Connor T. Hansen Papers, 1913-1987

Contents List

Container Title
Audio 591A
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   00:00
Introduction
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   00:30
Biography
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   01:30
Interest in Investigating Anti-Trust Activities regarding Wisco Hardware Company
Scope and Content Note: Exposed to the “private label” system when working for J.C. Penney. Also work for American Management Association gives him insight into workings of Big Business in America. Suspicious for some time because Wisco had not grown since World War II. Still profitable, but steadily losing key accounts. Basic problem was Wisco was not considered a “national” organization, and thus manufacturers did not give Wisco the same price considerations as nationwide distributors.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   06:15
The Political Side of Business
Scope and Content Note: Fitschen reared with conservative business attitudes. Felt good communication with Wisconsin's “people in Washington” was important to get S8220;people in Washington” was important to get Small Business Administration Loan, if possible; to see what role the FTC might play in helping Wisco; to discover any other way the government could be used to help further the interests of the company. Senator Proxmire his main vehicle.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   09:40
When Fitschen Took Over as General Manager in 1972, He Knew the Company Was Atrophic, But Looked for Outside Causes, as Most Internal Organs Appeared Healthy
Scope and Content Note: Asked accountant to analyze the cost of sales. Found that cost of sales was running 8-10 percent above national average.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   12:30
Next Step Was to Ask Manufacturers for Prices Equal to National Buyers
Scope and Content Note: Used allusions to activities in Washington (i.e., anti-trust inquiries) as bargaining lever.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   14:10
This Effort Stymied Because of Nixon Administration's Wage-Price Freeze Then in Effect
Note: Throughout these interviews there is confusion over the dates of the Nixon Administration's wage-price freeze. the confusion is understandable since there were several “Phases” to the freeze and since the different phases would have had different effects on Wisco's business. Fitschen, in general, seemed to place the initial freeze within months of the beginning of his administration at Wisco. in fact, the wage-price freeze was inaugurated a full year before this. It is possible, however, that the adverse effects of the freeze were not felt by Wisco until many months after its inauguration.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   16:05
More on the Effort to Get Manufacturers to Treat Wisco as Equal to the Big Companies
Scope and Content Note: Used account analysis to convince manufacturers that Wisco knows what its problem is and is prepared to cure itself if given equal treatment by manufacturers.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   18:00
What Wisco Had to Offer the Manufacturer in Exchange for Equitable Price Treatment
Scope and Content Note: Willing to attempt marketing experimentations that Wisco's competition was not doing. “Modular Selling.” (One travelling salesman covering a given area and representing five manufacturers as an expert, rather than the entire 500 manufacturers who dealt with Wisco. Further information and speculation about “modular selling.” Unable, however, to get the right type of salesman; and then hit by the wage-price freeze.)
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   21:30
The Wage-Price Freeze Hurt Wisco by Preventing It from Getting Delivery on Items
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   22:00
Reactions of Manufacturers to Wisco's Innovative Plans
Scope and Content Note: Like the plans, but feel the character of Wisco stockholders would not accept innovation very well. Had 50-60 percent cooperation from the dozen manufacturers approached.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   24:00
Never Occurred to Him That It Was Unfair That Wisco Had to Do Something Extra, as a Small Company, to Get Equal Treatment with the Biggies
Scope and Content Note: Did resent how much time this took away from day-to-day management of the company.
