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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)
(1951)

Indochina,   pp. 332-582 PDF (99.7 MB)


Page 344


344           FOREIGN RELATIONS, 195 1, VOLUME VI
is taking matter up direct with Pleven4 with-view to pushing- matter.
   If decisions have already been reached with respect to US.Govern-
 ment course of action in event Chinese Communist aggression against
 Indochina, it would be helpful for Embassy to be informed of these
 decisions. It is inevitable that among questions French-Government
 would raise in joint staff discUssions Indoehina situation would be that
 of action to be taken in event Chinese Communist overt crossing
 border into Tonkin, either through use of "volunteers" or with
openly
 organized units of regular Chinese Communist armies, as well as
     or a i e                        do.a   ss   it   i  n    a a
 whether US Government was prepared to assist with air and naval
 forces, or even ground forces. Pertinent-to the foregoing would also
 be question whether problem would require immediate discussion in
 and action by UNY and, whether US Governmeit prepared to act-t with
 or without UN sanction.'
   Sent Department 3853:- repeated info Saigon 384. Department pass
 Saigon.
                                                            BRUCE
   'Ren6 Pleven, Premier of France.
 751G.5 MAP/i,951 Telegram
       The  linister at     T Saigon (Heath) to the Secretary of State
  SECRET                             1SAGON,-January 9, 1951-8 p. m.
    1209. Accompanied by General Brink,' I saw De Lattre yesterday
  evening.-De Lattre started complaining r that., while General Brink
  and I were always ready to consider any reasonable request for mili-
  tary aid, subordinate officers of MAAXG were refusing to entertain
  requests presented -by his staff;: were requiring excessive 'ju stification"
  for each demand-and..tating orally with regard to many requests that
  they would not be sat, isfied since the US wasImore interested-in arm-
  ing Europe than providing equipment for Indochiiia. These offcers
  whom De Lattre did not name, were, he allegeĆ½di giving impression
  US was no longer interested in Indochina. He said: hat subordinate
  officers of MAAG had refused French request for, perforated landing
  mats-for extra airfields which, he must build with least podsibledelay
  in order to disperse his pl anes against possible enemy air attack and
to
  provide operating bases for additional planes he expects. These mats
  were absolutely necessary. If unobtainable he would have to have
  cement strips which would take months to complete and for which
  cement Was lacking. He was using all available cement for fortifica-
     'Brig. Gen. Francis G. Brink, C-hief of the Military Assistance Advisory
Group
   at Saigon.                            -:


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