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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States diplomatic papers, 1944. General
(1944)

Application of the principle of unconditional surrender to Bulgaria, Hungary, and Rumania,   pp. 580-613 PDF (12.3 MB)


Page 581


SURRENDER TERMS-BULGARIA, HUNGARY, RUMANIA  58t
  Probably as a result of a disagreement with Molotov over his arbi-
trary refusal to allow my plane to take Bill to Cairo, to which I took
strenuous objection and which I finally got reversed, the Soviets went
to great lengths to placate both of us. As a consequence the NKVD
officials came to the Embassy for a midnight discussion and last night
three of them dined at the Embassy, as far as I know, unprecedenteI
occurrences in any foreign Embassy.
  In my talk with Molotov alone on December 31 he brought up on his
own initiative the question of the meaning of "unconditional sur-
render" as applied to the various satellite countries, and asked whether
I had any information on our attitude. I explained that I had none
except as had been discussed with him by General Donovan in relation
to Bulgaria. I said that we had both read with interest the Pravda
article on December 27 concerning Bulgaria published since our talk
(summarized in our no. 2333, December 27 6) and that we had been
struck by the similarity of views expressed in that article with those
expressed by General Donovan. In reply to my inquiry, Molotov indi-
cated that he was in general agreement with the article.
  I told him General Donovan was planning to discuss the matter
with the President on his return and that in the meantime we had
hoped that Molotov might be able to give advice on the subject because
of the Soviet diplomatic contact with Bulgaria.7 He said that they
did not have sufficient information to reach a conclusion that they
were working on it. His only specific suggestion was that they placed
great importance on the continuation of the bombing of Bulgaria
which they believed would assist the Bulgarians in becoming more
sensible.
  Molotov continued that Marshal Stalin 8 at Tehran 9 had outlined
the terms which the Soviet Government were prepared to accord Fin-
land 10 and, as he recalled it, the President and Mr. Churchill 11 had
expressed no objection to these terms. I said I understood the Swedish
Government was pressing the Finns to make a move in this direction,
to which Molotov replied that it always took the Finns a long time to
make up their minds. Molotov added that they were also studying
the question of Roumania and Hungary.
" Not printed.
7Alexander Andreyevich Lavrishchev was the regular Minister of the Soviet
Union in Bulgaria until September 1944. At the beginning of 1944 he was
temporarily away on other duties and the mission was in the hands of Vladimir
Georgiyevich Dekanozov, an Assistant People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs
of the Soviet Union, who remained until March 1944.
8 Marshal osif Vissarionovich Stalin, Chairman of the Council of People's
Commiissars of the Soviet Union.
" For documentation relating to the conference at Tehran, see Foreign
Rela-
tionw, The Conferences at Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 457 ff.
   See vol. iII, pp. 556 if.
 11British Prime Minister Winston S. Churchill.


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