SUPPLEMENT TO "THE CO TINENTAL TIMES"
ABOUT
ITALY.
THE DOCLMENTARY RND HISTORICRL EVIDENCE THRT ANNIHILRTES ITS HOLLOW PRETE TS.
Foreword by R. L. Orchelle.
It is difjicult for one who is chiefly concerned
with human ideas and principles to restrain his
emotions and coach them in the co4 and deliberate
language of diplomacy aIer reading the evidence
that follows below. But even the smooth silken
garment of official dplomnacy cannot hide the
just indignatwon, the natural feelings of ontrage,
horror and disgust that seize upon men and nations
whe! dealing with a mercenary such as Italy.
For Italy, as is now clear, was a mercenary
and not an ally. She was in fact less than a
mercenary, for she was a parasite which,
having sucked itself full upon the body of its two
friendly hosts, fell away at the first breath of sife.
The 'fine Italian hand" of which we once heard
must have lost its artistic cunning if not its crimi-
nality. For beneath the threadbare garment of the
official diplomacy of Italy, all the greed, the fear,
the indecision that affect a guilty and treacherous
man in an emergency, are here lamentably con-
spicuous in the conduct of a nation.
One has the ins inctive feeling of dealing with
something foul, mean and despicable, somehing
reptilian and utterly sordid, when perusing these
negotiations in which Italy, taking the coward's
advantage of a comrade in distress, seeks to ex-
tort or filch the legitimate possessions of the
friend she was pledged to support. But this world
war has taught us that under the stress of the
passions it excites, the national character and the
natural characteristics that form its basis, appear
naked and unashamed, - here black as Erebus, there
ha :t as day.
I belive that all history has no spectacle to show
so utterly degrading as that of Italy, the anned
tr!ictr and brigand, breaking into its brother's
house whilst this was on fire, and extorting
1compensations" based upon a rank and disho-
r t quibble.
Compensation! Compensation!" was her one
des re, and her smile and smooth words scarcely
ro: cealed her murderous snrl.
iirough entirely undeserved this corrupt country
onmiht have obtained under duress a great treasare
ir the blackmail itwasso shameless tolevy.  But
its knavish statesmen had already prostituted it to
the massy gold and the airy promises of the half-
impotent Entente. Its hands were not only no
longer free but no longer clean. When it was offered
the prizes for which it had lasted and clamored
for years, its evil conscience, its suspicion and its
fear prevented their acceptance.  When it finally
came face to face with the igevitale fact of war
towards which the Entente had pushed and dragged
it, it stammered and hesitated and found no
plausible pretext.  The scowling, blustering brig-
and became the guilty qchool-hoy.
It woIuld be futile and even foolish to compare
the actions or morals of nations with those of in-
dividuals orto judge them by the same standards. The
morality of an abstraction like the state must td times
and in nature differ form the morality of indi-
viduals of that state. But the political morality of an
alliance has hitherto been held inviolate by all
honorable nations.  Honorable nations-that ad-
jective, to be sure, will no longer be used in con-
nection with Italy.
Inaccurate similes must also be guarded aganst,
but the wolf of the fable seeking an excuse to
attack the lamb that had fallen into a pit finds a
clear embodiment in Italy's note terminating the
Triple Alliance.   I  may   add   that in the
terms of this note as well as in its expressi n,
I seem to discern the mind   and  style  of Sir
Rennel Rodd, the British ambassador at Roine.
The black night of English diplo'nacy has darkened
the minds and the morals of the entire world.
"Compensation!" was Italy's venal cry. Com-
pensation she has in part receiv dfrom the Entente
in the shape of her thirty pieces of silver. Com-
pensation  she shall in full, yes, in oveflowing
measure receive at the hands of War whose sword
she has degraded to an assassin's stiletto, and at
the hands of History whose pages she has defiled
with a bill of sale and purchase.
When the machinations which Servia had
bee  carrying on for many years were finally
revealed in the most terrible manner before
thle eyes of the entire world by the murder
at Sarajevo, and Austria-Hungary, obeying
the mo:t elementary laws of self-perservation,
determined to demand a guarantee from Ser-
via that these things should cease, it might
certainly in all justice have expected an acknow-
ledgment of the righteousness of its action. It
was hardly to be expected that agreatEmopean
Power was to tolerate from a small neighborn-
ing state, the most hateful provocations, the
systematic prosecution of a movement of
disloyalty in its frontier provinces and an
unscrupulous cooperation in criminal attacks
and extensive conspiracies directe against
its safety and integrity without taking the
most energetic measures for defence.
