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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1947. The British Commonwealth; Europe
(1947)

Europe,   pp. 196-654 PDF (168.7 MB)


Page 407


THE MARSHALL PLAN
dollars deficit and of aggregate net commodity requirements.) These
reports reflect little or no mutual criticism and screening. They contain
no signs of cooperation by sixteen participants to provide maximum
assistance to each other. They evidence insufficient attempt to provide
for most effective use of critically scarce resources particularly coal,
coke, timber and transport facilities. They indicate no acknowledge-
ment of probable necessity of adjusting standards of living to realities
of European situation including capability to produce and possible
aid from abroad. Reports fail to distinguish between capital require-
ments for reactivation of basic industries from capital requirements
for longrun projects which should be financed outside of program.
  Financial report contains no assurance that effective steps toward
internal financial stabilization will in fact be taken.
  5. Some CEEC technical experts have acknowledged to us that re-
ports are generally unsatisfactory and also fail to meet US conditions.
It is evident that CEEC delegations do not feel their terms of refer-
ence permit them to prepare reports along lines which meet US con-
ditions. This situation can be remedied only by new instructions from
sixteen governments to their delegations in Paris. Such new instruc-
tions will come only, if at all, as a result of vigorous and direct rep-
resentations by US Govt to other govts concerned.
  6. Immediate problem is action, if any, to be taken by US Govt with
respect to: (a) formal submission of CEEC reports to US Govt and
(b) formal publication thereof. If US Government takes no action,
prospects are that reports in substantially present form will soon be
submitted to Secretary as final program of sixteen participating gov-
ernments in response to his Harvard address. This might conceivably
jeopardize acceptance in US of aid program for Europe because it
could lead to impression in US of inability of sixteen govts to form-
ulate realistic and defensible program. Consequences of US rejection
or prolonged debate might be to embitter European peoples with re-
sulting unfavorable political and economic repercussions. If for these
reasons Department determines that positive action respecting (a)
or (b) above is required, immediate approaches to top officials of
UK, French, Belgium, Netherlands, and Italian Governments would
seem to be necessary in order to assure desired results by tentative
September 15 deadline.
  7. Most effective way of avoiding consequences outlined paragraph
six above would be to take action designed to prevent formal trans-
mission of present reports to US Government and possibly also their
publication. Department may accordingly wish to suggest to key
governments that reports of CEEC should be submitted to participat-
ing governments for consideration rather than directly and formally
407


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