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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. China

United States policy with regard to the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, January-July 1955,   pp. 1-689 ff. PDF (242.1 MB)

Page 616

616 Foreign Relations, 1955-1957, Volume II
troops on offshore islands by one division. 3 Said he hoped Chase
understood his position (in over-ruling him). Chase reassured him on
this point. President continued matter had two aspects:
     (1) Military, in that if attacked, and US not to intervene, and
forces thus to be without adequate air and naval support, troops
would need the additional division to help morale and convince them
they could indeed defend islands successfully; and
     (2) Political, in that if public and military learned US and
MAAG opposing transfer this division, would deduce we thinking of
not defending islands (with inference we might urge another Tachen-
like withdrawal). Latter particularly important because since last
Robertson visit both public and military now fully aware US not
committed aid in defense Matsus and Kinmens.
     Chase expressed qualms regarding ability Chinese furnish ade-
quate logistic support. Chiang replied that he did not plan to move
the division immediately. Chase then suggested division's officers
down through battalion level make reconnaissance island in interim
and prepare alternative plans for division's role in defense. As for
basic decision, Chase said Admiral Stump informed that we had
made known our views frankly but that in view President's decision
nothing more to be said.
     At President's request, Chase promised convey Chiang's ideas
and comments to General Taylor.
    3 Chase reported in telegram 150730Z (MG 7954) from Chief MAAG Formosa
 CINCPAC, June 15, that he had just learned of Chiang's intention to send
an addi-
 tional division to Quemoy and that he had already stated his opposition
to the move
 and intended to do so again in an interview with Chiang the following day.
He com-
 mented that the five divisions qurrently on the island were more than adequate,
 their logistic support was already a difficult problem, and that the shift
would increase
 the proportion of Nationalist Army combat strength on Quemoy, Matsu, and
the Pes-
 cadores from over 30 to almost 40 percent. (JCS Records, 381 Formosa (11-8-48))
 280.    Editorial Note
     At a meeting of the National Security Council on June 30,
 during a briefing of the Council by Director of Central Intelligence
 Allen Dulles, there was intermittent discussion relating to China. Ac-
 cording to the memorandum of the discussion,
      "Mr. Dulles discussed developments noted on the airfields in
 Communist China, the transfer of additional jet bombers and MIG
 15's to Communist China, and the similar transfer of four Russian
 submarines and two destroyers. Mr. Dulles also called attention to

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