INTRODUCTION

BIOGRAPHICAL BACKGROUND
Scope and Content Note: Born in Europe (Austria). Came to the United States (Philadelphia) in 1927 at the age of seventeen. Spoke three languages but no English. Got a job in a food (poultry) store and worked his way up to assistant manager. He got involved in organizing the store in order to shorten hours and increase wages. His only previous contact with the labor movement had been his attendance at English classes at the United Hebrew Trades Council. Also attended Temple University for a time.

ORGANIZATION OF SCHACHTER'S STORE, 1934
Scope and Content Note: It was a live poultry store. When he and his co-workers went looking for a union, the Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen of North America (AMC&BW), Local 195, was the only union in the area dealing with food employees of which they were aware. The manager of the local told them he did not have time to organize a small group of only ten or eleven employees because he was then engaged in a big slaughtering house strike. The manager gave them picket signs and instructed them to picket their store if the boss refused to recognize the union. They picketed for several weeks. Finally, the boss called the union manager and offered to recognize the union provided he did not have to take Schachter back to work for him. “This was my lucky break.” Schachter, who was young and single, encouraged the union manager to accept the offer for the sake of the other strikers.

SCHACHTER'S FIRST WORK FOR THE UNION
Scope and Content Note: Natale Masi was Local 195's manager. He was probably a Marxist. He suggested Schachter get a weekend job (Friday through Sunday), which would pay almost half as much as a full-time job, and work for the union the rest of the week organizing stores similar to his own. Impressed by President Franklin Roosevelt's encouragement for unionization, Schachter accepted the suggestion.

EARLY ORGANIZING METHODS
Scope and Content Note: Schachter would go into a store and ask for union recognition. If refused, he would then have some unemployed workers picket the store. Eventually, some employers began to agree to grant recognition. Schachter would tell each employer the manager of the union would contact him later to negotiate an agreement and would give each employer a copy of the contract negotiated with his original employer. He worked like this for a little less than a year, receiving gasoline for his car and enough pay to equal, when added to his weekend job, a full week's wages. In that period he organized twenty or thirty stores employing eight to ten people each. They were mainly kosher poultry/meat stores which also sold non-kosher. Most of those organized were actual meat cutters.

MORE ON SCHACHTER'S BACKGROUND
Scope and Content Note: He finished school, a military high school in Austria, before coming to the United States. “Things were getting, even then, anti-Jewish.” Got his original job in the poultry shop through his father who was a Schochit, a rabbi engaged in kosher slaughtering. His father had previously tried to get him to work in a jewelry store.

CREATION OF AMALGAMATED FOOD AND ALLIED WORKERS, LOCAL 56, AMC&BW
Scope and Content Note: Schachter worked for Local 195 until late 1939 when the manager attempted to recruit him into the Communist Party. Schachter and Harry Poole (later AMC&BW President) turned to AMC&BW President Patrick Gorman who made Poole an organizer for the International and gave Schachter his own charter in New Jersey, Local 56. Based in Camden, Schachter served as President of Local 56 from that time until his retirement in August.

ORGANIZATION OF SEABROOK FARMS
Scope and Content Note: Seabrook grew food and then froze it. The communist-dominated United Cannery, Agricultural, Packing and Allied Workers (later the Food, Tobacco, Agricultural and Allied Workers) had previously tried to organize Seabrook. Seabrook did not put up as hard a fight against Local 56 because of its anti-communist orientation. Recognition was granted on a card check. Schachter did not know at the time that farm workers were not even covered by the National Labor Relations Act.

GROWTH OF LOCAL 56
Scope and Content Note: The New York Times and P.M. Magazine gave good coverage to the organization of Seabrook because it was so rare to organize farm workers. With this publicity, Local 56's reputation grew. Today, Local 56 has 10,000 members, with only 1,200 - 1,500 employed in retail stores. General Foods, Standard Brands and others were organized by Local 56. “We organized anything that we could,” including nursing homes. The local did not compete with other unions but organized anything that was not already organized and that was not being organized. Local 56 is unique in its variety, having 140 different contracts. When General Foods moved its Jello plant from Hoboken to Dover, Delaware, Local 56 followed. Also organized Campbell Soup in Salisbury, Maryland.

SCHACHTER'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE TEAMSTERS
Scope and Content Note: In the late 1930's, Schachter was assigned to the waterfront by Local 195 to attempt to organize the wholesale end of the poultry business. The people were rough and so were the hours; began work at four in the morning. During this period, he befriended the Teamsters and the Longshoremen organizers who were much more militant than he. The Teamsters were very helpful to him then, and he invited their aid while organizing Local 56. The Teamsters provided muscle and organized drivers and platform workers at plants Local 56 was organizing.

SCHACHTER WAS SELECTED AS LABOR ATTACHE TO TURKEY, 1952
Scope and Content Note: Turkey requested a real labor man who could mix with its own labor leaders. Ambassador McGee gave Schachter a party upon his arrival, though he knew not what Schachter's function was to be. At the party, the head of the Hotel and Restaurant Workers toasted McGee, “I want to thank your government through you for opening the doors of the embassy to the people of Turkey.” Schachter used a million dollars of the United States' one hundred million dollars of aid to Turkey to train labor leaders. Anyone elected president of a union received three months' education at the university at full pay. Schachter brought in two Americans to train Turkish professors how to train Turkish labor leaders. Strikes were illegal, so the education was limited to arbitration, mediation and other aspects of collective bargaining. It was a difficult choice for Schachter not to stay in Turkey for another term. McGee and others wanted him to stay, but he figured he might lose his position as an AMC&BW vice-president if he stayed away from the United States much longer. In addition to training local union officers, Schachter helped the Turkish labor movement to federate.