Tape/Side   1/1
Time   27:10
September 1973 Largest Trade Show in History of Wisconsin
Scope and Content Note: Cooperation from manufacturers, but stockholder-customers did not respond. This proves the point of the manufacturers about the conservative character of Wisco's owner-customers.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   00:30
Believes That in the Future Equal Pricing Will Be the Rule
Scope and Content Note: This based partly on economic argument (the profit motive) because such things as private labels really put the manufacturer in competition with himself and partly on the Watergate, CIA, et al. investigations which will result in public demand for openness and equity. Stumbling block, however, is nature of the small businessman who likes having several manufacturers cater to him, rather than engaging in centralist buying which is the more economical method.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   04:50
Further Argument as to Why Profit Motive Will Lead Manufacturers to Favor Equal Pricing
Scope and Content Note: Based on theory of constant overhead. Also, based on theory that there are added costs when “confidentials” or “private labels” are negotiated and that the added costs are not necessarily made up in larger volume of sales; these added costs and extra time might be more profitably used to push the manufacturer's own brand or label, which will sell at a higher profit.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   10:55
Very Few Buyers Aware That They Might Be Violating the Robinson-Patman Act When They Negotiate Confidentials
Note: The Robinson-Patman Act (1936) was intended to protect independent merchants against the preferential wholesale prices chain stores could command by virtue of their large purchasing volume.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   11:35
Goal in Talking to Various Government Agencies Was to Find One That Would Take an Interest in Wisco's Problems and Act on Them
Scope and Content Note: Would have preferred to take problems to a bank and treat them as financial, but was convinced that problems were political, that Wisco's basic problem in regard to cost of sales depended on “who we were rather than what we were.” Was only hoping that the FTC would take the time and money to investigate Wisco's claims.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   14:00
Inability to Get Courts to Rule in Favor of Wisco When Attempting to Collect Delinquent Accounts from Stockholder-Customers
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   15:05
Hoped to Use Government as a Resource to Help Promote Proposed Innovations
Scope and Content Note: This, however, was futurist in approach in a business that was not innovatively inclined.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   16:10
Did Not Really Expect Any Government Agency to Take Up Wisco's Cause and Use Wisco as an Example or Test Case
Scope and Content Note: Political nature of government agencies: answerable to the Congress which does not appreciate innovation in regulatory agencies.
Tape/Side   1/2
Time   16:50
Example of Sherwin-Williams Giving a Wisco Competitor a Lower-Priced Private-Label Paint
Scope and Content Note: Wisco engaged an attorney to challenge Sherwin-Williams as being in restraint of trade. Wisco did not have the financial resources, however, to carry on a suit against a big corporation like Sherwin-Williams. Meets with one of the nation's top antitrust attorneys who convinces Wisco that a legal approach in this case would be financially impractical. Upshot is that the small guy cannot use legal methods to alleviate problems, but must use political means, political pressure or threats. Envisions group action or pressure by the small guys, politically not legally, along lines of consumer activism. Fitschen, ideally, would like to lead or start some such movement.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   00:30
Senator Proxmire's Assistance
Scope and Content Note: Has a “keen interest” in Wisco problems, as a constituent's problems.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   02:40
Officers of Other Corporations Have Contrary Response
Scope and Content Note: Claim ignorance about Robinson-Patman Act and possible anti-trust violations. Sherwin-Williams and others always defer to their attorneys who assure them they are not in violation. 50-60 percent of time, however, Fitschen's “bluff” about antitrust vitiations would lead manufacturers to grant Wisco equal pricing.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   07:00
Ways in Which Confidentials Are Handled So That Unequal Pricing Does Not Show on the Books Where the Federal Trade Commission Could Find It
Scope and Content Note: Wisco becomes eligible to receive prices equivalent to what were being negotiated in confidentials merely because Wisco could demonstrate its knowledge of how confidentials worked. In other words, knowledge of how the biggies operate often opens door for similar operations.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   08:25
Example of How One Competitor Protects Itself from Charges of Antitrust Violation
Scope and Content Note: Cotter & Company (True Value, Chicago) has every manufacturer sign a statement saying they will not give them any discount unavailable to other companies, just to have a piece of paper, despite its veracity, to show any potential prosecutors.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   08:50
Blatancy of Price Discrimination and of Other Preferences to the Biggies
Scope and Content Note: Example of Timex dropping Wisco as distributor at behest of Cotter & Co. Example of S-K Tools dropping 100 distributors and giving the business solely to Cotter & Co. (True Value).
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   11:35
Legal Roadblocks to Challenging Certain Trade Practices as Being in Restraint of Trade
Scope and Content Note: “Legal people” themselves do not want to “rock the boat on federal trade.” This largely because there's no funding available to support such activity.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   16:45
Agrees with Summary That U.S. Economy Is Being Run at High Levels in Devious and Illegal Ways
Scope and Content Note: This being done “unintentionally” in so far as it is necessary in order to remain competitive and to make a profit. In other words, “everybody else does it, so I must.”
