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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States, 1951. Korea and China (in two parts)

The China area,   pp. 1474-2055 ff. PDF (222.6 MB)

Page 1481

tion about drawing the issue with the Chinese. What would the United
States do? It might clear its accounts for the time being under the
premise that the whole action was a UN action and that the United
States would conform to the limits allowable under UN endorsement.
It might cut loose from the UN aegis. After all, the bulk of the attri-
tion suffered had been on the part of Americans on the UN side
(Koreans excepted). Our Army was the one that got jumped. Other
nations had committed only small fractions. For the time being the
first course might be followed out of expediency. But the Chinese
should not assume that the debt would be wiped off that way.
  The discussion then went on to the Formosa problem.
  First Party said that the Cairo declaration 4 was still valid. In our
view the island should go to China eventually. Certainly we did not
claim it for ourselves and would not do so. Our interposition of the
7th fleet in the channel there was motivated by one consideration only.
We did not wish the position to be used against us. Our action in
Korea made this necessary. As one of the victor powers we have
residual rights there until a Japanese peace treaty has been made. The
Cairo declaration manifested our intention. It did not itself constitute
a cession of territory. We had been compelled to (act because of our
fear of a stab in the back from Peiping. We would be willing to see
the island go to any Chinese regime not likely to use it against us.
That brings up the question again: Is the Chinese regime the servant
of its people's interests or the servant of Moscow's interests? If the
regime is acting only in China's interest, Formosa is 'a solvable prob-
lem. If it is acting in the interest of Moscow-as it certainly appears
to be---it would be quixotic in the extreme for the United States to
permit the island to go forthwith to Peiping.
   It is futile and academic to consider any issues between the United
 States and the Chinese apart from the main problem of Peiping's
 intentions. This applied to the question of recognition.
   The United States conducts its recognition policy in its own in-
 terest as it sees it. Our continued recognition of Chiang Kai-shek's 5
 government did not indicate devotion to it or any determination to
 impose it in authority over the mainland. Those in the United States
 who speak up vehemently for him are in a distinct minority.
   To suspend relations with a relict regime naturally brings into im-
   Reference is to the communique issued by President Franklin D. Roosevelt,
 Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Winston Churchill follow-
 ing their conference at Cairo, November 22-26, 1943. The relevant portion
 clared that "all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese,
such as Man-
 churia, Formosa, and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of
 For the text of the communique, see Foreign Relations, The Conferences at
 Cairo and Tehran, 1943, pp. 448-449.
 I Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the Republic of China.

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