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON SCHACHTER'S STAY IN TURKEY
Scope and Content Note: Politically, the Turks were very good friends of the United States. Turkey was the only country, outside the United States, to provide troops to the United Nations' effort during the Korean War. Schachter was asked to interview Turkish soldiers returning from the Korean War to get their reactions to American soldiers. “They sincerely liked us.” “I cannot comment as to where we lost the Turkish people now.” Schachter still gets letters from his assistant and from the Minister of Labor. It took nine months to negotiate the agreement to spend the one million dollars because Turks bargain differently and much more slowly than Americans.

SCHACHTER BECAME AMC&BW DISTRICT DIRECTOR UPON HIS RETURN FROM TURKEY
Scope and Content Note: Harry Poole had become Executive Vice-President, and Schachter replaced him as Director of District 2, the largest district in the AMC&BW, constituting about one-fifth of the entire membership. He was permitted to remain President of Local 56.

AMC&BW OFFICE IN WASHINGTON
Scope and Content Note: At Secretary-Treasurer Pat Gorman's request, Schachter opened an office in Washington with a legislative representative who was responsible to Schachter. The legislative representative Arnold Mayer has since become a vice-president of the United Food and Commercial Workers Union (UFCW) and is still director of the Legislative Office.

AFTER MERGER WITH THE UNITED PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS (UPWA), PUERTO RICO WAS ADDED TO SCHACHTER'S DISTRICT

WHY THE AMC&BW DID NOT JOIN THE CONGRESS OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATIONS (CIO)
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW nearly joined, but Gorman had a sense of loyalty to the American Federation of Labor (AFL). “We were so nearly going CIO... that we wondered from month to month.” Also, Gorman said, “'We are already CIO,' meaning industrial organization.” While Gorman's sympathies were with the CIO his loyalties were with the AFL.

AMC&BW REACTION TO THE CREATION OF THE PACKINGHOUSE WORKERS ORGANIZING COMMITTEE (PWOC)
Scope and Content Note: “We felt very badly and we fought it.” AMC&BW was rather slow. PWOC “organizers were younger, more ambitious, more Marxist trained, more willing to sacrifice.”

RELATIVE STRENGTH OF AMC&BW AND THE PWOC
Scope and Content Note: Schachter feels AMC&BW was just as successful as PWOC/UPWA in organizing basic packing.

SCHACHTER'S OPPOSITION TO MERGER WITH UPWA
Scope and Content Note: He did not like UPWA's system of organizing. He felt charters should be issued by geographic area, not by individual plants as UPWA did. Strength, diversity and service come from the latter, while a strike can put the whole local out of work when the local constitutes only one plant. Schachter resigned from the merger committee because UPWA would not agree to geographic charters. Schachter feels AMC&BW bargaining unit locals are not as strong as its geographic area locals. The H.J. Heinz Company in Pittsburgh is a case in point; it would be stronger if it had organized other processing plants in the area.

AMC&BW BARGAINING UNIT LOCALS
Scope and Content Note: In Philadelphia, there is Local 195, the mother local. There is the local of Acme Markets (American Stores) which insisted on their own charter. There is Local 196, a catchall local which organized wall to wall in the retail industry. And, finally, there is Local 125, which has only Oscar Mayer workers. Locals like 125 and the Acme Markets are not organizing locals since their jurisdiction is so limited.

GEOGRAPHIC AS OPPOSED TO BARGAINING UNIT CHARTERS
Scope and Content Note: A local with a geographic jurisdiction “has a mission and an ambition to grow.” Had the “UPWA had the system we did, they would have been as strong as we were.” A union cannot have enough staff to organize and service properly when it is done from the top down. Recently Local 56 organized cafeteria workers; “they came to us” because Local 56 was the only union they knew.

AMC&BW AND UPWA RAIDING
Scope and Content Note: There was not that much raiding. If an AMC&BW local was ambitious, it would attempt a raid and the UPWA would retaliate. UPWA did not try to organize in retail poultry.

UPWA MASTER AGREEMENTS AND IOWA BEEF PROCESSORS (IBP)
Scope and Content Note: The UPWA was successful in getting industry-wide agreements, “but it was also their downfall.” Packing suffered when it failed to achieve a master agreement with IBP.

BOXED BEEF
Scope and Content Note: IBP introduced this system. Instead of shipping sides or quarters to the store where butchers would make the cuts, boxed beef is already cut when it arrives at the store. The bone and the fat are therefore not shipped. Boxed beef shipped in chemicals, so it does not have to be frozen.

MORE ON PACKING'S PROBLEMS WITH IBP AND INDUSTRY CHANGES
Scope and Content Note: Packing houses have been moved to where the cattle are raised. Also, IBP feels its new system of boxed beef requires less skill and should be paid less. AMC&BW made many compromises with local packers who are suffering now because of the disappearance of stockyards.

