Page 1446

   VIII. JULY 27, 1953-FEBRUARY 18, 1954: POSTARMISTICE
                               ISSUES
KOREAN RECONSTRUCTION; THE DULLES TRIP TO KOREA AND THE
  MUTUAL DEFENSE TREATY; PRELIMINARY NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE
  KOREAN POLITICAL CONFERENCE-THE" DEAN MISSION; THE NIXON
  VISIT TO KOREA AND RHEE'S PROMISE NOT TO ACT UNILATERALLY;
  FORMULATION AND CONSIDERATION OF NSC 167 AND 170 SERIES; FAIL-
  URE OF THE DEAN NEGOTIATIONS; SOUTH KOREAN-INDIAN FRICTION
  AND THE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING NON-REPATRIATE POWS;
  BERLIN CONFERENCE AND THE SHIFT FROM PANMUNJOM TO GENEVA
Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file
         Memorandum by the President to the Secretary of State
                                        [WASHINGTON,] July 27, 1953.
Subject: Assistance to Korea
  As I see it, there will be many ways in which help, during the
coming months, can be rendered to the Republic of Korea.
  (a). We are committed to a policy of helping to train, equip and
organize at least four more divisions, and to give some help in organiz-
ing other forms of military-units.
  (b). The MSA Bill will contain some funds for direct help of that
country.
  (c). We expect the Congress to authorize the use of some two
hundred million dollars out of savings brought about by the cessation of
hostilities to help in economic rehabilitation.
  (d). With the cessation of fighting, there will be available in Korea
certain technical formations of the Army, Navy and the Air Force,
whose services as technical advisers, overseers, and in certain cases,
actual constructors of needed facilities, would be invaluable. The cost
will be little, because in any case we must maintain these troops in that
region so long as we must keep fighting divisions there. I speak of the
various classes of engineers, single [signal troops, quartermaster troops,
motor vehicle experts, medical organization, and so on. In many ways
help rendered in this fashion could be almost more valuable than under
any other authorization, and certainly will be important enough to
indicate at once the vital need for real coordination.
  I believe a way to secure coordination would be to put this whole
business under the authority of the theatre commander. Because of the
special political and psychological conditions existing in Korea, there is
added reason not only for doing this through a single office, but of
charging the military with this responsibility.
1446