As little objection could have been raised
aganst the form of Austro-Hungary's pro-
ceeding as against its inner justification. It
was a difference between the Monarchy and
an independent state with regard to their
mutual relationship. There was nothing to
substantiate the supposition that the monarchy
was dependent upon the decision of other
powers with respect to the measures it was
to take in   order to secure its security and
as peace.
Although the point of difference concerned
only Austria-Hungary and    Servia, thee was
nevertheless a possib lity that Russia, igr.or-
ing our express decciation that in case of
a localized conflict, the sovereignity and ter-
ritory of Servia would reman invioate,
would for all that seize the welcome oppor-
tunity order to cary out a long-prepared
aggressive war against Austr a-Hungary and
the Ge: man Empire. This intention had be-
come more and more maniest through the
compreh ensive armaments, the numerous trial
mobilizations and the great strategic railways
that were under construction.
It was in fact, even to be expected thlat the
just demands which Servia's intolerable con-
duct had torced us to make would be re-
jected only when St. Petershurg gave the
signal that the moment for attacking the
Dual   Monarchy    bad   arrived.  For Servia
according to the Russian plans was to under-
take the duty    of deliveting  a flank attack
upon   us,-a   part for   which   Russia   had
well prepared Servia by means of her frequent
expressions of Pan-savic sympathies and
consequent political suppor.
It was to be clearly foreseen that with the
system of alliances and ententes which since
some decades forms the basis of European
politics, the unjustifiable intemedding of
Russia in the controversy between the Mo-
marchy and Servia might produce the most
serious consequences, and even a general
conflict.
For there was no room for doubt that the
German Empire which fully acknowledged
the justice of our charges against Servia,
would not fail to pursue that road which its
own interests as well as its pledged word
decreed, and throw   its full power on the
side of ihs yearlong ally in order to aid it
against a Russ an attack. This, of course,
would at o give France that long-awaited
favorable opportunity for which it had been
lying in wait in order to realize its hopes
of revenge. It was I kewise probable that
Englaud, despite the fact flat it had denied
the existence of any compact with the tvo
other Entente Powers, would nevertheless
take part in the struggle in order to help
crush the prosperous and flourishing German
Empire, the rival it so feared and envied.
One might a'so have finaly concluded that
Turkey, despite the fact that is was still
suffering from the after-effects of the Balkan
war, would place itself at the side of the
Central Powers based on the realization that
a victory of Russia would  mean an end to
its own in dependence.
What, then, was the attitude of Italy to
this possible European war? The terms of
the treaty with the two Central Powers to
which Italy for over thirty years owed its
security, its peace, the undisturbed develop-
ment of its economic and political forces as
well as the easy acquisition of two extensive
provinces a'ong the Mediterranean, were
clear enough. They declared that it was to
support its allies against two or more poweis
in any war that had not been provoked by
them.* It was certainly clear that the action
of Austria-Hungay, which after years of
unexampled   patience and love of peace in
the face of the Servian challenge, had simply
become inevitable, was not to be construed
as a provocation. The attack, on the contrary,
proceeded from Russia which in the execu-
tion of its ambitious plans desired to make
use of Servia as a sort of wedge directed at
the heart of the Dual Monarchy. Indications,
of course, were not wanting that Italy would
refrain from  entering the war on the side of
its allies- as not only the letter but the spirit
of the a.lance obviously obliged it to do.**
After the dubious position that Italy had
assumed at the time of the Agercias question
al  during the crisis following  upon  the
annexation of Bosnia-ferzogovina and after the
conference of Racconigi as well as its cn-
tlined fdrtations-with   the Triple Entente,
Aushia-Hungary and Germany were forced
to cherish  the suspicion  that Italy would
withdraw from its obligations as an ally and
seek to justify this by all manner of qu bbling
interpretations of the text of the contract.
Though there was for this reason little depen-
dance to be placed upon a carrying- out by
Italy of its duties as a party to the All ance,
it was certainly to be expected that Austria-
Hungary and Germany might at least count
upon a benevelent or friendly neutrality on
the part of their ally in the tremendous
struggle they were forced to wage.
The  developments of events during the
first stages of the war substantiated this
assumption, and gave no hint of the mon-
strous breach of faith and teachery of which
Italy was subsequently to make itself guilty.
