Page View
Documents on Germany, 1944-1959 : background documents on Germany, 1944-1959, and a chronology of political developments affecting Berlin, 1945-1956
(1959)
Letter from President Eisenhower to Premier Bulganin, on Germany, European security, and disarmament, January 12, 1958, pp. 228-236
PDF (3.9 MB)
Page 230
DOCUMENTS ON GERMANY, 1944-59 best it can * * * means conniving at aggression, giving free rein to war." Now the Soviet Union is no longer weak or confronted by powerful aggressive forces. The vast Sino-Soviet bloc embraces nearly one billion people and large resources. Such a bloc would of course be dominant in the world were the free world nations to be disunited. It is natural that any who want to impose their system on the world should prefer that those outside that system should be weak and divided. But that expansionist policy cannot be sanctified by protestations of peace. Of course the United States would greatly prefer it if collective security could be obtained on a universal basis through the United Nations. This was the hope when in 1945 our two governments and others signed the Charter of the United Nations, conferring upon its Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. Also, by that Charter we agreed to make available to the Security Council armed forces, assistance and facilities so that the Council could maintain and restore international peace and security. The Soviet Union has persistently prevented the establishment of such a universal collective security system and has, by its use of the veto-now 82 times-made the Security Council undependable as a protector of the peace. The possibility that the Security Council might become undepend- able was feared at the San Francisco Conference on World Organiza- tion, and accordingly the Charter recognized that, in addition to reliance on the Security Council, the nations possessed and might exer- cise an inherent right of collective self-defense. It has therefore been found not only desirable but necessary, if the free nations are to be secure and safe, to concert their defensive measures. I can and do give you, Mr. Chairman, two solemn and categorical assurances. (1) Never will the United States lend its support to any ag- gressive action by any collective defense organization or any member thereof; (2) Always will the United States be ready to move toward the development of effective United Nations collective security measures in replacement of rigional collective defense measures. I turn now to consider your specific proposals. III. I am compelled to conclude after the most careful study of your proposals that they seem to be unfortunately inexact or incomplete in their meaning and inadequate as a program for productive negotia- tions for peace. You first seem to assume that the obligations of the charter are non- existent and that the voice of the United Nations is nothing that we need to heed. You suggest that we should agree to respect the independence of the countries of the Near and Middle East and renounce the use of force in the settlement of questions relating to the Near and Middle East. But by the Charter of the United Nations we have 230
This material may be protected by copyright law (e.g., Title 17, US Code).| For information on re-use see: http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/Copyright