CHANGES PREDICTED IN THE MEAT INDUSTRY
Scope and Content Note: Frozen meat has not been well received, but it will be because it holds the flavor better than boxed beef. Indeed, most restaurants already serve mostly frozen meat. Schachter always wanted the union to be prepared for and to accommodate industry changes. Meat will follow the path of other branches of the food industry; all preparation will be done outside the store. Portion control-packers.

END OF TAPE 1, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

MORE ON CHANGES IN THE MEAT PACKING INDUSTRY
Scope and Content Note: It is much cheaper to move dressed beef than live cattle. There is a more rational system now in terms of having the right number of cattle or poultry ready for slaughter on a given day. An integrated, controlled system.

RAIDING VERSUS ORGANIZING
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW was concerned with raiding the company union (the International Brotherhood of Swift Employees). Raiding is not easy. The industry is not fully organized; “there is still room.” Local 56 is not finished organizing. The food industry is not organized. Some supermarket chains (like Winn Dixie) and some poultry plants stand out as unorganized.

DETERMINING FACTORS IN A NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB) ELECTION BETWEEN UPWA AND AMC&BW
Scope and Content Note: The AMC&BW would win when its presence was already felt in the community -- butchers, service, better strike benefits. While UPWA was very skilled at servicing from the top down, it was “too thin,” and the grievance procedure was too cumbersome.

COOPERATION BETWEEN AMC&BW AND UPWA
Scope and Content Note: Not much. There was more cooperation towards the end of the rivalry, where they would sit in on each other's bargaining and promise not to undercut. AMC&BW local autonomy worked against cooperation to some extent. Schachter's district had no national packers and thus was little concerned with national cooperation between the two unions.

AMC&BW REACTION TO 1948 UPWA STRIKE
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW felt smug. AMC&BW people were satisfied with what they had negotiated. UPWA should have settled, just as the Packing Division should have settled later with IBP.

1956 MERGER
Scope and Content Note: “They wanted more than they were entitled to; they didn't have the membership.” Schachter's district opposed merger. Gorman was not really for it.

PAT GORMAN, JESSE PROSTEN AND THE 1968 MERGER
Scope and Content Note: Gorman “lost a whole generation for us.” Gorman and UPWA's Prosten saw to it that UPWA President Ralph Helstein had a small role in the merged union and, as a result, Helstein resigned.

COMPARISON OF 1956 AND 1968 MERGERS
Scope and Content Note: Poor preparation in the districts in 1956. In 1968, the preparation work had been done and the votes were there. “I'm not so sure he (Gorman) wanted it” in 1956. If he had wanted it, he would have worked harder to convince the AMC&BW convention delegates before the convention met.

1968 MERGER
Scope and Content Note: UPWA influence was declining. AMC&BW was healthy. Gorman by this time “was ready for it,” and he really pushed for it, pushing Schachter to the point where he resigned from the merger committee. Schachter wanted to integrate the locals and the most Gorman would force UPWA to accept was a merger of small locals. There was very little opposition in the AMC&BW to the 1968 merger. Schachter voiced his opposition within the leadership but made no attempt to drum up opposition outside the leadership. “It's not my way to build up outside forces,” even though there were some who urged him to do so. There was still some opposition to the left-wing orientation of the UPWA. The compromise on this issue was to have co-directors of the Packing Division, though AMC&BW's man died shortly thereafter. Retail butchers did not really care about the merger; “they had their own...dukedoms.”

WHY IT TOOK SO LONG FOR UPWA AND AMC&BW TO MERGE
Scope and Content Note: “They were the intruders” into the industry, “and it took long for the bitterness to die.” UPWA had internal problems; “they had to elect their lawyer to be their president because they couldn't agree as to who would be (president) among themselves. We had no problem of that sort; we were a very cohesive union.” “We came out of our Board meetings intact.” UPWA's Anthony Stephens was working both sides because he was so bitter. UPWA did not want to be absorbed, “and we didn't want to give them equal status.” There was no actual decision made by AMC&BW to wait for UPWA to decline to the point where merger would be on AMC&BW's terms.

RELATIONS AFTER THE MERGER WERE PRETTY GOOD
Scope and Content Note: The only problem was with the Packing Division after AMC&BW's Packing Director died. In Schachter's area, there were no problems because there were not many big packers. “They were successful in moving some of their top rank and file officers to the left. So they were able to hold on that way.”

WHY AMC&BW AND THE RETAIL CLERKS INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION (RCIA) WERE UNABLE TO WORK OUT AN EFFECTIVE JURISDICTIONAL AGREEMENT
Scope and Content Note: Both unions had autonomous locals and the top officers could not force them to abide by agreements made at the international union level.

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

AMC&BW MERGER WITH RCIA
Scope and Content Note: Schachter knew RCIA President Jim Housewright very well and they got along very well. “We needed a merger; we needed a newness to our union.” Because of the lost generation of leadership referred to previously, AMC&BW's “leadership was becoming weak.” Gorman gave Schachter the go ahead to talk merger with Housewright. “Maybe in the end he was kind of sorry, but it got out of his hands.” The two unions accommodated each other by agreeing at the beginning that they “would take the best out of both worlds” in regard to pensions, health and welfare plans, etc., for staff. Some former UPWA people were opposed to the merger. The merger would create “a much stronger force in the food industry,” but some freedom was lost -- the large size of the new union requires a more bureaucratic structure. One thing that helped pull off the merger was the agreement that eight AMC&BW vice-presidents would have to resign in order to bring in younger people. Schachter favored this, even though he was one of the eight. RCIA was willing to accommodate “most of our objectives.” There is yet a lot of work to be done merging on the local level. Schachter has effected merger of the Pennsylvania state organizations.

