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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. National security affairs; foreign economic policy
(1950)

United States policy at the United Nations with respect to the regulation of armaments and collective security: the international control of atomic energy; regulation of conventional armaments; efforts to implement article 43 of the United Nations charter by placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council,   pp. 1-125 PDF (51.4 MB)


Page 35


REGULATION. OF- ARMAMENTS
enoughnor sufciently relevant to the problem to provide a plausible
escape from this harshchoie. .         ..
   [Here follows Part VI, 10 pageslwhich discusses the.Soviet attitude
 :toward, atomic weapons, citing the Russian practice, of minimizing in
 public statements the effectiveness of.w eapons of mass destruction.
 Kennan contends, h:owever, that for bot.h. ideological .and practical
 reasons, the Soviet Unionedoes wishto avoid nuclear War.J
                               VII
   'It flows from the' above:disc ussion that if, as I understand to be the
 case at'the present-moment, we are not prepared to reorient our mili-
 tary plan~ning and to envisage the renunciation, either now or with
 time, of our reliance,6 on "first use" of weapons of mass destruction
in
 a future war, then we should not movecloser than we are today to
 interational control. To do so would be doubly invidious; for not
 only would we be movinogtoward a situation Which we had already
 found unacceptable, but we would'meanwhile be4making that Sitution
 even more unacceptable 'by increasing our reliance on plans
 incompatible with it.
   If our military plans are to: remain-unchanged in this respect, then
 ilt ,is plrobably best for us to rest on the present U.N. majority pro-
 posals, not pressing them with any particular vigor, but taking care
 not to undermine them by any s'atements which would suggeSt alack
 of readiness on our part .to accept' lhemshould 'they find :acceptance in
 the Soviet camp,. It is truethat this position is somewhat disingenuous,
 since if the Russians should accept whatWe are ostensibly urging them
 to* accept, we might be acutely embarrassed. But the danger of ethir
 accepting it is not8s'eious. And in the present circumstances any new
 departure, involving even the suggestion of a withdrawal11from ' the
 U.N. proposals or of a willingnes to consider other ones, would
 re sultin much confusion, as between ourselves and our friends, which
 w~ould be both-difficult to dispel and unnecessary.
   Unless, therefore, we are:prepared to alter our military concepts
 as indicated above, thereby placing ourselves in a position where we
 could afford to take these weapons or leave them as the fortunes of
 international negotiation might determine, I urge that we consider
 the question of .the desirability of some neW international approach
 to have been: studied and answered in the negative, and that: we bury
 -the subject of internatio"nal control as best we can forthe present.
   The Ă½remaining discussion in this paper accordingly relates onlyto
 what we might do if we 'had reviewed our military concepts, if we
"'Itad come to'the conclusion that we would no longer rely on mass
destruction wea"pons in our planning for a future war, and if we had
resolved to work ourselves out of our present -dependence on those
weapons as rapidly as: possible.       ::;:.. '.. :
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