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   17:20
Senator Proxmire Useful for Opening Doors in Washington, Scheduling Appointments with Government Agencies Through His Office
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   20:10
Fitschen's Solution: Create an Awareness That the Problem Exists
Scope and Content Note: He would like to become an advocate of fair trade, a debater, in order to bring the problem to the public. Example in early 1960s when Wisco was in position to undersell all other local distributors on a certain line of automotive parts. Manufacturer then drops Wisco as a distributor because they were upsetting the local market status quo. (Implication is that local, smaller-than-Wisco distributors could pressure manufacturer into dropping Wisco in order to return to previous competitive balance in the local market.) Hence, small guys, when united, do have power.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   24:55
Should Fitschen's Ideas Be Carried to Their Ultimate Conclusion, Rational Economic Planning Would Be Needed in Order Preserve the Economic System
Scope and Content Note: Need for constant public view and scrutiny of business activities.
Tape/Side   2/1
Time   27:05
Not Convinced That Nationalization Necessary to Rationalize the Economy
Scope and Content Note: System cannot work if incentive and initiative are removed, as would be the case with most nationalization or socialization schemes.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   00:30
Doors Opened by Proxmire and What Resulted
Scope and Content Note: Relationship with Proxmire even before becoming general manager, as early as 1970-71. Small Business Administration entree provided when Madison office of SBA was undergoing internal problems which rendered it ineffective. Wisco did not fulfill all the necessary criteria for SBA assistance. Banks did not like to participate as lenders through the SBA. Proxmire helped overcome these obstacles, though Wisco was still unable to get an SBA loan. This saddled Wisco with a higher interest loan and this was a contributing factor in Wisco's downfall.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   04:10
Initial Approach to Small Business Administration as Early as 1968-1969
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   04:50
Why SBA Reluctant to Aid Wisco and How This Hurt Wisco
Scope and Content Note: Ability to generate profit thought to be limited. Rate of losing key customers did not merit aid to assist the company. Approach to SBA often viewed as a last resort and thus hinders company's fiscal credibility. Incident of Chester Bell, member of Board of Directors and member of Johnson-Hill group, who resigned from Wisco board and used his expertise as a Certified Public Accountant to get an SBA loan for his Johnson-Hill Company, which was also in trouble, rather than for Wisco.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   07:15
SBA Loans Were Political in Nature
Scope and Content Note: Organization in Milwaukee, the “victims of SBA,” got the Wisco story read into testimony of investigation of SBA, even though hearings had already been held without wide publicity. “Victims of SBA” asked Fitschen to become fund-raiser for them, but he couldn't because of contractual obligations to Wisco.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   09:20
Proxmire Also Opens Door to Ombudsman of Commerce Department
Scope and Content Note: As usual, the initial response was positive, but nothing much can be done unless someone is specifically placed in charge of an investigation.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   10:40
Specific Help Sought from SBA Was Loan to Meet $520,000 Second Mortgage Due at End of 1974
Scope and Content Note: Second mortgage was taken out largely because of technical error in guns and ammunition division (failure to include federal excise tax in buying price). At the time, Wisco was nation's tenth largest distributor of Winchester products. Took out the mortgage in hopes that an SBA loan could be floated before the twelve month term of the mortgage expired. However, the existence of a second mortgage automatically made Wisco a poor risk for an SBA loan.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   13:05
What Wisco Hoped to Get from the Commerce Department Ombudsman
Scope and Content Note: Either a way to reach higher levels of the SBA to ask SBA to work with Wisco on an experimental basis or to find a way to get the Federal Trade Commission, the Justice Department, and the SBA to work on a joint study of Wisco. But this was pretty small potatoes in comparison to the other major events of 1974--Watergate, oil shortage, wage-price freeze, etc.--and Washington atmosphere was cautious.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   15:00
Proxmire Able to Schedule Additional Meetings with the SBA
Scope and Content Note: This leads to meetings with the banking organization which is under contract to the SBA in Wisconsin. But this bank does not feel Wisco worth the risk.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   15:50
Attempts to Sell Wisco
Scope and Content Note: As early as March 1973 Cotter & Co. had expressed an interest in purchasing Wisco for the purpose of liquidating the company. Failure of big trade show in September 1973 results in Fitschen recommendation to sell company. In November of 1973, planned a trip to Holland where Overseas Gas & Electric conglomerate had expressed interest in purchasing Wisco. Arrived, however, on second Sunday of no Sunday driving in Holland because of the oil crisis, and business climate there was not conducive to new ventures. Met with Wisconsin's foreign economic representative, in Frankfurt, in attempt to find foreign buyer. Unsuccessful.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   19:00
Seeking European Buyer in Order to Become a Wholly Owned Subsidiary of a European Corporation Because Many European Firms Are Able to Purchase American Made Products More Cheaply Than American Firms Can
Scope and Content Note: Could therefore qualify for lower prices from manufacturers on the basis of being an international, or at least a national account.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   20:50
Unable to Find a Buyer, Has to Secure the Second Mortgage
Scope and Content Note: Poor financial condition of Wisco at the time. By end of 1974, paying $75,000 per year interest on borrowed money. Because of the nature of the wholesale business, high interest rates constitute almost as serious a restraint of trade as unequal pricing from manufacturers.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   22:10
Why Sale to Cotter & Company Was Not Consummated
Scope and Content Note: Meeting in Ft. Lauderdale with John Cotter in late winter 1973. Cotter was frank. He merely wanted to buy Wisco in order to get Wisco's accounts which would help justify his plans for building a half million square foot warehouse in Minnesota. Comes back from meetings with Cotter and Company feeling this a good example of a big company wanting to be a do-gooder because they didn't want to be embarrassed by having this smaller, but older, competitor going out of business because the biggies had been stealing its customers. Then went to Justice Department to see if it would oversee the involvement of Cotter and Company. Within a half hour of his return to Madison, Cotter & Company withdrew its offer to purchase.
Tape/Side   2/2
Time   27:10
Did Not Become Convinced Wisco Could Not Make It on Its Own until July 1974
Scope and Content Note: Called Executive Committee Meeting in July 1974 and made drastic recommendations including secret preparation for liquidation, which the Committee approved. This followed by special informational stockholders meeting which was attended mainly by dissidents. His plan at this time was to separate those interested in maintaining the company from those who wanted to quit, and using the non-quitters as the nucleus for a new company.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   01:15
Other Approaches to the Government
Scope and Content Note: Hoped to get Wisco's experiences on the record through testimony before some subcommittee, expecting to use Senator Proxmire and the Senate Banking Committee as an entree.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   02:55
In Retrospect, Feels He May Have Come on Too Strong in His Approach to Government Agencies
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   06:00
How Purchase by a Larger Corporation Would Have Aided Both Wisco and Its Retail Dealer/Stockholders by Providing Needed Capital
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   07:25
Stopped Actively Seeking Governmental Assistance in July 1974
Scope and Content Note: Became fearful at that time that the company might be bankrupt and he would not even know it. Personally felt he was being let down by colleagues at this time because no one wanted to make the decisions and moves that were necessary because no one wanted to be the scapegoat should the sick patient actually die.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   09:20
From June 1929 through 1971 Total of 600 Stockholders Invested Only $70,000 from Their Pockets: All the Rest Came from Earnings
Scope and Content Note: Hence, irony of state law which attached condition to proposed new stock issue that guaranteed any new investors would have right to withdraw investment in full at any time; this condition applied because company losing money.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   11:35
Conclusion regarding Government Assistance Is That the Agency Employees Are Forward Looking, But They Are Hampered by Legislative Restraints and Interference
Scope and Content Note: Disagrees with prevalent business attitude that you shouldn't tell the government anything. The governmental machinery is adequate, but it does not work well because of external (political) hamstringing.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   16:25
Example of How “Who You Are Not What You Are” Determines Preferential Treatment
Scope and Content Note: Anecdote of how climate changed when Fitschen told two different manufacturers his ultimate goal of turning Wisco around, as George Romney turned American Motors around, and using this as a springboard to the U.S. Senate. Suddenly who Fitschen was or wanted to be became more important than what he represented (Wisco Company) and preferential delivery treatment was promised. This a prime example of how personality, politics, etc. often is more important than sound economic reasoning when business decisions are being made.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   23:00
Example of How National Organizations Get Preferential Pricing
Scope and Content Note: Liberty Distributors (Des Plaines, Illinois), a voluntary organization of wholesalers throughout the country, could offer Wisco savings of 5 percent over buying direct from manufacturer, if Wisco joined the organization. Ironically, Liberty Distributors recently offered Fitschen job as their merchandise manager, which he turned down because this would have made him the negotiator of confidentials and he believes this role in the future will not be needed, as the National Manufacturers Association and other organizations will make organizations like Liberty “clean up their act.”
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   24:30
Why Banks Do Not Want to Work through the Small Business Administration
Scope and Content Note: Can get higher interest rate on their own, even though the lower interest loan is secured by the government. Another factor may simply be reluctance of bankers to work with the government, as this does not help the bank's portfolio.
Tape/Side   3/1
Time   27:30
When Fitschen Took Over as General Manager He Realized Wisco Was in Trouble and Why, But Inaccurately Placed Too Much Blame on Internal Causes
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   00:40
Internal Problems of Wisco: Personnel
Scope and Content Note: Envisioned a growth rate of one million dollars a year for five years and then two million dollars a year when he took over as general manager. Worked with industrial management consultant John Wrage to find new “associates” (Fitschen's euphemism for “employees”) to fill jobs of the large number of employees due for retirement within six to eighteen months of Fitschen's takeover. Internal-external problems about 50-50 ratio. Difficult to find good people; difficult to bring people from retail into wholesale because the profit margin (and thus the margin for error) is 2-25 percent in wholesaling and 40-60 percent in retailing.
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   05:15
Bad Attitude of the Owners an Additional “External” Problem
Scope and Content Note: The owners did not care; constantly criticized the employees and the organization. Considers the staff internal, but the owners external, as far as management goes; would consider the Board internal, however, as they give general manager instructions.
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   07:40
Problem of Department Store Accounts Being Able to Get Better Prices Directly from Manufacturer
Scope and Content Note: Because of Wisco commitment to equal treatment for all customers, Wisco could not meet these manufacturer-direct prices, because, although it might have been profitable to do so for a big department store, it would have been unprofitable to do so for the small retailer. Within very recent years K-Mart told all manufacturers that they must sell direct or K-Mart would not carry their products. Smaller chain or non-chain department stores, therefore, must try to do the same thing in order to remain at all competitive. All this creates imbalance in Wisco's inventory; that is, getting stuck with merchandise which big customers were now buying direct. Also, formerly big items now being sold in much smaller quantity because big customers buying these direct.
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   13:30
“Call-For” Service and Shortening of Service Point Change Nature of Much of Wisco Business from Rational to Random
Scope and Content Note: Faster service requires more and more skilled planning by Wisco employees, whereas originally the dealers did much of the planning as they anticipated seasonal and other needs and bought almost exclusively from Wisco. This futures buying was okay as long as Wisco employees were skilled in planning and as long as customers were predictable; but loss of key employees coupled with big dealers bypassing Wisco in favor of direct purchase from the manufacturer spelled trouble for Wisco in terms of inventory imbalance--having the wrong items on hand at the wrong time and not having the right items on hand when the demand arose. A prime example was the September 1973 sales show in the Dane County Coliseum when Wisco made large purchases with borrowed money in anticipation of positive dealer reaction which did not materialize.
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   18:20
$60,000 Put into New Catalog Which Was Not Well-Received by Dealers
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   19:50
Key Personnel Problem Was Getting Good Buyers
Scope and Content Note: Physical laborers and clerical help never a personnel problem; but difficult to get good, ambitious buyers who would go to work for an organization that could not show growth since World War II. Lost about 80 percent of buyers during first two years of Fitschen's general managership. Additional problems with replacing retiring buyers involved premature promotion from within, necessity of granting substantial raises just to fulfill interstate commerce requirements of minimum pay for salaried (non-time clock) workers, paucity of qualified people available outside the organization, inability to get a head buyer to relieve Fitschen of some of his work, three buyers who quit when belt-tightening demanded of all employees, etc.
Tape/Side   3/2
Time   28:25
In Order to Maintain Competetive Salaries, Staff Size Had to Be Cut from 70 to 50
Scope and Content Note: Many of the retiring buyers were making only $5-6000 a year, while new buyers had to be paid about $10,500. Since the company was not growing, the only way to come up with this additional money was to cut the size of the staff.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   00:45
How the Nixon Administration's Wage-Price Freeze Hurt Wisco and the Small Guy in General
Scope and Content Note: First, Wisco could not raise the price on items that were priced below an acceptable profit margin. Second, if a manufacturer had items in stock priced below what he could replace them for or below what he considered an acceptable profit margin should he attempt to replace them, he would simply not replace them (that is, not make any more, or else make them but not sell them for the duration of the price freeze), thus creating a shortage in the market place. This shortage would put the manufacturer in a position to determine which distributors would get his limited supply of a given article; naturally, he would choose to supply his biggest customers. Third, promises of wage increases to Wisco employees could not be met and employees would quit for higher paying jobs.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   07:30
How Wage-Price Freeze Hurt Wisco in Particular
Scope and Content Note: Innovative management trainee program aborted because promised, graduated wage hikes could not be delivered. Unlike many organizations, Wisco played it strictly honestly. Meanwhile, 22,000 items in stock, over a million dollars in inventory, required a lot of record-keeping in order to conform to the freeze regulations.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   15:00
“Mark Outs”
Scope and Content Note: Inability to provide customers with promised goods. While manufacturers could adjust more readily to the freeze by simply halting or slowing the manufacture of items that the freeze made less profitable, independent distributors were faced with constant demand for items they could no longer obtain from manufacturers because they did not have long-term or private label contracts with the manufacturers. A prime example was the inability of Wisco to supply its many rural dealers with barbed wire because the steel industry had cut back production of this item because its profitability was lessened by the timing of the wage-price freeze.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   16:15
Price Freeze and Mark Outs That Resulted from It Were Much More Fatal to Wisco Than Wage Freeze
Scope and Content Note: Rapid customer loss when unable to deliver the goods.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   18:30
Personal Goals When He Took Over Wisco
Scope and Content Note: The George Romney/American Motors parallel again. Wisco was “a sitting duck for the modern principles of management.” Wanted to use his five years training in New York (Chase Manhattan, American Management Institute, and J.C. Penney) and his twelve years of management experience to modernize this stagnant company which was in a very competitive business and had a market area envied by big Chicago and Minneapolis firms. Wanted to channel student energy into a management trainee program which would eventually result in small-town retail outfits sponsored by Wisco and managed by Wisco-trained youth. Growth rate goal of one million per year. But these were crisis years in many respects, and the many crises from many different angles prevented others connected with Wisco from having the vision needed to see through his plans. Repeats U.S. Senate race as a personal goal.
Tape/Side   4/1
Time   26:15
Attempts to Change the Wisco Management Image Amongst the Stockholders
Scope and Content Note: Need to overcome the controversial one-man rule of the previous administration. Wanted to have a very open administration and open goals. Innovative quarterly stockholder relations reports. Did not hide his political ambition from his top administrative aides.
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   00:45
The Situation at Wisco in Late Summer 1974; Negative Attitude of Board of Directors
Scope and Content Note: First formal talk of liquidation possibilities. Informational stockholders meeting of August 1974 gives Wisco a major blow, as majority present are those interested in ending the company. Feels meeting was packed by dissidents on the Board of Directors, including some that Fitschen had specifically nominated in order to get a balanced board. The main dissident was John Kress of Sparta. The La Crosse-Kickapoo Valley area was the greatest pocket of hostility to Wisco, while Green Bay and north provided the greatest loyalty. Kress and Vic Dorn, of Madison, both came on the Board in about 1973 with the attitude that Wisco was doomed. Claims Dorn and his brother had used Wisco sales shows to make direct contact with manufacturers and at one time had even set up a wholesale operation in competition with Wisco. Art Curry of Lafayette County Cooperative was only board member who was able to see reasons for Wisco problems outside the standard complaint of mismanagement and incompetent new employees. Failure of directors to pump up the company amongst retailers in their areas. Majority of those that showed up for informational stockholders meeting were either retired persons or those who were buying most of their merchandise from Wisco's competitors. These people (names names) only wanted to get their money out of Wisco. Fitschen, at meeting, challenges their negative attitudes and suggests forming a new organization from interested dealers if Wisco were to die. Negative attitude goes out from the meeting and Fitschen gets calls from all over the country from manufacturers asking if Wisco was bankrupt, if it was going out of business. Resentment against J.A. Fitschen also surfaces in the meeting. Fitschen realizes, as result of the meeting, that the end would soon be in sight. Summarizes that there is an awful lot of negativeness, duplicity, and games in business. The death of Wisco did nothing for the independent retailer; it merely made it more obvious that retail success depends on hook up with a national chain.
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   16:55
How Affiliation with a National Group Takes the Independence from the Independent Retailer
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   18:55
What the Negative Directors Had to Gain from the Death of Wisco
Scope and Content Note: The young, second generation stockholders had quite a bit of equity built up in Wisco and wanted to kill off Wisco before it lost much more money and thus made the stock worth less and less. Psychological effect upon younger dealers who would prefer to deal with big city wholesalers where all the glamor of the big city would come as a byproduct of their trade shows, etc.
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   22:50
More on How Affiliation with a National Wholesale Group Infringes on the Traditional, Independent, American Entrepreneurial Way of Life
Scope and Content Note: Fitschen's image of the typical retail hardware dealer.
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   25:15
The Advantages of the Independent Retailer
Scope and Content Note: How these advantages and this independence worked to disadvantage of Wisco.
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   28:35
“Crime” of Directors Putting Their Personal Gain and Personal Businesses before Wisco
Tape/Side   4/2
Time   30:25
As Locals Affiliate with Nationals, They Add to Momentum of National Control by the Biggies
Scope and Content Note: Control of hardlines business in U.S. is in hands of Penney's, Wards, Sears, K-Mart, Ace Hardware and True Value.
Tape/Side   5/1
Time   00:55
Fitschen Agrees That He Came on Too Strong Too Soon; the Nature of the Organization and Its Members Was Just Too Conservative
Scope and Content Note: Tried too much too soon before getting confidence of the people involved in Wisco. The energy, drive, youthfulness, etc. with which he hoped to impress people were the very things that made them suspicious. This resistance really began years earlier when Fitschen in about 1960 instituted a WATS telephone line system in his capacity as sales manager in order to make the system more efficient than the previous method of ten travelling salesmen. Cost $7500 per year, and two people on the phone could do the job of five people on the road and without the travelling expenses. WATS was controversial despite the significant cost savings. Wisco was first wholesale hardware company in nation to institute WATS.
Tape/Side   5/1
Time   13:50
Phil Halverson, Chairman of the Board
Scope and Content Note: Vice-president of operations when Fitschen became general manager. Quit Wisco in 1973 along with other management-level people when in mid-1973 it decided that vacations would have to be cancelled or postponed because the company was in a crisis situation. Went to work for Wisco competitor in Louisville and then bought a hardware store in Middleton, Wisconsin. Brought back in as a consultant to make sure management controlled the proxies at a key stockholders meeting. Election as Chairman of the Board a surprise.
Tape/Side   5/1
Time   20:00
Plan in 1974 to Have the Entire Board of Directors Resign in Order to Restore Confidence in the Company
Scope and Content Note: Several just refused to resign, though several new members were brought on the board. Unfortunately, these new members became less confident of the company's ability to turn itself around as the negative attitude of the holdovers rubbed off.
Tape/Side   5/1
Time   22:15
Attitude of the Employees of Wisco
Scope and Content Note: Seemed to be fearful of change and of taking initiative. They did not understand Fitschen either, by and large. This, even though he had purposely made himself available to any employee on any matter at any time. Weekly employee meetings; education program where Wisco would pick up part of the cost. J.A. Fitschen's relationship to employees had been paternal, but not close. J.D. Fitschen's relationship was more fraternal.
Tape/Side   5/1
Time   28:50
His Suggestion in 1974 about Starting a New Company with the Non-Dissidents
Scope and Content Note: Not so much a new company as giving the non-dissidents a chance to buy out the dissidents; not really offered as a practical solution, but more of a counteroffensive.