SCHACHTER'S HOPES FOR THE NEW UNITED FOOD AND COMMERCIAL WORKERS UNION (UFCW)
Scope and Content Note: Hopefully, UFCW will be a more progressive organization; “we were getting a little old and less progressive.” Hopefully also, UFCW will be stronger within the councils of the AFL-CIO. Evidence of this is already available -- a healthy Food and Beverage Department within the AFL-CIO. Hopefully too, mergers of other unions will create a new dominant factor in the AFL-CIO, rather than the traditional dominance of the building trades, whose conservatism Schachter does not like. He hopes the creation of UFCW will be a step toward making the labor movement a “movement, a force” to be reckoned with once again. The labor movement is about the only factor left in American society which can really represent people and can work for a better life for all -- cleaner air and water, etc. “The trade union movement can and must make the difference because there is no one else to do it.” For example, the AMC&BW led the fight for poultry inspection; there is still no law regulating the quality and healthfulness of fish.

SCHACHTER'S UNION PHILOSOPHY
Scope and Content Note: “We are a movement of wanting a better life within the capitalist system...and there's room for that.” He sees no better system available and sees no other movement in the United States to lead America to a better life. One of his reasons for favoring the merger with RCIA was to set the labor movement in this direction.

WHY IT TOOK SO LONG FOR AMC&BW AND RCIA TO MERGE
Scope and Content Note: Gorman stood in the way. He did not want to share leadership.

PATRICK GORMAN
Scope and Content Note: He was a rebel and liked it; that is why he never got a seat on the AFL-CIO Executive Council. Gorman was a complicated man, a good man. Schachter is grateful to Gorman for giving him the opportunity to become a labor leader and permitting him to go to Turkey as a diplomat. It is difficult to criticize him on the one hand and love him on the other.

ABSENCE OF THE RETAIL, WHOLESALE AND DEPARTMENT STORE WORKERS UNION (RWDSW) FROM THE UFCW MERGER
Scope and Content Note: Their official reason was the high dues structure, but the will might not have been there amongst the leadership either.

GORMAN DID NOT GIVE UP AUTHORITY WHEN HE RETIRED
Scope and Content Note: Schachter refused to run for president of AMC&BW when Harry Poole was elected (1976) because he knew he would either have to be subservient to Gorman or else fight him all the time.

IOWA BEEF PROCESSORS AND AMC&BW'S INEFFECTIVE LEADERSHIP
Scope and Content Note: There was a reasonable offer made early on, but Poole and Secretary-Treasurer Talarico did not have the courage to force the settlement on the Packing Division and its Director, Jesse Prosten.

SCHACHTER AND THE FUR AND LEATHER WORKERS
Scope and Content Note: Leadership has to take a stand sometimes. Schachter, for instance, had no problems with the Fur and Leather Marxists after they merged with AMC&BW because he was firm. In fact, he moved one of their organizers, Johnny Russell, from Pennsylvania to North Carolina where he built a 5,000 member local. He was an excellent organizer, but he had to be sent to where organizing was needed, otherwise he would cause trouble.

AMC&BW AND RCIA RAIDING
Scope and Content Note: Not much raiding, but they often intervened in each other's NLRB elections. The two unions did often work together in organizing situations; Schachter almost always engaged in cooperative organizing within Local 56's jurisdiction.

MORE ON SCHACHTER AND THE TEAMSTERS
Scope and Content Note: “I proved the fact that the Teamsters were our best friends.” Schachter once introduced a resolution to bring the Teamsters back into the AFL-CIO. AFL-CIO President George Meany remarked, “I can't understand you, Schachter; you're persona grata both places.”

END OF TAPE 2, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

AMC&BW AND TEAMSTERS JOINT ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Scope and Content Note: The organizing efforts of this joint committee were very successful. When Schachter returned from Turkey, Gorman asked him to work out some kind of agreement with the Teamsters because the Teamsters were threatening to raid AMC&BW. Schachter, Poole and Max Osslo made up the committee to seek cooperation. Based on his experience in New Jersey, Schachter suggested that organizing was the best way to effect cooperation between unions. Each union put $100,000 into an organizing fund. Schachter was co-chair of the joint committee, with the Teamsters' Harold Gibbons, who was rather inactive. To the surprise of many, Teamsters President Jimmy Hoffa was very receptive to the idea.

ANECDOTE ABOUT THE AMERICANA HOTEL
Scope and Content Note: Schachter knew the owner, who asked him to try to bring some business his way. He agreed and held the first meeting of the Joint Organizing Committee at the Americana. In return, the owner permitted his hotels to become union. For his friendliness with unions, the owner was expelled from his country club.

ANECDOTE ABOUT THE FIRST MEETING OF THE JOINT ORGANIZING COMMITTEE AND JIMMY HOFFA'S ATTENDANCE
Scope and Content Note: Schachter was to chair the meeting, and “they scared the devil out of me. 'When Hoffa comes in, you better be careful. He's going to take over, and he's going to do this, and he's going to do that.'” Schachter decided to establish his leadership role from the beginning, and Hoffa accepted it.

