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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1955-1957. China
(1955-1957)

United States policy with regard to the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China, January-July 1955,   pp. 1-689 ff. PDF (242.1 MB)


Page 621


                                            The China Area      621
Taiwan, and (b) direct talks between the United States and the CPR
on a higher level and on an agreed agenda. The Secretary again ex-
pressed doubt regarding the offer for talks between Taiwan and the
CPR, but U Nu reaffirmed what we had previously said. He com-
mented that he had offered to visit Taiwan but that Chou En-lai had
asked him not to go.
    Reference was made to the prisoner problem, the Secretary
saying that it is difficult to know just where we are in view of the
conflicting information which we receive.
    The Secretary asked U Nu whether he thought the CPR wishes
to avoid fighting. U Nu said that he cannot read their minds but had
learned a lesson in the Korean war. He had then felt the Chinese
would not intervene. He said that the Secretary had stated in a
speech that the United States would interfere if there were interven-
tion in Indochina, but that the Chinese had nevertheless intervened.
The Secretary read the relevant excerpt from his speech of a year
ago. 4 He had actually said, in effect, that if Red China were to send
its army into Indochina it could not do so without grave conse-
quences.
    U Nu said that fear of war apparently does not deter the Chi-
nese Communists. On the other hand they made it plain to him that
they understand that the United States is not bluffing. He also felt
that the Chinese Communists likewise are not bluffing. The mere
threat of war therefore, would not act as a deterrent.
     The Secretary spoke at length regarding the necessity to be pa-
tient and to let time take care of some of these problems. He felt that
there will be an evolution in both places, i.e., on the mainland and
on Taiwan, and that we should not force the issues because to do so
would cause a break and only war would result. He pointed out that
the Chinese Nationalists, too, are impatient and feel that they must
attack the mainland. We have used our influence in that respect and
have obtained an agreement from them that they will not attack. If
the CPR is not willing to let time contribute towards a solution, the
situation will eventually lead to war. He felt that it does not make
sense to push things too fast as with time the situation in that area
will change, although we do not know how at this time. He recalled
that President Rhee also desperately wishes to unite Korea. We also
believe Korea should be united, but not by force. We stopped any
movement towards use of force by withholding ammunition, equip-
ment and supplies. In Germany, a similar situation exists: Adenauer
agreed to give up force as a means to reunite Germany. In conse-
    " Reference is apparently to the Secretary's address of June 11,
1954, before the
 Los Angeles World Affairs Council. For text, see Department of State Bulletin,
June 28,
 1954, pp. 971-973.


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