Audio 690A
|
1978 April 10
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
00:30
|
Biographical Information : Born and raised in Orange, New Jersey. Received degree in chemical engineering from the Newark College of Engineering in 1932.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
01:20
|
First Full-Time Job Was with the Newark Call : Worked on the Call from 1936 to 1946. Left when it was bought out by the Newark Evening News, a newspaper which had never been organized by the Newspaper Guild.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
02:05
|
College : Influenced by high school teacher to go into chemical engineering. After two years of college, he knew he wanted to be a newspaperman, but it was 1930, and newspaper employment paid very poorly. Worked in a co-op while in college and kept that job until he started work on the Call.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
04:40
|
Family Background : Parents separated when he was three years old; looked up his father when he was twenty; raised by his mother and grandfather in an atmosphere that was proper and middle class. He is the only member of his family who ever belonged to a union.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
07:15
|
Fiester Was Active in the Guild Before He Could Join : Participated in the first big Guild strike (Newark Ledger) by picketing, by writing reviews for the movie reviewer of the Sunday Call who was active in the Guild's city committee, and by making a dozen stink bombs in the chemistry lab, where he worked with his co-op job.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
08:20
|
Anecdote Concerning the Stink Bombs
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
09:25
|
In 1936 He Joined the Local Guild and Later Became Its President
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
09:50
|
Background Of the Newark Call and Its Takeover By the Evening News
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
12:00
|
First Involvement with Labor : He was assigned to cover labor in 1937 while working on the Call and got to know members of the movement.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
13:00
|
Fiester's Early Connections with TWUA : Got to know Irving Abramson in 1940 when Abramson was elected President of the New Jersey CIO, and Fiester was assigned to cover that organization. Had earlier written a feature on Sol Stetin when he was made TWUA New Jersey Director. Textile workers played a large role in New Jersey CIO.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
16:40
|
Abramson Steered Fiester to the Job of Editor of Textile Labor
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
19:55
|
Fiester Attended TWUA Convention in 1946 and Was Much Impressed with Emil Rieve's Speech on Foreign Policy, and with the Way He Himself Was Treated as a Member of the Press : Attended the convention only because he wanted the Call to pay him to cover another story in the same town. Had previously read an article in Fortune Magazine, circa 1933, which praised Rieve's handling of a wage cut in hosiery.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
24:00
|
More Biographical Information : Born November 30, 1911; married four times; one daughter and two sons.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/1
Time
25:55
|
Joe Knapik and the Dyers Federation : The Federation's autonomy within TWUA was real. The Federation people acted like they had something to hide, which made it difficult for reporters.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
00:30
|
Description of TWUA Offices in 1946 : Second floor of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers' (ACW) headquarters (15 Union Square).
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
04:10
|
Anecdote Concerning Harold Rieve, Emil's Son : He had received his law degree before the war. Having no prospects for a job after the war, Rieve let him work in the Legal Department of TWUA for one year - after that year ended he was out. Rieve was always sensitive about this. This kind of nepotism was not very common in the CIO at that time.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
05:20
|
Sol Barkin Was Openly Critical of Decisions Made by Rieve and the Executive Council, But This Did Not Bother Rieve at All as Long as Barkin Did His Job
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
07:35
|
Fiester's Initial Task Was to Make Textile Labor a Semi-monthly Newspaper : Textile Labor “was not a bad paper by union standards.” It was literate but “typographically outrageous.” Fiester made changes gradually so as not to shock the readership. He kept the woman who was “passed over” when he was hired, and they became good friends; hired an additional staff person, who was too intellectual.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
13:35
|
Speech Writing for the Heavily-Accented Emil Rieve
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
17:30
|
TWUA under Rieve Had the Best Professional Staff in the Labor Movement : Staff members were given the freedom to be as good as they could be and the pay, while not the best, was adequate. Fiester from the start insisted on Guild minimum for Textile Labor employees.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
19:45
|
Anecdote Concerning the Cost of Hiring a Photographer : Rieve told him that was a detail for the editor, not the President.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
20:35
|
Examples of the Freedom Allowed Fiester : Got an independent newsprint contract. Made the decision to cut back from twelve to eight pages when things got tight in the Union, and later to once a month and the magazine format. When first financial statement of TWUA came out after Fiester's hiring, he was shocked at the high proportion of the budget that was given to Textile Labor.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
23:15
|
The Use of Pictures in Textile Labor : Rieve did not like having too many pictures of himself in the paper. George Baldanzi and those working in the South were uneasy about biracial pictures.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
23:35
|
In Character Rieve and Baldanzi Were Opposites : Baldanzi would sell out a principle for the moment.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
24:10
|
Anecdotes Concerning the Use of Pictures in Textile Labor : Integrated function put on by New York Joint Board. Wanda Pilot's Connecticut Joint Board.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
25:45
|
Fiester's Editorial Against the Attempted Deportation of a New York City Executive of the Fur Workers Union : Rieve gave Fiester a lecture on citizenship and said the man should be deported for never becoming a citizen.
|
|
Tape/Side
1/2
Time
28:05
|
Rieve Never Liked the Non-Communist Affidavits Demanded by the Taft-Hartley Act : Rieve was not very comfortable with TWUA's constitutional provision which forbade Communists to hold office. The provision was only invoked a couple times; Rieve preferred to beat them at the ballot box.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
00:35
|
1948 Convention Got Good National Coverage : It was an election year, and TWUA was the first large union to hold its convention. CIO had taken a stand against Truman, and the press was eager to see how this would be handled at the convention.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
02:00
|
Anecdote Concerning 1948 Keynote Speech : Stewart Alsop had written an article on Rieve in the Saturday Evening Post saying that Rieve “had a gift for irony.” When Rieve read Fiester's first draft of the speech and objected to “the jokes,” Fiester told him they were not jokes, but irony.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
02:55
|
Baldanzi's Attempt to Dump Roy Lawrence at the 1948 Convention : Lawrence “had the racial attitudes that were characteristic of the South of his time,” but he did work hard for TWUA, and he was part of the slate. Hence, Baldanzi's attempt was “a dumb thing to do.” The anti-Baldanzi group, in retaliation, tried to cut Baldanzi's protege, Charles Serraino, from the slate.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
06:50
|
Several Education Department People Were Working for Baldanzi : Pat Knight and Joe Glazer were leaders in this. Education Director Larry Rogin was not at the convention, so Fiester was told by Rieve to find Glazer. Fiester looked all over the city for him and incurred the wrath of the Education Department staff.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
08:30
|
Characterization of Charlie Serraino : During the 1952 fight, Rieve said Serraino should support Baldanzi.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
09:25
|
When Fiester Began Working with TWUA, Average Dues-Paying Membership Was About 375,000, and the Atmosphere within TWUA Was One of Optimism, Superiority, and Independence : The general feeling was that TWUA did not have to follow the ACW or the CIO. Hence, TWUA people began the anti-Communist crusade before it was accepted CIO policy. At the CIO convention in 1946, Baldanzi made a speech on Communism, with which Phil Murray was not pleased. Baldanzi's 1947 anti-Communist speech at the CIO convention was “a great piece of work,” “a beautiful speech.”