SUCCESS OF THE JOINT ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Scope and Content Note: Organized the poultry industry on the eastern shore of Maryland. In order to make it worth the Teamsters' while, they got dock workers and the like in addition to truck drivers. The Committee used organizers from within rather than established organizers. This was very successful because these people were ambitious. The Committee organized many small groups previously ignored.

THIS FORMAL RELATIONSHIP WAS BROKEN UP ON ORDER OF GEORGE MEANY WHEN THE TEAMSTERS WERE EXPELLED FROM THE AFL-CIO
Scope and Content Note: Schachter resigned as the AMC&BW's contact with the Teamsters because he was ashamed to have to obey Meany's order. He still attended Teamster conventions and maintained good relations with them. Meany permitted Schachter to get away with more than he would have permitted Gorman because Schachter was not as big a leader and because Meany was very pleased with the job Schachter had done in keeping the Turkish labor movement from going communist.

ANECDOTE ABOUT SCHACHTER'S RETIREMENT LUNCHEON WHICH SHOWS THE VALUE OF UNIONISM
Scope and Content Note: The 73-year-old former chief steward of the farm workers' section of Local 56 said, “Mr. Schachter was the greatest man I ever met, not because he gave me a raise in pay or because I still collect my pension check...but because he gave me dignity.”

ANECDOTE ABOUT ORGANIZING GENERAL FOODS COFFEE WORKERS
Scope and Content Note: Because they were paid well, they were supposed to be impossible to organize. Schachter worked with the International Longshoremen's Association on this campaign. These workers were organized because “as one worker expressed himself...'I can come here (to the union office) and say what I want about the company which I can't do over there.'” Later, when the company automated, the union saw to it that no one lost a job.

AMC&BW AND THE TEAMSTERS BROUGHT COMPLEMENTARY ATTRIBUTES TO THE JOINT ORGANIZING COMMITTEE
Scope and Content Note: Schachter and the AMC&BW had the muscle to convince people to express themselves and to give people dignity through unionism. The Teamsters had the muscle “to deliver the goods.” There should be another Teamsters-Butchers joint organizing committee.

TEAMSTERS AND THE ORGANIZATION OF FARM WORKERS
Scope and Content Note: Teamsters President Frank Fitzsimmons was hurt when the Catholic Church endorsed Cesar Chavez and the United Farm Workers (UFW) because Fitzsimmons' wife was a devout Catholic. Schachter told him the UFW had the right to organize farm workers, and he was not so sure the Teamsters would really try to organize every farm worker. It would have been best if the Teamsters and the UFW had cooperated. Chavez is more of a crusader than an organizer.

SCHACHTER'S THEORY OF NEGOTIATING
Scope and Content Note: Be tough but flexible at the bargaining table. The union and management are adversaries at the table, but the signed contract is a peace treaty. He wanted his companies to be successful so he could come back to them for more next time. “I am good friends with every employer I ever negotiated with.” “I'm for improving my lot without hurting the other guy.”

TEAMSTER CORRUPTION
Scope and Content Note: Hoffa claimed he had a right to employ anyone he wanted, and that the government expected him to be the policeman, the judge and the jury. “'You say he (a Teamster organizer) is a mobster.... Why is he walking around the streets?'” Schachter thought Hoffa was a prisoner of circumstances, not a mobster himself. Hoffa was “the best of labor leaders, as related to the rank and file, that I've ever met....” The muscle the Teamsters employed to help organize was not easy to control.

ANECDOTE TO ILLUSTRATE HOFFA'S CLOSENESS TO THE RANK AND FILE
Scope and Content Note: Teamsters were crossing an AMC&BW picket line in Scranton, Pennsylvania. The AMC&BW steward asked Schachter to call Hoffa and put an end to it. Schachter told him Hoffa was a very busy man and one cannot just call him up. The steward himself went to the phone and got Hoffa on the other end without delay. Hoffa promised the picket line would be honored. “I was stunned.” Hoffa “was the best rank and file leader that I ever met in my life.” “They adored him, as he adored them.”

THERE WAS NEVER ANY SERIOUS TALK ABOUT MERGING WITH THE TEAMSTERS

AMC&BW WAS A GOOD UNION “WITH REAL FINE IDEOLOGY, ALL DUE TO PAT GORMAN”

SCHACHTER AS A POSSIBLE CANDIDATE FOR AMC&BW PRESIDENT IN 1976
Scope and Content Note: He asked Gorman if he was ready to really give up authority. Gorman said no, and Schachter decided not to run. “I couldn't possibly see myself fighting a man who made me, and I couldn't possibly see myself being a non-entity.”

END OF TAPE 3, SIDE 1
Note: Tape 3, Side 2 is blank.

INTRODUCTION

ORGANIZING BANQUET BRAND FOODS
Scope and Content Note: This drive grew out of the Teamsters-Butchers Joint Organizing Committee. Banquet Brands was strongly resisting the organizing attempt. Under the threat of losing shelf space in organized chain stores, the company finally agreed to stop hindering organization. Good relations have existed since signing the first contract. The Teamsters and AMC&BW still negotiate jointly with Banquet Brands. Also, there is a joint Teamsters-AMC&BW Management Committee designed to avoid arbitrations.

