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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)
(1951)

South Asia: multilateral relations,   pp. 1650-2003 PDF (136.2 MB)


Page 1658


FOREIGN RELATIONS), 1-951, VOLUME VI
text of his concern about what more we might be doing in the field
of psychological warfare to meet the Communist threat.
  Turning to Pakistan, the British officials pointed out that this coun-
try stood ready to cooperate and that it was particularly interested
in the Middle East, whose defense it looked on as a matter of acute
concern.1 At the time of the Commonwealth 'Conference, Liaquat 12
had taken part in the talks on Middle East defense and while, to be
sure, he had mostly listened and made no commitments, it was clear
he was very much absorbed in the matter. (Mr. Garner said, however,
in reply to Mr. Palmer's question, that Pakistan would not participate
in the talks among some of the Commonwealth countries in March
on Middle East defense). The main barrier to gaining Pakistan's
cooperation was Kashmir. Until this question was out of the way, little
more could be done to bring Pakistan into the Western alliance but,
given a Kashmir settlement, Mr. Scott and Mr. Garner believed there
was a real chance of obtaining a defense agreement with Pakistan.
(This, of course, would then raise difficulties over the supply of arms
Pakistan would undoubtedly want). They believed that the Common-
wealth talks had had a beneficial effect on Pakistan's attitude and
discounted the importance of the incidents surrounding the delay in
Liaquat's departure from Karachi which, they said, largely revolved
around the mechanics of consulting the other Commonwealth Prime
Ministers about Liaquat's desire to have Kashmir discussed in London.
The British officials did not think that the Afghan-Pakistan dispute
by itself would be a serious obstacle to Pakistan's participation in
Middle East defense; without Indian support they believed the
Afghan case would largely fall apart.
  Mr. Garner next commented on the UK's defense discussions with
Ceylon. Basic agreement with Ceylon has been reached and only points
of detail remain. The position of the Ceylon Government is that it is
glad and even anxious for the UK to retain bases and the Ceylonese
have already publicly stated that they would be on the Vestern side
in the event of war. The defense agreement of 1947 13 in itself estab-
lished a firm alliance with the United Kingdom. The point now under
debate is how Ceylon is to fulfill its obligation to purchase bases for
United Kingdom use. At present the UK is occupying bases in Ceylon
through leases from private owners and is continuing to pay rent for
these bases. The UK is now trying to persuade Ceylon to go ahead
with the purchase of these bases and present them to the UK for use
without charge. As could be expected, Ceylon is asking the highest
  Documentation on the possible entry of Pakistan into defense arrangements
  for the Middle East is scheduled for publication in volume v.
  Liaquat All Khan, Prime Minister of Pakistan.
  "The text of this agreement, dated November 11, 1947, is in Mansergh,
Docu-
  mentV, vol. II, p. 749.
1658


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