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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1950. National security affairs; foreign economic policy

United States policy at the United Nations with respect to the regulation of armaments and collective security: the international control of atomic energy; regulation of conventional armaments; efforts to implement article 43 of the United Nations charter by placing armed forces at the disposal of the Security Council,   pp. 1-125 PDF (51.4 MB)

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trol necessarily follow. It would appear to me that three sets of con-
siderations would still have to be carefully weighed.,
  The first one is whether a control scheme such as it envisages
actually gives greater assurance against the possible use of atomic
weapons than the retention by the United 'States of an adequate re-
taliatory capability. In part, this requires a judgment as to the ade-
quacy of the inspection facilities which it would provide. If inspection
cannot be judged to be adequate, a scheme of this kind may give rise
to continuing uncertainties land frictions which could be as disturbing
to the world's sense of security as the continued holding of atomic
weapons by both sides. Furthermore, the -analysis of the Counselor's
paper indicates that it is improbable that the U.,S.S.R. would itself
initiate the use of weapons of mass destruction. If this improbability
is backed up by an adequate power of retaliation on our side, it would
appear that if we adopt a use policy limited to retaliation that the
chances that atomic weapons would 'be used against us would be small.
It would 'appear sensible that we go into an international control
scheme only if the effect thereof is clearly to improve the chances
that atomic weapons will not be used against us or our allies.
  The second set of considerations go to the point of whether the
suggested scheme is negotiable. Even though some of the U.SS.R.
objections to the U.N. proposal have been eliminated, it is difficult
to conceive of the U.S.S.R. being willing to abandon even on an interim
basis its position as to peacetime uses. There is also a real question
as to whether the U.K. and the Canadians would go 'along with the
suggested scheme.
  The third set of considerations go to the point of whether a success-
ful negotiation on international control of atomic energy is prac-
ticable for us, for our allies, and for the U.S.S.R. except in the context
of a broader program for the relaxation of tensions between the East
,and West. This leads to the question of whether further progress
toward working out German and Japanese peace settlements, a mutual
withdrawal of troops from the center of Europe, and a program for
the limitation of conventional armaments must not be made before we
can realistically expect a satisfactory agreement on atomic energy.
   (e) Our present public stance toward atomic energy is undoubtedly
confusing and may be detrimental to us in the light of General
Bradley's testimony that the atomic bomb would be "our principal
initial weapon in any war". This should certainly be clarified. For
public stance to be soundly based, however, it is necessary for us first
to decide on our positions with respect to (a), (b), (c) and (d) above.
Certainly if a modification is made in our use policy our public stance
could be greatly improved, even though it should be decided that our
position with respect to international control can only be modified in
the event of a better and more effective plan being proposed or as

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