AMC&BW MERGER WITH THE FUR AND LEATHER WORKERS (1954-55)
Scope and Content Note: A troublesome merger. The international Ladies' Garment Workers (ILGWU) and the AFL opposed it. The ILGWU thought it should have Fur and Leather Workers since they worked on garments. The AFL gave the AMC&BW a list of communists who would have to resign in order to get its approval for merger. Most of them did resign. The Fur and Leather Workers had, at best, 60,000-70,000 members. They were absorbed simply by creating a separate division for them. The “deep-seated Marxists” in Fur and Leather opposed the merger. However, they created little trouble after merger. Even if Meany had tried to expel the AMC&BW for this merger, the AMC&BW had many friends, like the Teamsters, in the AFL who might have prevented expulsion. Furthermore, the AMC&BW could have gone to the CIO. Fur and Leather had many non-communists and many talented people, including the current director of District 1.

EXPULSION OF VICE-PRESIDENT MAX BLOCK
Scope and Content Note: Max organized retail and his brother Lew organized wholesale. During World War II, they opened a restaurant called the “Black Angus” at a time when meat was hard to get for most people. Lew finally decided to give up his local and turned it over to Max. Complaints within the local then surfaced, and the local was placed in receivership. Max was called to appear before the McClellan Committee, and it was revealed he owned a country club. He then resigned from the AMC&BW Executive Board. Irving Stern, from the Fur and Leather Division, became head of one of the Block locals. Block was a good leader and a cooperative guy.

BOYCOTTS
Scope and Content Note: If a truck is picketed, the people who unload the truck can refuse to do so. However, there has to be a picket present; the driver or dockworker cannot refuse to unload simply because he heard there was a strike on the product carried in the truck or at the place where delivery is being made.

AMC&BW WAS SUCCESSFUL AS A MERGING UNION BECAUSE OF ITS PHILOSOPHY AND BECAUSE OF PAT GORMAN

MORE ON MAX BLOCK
Scope and Content Note: Gorman was going to be called in as a witness before the McClellan Committee, and Schachter and others spoke with the Committee's attorney, Robert Kennedy, who advised them to get Gorman out of town. Block was “a nice guy.” He did what he did for money.

AMC&BW STRUCTURE COMMITTEE WHICH CAME OUT OF THE 1972 CONVENTION
Scope and Content Note: Many questions arose at the convention and the leadership decided to set up a Structure Committee to study the union structure and respond to the many controversial resolutions that came up. Schachter chaired the Committee and held hearings. He started by asking Gorman what his job consisted of and then worked his way down the line. The Executive Board finally adopted, with one dissent, the final report of the Committee.

END OF TAPE 4, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

CHANGES IN THE AMC&BW IN THE 1970'S
Scope and Content Note: Mergers brought in different personalities with different philosophies. The Advisory Council was the result of these changes. The 1972 AMC&BW Convention “was the most troublesome from the point of view of conflicting resolutions.” These resolutions were handled by creation of the Structure Committee, and this Committee went on to study the districts, their size and staff and also the International's use of per capita, etc. “The opposition” at the convention did not have enough votes to pass these resolutions, but the administration decided not “to ram it down the throats of the minority.” Amongst other things the Structure Committee recommended combining the Women's Department with the Civil Rights Department.

THE AGE OF AMC&BW AND THE CHANGING TIMES AFFECTED THE UNION
Scope and Content Note: Schachter's district, for instance, organized an Equal Rights Amendment march in Virginia.

AMC&BW AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
Scope and Content Note: Locals appreciated the autonomy the International gave them. Receiverships were usually “friendly” If asked what union he belonged to, a member of Local 56 would say “Local 56,” but he would know that local was affiliated with the AMC&BW. The UPWA locals, on the other hand, identified first with the International and second with the local.

AMC&BW ORGANIZING OF PACKING PLANTS
Scope and Content Note: Packing plant organizing was directed by the International, often with the assistance of locals, especially if a local was to accrue new membership because of the organizing.

AMC&BW, “THE SINGINGEST UNION” IN THE AFL-CIO
Scope and Content Note: Schachter recites a song, “We're the Amalmated Meat Cutters, and Butcher Workmen too,” credited to Pat Gorman. “The genius of Pat Gorman was to hold it together on that kind of thing” (camaraderie as illustrated by the song). Some would also claim AMC&BW was “the drinkingest union.” Camaraderie and good fellowship existed in the AMC&BW as witnessed nowhere else. When AMC&BW merged with another union, the newcomers “were embraced into this camaraderie.”

AMC&BW'S LOW PER CAPITA
Scope and Content Note: Per capita tax stayed at one dollar from 1926 until about 1950. There were some special assessments, but mainly, the per capita was kept low because local unions took care of themselves.

JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS BETWEEN AMC&BW LOCALS - ST. LOUIS
Scope and Content Note: These problems were handled case by case. No master plan to deal with such problems was ever worked out. St. Louis Local 88 not only had good wages, but an early welfare program and strong restrictions on their work; it kept out boxed beef, for instance. The St. Louis packinghouse local, Local 545, was jealous of the strength of Local 88. The conflict between the two mainly involved personalities.

