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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)
(1951)

South Asia: multilateral relations,   pp. 1650-2003 PDF (136.2 MB)


Page 1661


SOUTH ASIA AREA
1661
but he repeated that the UK saw no signs suggesting that an outbreak
was in any sense imminent.
   In response to Mr. Kennedy's inquiry whether some advantage
 might be realized in lumping together the various disputes between
 India and Pakistan and treating them as a single problem, Mr. Garner
 said he felt this would only complicate the problem. The UK had
 tended to concentrate on one problem at a time and believed this was
 still the most feasible approach. Our greatest handicap, of course,
 was that the will to reach a settlement was not there. Mr. Scott agreed
 and speculated on the various solutions which might suggest them-
 selves. Theoretically, a little bloodshed might throw such a fight into
 the two governments that they would quickly come to terms, but this
 resort was so fraught with danger that we had no choice but to rule it
 out. Another possibility was arbitration, but here it was necessary to
 offer some inducement to the parties to submit to arbitration and there
 was little we could offer India, which already has pretty much what
 it wants.
   Mr. Scott said that Nehru appeared to be shaken at the time of the
 Commonwealth Conference when Mr. Bevin 14 took the opportunity to
 describe to him the danger of a pincer movement from Communist
 Russia on the West and from Communist China on the East aimed
 directly at India. Mr. Garner added that the paradox of Nehru, how-
 ever, was that while he appeared to appreciate the significance of the
 Communist threat in Asia, it seemed to have little effect in the way of
 producing in him a sense of realism on Kashmir. (Mr. Scott remarked
 to Mr. Kennedy that Mr. Bevin's personal notes showed that Nehru
 appeared "flummoxed" when Mr. Bevin pointed out to him the in-
 consistency of his stand on aggression in Korea and in Kashmir).
 Mr. Kennedy affirmed that the US wished to pursue a settlement of
 Kashmir as rapidly and effectually as possible and Mr. Garner said
 this was certainly also the UK position.
 IV. POSSIBLE UNITED STATES AND/OR UNITED KINGDOM ACTION WITH RE-
 SPECT TO PERIPHERAL SOUTH ASIAN PROBLEMS: AFGHAN-PAKISTAN DIS-
 PUTE, NEPAL) TIBET, FRENCH AND PORTUGUESE POSSESSIONS ON THE
 SUBCONTINENT AND INDIAN MINORITIES IN CEYLON
 Mr. Kennedy then explained the latest developments in connection
 with our proposal for talks between Afghanistan and Pakistan.15 Af-
 ghanistan had accepted, but we were still awaiting a definite reply
 14 Ernest Bevin, British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.
 1K For documentation concerning the proposals made by the United States
to the
 Governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan on November 6, 1950, see Foreign
Relations, 1950, vol. v, pp. 1446 ff.
248-231--77- 13


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