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
11:10
|
Digression into the Use of Leaflets by Organizers : Tended to rely on the printed leaflets and not bother to investigate the situation inside the mill they were dealing with.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
12:00
|
TWUA'S Support for Walter Reuther for CIO President
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
12:45
|
A Combination of Factors over a Long Period of Time Contributed to the Change in the Atmosphere of TWUA : The inability to organize the South was always a factor but the worst event was the 1951 southern strike. However, for many years after TWUA was no longer a significant factor in the labor movement, the Union refused to act like a dispirited and beaten union.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
14:50
|
An Alternative to Striking in 1951 : In an earlier instance, when wiser heads prevailed, the Union was faced with a similar circumstance. An increase was won in the North, and the bottom fell out of the textile economy before contracts terminated in the South. The Union chose arbitration, rather than a strike, secretly hoping to lose the arbitration.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
16:20
|
Another Factor Contributing to the Decline of TWUA Was Rieve's Retirement : After William Pollock became president of the Union, Rieve was “making mischief” by comforting Pollock's opponents. Fiester told him to either leave Pollock alone or to run against him, and he would lose if he chose the latter course.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
18:15
|
Anecdote Concerning Rieve's Comment to Fiester about TWUA Staff and the Executive Council : Rieve felt he was less successful in getting competent people for the Executive Council than he was for the staff positions. Rieve was the only great man Fiester ever worked closely with.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
19:10
|
William Pollock : The Union changed after he became President. Professional people like Fiester could leave TWUA and find work elsewhere; but many people could not leave and thus felt trapped. Pollock could be petty on little things, but good on big things. An example was the way Pollock went along with a big commitment to the Burlington campaign without a fight.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
20:50
|
Why TWUA Was Able to Get So Many Good Staff People : The cause itself, the struggle for the South, was a factor in getting people. The fact that Rieve allowed his staff the freedom to operate within their own area kept them there. He respected their opinions, and he got the best from them.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
23:40
|
The Fight at the 1950 Convention : The decision to try to unseat Baldanzi was made shortly before the convention, after delegates had been selected. Fiester contributed to the effort by writing leaflets and speeches, and by calling various members of the Executive Council. Rogin and Fiester counted votes before the convention and knew Baldanzi would win.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
25:40
|
Anecdote Concerning Fiester Calling Joe Hueter Before the 1950 Convention : Fiester asked Hueter if he would vote for Mariano Bishop. Hueter replied that since he ran the Philadelphia Joint Board and was paid by the Philadelphia Joint Board he did not have to concern himself with what Rieve wanted him to do. Hueter did not feel a case had been built against Baldanzi.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/1
Time
26:55
|
A Small Committee Was Formed after the 1950 Convention to Plan Strategy for 1952 : It consisted of Pollock, Herb Payne, [Bishop], and Fiester, as an ex officio member. Decision was made to keep a low profile, carry on the Union's work, and see what Baldanzi would do. Baldanzi's charges against Rieve were printed in the New Bedford Standard-Times; and, although Fiester knew people on that paper and could have used it to answer Baldanzi, he did not do so because the paper was very anti-union, and this way it looked like this anti-union paper was supporting Baldanzi.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
00:30
|
During the Two Years of the Fight, Fiester Tried to Present the News in Textile Labor “Objectively on Our Side” : Did this so successfully that, after the fight, Labor and Nation pointed to Textile Labor as an example of a labor paper that did not get involved in the politics of its union. Baldanzi, however, saw through it and called Fiester “Dr. Goebbels.”
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
02:10
|
Anecdote Concerning an Article in Textile Labor Which Was Not Intended to Be Political : Shortly before 1950, when the fight was beginning to brew, Fiester wrote an article about a southern agreement that had been reached with Dan River Mills just as the paper was going to press. Rieve had been on the phone with Baldanzi, Lew Conn, and a representative of the mill trying to get a settlement. Fiester's lead for the article had Rieve on the phone, but he did mention within the article the part the workers played, etc. After publication, Fiester was called into Rieve's office because Baldanzi was upset that the way the article was written it looked like Rieve had gotten the agreement single-handedly.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
06:25
|
Decision Was Made by the Strategy Committee That Baldanzi Must Be Baited Into Running for President : The bait was the firing of Sam Baron as Canadian Director, a move which showed that an elected member of the Executive Council could not be protected by Baldanzi; and this forced Baldanzi into an attack on Rieve's Administration.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
08:30
|
Anecdote Concerning Harold Daoust Taking Over as Canadian Director : Took the position claiming he was going to resist becoming a “limey.”
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
09:20
|
Comparison of Baron and Daoust : Baron was not particularly pro-Baldanzi, just anti-Rieve.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
10:10
|
Anecdote Concerning Passing Out the Philadelphia Joint Board Paper at a Woolen-Worsted Conference in New York : The paper was anti-administration. Rieve people left copies on the seats of each delegate to the conference. The delegates assumed the Baldanzi people had put them there and were annoyed that politics should enter into a serious Union conference.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
11:05
|
Baron's Firing Was Purely Political : He had no constituency outside Canada, and the Canadian membership was small enough that his firing would not be disruptive. Baron was neglectful of routine things, so it was easy to find an excuse to fire him. There was not, however, any more reason to fire him at that time than there ever was.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
13:25
|
As the Time Approached for Electing Delegates, Members of the Rieve Forces Went Barnstorming and Debated the Baldanzi Forces
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
14:05
|
Digression into Fiester's Dealings with Newspapermen : He knew what they needed and would try to get it for them. Newspapermen continually called and tried to get him to say something bad about Baldanzi.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
16:45
|
Baldanzi Had to Run for President Because Those on the Staff Who Supported Him Could Lose Their Jobs : If Rieve could fire Baron, a Vice President, they knew he could fire anyone.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
18:00
|
Isadore Katz: “Treason at the Bar”
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
18:30
|
Ben Wyle Proposed to the Committee That Delegates Could Technically Be Obtained from Inactive Locals Whose Charters Had Never Been Revoked, But Pollock Disagreed with This Scheme
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
20:05
|
Larry Rogin Was under Suspicion for a Time Because Some of His People in the Education Department Supported Baldanzi : Fiester pleaded Rogin's case to Rieve, and he was cleared.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
21:55
|
Causes of the Split Between Rieve and Baldanzi : Baldanzi did not have the same lifestyle as many Executive Council members and therefore was considered to be a loner, whereas generally the Executive Council operated as a clique. He was not a “team” man. He did not do his part in the campaigns for dues increases. He did what he thought would best suit his own purposes and thus sometimes ignored or went against unpopular policy decisions of the Executive Council. Thus he was considered to be unreliable and ambitious. Another factor was the ambition of Bishop and others on the Council.
