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Baldwin, M. W. (ed.) / Volume I: The first hundred years
(1969)
XVI: The career of Nur-ad-Din, pp. 513-527
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Page 514
514 A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES I 2 Ibn-aI-Athir, Atãbeks (RHC, Or., II, part z), p. 158.~ On the Second Crusade, see above, chapter Xv. with many precautions, met outside Aleppo and came to a friendly agreement, or not, it is clear that Saif-ad-Din accepted the situation.2 Nür-ad-Din had, in fact, gained the support not only of the regular regiments of Aleppo but also of the Yürük Turkoman tribes who had recently migrated into northern Syria, and was already able at the time of the attack on Edessa to put an army of 10,000 horsemen in the field. So powerful a force not only guaranteed his independence against his brother, though it would appear that Saif-ad-DIn was regarded forwally as Nür-ad-Din's suzerain during his lifetime, but also convinced Unur of the advantages of a reconciliation with him. In the following March the two Syrian princes were united by Nür-ad-DIn's marriage with Unur's daughter; al-YaghislyanI at Hamah returned to his former allegiance; and the alliance was signalized by joint operations in May against the Franks in the Hauran, where a rebel governor, Altintash, had sought assistance from Jerusalem. Back in the north, Nür-ad-Din prepared to defend himself against a more powerful rival. The Selchükid sultan of RUm ("Rome", central Anatolia), Mas'üd (1116—1155), now at peace with Manuel, was turning his arms southwards and engaging the northern garrisons of Antioch. NUr-ad-Din joined in, to occupy the fortresses in the ' AfrIn valley south of ' Azãz and on the eastern fringe of the cAmuq depression, followed, in spite of Raymond's attempted counter-attack, by the capture of Hãb and Kafarlãthã, which guarded the passage from the Rugia valley to the plain of Aleppo. But before the end of 1147 the news of the approaching Second Crusade brought operations to an end, as all parties in Syria awaited, in hope or fear, what it might bring.~ How far, even yet, the Moslem princes were from the conviction of a common cause against the "infidel" is shown by the absence of any consultations or arrangements for mutual defense. It was not until the decision to attack Damascus became known that Unur sent out appeals for assistance. The panic caused at Aleppo and Damascus by the early reports of the vast host on the way had already been alleviated by the disasters in Asia Minor, and was even giving place to some degree of confidence when the forces actually engaged in the campaign were found to be so much smaller than had been expected. In the interval Saif-ad-Din had joined forces with NUr-ad-Din and begun to move southwards, but had advanced no farther than Homs when the siege of Damas
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