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Foreign Relations of the United States

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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union

Multilateral relations,   pp. 1-732 PDF (280.9 MB)

Page 11

eral Assembly by continuing or increasing their aid to the Greek
guerrillas?" Certainly the granting of some form of recognition om
the part of Albania, Yugoslavia and Bulgaria to the Markos junta
would in itself represent an open disregard of the General Assembly
resolution. If UNSCOB should report to the United Nations that such
recognition was accompanied by continued aid to the guerrillas, it
would be difficult for the United States not to insist that either the
General Assembly, perhaps in special session, or the Security Council
take some appropriate action.
  7. So long, however, as the United States has made no decision as
to how far it is prepared to go in order to prevent Greece from falling
victim to the aggression of the Soviet Union or Soviet satellites, we
might be going through useless motions in pressing the Greek case
further either in the General Assembly or in the Security Council. The
General Assembly has no power physically to enforce its decisions and
the Security Council would be unable, in the face of a certain Soviet
veto, to take any effective measures against the aggressors. Since
resolutions already passed by the General Assembly would have been
openly ignored it would seem to be ridiculous to pass any more unless
there was some prospect of their support by action. The United States
would place itself in a false position if it should support the passage
of additional resolutions when it was not prepared, if necessary, to
join with other nations in accordance with the spirit of the Charter
to use force if necessary in order to avoid the slow strangulation of
Greece by the Soviet Union and its satellites.
  8. We should make decisions now which would enable us to let
the Greek Government and people understand that they can really
depend on the backing of the United States in their struggles against
foreign aggression, provided they do their part in eliminating the
Greek guerrillas and in restoring Greek economic life. We do not need
to tell them specifically that we are prepared to send armed forces in
certain circumstances to Greece. Until,. however, we are able to con-
vince them that our determination not to permit Greece to fall a
victim to aggression is greater than the determination of international
Communism to take over Greece, our efforts to aid Greece are, likely
to remain ineffective. The Greek people have been in a state of demor-
alization as a result of their suffering ever since the conquest of Greece
by the Axis. Their demoralization has been accentuated by their
kn wamge of what has happened to the peoples of the Balkans and
Eastern Europe under Soviet domination. They know that Greece,
without resolute backing, cannot indefinitely resist the Soviet Union
and its satellites. They have no assurance that they possess such back-
ing. In the absence of further assurances, there is a growing sense of
hopelessness, frustration and alarm. Many Greeks opposed to Com-

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