During this first period which begins with
the delivery of our Note at Belgrade and
extends into the winter months, the attitude
of Italy was determined by three points of
view. The first was due to its determination
not to discard its neutrality for the present,
but to proceed vigorously with extensive
military  preparations,  the  second  to  an
endeavor to justify its neutral position by the
text of the agreement and to reassure its
allies by protestations of friendship; the third
by the intention of obliging Austria-Hungary
by a vioknt interpretation of Article VII of
the terms of the Triple Alliance to acknow-
ledge that Italy was entitled to compensations
equal to   any  conquests that the    Dual
Monarchy might make i Servia and Monte-
negro. (Appendix No. 3).
In accordance with this the Italian Ministry,
after a previou oral communicatin to the
same effect by the Marquis di San Giuliano,
came to the conclusion on the Ist of August,
1914, that Italy would remain  neutral. The
reasons alleged for ths were that the action
of the Dual Monarchy with regard to Servia
constituted an aggressive act against Russa,
for which reason Italy was not obliged to
carry out its obligations under the Treaty.
This assertion is amply contradictd by merely
calling attention to the wel-knovn and ex-
tensive military preparations of Russia for an
aggressive war against the two Central Powers
and by the absolute independence of Servia.
Another rearon advanced for Italy's attitude
was that its exposed coasts would subject it to
greit danger in the event of a world war.
This may be true, though it would in no
wise excuse that country ftomn fulfilling its
dutiet. The final objection was that Austria-
Hungary, in violation of Article VII of the
Agreement, had neglected to inform Italy of
the decisive step it was about to take, and
* Article Ill of the terms of the Triple Alliance
in translation reads as follows: "In case two of
the parties to the agreement without direct pro-
vocation on their part are attacked by two or
more Great Powers not signatoiy to this treaty,
and thereby involved in war, a casus foederns
would be established for all the signatories to
this treaty."
** Article IV of the Agreement of the Triple
Alliance provides even for the contingency of a
warlike initative by one of the allies and for
the friendly neutrality of the others. In trans-
lation this reads: 'lIi the event that a Great
Power which is not a signatory to this contract
should threaten the security of one of the sig-
natcry states, and the state so threatened be
forced to declare war, the two other powers
thereby pledge themselves to observe a bene-
volent neutrauty towards their ally. In that case
each reserves to itself the right of taking part
in the war in common with its ally should it
deem this to be advisable.
that it refused to accept the Italian inter-
pretation of this article. The relation between
the latter point and the real facts shall be
discussed in detail a little furthr on. (Appen-
dix No. 4).
Although these Italian arguments could
scarcely be conceived as sound, Austria-Hun-
gary nevertheless accepted the declaration of
Italy's neutrality without any particular ob-
jections, the more so since Italy at the same
again declared  its intention  of abiding by
the remaining terms of the Alliance and even
of possibly coop rating later w th its part-
ners. All these proclamation; were made in
a tone of evident friendliness and sincerity.
Side by side with thete dscussions regar-
ding the question of netitrality must be con-
sidered the action of Italy undertaken as
early as the 2;th of July, 1914     This, as
already explained in the foreg-oing, had for
its goal a granting of compensations based
upon Article VII of the terms of the Triple
Alliance in the event of the occupation of
Servian  territory  by  Austrian- Hungarian
troops. (Appendix No. 2.)
The history  as well as the language of
this article make it perfectly clear that its
conditions apply wholly and solely to the
event of Turkish territory being so occupied.
This article was inserted in the treaty at the
request of Italy in the year 1887, that
is to say at a time when the terms of settle-
ment were meant to regulate merely the
future destiny of Turkey and its teritory.
There is not the slightest doubt that these
agreements had been reached in order to
prevent the   interests  of one  party from
suffering any disadvantages in respect to the
other without some equalizing consideration
coming   into  play, should  that unaltered
maintainance  of the the Turkish position in
Europe which it was the desire of the
Alliance to uphold, be rendered  impossible.
No thought at that time had been given to
non-Turkish   possessions  in   the  Balkan
peninsula. This is clearly evident from the
text which has remained unaltered since
1887, and which makes plain the fact that the
Turkish coast districts alon the Adriatic and
in the Aegean Sea are subject to this con-
dition but not the Montenegrin nor Greek.*)
The Austrian-Hungarian Government was
therefore entirely within its rights in insisting
that Article VIl had no application to the
event of a conflict with Servia and the
eventual  ocenpation  of  Servian  territory,
For this reason it did not feel itself under
any  obligation-- to  olntaiu  the consent of
Italy ere procceding with its diplomatic
steps in Belgrade, sincedbiese  did not even
constitute war,  though they may have led
to it.