|
|
Tape/Side
2/2
Time
27:25
|
Anecdote Concerning Fiester's Last Conversation with Baldanzi : At a White House dinner after the 1964 fight. Baldanzi claimed that the 1964 fight proved that he had been right in 1952.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
00:40
|
Baldanzi Questioned Fiester about Why He Was on Rieve's Side : Fiester told him that he admired Rieve and enjoyed working for him, and that if he were for Baldanzi, he felt he would have to quit his position which he did not want to do.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
01:40
|
At First Rieve Was Not a Leader in the Move to Get Rid of Baldanzi : A delegation from the Executive Council approached Rieve about replacing Baldanzi with Bishop. Rieve at first was skeptical and did not want to help. He was equivocal about it almost until the last minute. The Bishop forces, pointing to their success over Baldanzi in the Lawrence affair at the 1948 convention, felt confident they could defeat Baldanzi in 1950. Fiester feels that Rieve did not try to stop the move because the delegation did represent the majority of the Union. Head-on confrontation like this was not Rieve's style.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
04:50
|
The Split Between Rieve and Baldanzi Made the 1951 Southern Strike Inevitable : The strike revealed weaknesses that had not been readily apparent. Because the Union had a voluntary checkoff at Danville, both sides knew how many dues-paying members were crossing the picket line. After about four weeks, over half of the dues payers were back in the plant, and it was evident to the company how weak the Union was. Because it was a “deficit operation,” “that one was a good one to go with the UTW.” It was, however, a dispiriting experience for the southern staff.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
07:05
|
The Decline of TWUA Could Not Have Been Prevented - Even without the Fight : “It wasn't really a matter of the industry moving South, it was just a matter of the Northern industry disappearing.”
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
07:30
|
The Southern Strike Would Not Have Been Called If There Had Not Been an Internal Dispute : Neither side wanted to appear non-militant because anyone against the strike would have been attacked politically. No one knew the Union was as weak in Danville as it turned out to be, but everyone knew it was not strong there.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
09:05
|
TWUA'S Future in the South after the Strike : There may have been a chance for the Union to hold on in the South if it had been able to maintain arbitration and grievance procedure; that would have allowed the Union more effectively to fight attempts to drive it out. More blacks in the industry would also have been to the Union's advantage.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
12:00
|
Anecdote Concerning Chester Bowles Telling a New England Businessman's Group They Should Raise a Kitty to Help TWUA Organize the South : Bowles suggested a kitty of a half million dollars. Fiester followed that speech by noting that a half million was only a drop in the bucket, since TWUA was already spending one million dollars a year on the South.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
13:40
|
Danville : TWUA had a good image there, a good Joint Board Manager, a building, and community participation. It is difficult to say why it all fell apart. The charge of insufficient anti-bossism was not a valid one. Anti-bossism itself was difficult to develop in the South because, even though the jobs were not good, they were the only jobs to be had. Besides, with top management and top Union leadership being on good terms, anti-boss feelings by the rank and file could not be expected.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
20:15
|
Militancy of the Black Workers During the 1951 Southern Strike : People were surprised at this militancy. This may have been due to the fact that this was the first opportunity blacks had to show their militancy. It was known, however, that Southern blacks were pro-CIO.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
21:55
|
Lack of Support from the United Auto Workers (UAW) During the Strike : This involved personality differences between Rieve and Reuther, and also the fact that there were political overtones to the strike.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
24:55
|
TWUA Did Not Expect the Wage Stabilization Board to Help Them Out of the Strike
|
|
Tape/Side
3/1
Time
26:05
|
It Was Not the 1951 Southern Strike Alone Which Caused TWUA to Become Less Militant : Plant closings, the internal fight, Baldanzi's secession to the United Textile Workers (UTW) were also factors. The big organized southern plants did not immediately become emboldened and go after the Union. The Union's weaknesses, however, were exposed during the strike.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
00:30
|
Baldanzi and Operation Dixie : By the time Fiester began working with TWUA, Baldanzi was already spending a lot of time in the South; and after the dissolution of the Dyers Federation, he spent nearly all of his time in the South. Baldanzi did not select people for the Southern Drive based on their loyalty to him as such; however, he would not take people that Rieve was trying to get rid of.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
02:50
|
In 1949 Bishop Was Named One of Four Special Assistants to the President : His appointment in charge of several southern states was a political move. In part, it was a reaction by Rieve to Baldanzi's attempt to dump Lawrence the year before. Also there was a general feeling that Baldanzi, especially in negotiations, was too soft on the employers.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
04:10
|
Comparison of Rieve and Baldanzi from the Point of View of the Rank and File of the Union : They respected Rieve though he did not fraternize with them, whereas Baldanzi made a profession out of being one of them. At the 1950 convention the rank and file did not know what was going on because no one had asked them; and thus the Rieve forces should not have been surprised when the rank and file did not follow their lead in attempting to get rid of Baldanzi.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
07:00
|
Why Isadore Katz Supported Baldanzi : For a number of years Katz made more money than Rieve. Rieve rejected Katz's proposal that he be allowed to practice privately as well as be General Counsel to the Union, but Baldanzi sympathized with him on this matter.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
07:50
|
Digression into Katz's Winning the Apex Hosiery Case Before the Supreme Court, Which Gave Him a National Reputation
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
09:05
|
Rieve Could Be Very Stubborn, and Some of His Best Friends Felt That Occasionally It Would Not Hurt for Him to “Fall on His Face” : This was probably Hueter's attitude.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
10:05
|
Sam Baron : It was not so much that he favored Baldanzi as that he was mad at Rieve for firing him as New York Joint Board Manager and for “exiling” him to Canada.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
10:30
|
John Edelman Sympathized with Baldanzi Only Because He Was Treated Badly by Rieve : Baldanzi consoled him; Edelman, however, did not get directly involved in the fight.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
11:25
|
At Times Rieve Sounded Like the Dictator That Baldanzi Portrayed Him As
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
11:50
|
Anecdote Concerning Fiester's Remarks Written for Rieve in 1950 Which Were Presented to a Special Senate Committee to Investigate Conditions in the Southern Textile Industry : Incident illustrated how cantankerous Rieve could be at times.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
15:10
|
Anecdote Concerning E. M. Schoffstall's Inability to Deal with Rieve's Temperament
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
16:00
|
Charlie Hughes Was Ambitious and Saw Support for Baldanzi as a Way of Getting Elected to the Executive Council
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
17:15
|
When Baldanzi Announced He Was Splitting from TWUA and Going to UTW, Even Those Who Did Not Get Along with Rieve Rallied to the Cause : Fiester and Rieve were in Atlantic City, expecting to spend a few relaxing days, when word of secession arrived. Instead of relaxing on the beach, they wound up running the Union out of Fiester's hotel room. The Steel Workers and other CIO unions also rallied to TWUA.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
22:55
|
Anecdote Concerning Rieve Lecturing and Answering Questions at Dartmouth College : Rieve was good at extemporaneous speaking.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
24:05
|
Rieve Was Very Good with Figures : If questioned before a Senate committee, for example, he would “make up” figures in support of his statements, but he was always close to the actual figures.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
26:05
|
Many of the People in the Education Department Supported Baldanzi : Baldanzi was good at speaking at the institutes set up in the South by the Education people.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
27:10
|
Baldanzi Was Well Liked, Whereas It Was Difficult to Get to Know and Like Rieve : Rieve did not like dealing with too many people.
