIEGO
Scope and Content Note: By keeping the clerks unorganized, Osslo could get more from management for his people.

SUFFRIDGE'S RELATIONSHIP WITH PAT GORMAN AND OTHER TOP AMC&BW OFFICERS
Scope and Content Note: It was always very good. Whenever there was a jurisdictional problem, Gorman would telegraph the offending AMC&BW local and tell it to shape up; and the local would usually ignore the telegram. The AMC&BW International simply did not have enough influence with its locals.

FAILURE OF RCIA AND AMC&BW TO REACH AN EFFECTIVE JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENT
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge does not know why this was, since RCIA never claimed butchers and never filed with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) for butchers except in a retaliation situation. The issue, particularly in later years, was generally an in-store problem. The misunderstandings were always localized, not at the International level.

END OF TAPE 5, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

RCIA MERGER TALKS WITH AMC&BW
Scope and Content Note: These were carried on throughout Suffridge's administration, and there was a real big push just before Suffridge retired. There were many practical problems pensions, etc. which prevented merger. To a large extent, the talks were merely window dressing. The talks came the closest to success in 1967. AMC&BW Vice-President Leon Schachter was the most favorable on the AMC&BW side. Suffridge played a minor role in the eventual merger. The fact that the officers of long standing were gone was helpful for getting the merger. In merger talks during Suffridge's administration, the AMC&BW always conceded that. Suffridge would be the chief executive officer in any merged organization. The timing of the eventual merger was affected by changes in retailing, political changes and many other factors, but mostly it was the passing on of many of the older people in the AMC&BW who once aspired to Gorman's position.

AMC&BW'S PRIOR MERGERS
Scope and Content Note: RCIA “was delighted” the AMC&BW merged with the Fur and Leather Workers and RCIA did not. The Fur and Leather Workers' leadership “didn't give the Butchers too much aid and comfort.” RCIA applauded the United Packinghouse Workers' (UPWA) merger with the AMC&BW. RCIA had had some informal merger talks with UPWA.

RCIA AND RWDSU
Scope and Content Note: “They (RWDSU) were so insignificant in our life that we hardly knew they were in existence.” The major obstacle to merger with RWDSU was its highly miscellaneous membership longshoremen, bakeries, Campbell Soup, and other non-retailing units. RCIA's attempt to raid RWDSU in New York in the late 1940s was not a high priority for the International. It was mainly in response to letters from people inside the stores, but these people did not work very hard to help the raid. RCIA locals never used the threat of going to RWDSU to get their own way with the International.

RCIA AND AMALGAMATED CLOTHING WORKERS (ACW)
Scope and Content Note: ACW was not an important factor in retailing. In some places, the ACW tried to follow men's clothing products from the factory to the store. In the early 1950s, the ACW announced it was marking one million dollars for organizing clothing stores in northern Indiana. The effort, however, collapsed because “in retailing, a million dollars is small change.” “Actually, they were mostly spoilers, dealing through management to try to prevent organization, more than they were interveners.” The ACW attempted to enter discount houses but was not very successful. “There were elements behind the scenes in that group....”

THE AFL-CIO NO-RAID AGREEMENT AND THE AFL'S INTERNAL DISPUTES AGREEMENT WERE WORTHWHILE

SUFFRIDGE'S ELECTION TO THE EXECUTIIVE ECOUNCIL OF THE AFL-CIO AND PAT GORMAN'S NON-ELECTION
Scope and Content Note: The AMC&BW never got anyone elected to the AFL-CIO Executive Council because of the poor relations between their leaders and the leaders of the AFL-CIO. Suffridge's own election came as a surprise.

RCIA AFFILIATED WITH THE INDUSTRIAL UNION DEPARTMENT BUT WAS NEVER VERY ACTIVE IN IT

RCIA'S AFFILIATION WITH THE AFL-CIO MARITIME TRADES DEPARTMENT
Scope and Content Note: Because of good relationship with President Paul, Hall and the SeaFarers, and because RCIA did have some jurisdiction in waterfront commissaries.

