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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)
(1951)

Indochina,   pp. 332-582 PDF (99.7 MB)


Page 342


342
FOREIGN RELATIONS, 1951, VOLUME VI
were 20,000 Chinese troops and Officials inthe northernborder region.
He had reports that at Langso, there were.6,500 Chinese troops and
that thepolitical administrator was-a.:Chinese woman Communist.
(Note: Governor Giao in a later conversation said he. did not believe
more than a few Chinese were actually on Vietnam soil. -He regretted
that De Lattre had not yet decided-to give French support
to the formation of Vietnamese counter-guerrilla and resistance
organization.)
  7.This concluded -the-substantive aspects of our conversation. After
leaving- the palace, Bao Dai's Military' Adjutant accompanied me to
the airport. He-is also'nominally commanderof one of the Vietnamese
battalions in the north., Of his own volition he criticized the tactics
being employedIagainst the Viet Minh. He, said that instead of fight-
ing defensively,-smaller groups mustbe organized to. make raids at
night and on holidays against Viet! Minh communications and land
detachment. They .would need special arms and equipment for such
operations. Regular military formations-must be maintained for the
defense of the cities andto meet Viet Minh orthodox military-forma-
tion but formation :ofcounter-guerrilla: units should not be delayed.
However, .he :-said :concurrently, there must be an increased effort
politically-toindoctrinate both troops andd population. V:iet-Minh
propaganda was latterly meeting with great-success.
   8. I was more than usually disappointed in this last conversation
 with Bao0 Dai. He. expressed intelligent understanding and agreement
 with the measures which-should be .undertaken but, there. was no evi-
 dence of urgent determination and leadership to accomplish them. He
 is_ undoubtedly working on'the formation of his army at Dalat and
 is consultingwith a great number of people these days. I learned that
 the Cao Daist Pope was at Dalat the day of: my visit and that several
 miles away resided .General -Quan Nam-Hung, an old Vietnamese
 officer who was trained and-served under Chiang Kai-shek.-But with
 our reverses in Korea and-new Viet Minh attacksin- the north,-the
 feeble-public support.afi  hope in ,Bao Dai's regime-is becoming
 dangerously weaker. It is: clear to: me that Bao Daiiis perfectly aware
 of this-deteriorating-situation; but itis also perfectly clear that he-has
 not yet-arrived at a definite plan ,or urgent determination to correct
 it. I expect to see De Lattre-today or tomorrow.nand return.-for -further
 conversations with Bao Dai early next-week.-
    I might add that I asked Bao Dai if he intended to go to Hanoi
  and he said yes-but not immediately.'His first trip must bemade to
  Hue. He said showing that the imperial -and Confucian family tradi-
  tion is stillY strong in him-despite his-Western education that he was
  chief-of the.imperial family ineluding"A0,000 or 40,000 people. Sev-
    SPresident of the Republic of China.]'i


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