|
|
Tape/Side
3/2
Time
28:45
|
As the Fight Progressed, Both Fiester and Rogin Established Policies within Their Departments : Their staff people did not have to support Rieve; but they were not to give open support to the Baldanzi side. They would not be given work to do that was political; they were to get their jobs done.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
00:30
|
Why Each Member of Fiester's Staff, with One Exception, Supported Rieve : Each had different motives, but all knew their jobs would be in jeopardy if Baldanzi won, even though only Fiester did political work.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
03:25
|
Though Rieve Did Not Fire Anyone on the Headquarters Staff after the 1952 Convention, There Was a Purge of Fifteen Field Staff Members : Fiester feels this was a mistake and that if he had known about it he may well have been able to stop Rieve from doing it. Rieve and Reba Gilpin (Canzano) were largely responsible for the firings. It was a mistake which Rieve probably would not have made if he were not exhausted from the convention.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
06:40
|
Anecdote Concerning Rieve's Drinking Sherry after an Executive Council Meeting in Atlanta
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
08:10
|
Baron Fought in the Spanish Civil War on the Loyalist Side : Was almost killed by the Communists because he was a Social-Democrat.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
09:00
|
Issues in the Rieve-Baldanzi Fight : There were no ideological differences, just personality and political differences. In contract negotiations, application of internal policies, etc., Baldanzi may not have always carried out the wishes of the International office, but there were no ideological conflicts because “everyone was a Social-Democrat.”
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
09:55
|
Democracy in the Union Was Not a Valid Issue : Fiester did not perceive the Union as becoming less democratic between the time he joined the Union and the time he left. Rieve would keep track of the financial reports submitted by the joint boards, and he made certain they did not accumulate too much money; he would “shake down” the wealthy joint boards when he wanted donations for special projects.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
12:45
|
Because the Textile Industry Was National in Scope, It Was Necessary to Have Concentration of Power in the International : Locals and joint boards, however, did have considerably more local autonomy than the Auto Workers and the Steel Workers, whose industries were even more national and more concentrated.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
15:05
|
1950 Convention and the Proposed Amendments to the Constitution : One of Baldanzi's amendments would have given locals the right to disapprove regional and state directors appointed by the national office. If a local or joint board was self supporting, they themselves could elect a manager, pay his salary, and be independent of the national office. If a local or joint board was not self supporting, Rieve would appoint someone to be in charge. The Baldanzi people wanted it both ways: to have the national office pay the administrator's salary, but the local or joint board have selection authority.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
18:15
|
Local 6, Lewistown, Pennsylvania, TWUA'S Maverick Local : Lewistown was located on the fringes of the coal industry and had a tradition of independence.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
19:40
|
Bishop Was Chosen to Run Against Baldanzi in 1950 Because He Was the Healthiest : John Chupka had had a heart attack, Payne was too ill, and William Belanger would not leave his base in Massachusetts. There was no one else with enough stature in the Union who could have run.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
21:45
|
After the 1950 Convention Rieve Was Angry with Those People Who Had Talked Him into the Fight : His prestige had suffered.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
23:05
|
Between 1950 and 1952 Both Rieve and Baldanzi Put the Interests of the Union First : Though they basically agreed on Union policy, there was growing resentment and thus little chance of a reconciliation between them.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/1
Time
25:55
|
At the 1952 Convention Two of the Three Union Trustees Sided with Baldanzi Over the Issue of the Private Fund of the President Which Was Used for Various Purposes : The fund was perfectly legal, since this was before the Landrum-Griffin Act. An example of its use was a donation to Senator Paul Douglass' campaign.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
00:30
|
Baron Had a Fund Similar to the President's While He Was Canadian Director
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
01:15
|
Rieve Saw Bishop as His Successor after the 1952 Convention : Pollock had never been considered a potential president. Pollock was on the ticket because a representative of the weaving branch of the industry was needed. He would not have challenged Bishop for the presidency.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
02:40
|
When Baldanzi Seceded from TWUA, the UTW, Which Was Barely Surviving, Was Glad to Have Him Even Though He Had Spoken Against Them in the Past : Baldanzi felt that if those people who had voted for him had gone with him into the UTW, he would have been able to “mold the Union in his image.”
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
05:15
|
Thirty-Eight People Left TWUA after the 1952 Convention : Fifteen people were fired immediately, and the rest either resigned or were fired for openly lining up with the secession movement.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
06:10
|
Charlie Hughes' First Loyalties Were to Himself, Not Baldanzi, and Thus There Was No Question of His Secession
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
06:45
|
There Was No Possibility of the Philadelphia Joint Board Pulling Out of TWUA : Most of the Philadelphia Joint Board leaders had been in the UTW before and did not want to return.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
07:30
|
TWUA Morale During the Late 1950s : Remained high, even after the decline had set in. Still acted like a big union even when it no longer was.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
09:05
|
Dissolution of the Dyers Federation : The charges against the Dyers and President Joe Knapik were developed in part by Baldanzi. The Dyers attempted to resist their takeover and dissolution by going to Chancery Court in New Jersey. Fiester, being from New Jersey and knowing how Chancery Court could be politically influenced, advised the Union on what attorney to hire. When the Dyers saw the match-up of attorneys, they knew they had lost.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
15:05
|
Knapik Went to Rieve and Asked That the Dyers Be Allowed to Have a Convention in Order to Dissolve, and That People Loyal to Him Be Retained, Though He Knew He Himself Would Have to Leave
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
17:10
|
The Federations Were Politically Necessary at the Time TWUA Was Created : Rieve, however, always felt they were a mistake. When the Union began, the Federations were the dominant influence. By the late 1940s, the International was dominant.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
19:40
|
There Was No Move by the Dyers to Pull Out of TWUA as the Hosiery Workers Had Done : Knapik, their leader, convinced the Dyers that dissolution and incorporation within TWUA was the best thing for them.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
20:40
|
Payne Became Director of the Dyers Division : He was able and trusted by Rieve. The Dyers resented Payne, until he negotiated their first contract, which was a very good one.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
21:25
|
Rash of Appeals to the International Union by New Jersey Dyers in the Late 1940s : It did not have anything to do with the Dyers or with TWUA as such; it had to do with the background of the people themselves, and the fact that there had always been a certain amount of infighting.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
22:30
|
Undesirable Practices in Administering Numerous Small Shops in an Urban Area : The problem afflicts other unions as well. Threats of violence are the only way to maintain the general wage standards.