RCIA AND MERGER WITH OTHER UNIONS
Scope and Content Note: During the middle 1960s, the RCIA “could have enrolled numerous other international organizations that were looking for a home and looking for a place that they could come where they would have a roof over their head and have stability....” However, Suffridge felt the RCIA had enough unorganized people within its own jurisdiction, and “it was unproductive to enroll a lot of people you couldn't service...and that you didn't understand. We had plenty of that in our own organization.” Taking in these difficult-toservice people would have diluted the RCIA. Shefferman once offered two million dollars if the RCIA would take in a certain New York group.

END OF TAPE 5, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

FIRST EASTERN DIRECTOR WAS RUDOLPH COULTER, C.C. COULTER'S SON, AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZER

INTERNATIONAL STAFF DID VERY LITTLE ORGANIZING PRIOR TO CREATION OF DIVISION STRUCTURE

REGIONAL COORDINATOR SYSTEM
Scope and Content Note: In order to bring service closer to the locals, each division was assigned three regional coordinators.

DEPARTMENT OF ORGANIZATION
Scope and Content Note: Merely a formalization of past practice. Purpose was to provide supervision of organizing within the divisions. Ben Crossler was selected as first Director of Organization. He had a gift for coordinating activities. Director of Organization was a demanding Job pressure, travel, etc. and turnover in the position was high.

RESEARCH DEPARTMENT, FORMED 1946
Scope and Content Note: Formed at that time because there was a need, and the union could afford it.

COMMUNITY RELATIONS DEPARTMENT, FORMED 1963
Scope and Content Note: Variety of public relations work. Like other International departments, it came about naturally as a need was seen. Was involved in a lot of civil rights work.

RCIA AND CIVIL RIGHTS
Scope and Content Note: RCIA never had any racial bans. Suffridge refused to grant an application for a separate charter of blacks in Houston. When Suffridge became President, RCIA had two separate black locals. It took him two years to convince the black local in Chicago to merge with another local because the members felt they would lose their identity. The jobs of the black leaders were preserved when the two black locals merged with other locals.

MORE ON COMMUNITY RELATIONS DEPARTMENT
Scope and Content Note: Mainly for internal purposes to see that locals were educated not to discriminate and to become active in community affairs.

NATIONAL CHAIN STORE COMPIITTEE
Scope and Content Note: Always informal and always ad hoc so that a rotation of local officers was possible. “It was developed to achieve a given purpose at a given time.” Its roots were in California and the drive to organize Safeway. Representatives of locals dealing with a particular chain would be called together to discuss and plan an action; then each local would return home and carry out the action in its own way. A national blueprint was not handed to them. It was usually called together for a particular purpose, not a general discussion.

PUBLICATIONS AND OTHER PUBLIC RELATIONS
Scope and Content Note: Publications received a relatively high percentage of the International budget. “Communications was what organizing is built on.” “A Watch for Joe,” a movie produced by Hal Makelin for RCIA, was thought up by Suffridge, working through the Screen Actors Guild. RCIA sponsorship of radio and TV shows was ended because it was felt the money could be spent better elsewhere. About 13 million people heard each ad on Monitor. “That was the cheapest and best coverage we ever had.”

ACTIVE BALLOT CLUB (ABC)
Scope and Content Note: St. Louis was the only RCIA area that was very active in the AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education (COPE). ABC was created to spur political involvement by locals. Suffridge never felt COPE was very effective anyway, partly because of the separation of political education from lobbying, which often resulted in work at cross purposes. The purpose of ABC was to tie political education and lobbying into one department. Because retail employees seemed to be split fairly evenly between Democrats and Republicans, ABC had to be non-partisan.

END OF TAPE 6, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE 0N ABC AND POLITICAL ACTION
Scope and Content Note: The union would poll candidates on issues of importance to the RCIA, and the results would be distributed to the membership. “RCIA probably had the best Congressional lobbying and the best relations with U.S. Presidents of any union. Contributions to ABC were used mainly for publications, advertising, and the lobbyist's salary. RCIA would take a full-page ad in Roll Call welcoming Congress back to Washington after each recess.