The contrary interpretation/of this Article
was nevertheless insisted upon by Italy,
which, a; already made plain, adopted this
failure of a previous notification by Austria-
Hungary, as well as its own devious reading
of the agreement as an excuse for freeing
itself from the duty of a military cooperation.
On the other hand the Italian government
based its principal claims for compensation
for the possible occupation of Servian terri-
tory by Austria-Hungary, upon the inter-
pretation given the article in Vienna.
Long negotiations quite friendly in tone,
took place between the two cabinets regarding
the latter question, and in these the German
gove nment participated. There is not need
of recalling these pourparlers in detail; it
will suffice to say that finally Austria-
Hungary, in consideration of the indeed
neutral but otherwise quite friendly atttude
of  Italy,  declared  itself  willing  as  an
evidence of the loyal attitude it wished to
show Italy, to accept the latter's interpretation
of Article VII. It agreed that in the event
of a temporary or definite conquest of
territory within a Balkan district, it would
enter into conversations with Italy regarding
the question of compensation. This decla-
ration was delivered in Rome on the 25th
of August and accepted with thanks by the
Marquis di San Giuliano, who was of the
opinion that the discussion of the future
compensation was premature at that stage
of the war. (Appendices Nos. 6 and 7).
This for the time being    concluded the
discussions between the cabinets of Vienna
and Rome regarding the chief issue of their
mutual relationship. Tie following months
were devoted by Italy to the development
and strengthening of its military means and
forces. A. the same time Italy proceeded
to take measures which had for their goal
the acquisition of territorial points of support
on the opposite coat of the Adriatic, in
Albania.   These   measures   which    were
tentatively urged at the b ginning, began to
accentuate themselves in .direct proportion
to the progress made by Italy's military
preparations, and in accordance with the
convicton that the world war would not
result in a swift victory for one group or
the other, but in a long and stubborn
struggle. Though this st-p of Italy's was in
accordance neither with the agreement of
*) Article VII of the terms of the Triple
Alliance Contract reads as follows in translation:
"Austria-Hungary  and  Italy  who  desire to
maintain as far as possible the territorial status
quo in the Orient, hereby pledge themselves to
oppose all territorial changes whtch might prove
to the disadvantage of one or the other of the
powers signatory to the present Agreement.
But should it occur in the course of events
that the maintainance of the status quo in the
Balkan districts or the Ottoman coasts and
islands in the Adriatic or Rgaen Sea become
impossible, and that, either through the act of
a third power or otherwise, Austria-Hungary
and Italy should be obliged to alter this status
quo by a temporary or per "anent occupation,
this occupation would be carried out only after
a previous understanding between the two
powers. This would be based upon the prin-
ciple of mutual compensation for atl territorial
or other advantages which either of them might
attain after the suspension of the present status
quo, and would ne intended to satisfy the
interests and the justifiabledemandsofboth parties.
1900-01, nor in harmoniy with the formal
declaration made by Italy at the beginning
of Augut 1914 at Vienna, no protest was
made by Austria-Hungary, especially so
since Italy gave notice at Vienna of each
"provistonal" measure and cont'nued to
declare its adherence to the Treaty of
London and the continuance of the Agree-
ment of 1901 (Appendices Nos. I and 5).
It soon became apparent, however, that the
ambitious plans of Italy for the occupation
of the "altra spoida" had not been ex-
hausterl.  A passionate excitement began to
seize upon that country.  The theory of ab
solute neutrality gave way to the new motto
of a "armed and watchful" neutrality, and
later on to the cynical phrase of "sacro
egoismo."  Supported by the government in
secret and furthered and openly subsidized
by the agents of the Entente Powers, this
soil of Irredentist, radical and republican
shibboleths gave birth to a movement which,
quite indiffirent to all pledges of honor and
faith, inscribed the names of the Italian
districts of the Monarchy upon its banners,
and whose adherents in the press, in the
street and  in public meetings, began  to
agitate more and more stormily in favor of
Italy's participaion in the war on ihe side
of the Entente.
The fact that the official policy of Italy
was governed by the same tendencies became
apparent only after the conduct of forei n
affairs passed  into  the hands  of Baron
Sonnino upon the death of the Marqis di
San Giuliano at the beginning of November.
