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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1948. Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union

Multilateral relations,   pp. 1-732 PDF (280.9 MB)

Page 9

area. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe it disadvantageous to the Na-
tional Defense for an officer in command of armed services to be re-
quired to report directly to the United States Government concerning
political or economic matters except when requested for his personal
views by the Department of State.
  The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the firm opinion that, from the
military. point of view, the action recommended in the conclusion in
paragraph 18 is the most logical step to improve our position in Greece
at the present time and, consequently, our position in the Eastern
                                For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
                                    WILLIAM D. LEAHY
                                 Fleet Admiral, U.S. Navy,
                                    Chief of Staff to the
                          Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces
Memorandum by the Director of the Offiee of Near Eastern and Afri-
         can Affairs (Henderson) to the Secretary of State
TOP SECRET                        [WASHINGTON,] January 9, 1948.
Subject: Comments with Regard to a Report to the National Security
   Council, dated January 6, 1948, on "The Positikn of the United
   States with Respect to Greece"
   A. Comments with regard to Paragraph 15, which, provides that
under certain circumstances, the United States should be prepared to
send "armed forces to Greece or.. elsewhere in the Mediterranean.
  1. Those of us who are working on day-to-day problems with Greece
are unanimous in our conviction that a decision should be reached as
soon as possible s'as- to -how determined the United States is to prevent
Greece from succumbing to the aggression of international Commu-
nism  and from  becoming eventually a base for further Soviet
  2. We are further convinced that unless we decide that our deter-
mination to prevent the conquest of Greece by the Soviet Union or its
satellites is to be stronger than that of the would-be aggressors to take
Greece land- unless we make this fact clear to the Soviet Union, the
Soviet satellites, and the Greek people -themselves, either (a) Greece
and the whole Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East, not to
speak of Europe, will be lost to the Western world, or (b) the neigh-
bors of Greece will have gone so far- before realizing the extent of
our determination that they cannot draw back and there will be the
beginnings of a new World War.

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