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United States Department of State / Foreign relations of the United States : diplomatic papers, 1945. Europe

Poland,   pp. 110-436 PDF (118.9 MB)

Page 180

860C.01/3-2545: Telegram
LThe Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Harriman) to the Secretary
                             of State
                                  Moscow, March 25, 1945-9 p. m.
                                  [Received March 25-7:45 p. m.]
  906. Polco. ReEmbtel 882, March 24, 1 p. in.37 At the meeting
of the Polish Commission on March 23 Molotov seized on every pos-
sible issue to raise objections to our interpretation of the Crimea
declaration and to our proposals for procedure. He insisted that his
memorandum of March 22 (reEmbtel 869, March 23, 5 a. m.) setting
forth the view of the Soviet Government represented the correct in-
terpretation of the Crimea declaration and criticized the interpreta-
tion given in our memorandum (reDeptel 640, March 18, 1 p. m.).
He again refused to discuss seriously the names of Poles to be invited
for consultation and gave every evidence of a desire to resort to de-
laying tactics with respect to this particular point.
  Molotov began the discussion by asking whether the Commission
should continue its work. Clark Kerr and I both stressed the im-
portance which our governments attached to the Polish question and
the desirability of reaching an early settlement. Molotov then intro-
duced the Soviet contention that the 'Warsaw Government should
serve as the "basis" for the formation of a new Polish Government.
Throughout most of the discussion AMolotov endeavored to obtain our
agreement to this contention and also to his proposition that the
'Warsaw Poles should be consulted in the first instance. Moreover,
he refused to admit that the other two democratic elements mentioned
in the Crimea declaration were on a par with the Warsaw Poles. I
firmly rejected Molotov's arguments and stated that the United States
Government could not accept these contentions. I reminded Molotov
that at Yalta there had been considerable discussion on the wording
of the declaration and that the word "enlarged" as suggested by
Soviet delegation had been rejected and the word "reorganization"
  I added that no useful purpose would be served by trying to intro-
duce the word "basis" into the discussions and that the Crimea
cision should stand as written.
  Molotov introduced the point raised in his memorandum that not
all Polish Democratic leaders could be invited for consultation since
the members of the London Government who considered themselves
Democrats would thereby be included. Clark Kerr and I both made
it perfectly clear that neither of our governments had ever considered
37 See footnote 36, p. 179.

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