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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Asia and the Pacific (in two parts)
(1951)

Indochina,   pp. 332-582 PDF (99.7 MB)


Page 337


INDOCHINA
337
   National:
   5. Renewed effort should be made to animate Bao Dai to sustained
and vigorous effort of leadership. Whatever excuse may have existed
in past to effect that Bao Dai could not link his future to govern-
ment not truly sovereign no longer exist today after Pau transfers and
in face Chinese menace.
   6. US will exert pressure for constitution broadened national unity
government which would forthwith announce plans and proceed to
implentation liberal program social educational, and economic better-
ment (with present and if necessary increased ECA funds) and would
set in motion machinery for institution representative organs.
   7. US will indicate availability under approved circumstances forms
 of assistance to facilitate defections from VM. Legation suggests this
 must be activity another agency.
   (C) Economic.
   View nature AS economic problems sketched part I, present STEM
program, in character if not in quantity or rate, regarded as reasonably
satisfactory. Though its importance should greatly increase in 1951
as organization and planning period of 1950 is translated into major
deliveries of current fiscal year, every effort should continue be mado
speed procurement and shipment programmed items. In next six
months military effort must be given priority, although in long run
economic assistance through capital development and improved tech-
nology necessary put AS on truly sound economic base.
   Emergency economic needs are: (1) US may have to finance antici-
pated AS budgetary deficits 1951 as explained part I, if French un-
willing or unable to do so, (2) preparations for assisting in handling
northern refugees if large numbers make way south, and (3) settling
soonest with French issue of US being able in spite March 8 accord
furnish advisers AS governments to supplement, not supplant French,
in order assist more efficient and honest administration, lack of which
may contribute discourage the whole-hearted support for Bao Dai's
government which is so badly needed.
   (D) Informational.
   This activity should approach if not parallel importance our mili-
tary and economic programs. The executive staff of USIS now con-
sists of two junior officers. The focus should shift from "sell America"
to "hit the enemy". We must expand our use of all media, employing
materials collected and edited locally. The program outlined by Good-
friend mission should be backed with funds and personnel. Efforts to
insure sympathy of youth, labor and religious groups should be en-
ergetically promoted. Viets must be coached by American technicians
in giving Viet government "new look"; uniforms, stamps, seals,
gov-
ber 4, does attribute the following to Secretary of State Acheson, however:
"If the Communists are successful in Korea, this may so weaken the French
in Indochina that they will pull out. Ile doubted if any one of the President's
advisers would urge him to intervene in that situation." For the record
of the
first meeting and other documentation on the Truman-Attlee conversations,
see
Foreign Relations, 1950, vol. iii, pp. 1789 ff. For additional documentation
on the
conference, see ibid., vol. vii, pp. 1237 if.
i


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