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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in two parts)

VIII. July 27, 1953-February 18, 1954: postarmistice issues,   pp. 1446-1751 PDF (117.1 MB)

Page 1598

1598         FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1954, VOLUME XV
delete 5-f, subsequently circulated as NSC 167/2 6 and referred to OCB
as the coordinating agency designated by the President.
  [Here follows discussion on item 6. "NSC Status of Projects."]
                                                   S. EVERETT GLEASON
  6 Infra.
S/S-NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 167/2 Series
Report by the Executive Secretary (Lay) to the National Security Council1
TOP SECRET                             WASHINGTON, November 6, 1953.
NSC 167/2
   1. The U.S., acting in its own behalf and in its capacity as executive
agent for the UN, should promptly notify Rhee formally and let other
ROK leaders know that if South Korea unilaterally initiates military.
operations against Chinese or North Korean forces in or north of the
demilitarized zone, then:
  a. UNC air, ground and sea forces will not support such operations
directly or indirectly;
  b. The U.S. will not furnish any military or logistic support for such
  c. All U.S. economic aid to Korea will cease immediately;
  d. The UNC Commander will take any action necessary to prevent
his forces becoming involved in the renewal of hostilities and to pro-
vide for their security.*
If Rhee should ask whether or not UNC        forces might be withdrawn
from Korea, he should be told that, if he ceases to cooperate with
UNC, the UNC will decide its course of action purely in terms of its
own interest and without consulting him.
  2. At the same time the U.S. should seek to obtain from         Rhee a
formal assurance in writing that he will not initiate unilateral military
action at any time against the Communists in or north of the demilita-
rized zone. If he refuses to give such assurance, the U.S. should inform
him immediately that the UNC reserves all rights to take whatever ac-
tions it deems necessary to preserve the security of the UNC forces.
   According to a covering memorandum by Lay, the President approved this
paper on
Nov. 6 including the agreement by State and Defense to retain paragraph 5-c
and delete
5-f The OCB became the coordinating agency for implementation of the courses
action in this paper. Lay again requested that special security precautions
be observed
and access to NSC 167/2 be "very strictly limited on an absolute need-to-know
  * Hereafter in this paper, the term "UNC forces" refers to those
forces which remain
loyal to the UNC and excludes ROK forces engaged in any unilateral renewal
of hostil-
ities. [Footnote in the source text.]

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