This brought about a second phae in the
development of evens in Italy.  In this the
domi ating idea, without a thought a; to the
duties of an alliance or any moral considera-
tion, was the resolve to make use of that
favorable moment in which the two allies
were engaged in a mighty struggle with
formidable opponents, in order to extort
from Austria-Hungary the surrender of those
southern provinces in which Italians had
settled, or if need be, to seize them by force.
The first step in this direction  was taken
by the Italian cabinet on the llth of De-
cember when its Ambassador at Vienna, with
various  unmistakeable hints ani  allusions
to the "national aspirations", brought forward
the argument that in view of our military
operations on Srvian territory, Italy, accord-
ding to Article VIl of the terms of the
Triple Alliance, was entitled to compensa-
tions. Italy still further laid bare her inten-
tions-a month later when she made the
formal  inquiry  whether Austria-Hungary
would not be willing to concede a portion
of its territory as a basis of negotiations for the
compensation to be granted under Article VII?
Front the mass of arguments furnished by
Austria-Hungary in the course of the dis-
cussions with Italy it will be necessary to
quote only a few.    Military operations in
alien territory do not constitute even a
temporary occupation within the meaning
of Article VII, and therefore give the other
party no right to any compensation.  Inas-
much as Servian territory is in fact not oc-
cupied by our troops, there can be no basis
for the approximation of the compensation,
since this depends on the advantages derived
by the occupying power. It is also obvious
that such compensation is only to be sought
there where the advantage has been gained
which the compensation is m-ant to balance,
that is to say upon the Balkan peninsula
When the contract was made there was no
thought of giving up other districts towards
this end, especially one's own districts.
In addition to this Austria-Hungay made
public on the 9th of February the counter
demands of Italy according to its reading of
Article VII, as made clear by the Ita ian oc-
cupation of islands in tie Agean Sea and
Valona. Italy, on the contrary, held fast to
its standpoint and finally after long and
fruitless negotiations it declared towards the
close of Februaty that a rL-sumpt on of our
operations against Servia without a prelimi-
nary agreement with regard to the question
of compensations would be regarded as a
breach of the terms of the treaty and that
the most serious consequences would ensue
upon this. It also stated that such an agree-
ment could be reaced only on the basis of
a surrender of Austrian-Hungarian territory.
The situation was nov clear. This attitude
of the Roman cabint which was accompanied
by an incitement of public opinion against
the two Central Powers by the gover ment
and by the press, and by the most active
preparations for mobilizatiou, left no room
for doubt that relations with Italy could be
maintained only by means of concessions
of territory on the part of Austria-Hunga y.
It was also apparent that no considerations
of conscience nor of honor would prevent
Italy from seiz ng a favorable opportunity
for making an attack upon the Dual Monarchy
in order to realize its national aspirations.
However cooly and calmy the people of
Austria-Hungary regarded this danger, it was
neve'theless necessary that the men in who-e
hands the destnies of the monarchy were
placed should ask themselves iin full con-
sciousness of their responsibilities, whether,
all other means having been  exhausted, it
was not desireable to attempt to maintain or
possibly strengthen the political relationship
with Italy  even  at the high  price of a
cession of territory.
Austria Hungary naturally found the ut-
most difficulty in reconciling itself to the
thought of yielding  up without a struggle
land which had for centuries been under the
s eptre of the house of Habsburg, land which
served as a natural rampart to the monarchy,
and whose sons even in this war had given
so many proofs of their fidelity and self-
sacrifice. And this resolve was to be given
tne most serious thought since the traditions
of the monarchy had nev r vitiated an hoinest
promise by any subsequent deception. Never
in all its history had Austria-Hungary broken
its given word.
But this extraordinary situation called for
extraordinary resolutions.  On the 9th of
March therefore, with the approval of his mo-
narch and of both governments, Baron Burun
was able to communicate to the Italian am-
bassador that Austria-Hungary accepted in
principle the cession of certain territory as a
basis of the negotiations regarding the
question of compensation.
Though an understanding had thus been
achieved in respect to certain major points,
great difficulties nevetheless arose duringthe
second phase of the negotiations concerning
a matter a preliminaries. Before the matter
could be ditscussed further the Rima-' Cabinet
imposed ine condition that it was to be
unlerstood in advance that the cession of
territory was to take place immediately after
the signing of the 'ocuments -a demand
which in itself served to throw a v ry
quetionable light upon the sinceri y of Italy's
desire to achieve a peaceful solution.