|
|
Tape/Side
4/2
Time
24:05
|
The Nature of the Industry Accounted for the Reason the Dyers Federation Led TWUA in Fringe Benefits : The dyeing industry “is crooked from top to bottom.” In the process of dyeing and finishing, the material stretches, and there is more material after the process than before. Theoretically, this excess belongs to the owner of the material, but he never sees it. The workers steal the excess before the dye shop owner does. Compared to the thievery and the huge markup on the finished product, the workers are cheap. The employers, therefore, can afford to pay high wages and they do so in order not to have problems with the workforce.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
00:35
|
In the Late 1940s Rieve and Baldanzi Were Very Vocal in the Movement to Rid the CIO of Communists : They had both been raised as Social-Democrats. Whenever a conflict arose between the interests of the American unions and American workers on the one side, and the interests of the Soviet Union on the other, the Communists within the American labor movement went with the Soviet Union. Rieve took a much firmer stand on this issue than Sidney Hillman, because there were Communists in the ACW. Rieve thought it deplorable that John L. Lewis would not allow Communists in the United Mine Workers but did allow them in the CIO.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
04:00
|
In the 1930s Communists Had a Good Image But It Changed with World War II : They were the most vocal against fascism until the Hitler-Stalin pact. Then the Communist unions involved in defense production made a big issue of workers' rights and opposition to militarism. However, when Hitler attacked Russia, this all changed; these same unions failed to process grievances, to champion workers' rights, or to do anything that might impede war production.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
06:00
|
Anecdote Concerning American Communists' Subservience to Russia : After World War II, two Russians associated with the Soviet-American Friendship League visited New York, and Fiester questioned them about the relationship of the Communist Party in Russia and in the United States. If the Hitler-Stalin pact was only an attempt by Stalin to stall for time, why didn't he tell the American Communists?
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
07:35
|
Anti-Communist Provisions of Taft-Hartley : Even though Rieve and Baldanzi were anti-Communist, they did not like these provisions because they were democrats.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
08:10
|
There Was Never Any Support, by Rieve or by TWUA, for an American Labor Party : Anecdote concerning Rieve, a relatively recent immigrant, believing that American workers would not register for the World War I draft because this was a blatant form of militarism. Rieve soon realized he was wrong, and this gave him an understanding about the diversity of American workers and convinced him they could never agree on a labor party.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
11:30
|
Why TWUA Was a Leader in Signing the Anti-Communist Affidavits of Taft-Hartley : The concept of the affidavits was very popular in the South; and the CIO did not lead a move to resist the provision.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
13:10
|
The Political Action Committees of the CIO and TWUA Sometimes Differed : TWUA would do what it thought best in areas where it had influence.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
14:40
|
The 1948 Presidential Election : TWUA opposed Henry Wallace's Progressive Party because it ran candidates against liberal Democrats, which harkened back to the 1920s Communist tactic of the need to make things very much worse before they could be made better.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
15:30
|
TWUA Would Sometimes Support Candidates Whom the CIO Did Not Endorse
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
16:15
|
TWUA and CIO Disagreed on the Question of Imports : It often became an issue at CIO conventions. Fiester feels the labor movement has gone too far “the other way” now; it is supporting a “too restrictive” policy on imports today.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
18:35
|
The Impact of Taft-Hartley on TWUA : It was detrimental to organizing efforts, though organizing had become difficult before the law was enacted. What really hurt TWUA was the increasing obstructionism of the NLRB trial examiners (which began before Taft-Hartley) and Taft-Hartley's end to the pre-hearing election, which ultimately made it impossible for the workers to organize if the employer was determined to prevent them from doing so. The right of the employer to use these stalling tactics did much more harm than the right-to-work provisions of Taft-Hartley. Rieve held that the government had to be neutral between the employer and the Union, but it was not supposed to be neutral, according to the National Labor Relations Act, between organizing and not organizing.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/1
Time
24:00
|
In the Late 1940s TWUA Was Not Considered to Be a Poor Relative of the CIO : At that time wages won by TWUA were almost equal to those of the ACW, standard fringe benefits were ahead of the UAW, and TWUA had a great deal of influence within the CIO.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
00:35
|
Growth of the Union's Financial Reserves, 1948-1950 : There was never a decision made to build up a large treasury. Some money was needed in case of large-scale strikes which would mean loss of dues income. If the climate was not good for organizing, no amount of money would be able to help the situation; if the climate was good, money was not especially crucial.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
03:05
|
In the Late 1940s TWUA Was Winning Small NLRB Elections But Losing Larger Elections : The larger companies were more sophisticated and had more money to spend on resisting efforts to organize.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
04:00
|
Wisconsin Representation in TWUA : At TWUA conventions between 1939 and 1948, Wisconsin representation dropped from 30 to 7 delegates. Fiester feels this may have been because ACW wanted to keep some Wisconsin industries within its own sphere, or because there was a good UTW administration already present in the state.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
06:45
|
TWUA Did Not Expect a Period of Stagnation after World War II nor Did It Foresee the Prolonged Slump of the 1950s
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
10:25
|
Fiester and Textile Labor : Fiester once wrote an article entitled “Grant Wore a Beard” comparing the administrations of Grant and Eisenhower; the Democratic Party organ reprinted it. That was one of the few articles for which he took a by-line. Generally, he sought to keep himself out of the paper.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
12:55
|
Fiester Was More than Just Editor of Textile Labor and Speechwriter for Rieve : He did a great deal of “translating from the Barkinese,” including rewriting Barkin's Decline of the Labor Movement. He would always try to comply with requests from other staff members to ghost their speeches and articles. He often wrote leaflets and ads for Union campaigns.
|
|
Tape/Side
5/2
Time
18:40
|
TWUA Building : Rieve insisted on keeping it “spic and span,” but it deteriorated steadily after he left.
