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Jensen, Merrill; Kaminski, John P.; Saladino, Gaspare J. (ed.) / Ratification of the Constitution by the states: Pennsylvania
2 (1976)
A. Public and private commentaries on the Constitution, 17 September-6 October 1787, pp. 130-172
Page 171
A. COMMENTARIES/6 OCT. tion, it is the legislature alone that appoints the delegates to Congress. The power of direct taxation has likewise been treated as an im- proper delegation to the federal government; but when we consider it as the duty of that body to provide for the national safety, to support the dignity of the Union, and to discharge the debts con- tracted upon the collective faith of the states for their common bene- fit, it must be acknowledged, that those upon whom such important obligations are imposed, ought in justice and in policy to possess every means requisite for a faithful performance of their trust. But why should we be alarmed with visionary evils? I will venture to predict, that the great revenue of the United States must, and always will be raised by impost, for, being at once less obnoxious, and more productive, the interest of the government will be best promoted by the accommodation of the people. Still however, the objects of direct taxation should be within reach in all cases of emergency; and there is no more reason to apprehend oppression in the mode of collecting a revenue from this resource, than in the form of an impost, which, by universal assent, is left to the authority of the federal government. In either case, the force of civil institutions will be adequate to the purpose; and the dread of military violence, which has been assidu- ously disseminated, must eventually prove the mere effusion of a wild imagination or a factious spirit. But the salutary consequences that must flow from thus enabling the government to receive and support the credit of the Union will afford another answer to the objections upon this ground. The State of Pennsylvania particularly, which has encumbered itself with the assumption of a great proportion of the public debt, will derive considerable relief and advantage; for, as it was the imbecility of the present Confederation, which gave rise to the funding law, that law must naturally expire when a competent and energetic federal system shall be substituted. The state will then be discharged from an extraordinary burthen, and the national creditor will find it to be his interest to return to his original security. After all, my fellow citizens, it is neither extraordinary or unex- pected, that the Constitution offered to your consideration should meet with opposition. It is the nature of man to pursue his own interest, in preference to the public good; and I do not mean to make any personal reflection, when I add, that it is the interest of a very nu- merous, powerful, and respectable body to counteract and destroy the excellent work produced by the late Convention. All the offices of government, and all the appointments for the administration of justice and the collection of the public revenue, which are transferred from the individual to the aggregate sovereignty of the states, will necessarily turn the stream of influence and emolument into a new channel. Every person, therefore, who either enjoys or expects to 171
Copyright 1976 Wisconsin Historical Society Press.| For information on re-use see: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright