Page 115

Departure from Asia 
on the opposite flank of the Eurasian continent, and the Chinese as their
Communist enemies, 
in spite of the fact that Jiang Jieshi (AfT &, Chiang Kai-shek) and his
Guomindang party 
([09 Km, Kuomintang) maintained close ties with German Nazis. Spanish Republicans
acted in inverse fashion, siding with the Chinese. Even the anarchist press
praised Chinese 
figures such as Sun Zhongsan ( "1  LU, Sun Yatsen) or Jiang himself
despite utter dis- 
sonance with anarchist ideals. Among all of the groups, the Chinese Communists
were the 
most crucial promoters of the idea of parallelism. They deployed slogans
from the Spanish 
war to galvanize their troops, such as the famous "No pasaratn"
[They (fascists) shall not 
pass]-this time in reference of the seizure of Wuhan (AIVi%)-and also promoted
experi- 
ences learned in Spain, such as the cross-class unity against fascism (Unidad
Popular).'5 
On the Francoist side, inroads to Asia were complicated by Asian countries'
wide- 
spread recognition of the Republican government. Italy provided considerable
support 
for the Francoist cause in Asia, being crucial in 1937 in winning Japanese
recognition of 
Nationalist Spain, whose government had been deeply divided over the issue,
the diplomatic 
corps having favored maintaining the status quo and the military supporting
Franco. The 
Italian commitment was so intense that Rome even agreed to recognize the
Japanese pup- 
pet state in Manchuria, the Manchukuo (}im)Ii 1), established in 1932, in
order to win the 
Japanese acceptance for Franco. The sequence of events left little doubt:
Italy recognized 
Manchukuo on November 30, 1937; Japan recognized Franco's Spain the following
day; 
and Franco recognized Manchukuo the day after that in an act performed at
the Spanish 
embassy in Italy. This Italian decision to bet on the Japanese policy in
Asia was a reversal of 
previous policy, but also a crucial step for the separation of the world
powers into two oppo- 
site camps during 1938. Germany finally agreed also to recognize Manchukuo
in the month 
of March, while Tokyo and Berlin, after rebuffs from the Netherlands and
Great Britain, 
invited Rome to join the Anti-Comintern Pact. Italian aid to Franco upon
his entry onto 
the Asian stage therefore had unforeseen effects. By being instrumental in
helping Spaniards 
(who, for their part, accepted their subordination to Rome in an area that
was not among its 
priorities), the Italians hoped to enhance their status among the Great Powers.
Spain had a mixed attitude toward Asia during the Second World War. At first
its 
position mirrored the Japanese militarists-initially shocked by Hitler's
pact with the Soviet 
Union and later restored to the Axis realm by Germany's victories, though
never entering 
directly in the fight. Although the Hitler-Stalin pact rendered obsolete
the Anti-Comintern 
Pact, Spain and Japan continued to be linked by Spain's secret adherence
to the Tripartite 
Pact between Germany, Italy, and Japan, that had been agreed to at the meeting
of Franco 
and Hitler at Hendaye in October 1940. Thanks to the political friendship,
Spain became 
the main Western help for Japan's war effort after the attack on Pearl Harbor
in December 
1941 by collaborating with the Japanese on intelligence in the United States,
by represent- 
ing the interests of Japan in most of the Western Hemisphere, by being ready
to sell raw 
materials, and by using its remaining influence in the Philippines to support
Japanese bids to 
115