ANECDOTE ABOUT GETTING HOUSE LABOR COMMITTEE CHAIRMAN JUDGE GRAHAM BARDEN TO BEND ON THE ISSUE OF INCLUDING CLERKS IN THE MINIMUM WAGE LAW

RCIA AND U.S. PRESIDENTS
Scope and Content Note: The RCIA Executive Board never made presidential endorsements while Suffridge was the chief executive. Although a registered Republican, Suffridge worked for the election of Franklin Roosevelt, Harry Truman and Adlai Stevenson, even though Dwight Eisenhower gave better responses to RCIA queries. Also supported John Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson and Hubert Humphrey. In 1972, however, Suffridge privately endorsed Richard Nixon. Suffridge registered as a Republican because his family had been Republican, and registration was necessary in order to vote in most primaries. He has, however, always been an independent when voting. Suffridge had better entree to Presidents than other union leaders “because I never told the press after I met with them.” Presidents must call in people from different walks of life to get their opinions, and every President from Harry Truman on used Suffridge in this manner. He met with Richard Nixon for an hour at Key Biscayne only a few months before his resignation. Suffridge would meet with Presidents and answer their questions, but never debate with them. Suffridge feels President Jimmy Carter suffered from not using such “sounding boards.” Presidents were “hungry and eager to find out what was going on on the street.”

SUFFRIDGE'S TRIP AROUND THE WORLD WITH VICE-PRESIDENT LYNDON JOHNSON IN 1961
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge was called on a Friday to see if he would like to go on the trip the following Monday. He found out later the reason he was asked to go was because of his activities in international labor organizations, which provided him with contacts in about 75 countries, who could provide him with better information on the state of affairs in any particular country than most government agencies could provide. Anecdote about Johnson saying next to Lady Bird, he could not think of anyone other than Suffridge he would rather have go on the trip. Lady Bird Johnson was impressed that in the Philippines, the “Welcome President Suffridge” sign was larger than the “Welcome Vice President Johnson” sign. Anecdote about a close call on Air Force One while Johnson was flying in the press plane.

DISCUSSION OF THE STOP IN VIET NAM
Scope and Content Note: The touring party was given a big display of military equipment which the U.S. had sent. Suffridge's impression at the time was that the U.S. would not involve troops in Viet Nam but should provide arms and supplies. Later on, in talks with American military personnel, he was told the war could have been ended at that time if the military had been given the go ahead. While bombs could be heard at night, there were few outward signs of war at the time.

INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF COMMERCIAL, CLERICAL, AND TECHNICAL EMPLOYEES (FIET)
Scope and Content Note: (The initials are for the French translation, most commonly used.) RCIA affiliated with FIET because of Suffridge's personal interest in foreign affairs. His interest was spurred by a trip to Europe in 1954 on behalf of the AFL. Another trip in 1957 gave him an opportunity to meet more European trade unionists. The RCIA was represented at its first FIET Congress in 1958.

END OF TAPE 6, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON RCIA AND FIET
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge and a delegation of RCIA local union officials participated in the 1958 Congress which elected a younger Secretary-General.

RCIA'S INTERNATIONAL AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT, CREATED 1960
Scope and Content Note: Gerald O'Keefe, a Marine with a law degree, was selected to head the department. One of the purposes of the department was to open FIET to areas other than Europe, particularly Latin America. A Latin American office of FIET, headed by Arthur Lee, was set up and, later, a second such office was created. The purpose of these offices was to educate Latin Americans to the principles of free trade unions, democracy versus communism, etc. The RCIA has continued to staff these offices as well as others in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, with people out of RCIA locals. Unlike other unions whose affiliation with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU) and other international labor organizations is largely ceremonial, RCIA has been active in its affiliations because Suffridge saw no reason for purposeless affiliations. RCIA's involvement in FIET built its membership from one and a half million to eight or nine million members.

SUFFRIDGE'S ELECTION TO THE PRESIDENCY OF FIET AND TO THE EXECUTIVE COUNCIL OF ICFTU
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge does not know why he was elected to the council of ICFTU. He remained on the FIET Executive council after his retirement, just as he did many other boards. He resigned from all such posts, numbering about 30, when he retired to Florida in 1972.

WHY RCIA ELECTED OFFICERS BY REFERENDUM
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge felt it was more democratic than convention elections.