LOCAL 56 FOLLOWED ITS PLANTS BEYOND ITS JURISDICTION
Scope and Content Note: It now has plants in three states. When General Foods closed three plants in New York-New Jersey, Local 56 followed the company to the location of its new plants. Schachter found out that the plant moving to Dover, Delaware, was permitting foremen to transfer employment and to have a few days off to look for a new home, etc. He insisted the same privilege be extended to shop stewards, and the company was embarrassed into compliance. Thus, 27 stewards were transferred to Dover, and organization of the new plant was easy. Since there was no AMC&BW union in Dover, the International could not object to Local 56 following this plant outside New Jersey. AMC&BW's Campbell Soup local in Salisbury, Maryland, was being raided by the Teamsters. When Local 56 took over jurisdiction of the plant, the Teamsters “walked away.” “Now who was going to complain. Rather than losing 500 workers, we retained them.”

SCHACHTER'S ORGANIZING TECHNIQUES
Scope and Content Note: When organizing a new employer, he could encourage that employer to contact Seabrook Farms, General Foods, or Campbell Soup to “find out what kind of union we are.”

MORE ON LOCAL 56
Scope and Content Note: The Local's annual report lists all the plants organized and all the chief stewards. This gives the membership an accounting.

MORE ON AMC&BW AND LOCAL AUTONOMY
Scope and Content Note: “It was a loose, democratic, friendly international union. You organized people; they loved it.” The International had authority to put locals in receivership if the members were suffering, but the International was reluctant to exercise this authority.

END OF TAPE 4, SIDE 2

INTRODUCTION

AMC&BW'S CAMPAIGN FOR A GENERAL POULTRY INSPECTION LAW
Scope and Content Note: Employers “were deathly afraid of it.” Some states opposed it, feeling their own laws were sufficient. When Schachter started in the business, the poultry was sold live, and slaughtered on the spot; so the customer knew it was a fresh bird. Complaints from members about unclean slaughtering circumstances led to a study which showed that many poultry diseases were communicable to humans. Some clean employers did support the inspection law campaign. Kosher poultry dealers in New York opposed the law. The rabbis, in fact, were stricter inspectors than government inspectors. The Empire Poultry Company, in Pennsylvania, is organized and completely kosher. It employs 25 rabbis who serve as inspectors as they butcher. They are stricter than the government inspectors, and the company gets more money for its chickens than others. Empire Poultry supported AMC&BW inspection efforts. Schachter's father, a poultry slaughtering rabbi, claimed United States' meat was more kosher than anywhere else in the world because “we can afford to be very choosy.” In Europe, for instance, the rabbi would be a little more lax if condemnation of an animal would have a severe economic impact on a small-time butcher or farmer.

AMC&BW EXECUTIVE BOARD KEPT ITS DISPUTES WITHIN THE BOARD MEETINGS IN ORDER TO PRESENT A UNITED FRONT TO THE MEMBERSHIP
Scope and Content Note: The Executive Board was cohesive, but it was not a rubber stamp.

MIDLAND JOINT COUNCIL
Scope and Content Note: This Council did not have a geographic area or a trade union purpose. “Gorman just let it happen...a big mistake.” It was basically a political caucus and came to wield considerable power; it attracted anyone who “had anything in opposition.” The Midland Joint Council was part of the reason for establishing the Structure Committee in 1972. One of the recommendations of the Structure Committee was not to charter any more councils like this one.

SCHACHTER'S DISTRICT COUNCIL
Scope and Content Note: A seven-man Executive Council and an Advisory Committee of the chief executive officers of all locals in the District (about 30). Annual conferences and biennial elections. This Council passed a strong resolution against construction of unsafe nuclear plants (a position the UFCW does not like), a resolution in favor of the Equal Rights Amendment, etc. Speakers, general resolutions outside actual collective bargaining, assistance to locals which are organizing, etc. are the purposes of the Council.

RETAIL JOINT COUNCIL OF PHILADELPHIA AND VICINITY
Scope and Content Note: Five cents operational per capita, plus five cent strike fund per capita. When there is a strike, the Council matches the International Union's strike benefits. The main function is joint bargaining. Employers formed an association in response. At one time, it had a uniform agreement. Employees all contribute to the same health and welfare and pension funds, thus giving these plans considerable portability. There is also Council-wide seniority.

FILLING AMC&BW EXECUTIVE BOARD VACANCIES
Scope and Content Note: Usually filled upon Gorman's recommendation. In later years, the Board tried to select people from the Advisory Council, since it was viewed as a training ground.

WHY GORMAN FINALLY RETIRED
Scope and Content Note: A resolution was passed which prohibited re-election after age 68.

NEW TOP OFFICERS IN 1976
Scope and Content Note: Harry Poole was selected by Gorman because of his seniority and because he would not try to thwart Gorman's continued control of the union. Talarico was also picked personally by Gorman to be secretary-treasurer, probably on the advice of Vice-President Emmett Kelly. Again, Gorman felt he could control Talarico. Schachter might have considered running for president if someone else had been selected secretary-treasurer.

AMC&BW OFFICERSHIPS
Scope and Content Note: Gorman became secretary-treasurer when Dennis Lane died because the power of the purse made that position the most powerful one in the AMC&BW. Presidents from then on were selected mainly by seniority.

