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Information bulletin
(June 1951)
Reber, Samuel
US policy in Europe, pp. [15]-19
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Page 18
There are some who argue that the United States wishes to use Europe as a buffer to ward off an attack on itself. They reason that defensive measures will provoke attack and that then the most that can be hoped for is the ultimate liberation of a Europe of blackened ruins and devastated industries. To this I would reply that our primary purpose is not to repel an aggressor once he has attacked but to prevent that attack before it has got underway. The North Atlantic system envisages building such defensive power that no aggressor will dare risk war against it. Our vast reserve power must provide concrete proof that no war could be won. And even today we possess formidable weapons which could strike through the air at the centers of aggression. llE HAVE MADE CLEAR that Germany is to be in- " vited to share the responsibilities and the protection afforded by the North Atlantic security system. The Federal Republic and Berlin have been given assurances that they will be defended in the event of attack. Ger- many will have an opportunity to make its contribution but there will be no new Wehrmacht, no new German General Staff. On the other hand, we are not looking for mercenaries. Whatever contribution in the way of armed units the Germans make, and it is theirs to decide, will be merged in the collective security force on the same basis as the military contingents of the other European nations and will be subject to international control. I have emphasized the true character of our common defense effort because I realize that in many countries of Europe today there are those who advocate neutrality in the present crisis. This mood of "neutralism," which is merely an expression of defeatism and nihilism, is due in large measure, I believe, to the feeling that war is probably inevitable and that Europe cannot be defended. The neutralists hold that the existing world tension is due solely to the antagonism between America and Russia which would make Europe a battleground in their struggle for mastery. Hence they maintain Europeans should stand aloof and avoid commitments to either power. When we look at the realities it becomes apparent that such thinking is blind and dangerous. It is obvious and significant, that the Communists throughout the West seek to foment neutrality sentiment. The reason is clear. However the Soviets may utilize neutralism as a con- fusing and paralyzing tactic, for them it is only a station on the direct road to Communist domination. For nothing is more clear today than the Kremlin's determination to expand the Soviet system over all Europe and add a series of new satellite states to its vast empire. The vacuum created by neutrality constitutes a tempting in- vitation for conquest. NEUTRALITY FOR EUROPE is today tantamount to unconditional surrender. It would mean renunciation of the possibility of defense and removal of the chief barrier to Communist imperialism. For Europeans, the decision to act in the common security involves great sacrifices but the minimum of risk. To preserve freedom men must be prepared to fight for it. Neutralism is an expression of impotence and a lack of faith in the future which does not correspond to the realities of today. Europe, viewed collectively, is an aggregate of peoples and cultures adding up to immense potential strength. That it has survived at all is a tribute to the enduring greatness of its peoples. The strength of the free peoples of Europe can be enormously augmented if only they unite. The concept of a European Federation, which was conceived in the wake of World War I by such men as Briand and Stresemann, emerges from the last conflict an achievable reality. That such unity, long dreamed of, is today on the point of realization is clearly foreshadowed by the recent signature of the Schuman Plan. The "cornerstone of European Federation," it was called by Chancellor Adenauer. A long step in the direction of European unity was taken when the representatives of six European powers signed the Schuman Plan. That Plan will create economic unity in the two industries which are basic to all others, coal and steel. It will create in Europe the condition which, more than natural resources, has enabled the United States to lead the world in steel production: an enormous single market, free of artificial restrictions and barriers to efficient production. Let us hope that it may be the prototype of unity in other fields; that the increased production which it will make possible in the coal and steel industries will be expanded to others; and that Europe will have a single market for, and greatly increased supplies of, all sorts of consumer goods, which is to say a high and rising standard of living. M OST IMPORTANT OF ALL, let us hope and work for the ideal which animates the Schuman Plan; the building of a structure of political unity on this economic foundation. Always before Europe has attempted to build unity wrong end first -by trying to create political unity with no foundation of common economic interests. Worse yet, it has often attempted to do so by bloody wars of conquest. The Schuman Plan represents the first attempt to create the solid basis of economic unity without which political unity can be only an artificial and sickly growth. We heartily welcome the initiative taken in the formation of the Council of Europe and Germany's admission as a full member. We Americans hope that Europeans will get together. Our nation was built upon the principle of federation, and we too have had many conflicting interests to recon- cile. We believe that in these critical times it is more than ever imperative that the peoples of Europe should submerge their differences and establish a firm and abid- ing union. Only such a union can mobilize the immense resources of material and moral strength necessary to establish a counterweight to Soviet power. This union, I believe, must be threefold. It must over- come the economic barriers which have stifled trade and production, depressed living standards and exacerbated national animosities. It must establish effective political machinery to restrain nationalistic forces and safeguard the common interest. And it must create a new loyalty INFORMATION BULLETIN JUNE 1951' 18
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