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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)

Indochina,   pp. 332-582 PDF (99.7 MB)

Page 345

tions in the, north and to provide necessary subterranean hangars
for certain fields.
   I told General De Lattre that there was no change in the situation;
 that France had already received a large amount of the material with
 little delay. General Brink had. taken the initiative of going to see
 lacArthur2 and had obtained from the latter, at some sacrificeto
 reserves for Korean action, large quantity of material which French
 were now utilizing. General Brink's initiative had advanced deliveries
 of these, items by probably three months. Requests for military aid
 to Indochina enjoyed a priority immediately after that of Korean
 operations. I remarked that De Lattre's staff had probably misunder-
 stood the observations of the officers of MAAG.
   We had recommended giving sizable program of aid of which many
 items would arrive without delay. General Brink pointed out that he
 had recommended the provision of landing mats and was still recom-
 mending delivery but from what he had learned in Japan they were
 in short or non-existent sup.ply. It would take several months to get
 them. He, General Brink, had informed the Chief-of-Staff of theĆ½
 circumstances and it was a service to De Lattre to know in advance just
 what material he could receive only with considerable delay, so he
 could plan realistically, De Lattre expressed himself satisfied. but
 asked that Brink go over with his Chief-of-Staff a list of pending
 requests and point out items whose delivery would involve long delay,
 I closed this part of the conversation by the remark that he knew he
 could count on us to cooperate in every way toward the acceleration of
 the armament program. I also remarked that some ten days ago De
 Lattre had told us he was sending the next day a list of items which
 were urgently needed. We had altered our military mission to process
 the requests but the list actually had only been received yesterday.
 De Lattre admitted this delay which was caused by the fact that he
 had turned-the list over to Colonel Beauffre whom he had to take with
 him on his sudden trip to Hanoi to work out defense measures against
 Viet Minh attacks of two weeks ago.
 De Lattre said he had changed his plans about going to Paris. He
 had now decided not to go before the middle of February. He had t&
 be on hand here during this period of possible Viet Minh attacks. He
 was no longer worried over the renewal of Viet Minh offensive. He
 did not believe French would lose an inch of ground nor did he believe
 the Chinese troops would join operations at this time. With expected
 material. some reinforcements, airfield and defense construction he
 2 Generalof the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander for the
Allied Powers in Japan; Commander in Chief, Far East; Commander in Chief,
United Nations Command.

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