ATTEMPTS TO INCREASE THE NUMBER OF CONVENTION DELEGATES OF LARGE RCIA LOCALS
Scope and Content Note: No one ever sought Suffridge's support for such a move. Large delegations are a financial burden and tend to make for a less orderly convention.

THE ISSUE OF RAISING MINIMUM LOCAL DUES
Scope and Content Note: Minimum local dues were included in the International constitution so that locals would be forced to have enough income to support themselves. It became an issue at the 1959 convention but only a minority opposed raising local dues, and there were no repercussions.

WHY THE INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE BOARD WAS COMPOSED OF EMPLOYEES OF THE INTERNATIONAL
Scope and Content Note: This was Suffridge's reaction to the condition and quality of the Executive Board when he became President; at that time, the vice-presidents were mostly inactive local officers. After Suffridge's retirement, there must have been some pressure for change because local people were again put on the Board. Through attrition and enlargement of the Board, the inactive vice-presidents were replaced, and more and more active vice-presidents who were employees of the International were put on the Board.

JOE DeSILVA OF LOCAL 770, LOS ANGELES
Scope and Content Note: DeSilva would have liked to have been International President, but he did not want to become a division director or otherwise employed by the International because he “made more money and had more prestige there (Local 770) than he could have had anywhere else.”

END OF TAPE 7, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

JAMES McLOUGHLIN AND LOCAL 424, SAN JOSE
Scope and Content Note: He always found something to complain about at each convention. About 1936-37, Desepte had recommended that McLoughlin and his lieutenant be thrown out of office for radical political activities. Coulter asked Suffridge's advice, and Suffridge said the situation should be ignored because McLoughlin was a good trade unionist and probably not a Communist. Suffridge was given the choice by Coulter, and he decided not to remove McLoughlin from office. He was loyal, but his nature required that he be in opposition in many instances.

THE POWER OF RCIA'S CHIEF EXECUTIVE
Scope and Content Note: The power was largely there when Suffridge arrived. The power could have been abused but was not. Abuse of the power probably would have meant removal from office. “I was never, very conscious of the great power vested in that particular office.” Everyone and every local were treated equally. “I never gave any particular thought to those vast powers that Harrington speaks of” in his book, The Retail Clerks. Furthermore, Harrington exaggerated the extent of those powers.

PAY FOR INTERNATIONAL REPRESENTATIVES
Scope and Content Note: The President set the wages, and this worked well from Suffridge's point of view. In later year a scale for vice-presidents was instituted. Hiring and pay increases in later years generally followed the recommendations division directors.

MAKING THE PRESIDENT THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE, 1955
Scope and Content Note: In order to bring the International into modern common practice. Suffridge did not push it. Guy Sacket, one of the holdover vice-presidents, suggested making the President, instead of the Secretary-Treasurer, the chief executive shortly before the convention was to be held. No one objected. Vernon Housewright did not mind this, even though it might be perceived as a cut in status for him, because he was a retiring type of individual who did not really like chairing the convention.

ANECDOTE ABOUT THE APPOINTMENT OF BEN CROSSLER AS DIRECTOR OF ORGANIZATION
Scope and Content Note: Crossler had supported Desepte for President in 1944 and felt Suffridge held this against him. Thus, he was surprised and quite moved when Suffridge appointed him Director of Organization. This was an example of Suffridge treating everyone equally according to their abilities.

SUFFRIDGE'S REFERENCE AT THE 1959 CONVENTION TO HIS POSSIBLE RETIREMENT WAS NOT SIGNIFICANT
Scope and Content Note: He always intended to retire at age 55.

CREATION OF PRESIDENT EMERITUS POSITION; OFFER OF SECRETARY OF LABOR POSITION; OFFER OF PRESIDENCY OF AFL-CIO
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge refused a raise in 1963. And the convention responded by giving a supplementary pension. The position of President Emeritus was created, in part, out of concern that Suffridge might move on to higher office. He had been asked on more than one occasion to become Secretary of Labor, including a firm offer from President Johnson. Suffridge, however, had no such aspiration. In 1967, Meany told Suffridge he would resign as President of the AFL-CIO and have Suffridge elected at the pending Executive Board meeting if Suffridge would accept. This was not the first mention of the subject. Suffridge, however, had no desire to head the AFL-CIO, having been the President of RCIA since the AFL-CIO position really was one of less power and influence.

