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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. The Near East, South Asia, and Africa (in two parts)
(1948)

Israel,   pp. 533-1707 ff. PDF (461.4 MB)


Page 1284


FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1948,8 VOLUME V
arms traffic. Financial support would certainly stem mainly from this
country, and a considerable portion of the actual war matlriel would
likely originate here. Consequently, violent anti-US reaction could be
expected throughout the Arab world in the wake of any Jewish mili-
tary successes. There is also the probability that under such circum-
stances similar resentment would be directed against the UN and
against those nations voting for the embargo. Meanwhile, the USSR
could be expected to exploit the inadequacies of the embargo in order
to play both ends against the middle.
3. Implications of a UN Arms Embargo Against One Belligerent.
  a. Against the Jews.
  An effective UN arms embargo against the Jews alone would obvi-
ously mean military victory for the Arab forces. In a relatively short
time the Arabs would be in a position to establish some form of unitary
state in Palestine, wherein the present Arab majority would be able to
control the Jewish minority. US prestige in the Middle East would be
improved since Arab leaders would probably credit the US with hav-
ing permitted this pro-Arab measure.
  The repercussions in Israel of an embargo against the Jews would be
violent. The Jews would look on the embargo as a betrayal by the
West, and the Stern Gang and other pro-Soviet elements would gain
in influence and would attempt to wrest control from the pro-West or
moderate elements. To circumvent the schemes of the extremists, the
moderate elements might try to bargain with the Arab leaders in the
hope of finding a modus vivendi for the Jews under some form of
confederation. Deciding factors in the extremist-moderate struggle
for power would be the amount of support given by the USSR to the
extremists and the nature of the political terms the Arabs would be
willing to grant the moderates.
  b. Against the Arabs.
  An effective UN arms embargo against the Arabs alone would mean
military victory for the Jews. While the Arabs would be denied outside
help, the Jews would be able to buy arms in various parts of the world,
and to effect relatively easy delivery. They could thus assume the
offensive and force Arab acceptance of a Jewish state. Other nations
could be expected to grant diplomatic recognition, which would add to
the prestige of Israel and its government and help to ease current eco-
nomic difficulties.
  The Arab states would, of course, look upon such an embargo as a
hostile act intended to defeat their claims in Palestine and to guarantee
Israel's independence. Arab leaders have already declared that, if
increasing aid is given the Jews by other powers, the Arab states will
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