WHY GORMAN WAS NEVER ELECTED TO THE AFL-CIO EXECUTIVE COUNCIL
Scope and Content Note: The AFL-CIO had a nominating committee to select Council members, and Meany had some influence on that committee. Gorman often challenged Meany, and that predisposed Meany to oppose selection of Gorman. Schachter considers only one instance of Gorman opposition to Meany to be particularly unjustified. Meany condemned a newspaper which purported to be a labor newspaper but actually was “a racket paper which was getting ads for supposedly keeping peace in the family of labor.” Gorman, because the editor was a personal friend of Max Block's, pleaded with the AFL-CIO Executive Council to forgive him. Schachter feels that incident was the crucial factor in preventing appointment of Gorman to the Council. Also, Gorman was “a kind of controversial guy...that would have gone outside after the Council meeting and talked to the press.” Meany and Gorman, however, were good friends. Merger with the Fur and Leather Workers, editorial in the Butcher Workman which disagreed with AFL-CIO policy, and other such things frightened Meany. Meany was a very strong labor leader. Gorman was not a strong labor leader, but more of a philosopher with socialist leanings. Gorman liked to write and wrote thousands of letters, usually flowery and complimentary.

END OF TAPE 5, SIDE 1

INTRODUCTION

AMC&BW GOOD RELATIONS WITH RETAIL CHAINS
Scope and Content Note: AMC&BW had a philosophy that being on opposite sides of a bargaining table did not make labor and management enemies. Outside of negotiations, the union often worked with management, like on legislation. The foundation of the good relationship was in Gorman's opposition to the chain store tax. This opened the door to organizing A & P. “So Pat was known as a cooperator; our union, therefore, was known as a cooperator.” The employers' “success is our success.”

THE CONDITION OF THE BIG RETAIL CHAINS TODAY
Scope and Content Note: A & P had a philosophy that it had to have a store in every town. A & P remained within the family too long.” It did not have outside management, did not grow and did not close stores that should have been closed. It is now German owned and making a comeback with new ideas. The Germans understand how to tailor a store to its clientele. A & P's old leadership was old and tired. In general, chain stores are being taken over by new managements. Community changes often affect store closings. Area and location have a good deal to do with retail store success. Another big factor is merchandise “shrink” -- that is, shoplifting and other disappearance of merchandise. Independents have an advantage in this area because the owner is usually on the site and can watch the employees and the inventory more closely.

WINN DIXIE
Scope and Content Note: The union won one store in Jacksonville, Florida, but by the time the various appeals were completed, “there was not a single person left in that store.” Recently did sign an agreement with Winn Dixie in which AMC&BW agreed not to boycott in exchange for a warehouse and “a couple things.” However, Winn Dixie immediately applied the new rates to all unorganized sectors of the company. Labor law reform will be necessary before stores with this type of management can be organized.

ORGANIZING BY THE INTERNATIONAL
Scope and Content Note: The International will put on a concerted drive in an area only where there is a chance or where a local has made a start. “There is not a decision by the International, 'Let's go after Publix markets.'” There has got to be a “bite” first.

THE BIG PACKERS WERE NO MORE ANTI-UNION THAN BIG COMPANIES IN OTHER INDUSTRIES
Scope and Content Note: Without any socialist traditions, American companies did not understand unionism and resisted it.

MORE ON SEABROOK FARMS
Scope and Content Note: Referred to as “the Ford of agriculture,” Seabrook, in fact, did not sign with the union until after Ford Motor Company had signed with the United Auto Workers. When the Food and Tobacco Workers tried to organize Seabrook, two deaths occurred. When C.F. Seabrook found out Schachter was an anti-communist, he became less opposed to AMC&BW organizing his company.

THE BIG PACKERS PUT ON THEIR BIG PUSH AGAINST UNIONS PRIOR TO THE 1930'S

THE ABILITY OF AMC&BW TO GROW IN THE 1950'S AND 1960'S WHILE OTHER UNIONS LOST MEMBERS
Scope and Content Note: Again, due to local autonomy. To be a successful enterprise, a local union must grow. The only income is dues; and the more dues, the more staff, the better service, etc.

ANECDOTE ABOUT CHARLES KING, ONE OF THE FIRST ORGANIZERS SCHACHTER HIRED FOR LOCAL 56
Scope and Content Note: A butcher in Trenton, New Jersey, King had attended Princeton for three years, was young, handsome and intelligent. His first assignment was to arrange a meeting for the employees of a local Stokely plant. The meeting had a very high turnout of enthusiastic employees. Schachter asked him how he was able to arrange such a large meeting in so short a time. He answered that he had posted a notice on the company bulletin board, “like we always do.” He did not realize that the situation was usually different in an unorganized shop than it was in his own union shop.

THERE WAS NO OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZING OUTSIDE BASIC MEAT

ORGANIZATION OF H.J. HEINZ COMPANY, PITTSBURGH
Scope and Content Note: It was organized by Marxist organizer after an extensive battle. The owner refused to sign a contract. The AMC&BW went to court and got a landmark decision from the Supreme Court which stated that if an employer reached an agreement with a union, the agreement must be put in writing.

AMC&BW MEMBERSHIP IN BASIC PACKING DID NOT DECLINE DURING THE 1960'S LIKE UPWA'S DID
Scope and Content Note: This was due to the fact that AMC&BW organized many independents and did not confine itself to the big packers like UPWA did.

SMALLER PACKERS ARE NOW DECLINING
Scope and Content Note: Big packers are beginning to dominate by moving their operations to the source of meat. Description of the plight of a small-time kosher packer in Philadelphia who has been forced to go out of business.

END OF INTERVIEW