|
|
|
1977 April 11
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
00:30
|
The Secession Movement : The secession movement was a very real problem for TWUA because the Union had no idea how many local officers, who had backed Baldanzi at the convention, would follow him out of TWUA and into UTW. Much effort was put into saving the Fieldcrest Mills. The Union used delaying tactics with Danville, but did not spend much time or money there. The Cone Mills were lost very quickly, but won back with the aid of Walter Reuther.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
04:50
|
Legal Methods of Preventing Secession : The courts generally recognized the TWUA constitution as governing, but this was complicated by precedents set a few years earlier when the courts bent over backwards to help the CIO in its battle against the Electrical Workers (UE). An existing contract was a bar to an NLRB election, but a local could decertify. The courts did recognize TWUA's constitutional claim to local treasuries.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
08:00
|
Latent Pro-Union Sentiment in the South : Two examples: 1) Despite the unsuccessful strike in Danville in 1951, the workers still voted for UTW rather than No Union in the secession election. 2) When Sidney Cone attempted to dump TWUA after passage of Taft-Hartley, the workers, only 40 percent of whom were dues payers, led him to believe they would vote the Union out; yet the Union got 70 percent of the vote.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
11:00
|
Factors in the Secession of Danville and the Cone Mills : One factor was support for Baldanzi, but also there was a reaction to the defeat of the 1951 southern strike. The workers had convinced themselves that the International failed them during the 1951 strike.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
13:00
|
Cone Mills' Return to TWUA : The checkoff had been lost, and the UTW had no money to provide service. TWUA, on the other hand, could provide this service; and the workers, “their fling with sentiment” over, returned to TWUA.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
14:20
|
Organizing in the Mid-1950s : Success in TWUA organizing efforts was related to the amount of resentment built up by the workers against the company. The degree of success also depended upon which branch of the textile industry was being organized. The Union rarely, if ever, won an election if the employer was determined to keep it out.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
16:15
|
TWUA Inability to Develop Indigenous Leadership : Many bright young people entered the mills in the South after World War II, and the Union was hopeful of turning them into local union leaders; but the companies quickly brought them into management. This problem has affected TWUA for some time. The quality of leadership has declined; bright and talented leaders did not want their sons to go into the mill. Their sons became professional people. In higher-paying industries the sons may receive college educations and still return to their father's non-professional occupations.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
21:05
|
Fiester's Estimation of TWUA in 1956 : Democratic. If it projected any conservatism in its image, it was because Rieve was not given to extravagant ideas which were unlikely to be fulfilled. “There was a general conviction that what we were doing was right,” and that TWUA was more right more often than other unions.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
23:25
|
TWUA Decision to Support Reuther for CIO President : Anecdote illustrates Rieve's statesmanship. Though Rieve had his differences with Reuther and was very fond of Alan Haywood, he was able to see past his personal feelings to what he thought would be the right decision. TWUA's votes were decisive.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/1
Time
25:55
|
Anecdote Concerning Supposed Premature Announcement That Haywood Had Been Elected : Rieve was to chair the CIO convention when the winner of the presidential election was announced. For radio and television taping, Rieve did mock announcements for both candidates during a recess. The public address system had been mistakenly left on, and Rieve's mock announcement of Haywood as the new CIO president was piped into the press room. The microphones were then shut off and Rieve's mock announcement of Reuther as new president was not fed into the press room. Fiester was on the spot.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
00:30
|
By the Mid-1950s TWUA Had Become an “Administrative” Union : There were two reasons for this. First, while TWUA did remain more oriented toward organizing than other CIO unions, the climate was not good for organizing; and it would have been foolish to squander too much money on it. Second, organizers did not wish to remain organizers; they would rather become administrators because it was an easier job.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
04:40
|
TWUA Saw the Merger of the AFL with the CIO as Inevitable : The CIO was disintegrating for a variety of reasons - the expulsion of Communist unions, the fact that Dave McDonald and the Steel Workers flagrantly exhibited their distaste for Reuther, and the disaffection of the intellectual and academic communities.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
07:40
|
Fiester Analyzed the Situation of American Labor in the 30th Anniversary Issue of The American Scholar : His remarks, including some about George Meany, were not all complimentary to labor.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
09:30
|
Opposition of McDonald and the Steel Workers to Reuther : There was animosity between Reuther and the Steel Workers since their man, Haywood, had been beaten by Reuther.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
12:00
|
There Were Many Reasons Why Rieve Retired in 1956 : One reason was his weak heart. He also was well aware of the decline of TWUA and how difficult it would be to reverse this.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
15:00
|
Not Only Did Rieve See Bishop as His Successor, But Rieve Also Thought Bishop, as President, Would Willingly Listen to His Advice and Suggestions
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
15:40
|
Pollock Was Not the Immediate Choice to Succeed Bishop as Executive Vice President : At a meeting of the Executive Council in Fall River after Bishop's funeral, Chupka declined the nomination as Executive Vice President. Daoust nominated Pollock and he accepted; but no decision was reached about whether or not a new Executive Vice President should be chosen. The next day the Council met again in Boston and decided to fill the position. Pollock was still the only candidate, but a majority of the Executive Council still did not want him.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
19:35
|
Rieve Did Not Assume a Leadership Role at This Executive Council Meeting : His excuse was that he wanted the Council to begin getting used to his not being there; but they could not make a decision about Pollock until Rieve took charge.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
20:15
|
Those on the Executive Council Who Did Not Favor Pollock Were the Same Ones Who Would Oppose Him in the Subsequent Fight : They were also the same ones who had the most working experience with him.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
21:50
|
More on the Reasons for Rieve's Retirement : He wished to divorce his wife and remarry but felt he could not do this while he was still president of the Union.
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
22:55
|
Fiester Feels That the Situation of Pollock Being the Only Candidate for Executive Vice President and the Executive Council Still Hesitating to Elect Him Was a Terrible Position for Him to Be In
|
|
Tape/Side
6/2
Time
24:45
|
At Least Until the Time That Fiester Left TWUA, in 1957, There Were No Factions Within the Executive Council Under Pollock
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
00:30
|
Fiester Did Not Perceive Any Differences Between Rieve and Pollock in the Way TWUA Was Run : Pollock followed the routine that Rieve had developed. Although Rieve's “creative input” was now missing, the structure of the Union had been established so that Rieve's exit did not make too much difference. Pollock was approachable and very good at relating to the rank and file.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
05:25
|
Fiester Found There Were Differences in His Own Dealings with Pollock : Fiester would have to fight for what he had previously gotten automatically; for example, wage increases for his staff.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
08:35
|
Anecdote Concerning Fiester's Early Arguments with Pollock Over Per-Diem Allocation : When Fiester first began working with TWUA, the overnight out-of-town per diem was $7, but it was only $3 for an out-of-town day trip. Fiester would often attend meetings in Boston for a full day; and he tried to get reimbursed for $7, but Pollock's office would not hear of it.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
10:35
|
Pollock Was Approachable to Rank and File, But Not to Staff People If He Was Suspicious of Their Loyalty to Him
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
11:50
|
Rieve's Competence in Dealing with Government : He usually got his way through simple doggedness, if nothing else. Cogent, lucid, determined.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
15:10
|
Anecdote Concerning Truman's Dislike for Rieve : Truman privately expressed to Fiester this dislike during the first White House labor press conference. Truman's attitude stemmed from Rieve's early support for Eisenhower for the 1948 Democratic presidential nomination. They made up later.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
16:40
|
Anecdote Concerning Rieve's Dislike for Senator Robert Taft : “What good is it, the best mind in the Senate? He's got it made up against us.”
