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Foreign Relations of the United States

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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts)
(1948)

Israel,   pp. 533-1707 ff. PDF (461.4 MB)


Page 1285


leave the UN, break off diplomatic relations with those nations most
directly concerned, and cancel the concessions held by the same powers
in Arab countries. These concessions might eventually be transferred
to more friendly powers.
   In terms of self-interest, the Arab states would lose little by severing
 diplomatic relations with the-SC members responsible for the embargo
 or even by withdrawing from the UN. The imposition of economic
 sanctions'by the Arab states on the powers which had voted for the
 embargo ovuld - cause serious disloCations in the Arab countries and
 would delay developmenit programs indefinitely. Nonetheless, the
 Arabs might well' be willing to sacrifice economic benefits in order ýto
 punish the offending nations. Sanctions would likely include the can-
 cellation of oil and air concessions or the sequestration of foreign in-
 stallations. Moreover, the Arab masses would probably turn against
 their own governments, holding them responsible for the defeat. The
 violence land unrest accompanying these political upheavals would
 create the chaotic conditions most favorable to Soviet exploitation.
 4. Implications of UN Failure 7To Take Positive Action.
   In the event-tthat the UN truce expires with the UN having taken
no positive action, the development of the military situation in Pales-
tine will depend largely on the policies pursued by the 'US .and UK
regarding arms shipments tothe Middle East. If the US and the UK
should ,maintain .embargoes, the Jews could obtain more arms and
equipment from other sources thann the Arabs. This advantage, how-
ever, would not be immediately decisive; fighting would continue on
a greater scale but would not bring outright victory to either side.
   The USSR probably would not support either side exclusively. If it
shouldattempt to increase its influence in Israel by making large ship-
ments of matgriel: to the Jews, orif for any-reason a Jewish victory
appeared imminent, the UK would almost certainly seek -to redress the
balance by resuming armsý shipments to the Arabs. Thus themilitary
deadlock would hold.
  The UK's action would cause the Zionists to increase their pressure
on the USto lift its embargo. If their efforts were successful, the result
would be an increasingly bloody struggle in Palestine for an indefinite
period of time, coupled with a catastrophic deterioration in already
strained US-UK relations. Should the UK subsequently stop its ship-
ment of arms to the Arab states in order to avoid a complete break
with the US, the Arabs would be in a desperate situation. At this stage,
the USSR would almost certainly give support to the Arab Armies
considerably beyond the small amount of matgriel aid already reaching
them through the Soviet satellites and would take advantage of the
isolation of the Arab world from the West to extend is control into
the Arab countries.
     598-594--76-- 49
ISRAEL
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