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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1952-1954. Korea (in two parts)
(1952-1954)

V. January 3-April 26, 1953: new look at Korea under the Eisenhower administration,   pp. 721-937 PDF (85.1 MB)


Page 826


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1952-1954, VOLUME XV
   Present at the meeting were the President of the United States, pre-
 siding; the Vice President oftheUnited States; the Secretary of State;
 the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of Defense; the Director
 for Mutual Security; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director
 of Central Intelligence; the Acting Director of Defense Mobilization;
 the Federal Civil Defense Administrator; the Chairman, Atomic
 Energy Commission; the Deputy Secretary. of Defense; the Assistant
 Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); the Special Assistant -to the Presi-
 dent (for FCDA presentation only); the Special Assistant to the Presi-
 dent for National Security Affairs; the Special Assistant to the Presi-
 dent for Atomic Energy Affairs; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and
 the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC. The Civilian- Consultants
 present were as follows: Messrs. Dillon Anderson,- James B. Black,
 John Cowles, Eugene Holman, Deane W. Malott, David B. Robertson,
 and Charles A. Thomas.
   [Here follow summaries of briefings by members of the Council and
 Consultants on the issues involved in reducing government expenditures
 consonant with national security.],
   The President then spoke his.-mind on the Korean problem. If, he
 said, we decide, to go up to the strength which will be necessary to
 achieve a sound tactical victory in'Korea-for example, to get to-the
 waist-the Russians will very quickly realize what we are doing. They
 would respond by increasing the Communist strength in Korea, and, as
 a result, we would be forced ultimately into a situation very close to
 general mobilization in order to get such a victory in Korea. General
 Bradley expressed agreement- with the President's thesis.
   The President then raised the question of the use of atomic weapons
in the Korean war. Admittedly, he said, there were not many good tac-
tical targets, but he felt it would be worth the cost if, through use of
atomic weapons, we could (1) achieve a substantial victory over the
CommuniSt forces and (2) get to aline at the waist of Korea.
   Secretary Dulles expressed the thought that it might now be possible
to achieve an armistice in Korea on the basis that the previous Admin-
istration has sought.in vain. Addressing his question to Mr. Robertson,
Secretary Dulles asked if in the circumstances we should accept such
an armistice.
   Mr. Robertson avoided an explicit: answer, but expressed the general
belief of the group of Consultants that the American people would wel-
come an armistice 'on this basis.
   Mr. Cutler then asked the Consultants if they were prepared to
answer the question whether we should try for a massive victory in
subject [review of national security-policies in relation to their costs]
should-be chiefly for
briefing purposes, and they should:be asked-to return at a later date to
give their reac-
tions to the preliminary views'of the Council members when more fully developed."
(S/
S-NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)
826


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