Quite apart from the practi al difficulties
operating against the precipiate execution of
such a deep-goine-  measure, it was hardly
to he expected that Austra-Hungry in a
one-sided  interpretation  of  this  contract,
shoul I place Italy in actual possession of the
territory to be surrendered,--t-rritory of the
hignest strateic value.-ere the reciprocal
rturn Italy was to make,-the maintenance
of neutrality until peace had been re tored,-
had indeed become an actuality. There was
certaily no reason for our having such
overwhe lming confidence in Italian loyally
and reliability.
It was of course impossible for Austria-
Hungary to yild to any such demand. The
nati )n was, however, pr pred to offer the
most thorough guarantees that the ceding of
the land in question would take place with-
out delay after peace had been sighed.
But inasmuch as the Italian , C binet
would not withdraw from this demand, a
halt in the negotiations would have been
unavoidable, had it not been decided to leave
this question open for the present and to
proceed with the discusion of the thing
itself-the dimensions of the district to be
ceded, as well as the other concessions.
At the request of Italy, which seemed to
have no concrete proposals of its own to
make, Austria-Hungary now   announced its
various offers. This proposal which was
handed to the Italian ambassador in Vienna
on the 27th of March, comprised in its essen-
tials the cession of the entire Italian part of
south Tyrol, for which Italy was to promise
its benevolent neutrality until peace had been
declared and to concede the right of its ally
to complete liberty of action in the Balkans
for the duration of the war.
He who knows the important part played
in the national consciousness by the Trentino
in the decades that followed upon the estab-
lishment of the Italian realm, must acknow-
ledge the magnanimous manner in which
Austria-Hun-gary was now willing to bring
about the fulfillment of this fervent desire
of the Italian nation without any petty chaf-
fering. This step wouldhavedoneaway withall
the difficulties that lay in the way of a thorough
understanding. But this hope was in no way
to be realized. Though it may have been
possible up to this point for us to believe
Italy's declaration that it was anxious to
establish a new basis for the continuance
of the alliance, we were from now on
justified in assuming from the inordinate
d mands now made by Salandra's cabinet
that it did not in the least desire a peaceful
solution. We were convinced that in this
new stage of development Italian policy was
no longer dominated by the ideal of national
development in conjunction with the main-
tenance of good relations with the two Central
Powers, but rather, an expansion of national
uni y at the expense of Austria-Hungary, a
seizure of the compete supremacy in the
Adriatc by cutting off the monarchy from
this sea, and a complete and permanent
aliance of Italy with the powers of the
Enterte, followed by final active participat.on
on their side.
The 'emands of Italy were indeed outrage-
ous. They comprised the cessiont of the entire
[alan Tyrol, the purely German district of
Bozen, as wcil as the predominantly Slav
district of the Upper Isonto valey, in add-
tion to GOrz and the coat territory as far as
Nabresina, a str p of Karnten, the purely
Slav islands of Lissa, Lesma, Curzola and
Lagusta and va ous small islands, the esta
lbsh-nent of Trieste and its district as an
independent state, the recognition of Italian
sovereignity over Valoia and its district, as
well as rte complete surrender o all Austrian-
Hungarian  iiterests in Albania, and  the
imme.riate carrying out of the territorial
surrende s.
rhe lnes of this program gve one a clear
insight into the id as toat lie at the iottoni
of it. The lines of demarcation on land are
chosen not because of their national colour,
but because they serve as  tra egic ponts-
and points of an aggressive nature. The postu-
lates wtln regard to Albania nnd t ie Dal-
matian islads prove how   completely the
Ad ia ic problem had overweighed alt other
conside-ations. And the mere fact that Italy
had made a number of demands that threat-
ened the very fie of the Dual Monarchy, is
sufficient proof that tie autnorities in Rome
had determined, quite irrespective of a peace-
ful or forcible so uion, to ureak with toe
Ce Atral Powers and to arraign Italy actively
on the side of the Eutente. Tue tnesis of a
"irmer bond of all ance by the elimination
of the existing points of trctoiu"-even the
leaders in Rome must have been clear that
this was inconsistent with a policy which, for
example, in all earnest went so far as to
wish to tear Triest and those issands tht
protect the coast of Dalmatia from out tne
structure of the Dual Monarchy.
Altuough the in at able d-mads of Italy
would certainly have brought about a com-
plete cessation of the negotiations, a glance
Elam a E
I a EL
ri
TRUTH