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
18:55
|
Rieve/Pollock Relationship, 1953-1956 : After Pollock was elected Executive Vice President, Rieve began spending time in Florida; he wanted Pollock to get used to running the Union. Various staff members would call Rieve in Florida and complain about Pollock. Both Rieve and Pollock complained that neither called the other. Fiester feels that Rieve overestimated the influence he would have over Pollock, both before and after Pollock became President.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
22:40
|
Rieve Attended and Participated in All Council Meetings in His Capacity as Chairman of the Executive Council, But Did Not Try to Dominate Them
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
24:10
|
Why Department Heads, Including Fiester, Began Leaving TWUA Within Two Years after Pollock Became President : A combination of factors: the poor, almost hopeless, condition of the industry (and therefore also the Union), and the fact that the Union no longer had a President people thought could come up with a miraculous cure, but rather had a President who was difficult to work with and to reason with. Also, there was nowhere to go, in terms of prestige, with TWUA.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
26:45
|
Anecdote Concerning Pollock's Negotiations with the Clerical Workers, Which Illustrated His Obstinacy
|
|
Tape/Side
7/1
Time
28:50
|
Though It Is Not Evident in Textile Labor, the Union Was Dispirited
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
00:30
|
After Fiester and Larry Rogin Left TWUA, They Seemed to Follow Each Other Around : They first went to Michigan and then to Washington, D.C.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
02:00
|
Dispirited Feelings Were Not Outwardly Exhibited by Staff Members; They Were Felt Internally : Even though the Union was disheartened, it ran on momentum for a number of years, getting involved with things one would not normally expect a dispirited union to get involved with.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
02:50
|
When Fiester Visited TWUA a Few Years after Leaving, the First Thing He Noticed Was the Physical Deterioration of the Building : The implication was that if the physical aspect was being allowed to deteriorate, people no longer cared.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
04:30
|
More on Textile Labor
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
06:25
|
The Burlington Drive : It was not undertaken just for the purposes of education and agitation; it was an organizing drive as well, even though the textile industry was in a recession. The purpose was to make inroads into a few key plants so that the company would have to listen to the Union and not just shut down plants as they had done previously. The decision to launch this drive was a collective one, and Pollock released the money for it without much hesitation. It was based on the same premise as the current J.P. Stevens campaign - get an important foothold in order to make the Union believable again. It probably also had elements of “Pickett's Charge” in it.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
10:05
|
The Timing of the Burlington Campaign : The Union had not attempted such a concentrated effort since the late 1940s. The reasons for this were the 1951 strike and the internal politics of the early 1950s. In addition, with Danville and a few others, the Union did have an existing Southern foothold prior to secession. Also, it was clear by 1956 that the decline of the industry in the North would not be reversed. The Union had had some success in some Burlington plants, and it was felt that there were a few key Burlington plants which could not be closed down and could be organized.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
16:15
|
Burlington, Darlington, and Harriet-Henderson Were Not Thought of as Defeats; Instead They Were Viewed as Setbacks
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
19:05
|
Harriet-Henderson Strike and the Southern Conspiracy : Everyone realized that the significance of Harriet-Henderson went far beyond that particular situation. The foundation of what TWUA had to offer workers - a grievance and arbitration procedure - was being threatened.
|
|
Tape/Side
7/2
Time
24:05
|
Boyd Payton and the Henderson Bombing Conspiracy : A Charlotte reporter dug into the situation and reported to Fiester that he became convinced that Payton was aware of the plot. Payton, however, had to maintain his innocence for the good of the Union, if for no other reason.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
00:35
|
Other Unions Also Have Had a Difficult Time Organizing in the South : The difficulties of the International Union of Electrical, Radio, and Machine Workers (IUE) with General Electric, and the United Auto Workers (UAW) with General Motors in recent years are illustrative. Contributing to this difficulty has been the growth of labor relations experts working on the side of management.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
03:15
|
Southern Agitational Wage Drives : They were timed as though the plant was organized and it was time for a wage increase.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
05:05
|
Executive Committee of the Executive Council - 1956 : Earlier proposals for an Executive Committee of the Council had been made because some Council members resented the fact that Rieve depended on his “kitchen cabinet,” consisting of Department heads and maybe one or two Council members, for advice. In 1956, the idea was proposed as a means of helping Pollock, but also with the underlying purpose of controlling this new President. Pollock would have no part of it; so the Council did not present the idea to the 1956 convention.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
08:15
|
Anecdote Concerning Walter Reuther's Surprise at How Easy TWUA Was Able to Get a Dues Increase Approved at Convention
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
09:50
|
Creation of TWUA Strike Defense Fund : Although Rieve had been opposed to delegated or segregated funds, the Defense Fund idea was universally accepted within the Union. Everyone could see the need for it.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
11:25
|
Resolution of the 1956 Convention Condemning White Citizens Councils : Pollock did not want to bring it up in the convention but finally did so the afternoon of the last day. After the resolution was passed, some members walked out of the hall, but Fiester feels they were leaving only because the convention's business was finished. E. T. Kirkland, from a South Carolina local, spoke against the resolution and was seen leaving the hall after the resolution was passed. A reporter told Fiester it looked like a secession movement, so Fiester collared Kirkland, who was only leaving because the convention was almost over, and got him to return, take the floor, and clear up the misunderstanding. Fiester felt about half of those who opposed the resolution did so because they thought it would hurt the Union, and half because they were racists.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
18:25
|
Anecdote Concerning Pollock Memorizing His Acceptance Speech
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
18:55
|
When Fiester First Wrote Speeches for Rieve, He Practiced Them Using Rieve's Accent
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
19:20
|
The 1952 Internal Dispute and the 1951 Southern Strike Both Contributed to the Decline of TWUA : If Rieve had handled the dispute differently, it would not have had such serious consequences. The Union could have held on to good people - including Baldanzi - and the 1951 southern strike would not have occurred. The Union would have been in much better shape in the South for future actions. Although significant membership losses would not have been avoided, a “better Union would have survived”; and it would still be “a Union by itself instead of going back into the womb.”
|
|
Tape/Side
8/1
Time
25:25
|
Fiester Does Not Believe There Is a Southern Conspiracy of the Depth Some Claim
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
00:35
|
TWUA-UTW Merger : If Baldanzi had not been designated President of UTW by Peter McGavin, administrative assistant to Meany, merger would have been much more likely.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
04:20
|
TWUA, UTW, and the No-Raid Agreements
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
05:25
|
TWUA Was Aware That There Were Certain Things in the UTW Which Were Not Above Board, But They Did Not Know of the Underworld Influence Within That Union : Textile Labor ran an article comparing the cost of the UTW officers' homes in Silver Spring, Maryland, the number of cars they owned, etc., to their Union incomes. Tom Cosgrove did the investigative research. Meany was aware of the existence of two sets of UTW books, and Textile Labor printed that. The questionable character of UTW's two top officers did hold the TWUA back from seeking merger while they remained the General Officers.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
10:30
|
Pollock Was Not Opposed to Merger with the UTW and Taking Baldanzi Back Into TWUA : Baldanzi rejected Pollock's offer of proportional UTW representation on the Executive Council and the resurrection of a general office similar to that of Executive Vice President. Fiester feels that Baldanzi no longer cared to fight or to be a strong leader. He was content to preside over the UTW, in the shadow of TWUA, letting TWUA have the strikes and set the contract conditions. Different TWUA leadership would not have made Baldanzi any more willing to merge.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
15:40
|
Pollock Was the Basic Cause of the 1964 Fight : He was budget conscious and was petty on small matters. The industrial Divisions and the headquarters Departments of the Union were not allowed to operate as freely as previously. If staff attempted to reason with him after he had vetoed something, he took it as a challenge of his authority as President; and he was sensitive about that authority.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
18:05
|
People Who Were Fond of Pollock, Like Harold Daoust, Would Become Just as Furious with Him : Daoust claimed that Pollock “laid down” harder on his friends.