SUFFRIDGE'S RETIREMENT
Scope and Content Note: He offered his resignation in order to retire at age 55 as he had always said he would. The Executive Board was not prepared in advance and petitioned him to fill out his term in office. The refusal of the vice-presidents to accept his resignation was due, in part, to the fact that each vice-president owed his position to Suffridge, and a new president would be an unknown quantity. Suffridge accepted the Board's petition, and this may have been a big mistake since it would have been better to ease a new man into this important position rather than subject him to an election immediately.

END OF TAPE 7, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

1968 RCIA ELECTION CONTEST
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge made it known that he would not stand for re-election, and that he was supporting his assistant, Jim Housewright. “Everything hit the fan then.... I never imagined that there were so many people who would like to have had the job.” Many urged Suffridge to be neutral, but neutrality at that point would have appeared as non-support for Housewright. Suffridge was not aware of any politicking going on between his original resignation attempt and the 1968 election.

SUFFRIDGE'S SELECTION OF JIM HOUSEWRIGHT AS HIS SUCCESSOR
Scope and Content Note: Housewright seemed to have balance, sincerity, honesty, and the ability to communicate. Housewright was Suffridge's personal recommendation, and he did not consult with anyone else.

JOHN HALETSKY, HOUSEWRIGHT'S OPPONENT IN 1968
Scope and Content Note: Rumor had it that four or five people wanted the job and drew straws to see which one would be the candidate.

THE OPPOSITION SLATE, 1968
Scope and Content Note: The opposition did not run a candidate against Secretary-Treasurer Maguire in the hope that this would neutralize him or get him to support their slate. The campaign had few issues and was quite slanderous. In the long run, it was probably good for the union. The opposition drew support largely from the locals and areas from which it ran candidates. DeSilva probably would not have been a stronger candidate than Haletsky. Even though he was better known, his personality did not sit well with many people.

THE LARGE NUMBER OF CHALLENGED BALLOTS IN THE 1968 ELECTION
Scope and Content Note: The election committee was composed of strong partisans for each side. It was not a question of inadequate membership lists or locals with dues in arrears because Suffridge had instituted data processing equipment early on. Nor was it a matter of dishonesty in the balloting.

AUTOMATION
Scope and Content Note: RCIA never objected to technological improvements. Self-service in department stores was just beginning when he first got involved in the union, and it continued to grow. Computerized grocery checkouts still have many problems but will no doubt cut into employment in the industry. Suffridge was working on inventory control for groceries before he got involved in the union.

THE IMPACT OF SELF-SERVICE
Scope and Content Note: Self-service in department stores did not make organizing more difficult since people involved in those aspects had always been the hardest to organize.

RCIA HEADQUARTERS MOVED TO WASHINGTON, D.C.
Scope and Content Note: Even before he became President, Suffridge felt the union headquarters belonged in Washington. It was only in Indiana because that was considered the population center of the country. The RCIA had a Washington office long before moving headquarters there..Washington is “where things happen,” and he was spending a lot of time there anyway.

MERGER OF RCIA STRIKE AND GENERAL FUNDS
Scope and Content Note: Suffridge felt the entire assets of the organization should be placed behind a strike, and a separate strike fund was therefore irrelevant. There was always a provision for mandatory special assessments, but this authority was never exercised. Voluntary special assessments were rarely employed.

1939 CONVENTION AUTHORIZATION TO INCREASE THE SIZE OF THE EXECUTIVE BOARD
Scope and Content Note: This was done in anticipation of adding more divisions.

END OF TAPE 8, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

RCIA PENSION PLAN
Scope and Content Note: It consumed a good deal of time at each convention because it was something local union officers were very interested in, and because as the fund grew, new benefits could be added. RCIA's' pension plan was unique at the time it was instituted because it was formal and funded. The plan was included in the constitution because that was the safest way to prevent abuse. It was one of the top 12 best funded plans in the country.

GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF RCIA LEADERSHIP
Scope and Content Note: Happenstance. It was a case of finding the best person for each job wherever he or she might be located.

END OF INTERVIEW