On March 18, 1953, the clubs of professional baseball's National League unanimously agreed to the transfer of the Braves franchise from Boston to Milwaukee. The Braves played their opening game at Milwaukee on April 14, 1953, and during the ensuing 12 seasons the team played before a home attendance of 18,996,059, or an annual average of 1,583,000 fans. In 1953, attendance reached 1,826,397, when the Braves finished in second place in the League. Attendance topped 2,000,000 in each of the following four years, when the Braves were third, second, second, and first place in the League. In 1958, when the Braves again won the pennant, attendance was 1,971,101. Beginning the next year, however, the Braves dropped in the standings and attendance fell considerably. Although not directly referred to as an element of the legal case, the lagging attendance in Milwaukee was a major reason for the team's move to Atlanta, located in a growing area of the country then without a major league baseball team.
In 1962, a new corporation acquired the team and franchise for $6,218,480. Attendance increased during the next two years, although the team's standings did not. On October 21, 1964, the team's board of directors voted to request the National League's permission to transfer the franchise to Atlanta. The other nine clubs of the National League authorized the transfer, effective with the 1966 season. The club's offices were moved to Atlanta in 1966, and the team played its home games there.
The State of Wisconsin sued the Braves, the National League, and the corporate owners of the clubs of the National League, in state circuit court on August 6, 1965, charging a violation of the state's anti-trust laws. (The full title of case was: State of Wisconsin vs. Milwaukee Braves, Inc.; Chicago National League Ball Club; Cincinnati Reds, Inc.; Houston Sports Association, Inc.; Los Angeles Dodgers, Inc.; Metropolitan Baseball Club, Inc.; Philadelphia National League Club; St. Louis National Baseball Club, Inc.; Pittsburgh Athletic Co., Inc.; National Exhibition Co., Inc.; National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, an unincorporated association .) On August 26, 1965, the defendant clubs and league petitioned to remove the case to the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin; the State moved to remand the case to circuit court five days later. Following remand of the case to the circuit court on November 9, and preliminary legal skirmishing, the issues were tried without a jury in April 1966.
In its argument, the State charged that the defendants, who held a monopoly in the field of major league baseball, had agreed to shut down baseball in Milwaukee in restraint of trade and commerce in violation of the State's anti-trust laws. The plaintiffs sought monetary damages, a restraining order preventing the Braves' move to Atlanta, and a permanent injunction requiring the defendants to grant a new franchise to Milwaukee or permit purchase of the Braves by local interests. The State alleged that the National and American Leagues and their member clubs had engaged in a group boycott of applicants for a franchise to continue major league baseball in Milwaukee. Willard S. Stafford, of the Stafford, Rosenbaum, Rieser, and Hansen law firm, was special counsel for the State of Wisconsin (acting through the Attorney General's office) during this action.
In an April 13, 1966, decision Judge Elmer W. Roller found that the defendants had violated the State's anti-trust laws (1963 Wisconsin Statutes Sect. 133.01), and awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $5,000 against each defendant. The court also restrained and enjoined the Braves from playing in any city other than Milwaukee, then stayed the order pending submission of a written plan for expansion of the National League to permit major league baseball to be played in Milwaukee in 1967.
The Milwaukee Braves and other defendants-appellants appealed to the Wisconsin Supreme Court, where the judgment was reversed. The majority was divided on the reasoning for its decision; some members concluded that the federal law preempted the operation of Wisconsin anti-trust statutes, which thus could not be applied to the defendants-appellants, while other justices felt that enforcement of the State's anti-trust laws would unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.
In December 1966, the State of Wisconsin petitioned unsuccessfully for a writ of certiorari to take the case to the U.S. Supreme Court. After that petition was denied, the State then petitioned unsuccessfully for rehearing on the Court's order, and the case was ended.