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
20:35
|
More on Daoust as Canadian Director
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
21:25
|
Fiester Wrote the Executive Council Report and Pollock's Keynote Speech in 1964
|
|
Tape/Side
8/2
Time
24:20
|
Rieve's Speech at the 1964 Convention : Rieve told Fiester his reason for giving that speech was to tell the Union members the truth about the situation. Fiester suspects he waited until after most people had already voted because he did not want to be repudiated. Fiester went to see Pollock after the session ended and asked that Rieve's funds not be cut off. Pollock, to his credit, agreed.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
00:25
|
Sol Stetin : Good, honest, and very dedicated. Fiester wrote Stetin's keynote speech for the 1976 “dissolution” convention. Fiester felt the speech was “an honest last statement of the Union,” but Stetin edited out portions that he felt were controversial; for example, the 1951 southern strike, and the disagreements within the Executive Council. This was very disappointing to Fiester. Fiester feels Stetin inherited an organization “on the fringe of disaster” and was concerned with maintaining a facade to the end.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
06:00
|
Merger with ACW : It was the best thing TWUA could do, given the circumstances. The ACW, with its new leadership, is no longer moribund. It will be good if the present ACTWU leadership devotes time and money to the textile portion of the Union, and if the more conservative ACW does not smother what is left of the old TWUA spirit.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
12:25
|
Why Fiester Left TWUA in 1957 : Without Rieve, and with Pollock's resistance, working in TWUA was not the same, and Fiester was more than ready for a change.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
14:45
|
Fiester Became Editor of the UAW'S New, Weekly, Regional Newspaper - UAW Solidarity : The concept, for a newspaperman like Fiester, was exciting. Fiester did not seek the job; rather, Reuther's “P.R. man” came to him.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
19:10
|
Format, Procedures : Seven different editions each week, one for each UAW Region. There were three teams of two people each; each team was responsible for two editions. Fiester did the national edition himself. Copy would begin to come in on Friday; writing would be done on Tuesday and Wednesday. Mats were made up by the printer to meet airplane schedules so that they could be delivered to local printers in time to be run off and delivered. Fiester stayed at the printers all night on Wednesdays.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/1
Time
25:35
|
UAW Ran Out of Money for the Newspaper after 21 Weeks : Cut down to twice a month, then once a month.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
00:30
|
In January, 1959, the UAW Decided, Due to the Financial Condition of the Union, to Re-Merge the Publications and Public Relations Departments : Fiester, as head of the Publications Department, was out of a job. Reuther, after telling him this, made a speech about unemployment, called the “hound dog-kennel dog” speech, in which he talked about how one should aggressively seek re-employment. The terms under which Fiester left were very good, including severance and vacation pay, a month's salary, moving expenses, and the use of the Union's air travel card for one month. Fiester was concerned about the fate of his staff, half of whom were to be fired, and Reuther agreed with Fiester's request that those who were fired get the same provisions as he himself received. However, Reuther did not live up to the agreement.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
06:30
|
A Weekly, Regional Newspaper Was Not an Overly Ambitious Project : The UAW did not budget its money; and Reuther favored special funds for special projects, so there was not enough general funds available when things got tight in the industry, as happened in 1958.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
09:35
|
Successful “Stunt” During Special UAW Convention, 1958 : By holding one of the Michigan editions of Solidarity back a couple hours, Fiester's staff was able to put out an afternoon paper which quoted speeches delivered during the morning session. The delegates were very impressed.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
11:25
|
Fiester Was Then Hired to Do All the Publicity for the AFL-CIO Joint Minimum Wage Committee : This committee had been formed before the merger of the AFL and the CIO by unions with the most interest in minimum wage and with the necessary funds to contribute to the committee. These unions included TWUA, ACW, the International Ladies Garment Workers (ILGW), and the Hatters. The committee was re-formed after merger, with Arthur Goldberg the co-chairman for the CIO and Andy Biemiller the co-chairman for the AFL.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
14:10
|
As the Work of the Joint Minimum Wage Committee Decreased, Fiester Began Assisting the Public Relations Department of the AFL-CIO and Ultimately Went on That Payroll in November 1959 : He was to handle public-service movies (“Americans at Work”) produced by the AFL-CIO, which were shown once a week. This did not take up all of his time so he continued assisting with publicity.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
16:50
|
Fiester Began Writing Meany's Civil Rights Speeches : These speeches were sent to Meany through his administrative assistant, Lane Kirkland, rather than through his secretary, which meant that Meany was now making forthright statements on civil rights. Previously the “palace guard” had prevented this.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
19:10
|
Fiester Twice Wrote the AFL-CIO Presentation to the Platform Committees of the Democratic and Republican Parties, in 1960 and in 1964
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
19:45
|
AFL-CIO Got Equal Employment Opportunities into the Civil Rights Bill, Although President John Kennedy Thought It Would Be a Mistake
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
20:50
|
George Meany Speeches : Has prepared speeches when speaking to an outside organization but speaks only from notes when appearing before an affiliate.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
21:30
|
Fiester Also Got Very Involved with Biemiller's Congressional Testimony
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
22:10
|
Fiester Was Loaned Out to Affiliated Unions Who Were Being Raided by the Teamsters : His function was as a disinterested third party, doing the publicity. The best way to fight the Teamsters was to laugh at their pretensions. Fiester was assigned to work on the Hubert Humphrey campaign, but ended up spending his time staving off a big Teamster raid on the Machinists in St. Louis.
|
|
Tape/Side
9/2
Time
25:20
|
Fiester's Wage Status Was the Same as Biemiller's Lobbyists, Who Were at the Top of the AFL-CIO Staff Wage Scale
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
00:00
|
Introduction
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
00:35
|
International Labor Press Association (ILPA) : An organization of AFL-CIO union periodicals. Fiester headed the CIO delegation when this organization was formed by merging the AFL and the CIO press associations. Fiester became the organization's first vice president, but resigned when he took the UAW job. The first secretary-treasurer did not stand for re-election after his third two-year term, so Fiester was elected to that position and served for eight years. Although Fiester eventually resigned as secretary-treasurer and was elected to the less-demanding office of president, he still did most of the secretary-treasurer's work.
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
04:25
|
In November 1968, Fiester Went to Work for the Industrial Union Department (IUD) : He agreed to go to work for the IUD only if it was to become an active organization. He put out a newsletter and helped with the first big conference organized labor held on occupational safety and health. The IUD, however, did not follow up on the conference; all it did was pass a resolution petitioning the AFL-CIO to do so. This was typical of IUD ineffectiveness. Finally, Fiester wrote I. W. Abel claiming the organization would never amount to anything until it had competent executive leadership. Because this involved a slam at one of Abel's buddies, Fiester was fired. The firing was delayed until the end of February, 1969, because Fiester was involved in the strike of the coordinated bargaining committee of the General Electric and Westinghouse unions at the time.
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
14:00
|
Coordinated Bargaining with GE and Westinghouse Unions : Fiester served as the Meany representative in the public relations section of the coordinated bargaining committee. He set up a national teletype system for the unions to match that of GE.
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
16:30
|
Fiester Has Been Free Lancing Since Leaving IUD : He was too old and too expensive to get hired full time by most unions. He was already editing the Shoe Worker and other things have kept coming up. Writes articles and speeches for unions when they find themselves short handed. Wrote many speeches for Bill Usery when he was with the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and also during his brief stint as Secretary of Labor.
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
20:20
|
Fiester Has Been Editing The United Shoe Worker since 1962
|
|
Tape/Side
10/1
Time
21:00
|
Fiester Has Been Editing The Insurance Worker since about 1972
|
|